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SUMMARY
This Thesis examines the nature and role of the pension funds in the United
Kingdom, in theory and in practice, from within and without, and from a
contemporary and historical perspective. The pension funds are considered via
a series of broad surveys, wherein each chapter may be regarded as a complete
study of its own. This is necessary to gain the insight into the behaviour of the
pension funds and their operational environment that enables a model of their
actual behaviour to be accurately constructed.
The earlier chapters—Chapters One to Four—examine the institutional
context of British pension fund activity, such as their historical development,
the role of financial intermediation in general, and the socio-legal environment
within which they operate.
The middle chapters—Five and Six—provide surveys of the literature on
investment portfolio theory and theoretical and empirical studies of British
financial intermediation. The latter tend to divide into two distinct approaches,
whose relative strengths we consider.
Finally, the remaining chapters—Seven through Nine—offer an empirical
view of the U. K. pension funds' behaviour over the period 1963 - 1985.
Chapter Seven considers the flow of funds through the pension funds, ie
sources and uses. Chapter Eight analyses the role of the pension funds in the
U. K. capital markets. Chapter Nine suggests a simple econometric model of
the investment behaviour of the United Kingdom pension funds based upon
the salient features from earlier chapters. In the final chapter we consider what
we have learned from the research of the other chapters, consider the
implications, and make suggestions for further research in the area.
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Chapter One: Ontroclaction
1.0 Introduction
It is fascinating to observe that each and every period of history has its own
characteristics. Indeed, if one pauses to consider the matter more closely we
find that these characteristics are determined by the changes that occur during
a given era. These changes may be in political and economic circumstances, or
in social attitudes, or even in technology, etc. One of the least noticed yet most
obvious changes which would appear to characterise the twentieth century
(especially the latter half) is the change in the life expectancy of an individual.
For although we are informed in the Bible that man shall live for "three score
and ten" years, it is only in the current century that these words have begun to
ring true. Current data on life expectancy in the United Kingdom is presented
in Table 1-1 below. As can be seen, the average life span of a man is currently
expected to be some seventy years whilst that of a woman is about six years
greater. That we are expected to live longer than our forebears is something
that we take very much for granted, but to what causes may we ascribe this
particular phenomenon? By and large, we may classify all of the contributory
factors under the umbrella heading of technological improvement: vastly
superior foodstuffs in both quantity and quality; ever-improving medical
knowledge and facilities; greater hygiene, etc. All of these and other factors
have combined to assist the individual to live a longer life. However, in this
study we are not so much concerned with the causes of longevity, nor do we
consider the question of its desirability; our main concern deals with one of its
major consequences, the provision of pensions.
The impact of the increasing longevity of the individual is very much bound
up with trends in other demographic factors. For example, in the OECD
countries (in particular) over the post-War period, while life expectancy has
been increasing the birth rate has been experiencing a long- term downward
trend. The result of this has simply been an increase in the ratio of the elderly
to the remainder of the population. Because the OECD countries typically
provide a retirement income to the older members of their population, a higher
proportion of older people places a greater strain on current national resources
than would otherwise be the case. A recent article in The Economist illustrated
this point very clearly. 1 Table 1-2 shows that, barring any unforeseen
catastrophes, the percentage of the population accounted for by pensioners
(those elderly who have retired from gainful employment) is expected to
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Table 1-1: Life Expectation in the U.K.
19
Male
31
Female
19	 81
Male	 Female
From birth 58.4 62.4 69.8 76.2
From age:
1 year 62.1 65.1 65.1 76.1
10 years 55.6 58.6 58.6 67.2
15 years 51.1 54 55.9 62.3
20 years 46.7 49.6 51.2 57.4
30 years 38.1 41 41.6 47.6
40 years 29.5 32.4 32 38
45 years 25.5 28.2 27.5 33
50 years 21.6 24.1 23.1 29
60 years 14.4 16.4 15.6 20.6
65 years 11.3 13 12.4 16.7
70 years 8.6 10 9.5 13.2
75 years 6.4 7.4 7.4 10
80 years 4.8 5.4 5.5 7.3
Source: Government Actuary's Department
Social Trends (January 1986)
Table 1-2: Number of pensioners as % of
the labour force
1985 2010	 * 2030	 *
U. S. 24 25.6 41.5
Japan 18.3 40.1 42.7
W Germany 29 40.8 63.6
France 31 39.5 54.6
Britain 30.3 28.1 37.6
Italy 27.1 33.6 46.5
Canada 16 22.6 39.4
* OECD Projections
Source: The Economist, June 14 1986, page 67.
increase over the next half-century. (This trend is a continuation of that of the
past fifty years or so.) The graphs in Figure 1-1 show what these increasingly
elderly populations mean for the debt-to-GNP ratios of the countries involved.
The dotted lines show the OECD's projections for debt-to-GNP ratios o ver the
next 25 years if governments maintain the non-interest part of their budgets as
a constant proportion of GNP. The solid line shows what is likely to happen to
public-debt ratios if the cost of state pensions automatically moves in line with
demographic changes, while all other expenditures and taxes remain constant
as a proportion of GNP. In virtually all cases the cost of providing pensions
can be seen to increase the ratio of debt to GNP, often quite dramatically. The
only exception here seems to be the United States where "...immigration and
higher birth rates imply favourable demographic movements." This example
gives us a very clear picture of one of the major macroeconomic impacts of
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pensions provision as undertaken in the OECD countries. Thus, the
importance of the role of pensions in determining other aspects of economic
and social policy cannot be overstated, and studies that examine any aspect of
the provision of pensions are possessed of dual importance. Firstly, they are
important in their own right, for the light they shed on the issues they examine
directly. Secondly, they are important for the implications they have for other
aspects of economic and social policy.
Figure 1-1: Net Debt-to-GNP Ratios in OECD Countries
France
Net debt-to-GNP ratios
1970-85 actual
1986-2010 projections
so.sowm.. OECD
Assuming no change in
pension costs
Taking account of
demographic changes 20 
471
Source: The Economist, (June 14, 1986) P age
 67.
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In this Thesis our major aim is to model the investment behaviour of the
pension funds in the United Kingdom. These pension funds, together with the
State-administered scheme, are the means by which British citizens are able to
provide themselves with an income during retirement; the two are in many
respects complementary. Therefore, we spend a considerable portion of this
Thesis on examining the history of pensions provision in the United Kingdom,
as well as the institutions relating to both pensions provision and investment
behaviour. Nonetheless, prior to all this there are a number of related
questions that need to be addressed, to which we now turn our attentions.
1.1 Why Study the Pension Funds?
To a large extent the choice of studying the pension funds reveals the
author's preference. It reveals a combination of both interest in the pension
funds and a belief that there is still something left to say about them. Certainly,
there are many economists who are interested in consumer behaviour but do
not pursue its study because (perhaps wrongly) they believe there is not a great
deal remaining to be said. The study of the pension funds should be seen as an
integral part of the study of the workings of the financial system. Traditional
(or classical) economic theory typically abstracts away from the problems of a
monetary economy. Little attention is paid to the notions of money or finance
in the average undergraduate course in (eg) microeconomic theory. And yet
we live in a monetary economy; indeed, one with a highly advanced financial
system. Money is itself an institution. It provides the vehicle by which most of
us conduct our transactions. As we shall see in Chapter Two, the financial
system has been built up around the core which is money; money is the centre
of the financial system. If we are truly to understand how our economy works
we must consider the workings of the financial system as an integral part of the
whole. In addition, Goldsmith (1969) has shown that there is a distinct
correlation between the level of financial development in an economy and its
level of economic development. There has been much debate on the direction
of causation in this relationship, and it is possible that the study of financial
institutions such as pension funds may shed some light on the issue.
Further reasons abound for encouraging the study of pension funds. It is
often suggested in both the press and the literature that the financial
institutions affect the transmission of monetary policy. In fact, it is usually
argued that they impede monetary policy, thereby reducing its effectiveness. If
this is the case then they are acting contrary to the objectives of the elected
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representatives of the population, ie, they are not acting in the public interest.
This point is hotly denied by those tagged with the epithet of 'strict
monetarists'. The fact that the pension funds are major purchasers of financial
assets, including those issued by the government, gives a priori credence to the
former viewpoint. Indeed, because the pension funds purchase such huge
quantities of government securities it could be argued that they may also
impede the effectiveness of fiscal policy by affecting the government's ability to
finance its activities. The study of the pension funds may help to throw some
light onto these issues too.
Other issues follow from this. Later in this chapter, as well as in later
chapters, we shall see that since 1945 (in particular) the financial institutions,
such as the pension funds, have increased their market share in terms of their
purchase of financial claims. If individuals are accounting for a decreasing
percentage of the quantity of financial claims issued in the United Kingdom,
then the implication is that the financial markets are becoming less competitive
and increasingly oligopsonistic, if not wholly monopsonistic. Traditional
microeconomic theory teaches us that a lower degree of competition results in
an allocation which is less efficient. This may have particularly undesirable
effects at the macroeconomic level. For example, suppose that the pension
funds decided to unload a particular security. Because they hold such large
quantities this is likely to cause a dramatic fall in the price of that security
which, in turn, may lead to a wave of pessimism and a general lowering of
security prices, engendering pessimism about the prospects for the economy as
a whole. The 80 point drop in the Dow Jones Index during the week following
July 4, 1986 was said to have occurred when the financial institutions (the
pension funds, in particular) started to take their profits following the slow-
down (or end) of the bull market of the previous twelve months. There is no
doubt that this lowering of competitiveness has the effect of increasing the
short-run volatility of the prices of financial claims.
The above argument can be taken and developed even further. For example,
according to Wolanski
There is a relatively small number of institutions which control the pension scheme
assets. For example, the largest 20 life insurance companies manage some two-
thirds of the total life office long-term funds. Similarly, there are probably less
than 25 banks, brokers and others which manage the bulk of externally-managed
pension scheme money and around 20 in-house managers looking after the
investments of the larger pension schemes. In all, this suggests that around 65
organisations control the major part of 'pension power' and that they are
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accountable to part-time trustees whom they might meet on a quarterly, or less
frequent, basis.	 (1979, pp.3-7)
Thus, although the pension funds' possession of such large quantities of
financial claims may not necessarily be a cause for concern, the fact that the
control of them is in comparatively few hands indicates a high degree of
market concentration and, therefore, power. This is particularly the case with
ordinary shares, where it is possible for the pension funds to wield a great deal
of influence on the commercial and industrial policy of the country by using
their voting rights at shareholders' meetings. This point is taken up by
Cuthbert and Dobbins (1980), and with some vehemence and detail in the
studies by Minns (1980) and Green (1982). Drucker (1976) considers the same
issue (with reference to the United States) but comes to a rather different
conclusion, which he summarises by coining the phrase "pension fund
socialism"; via the pension funds the people own (most of) the means of
production.
The influence of the pension funds on the industrial performance of the
economy has been noted on grounds in addition to the concentration of market
power they possess. For example, although it is often recognised that there are
imperfections in the capital markets such that it is more difficult for small
businesses to raise funds, it is also argued that this difficulty is furthered by the
investment policies of the large financial institutions, and particularly the
pension funds. Certainly there is an abundance of evidence, much of it
anecdotal, which implies that the pension funds are loth to invest in smaller
companies. The evidence from the pension funds' net acquisition data
indicates in no uncertain terms that they are not significant providers of
venture capital. Indeed, it was this point that was a major conclusion of the
Wilson Committee, who also acknowledged that there had been some
improvements in this area. Certainly the evidence of more recent years is that
this criticism of the pension funds has been taken to heart, and they now
exercise some degree of social responsibility in their investment behaviour,
although perhaps not enough to entirely please (eg) the Trades Union
movement.
It could be argued that all or many of these points could be considered by
studying any of the financial institutions, and not just the pension funds.
Nonetheless, there are several points against this line of thought. Firstly, it
should be noted that in a monetary economy the most important financial
intermediaries are probably the banks because of their role in facilitating the
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means of payment. But the study of banks does not lead to conclusions that
apply equally to all financial intermediaries. There is a great deal of difference
between the depository intermediaries (such as the banks) and the non-bank
financial intermediaries. For example, the latter play almost no role in the
means of payment within the economy. Additionally, they have typically been
subject to less stringent governmental regulation, affording them a competitive
advantage over the depository intermediaries. Having said that, then what
criterion makes the pension funds more worthy of study than any other of the
non-bank financial intermediaries? Perhaps the major reason that we shall see
is that the pension funds play a more dominant role in the financial system
than their sister non-bank financial intermediaries; they often purchase more
assets, or are more active traders. A second reason worthy of consideration is
that the purchase of the liabilities issued by a pension fund is much less the
subject of choice than the purchase of the liabilities issued by the other non-
bank financial intermediaries. How much choice did you have in deciding how
much to contribute to your pension scheme? How much choice did you
exercise in purchasing a life insurance policy, or putting your funds in a unit
trust or investment trust? The impact of the 'compulsory' nature of saving
through pension schemes on the aggregate level of saving is an important issue
that has still not been entirely resolved. It has been argued by (eg) Threadgold
(1978) that life assurance and pension fund saving is not neutral and, therefore,
acts to increase the aggregate level of personal saving. This argument is based
on the higher saving ratio experienced during the latter part of the 1970s
compared to the early 1970s and the 1960s. Both the theoretical issue of the
neutrality of pensions—ie, the substitutability of pension saving for other forms
of saving— and some U. K. empirical evidence is considered in Section 1-3.
A final point worthy of note here concerns the issue of the ownership of
pension fund assets. This was first brought to public attention some years ago
by Harbrecht (1959), who noted that
...pensions are no longer gratuities, although they are not yet considered the
property of the employees. The vital question at the moment is, therefore: To
whom do they belong? They cannot be said in any proper sense to be "owned" by
either the employer or the employee. In fact, no one actually "owns" them,
although at the present time many of the prerogatives of ownership are being
exercised by pension fund managers and financial institutions. 	 (1959, p.271)
It is interesting to note that today, almost three decades later, the issue is still
being debated, with perhaps the best study in this area being that by Bulow
and Scholes (1984) in the voluminous work on U. S. pensions edited by Zvi
Bodie and John Shoven. At the microeconomic level the issue of ownership
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presents problems for the balance sheets of employers who set up and pay
contributions to pension schemes. This has been considered in some detail by
David Fanning (1982a, 1982b), who concludes that employers need to take a
more active role in the management of pension funds in their own best
interests.
1.2 What is a Pension?
A glance at an English language dictionary reveals the etymological roots of
the word "pension" as being French from the Latin pensionem, meaning
"payment", from pendere meaning "to pay". The word "pension" itself is
usually defined along the lines of "a periodical allowance for past services paid
by the Government or an employer". A more lay definition of the word might
be "retirement income", or "income paid to persons considered too old to
work". Although this concept of a pension would seem to be fairly
unambiguous, it is a useful procedure to attempt to be a little more rigorous,
particularly in a work of this nature. Following Blinder (1983) we may care to
think of a pension (or a pension plan) as a bank account with several peculiar
characteristics:
(i) Workers usually cannot withdraw money from their accounts until
they have reached a certain age ('retirement age').
(ii) Workers usually cannot withdraw money from their accounts
unless they leave the firm (ie, they 'retire').
(iii) The amount of money that a worker may withdraw from their
account may depend on several factors in addition to how much
has been deposited. For example, it may also depend upon the
worker's life-cycle time patterns of both wages and hours of work.2
(iv) Upon retirement the worker is not allowed to close her account by
withdrawing the entire balance. Only a small fraction (sometimes
zero) can be taken as a lump sum upon retirement. Most
withdrawals take the form of annuity payments. Thus, the account
may be considered as tied to the purchase of insurance against
longevity.
(v) If a worker leaves his firm too soon, he may lose the entire balance
in his account. (If this is the case the pension has not yet become
'vested'). This may even be the case where the worker is changing
employer, in which the pension is said to be not 'portable'.
(vi) The individual worker typically has no input into the decision as to
how much is deposited into their account.
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As we shall see later on, although these six characteristics are not
attributable to each and every pension paid in the United Kingdom, they are
quite typical, and have some fairly obvious immediate implications. Firstly,
characteristics (i), (ii) and (iv) suggest that this peculiar type of bank account
(call it a 'pension fund') is uniquely suited to saving for retirement purposes:
the wealth accrued cannot normally be used for bequests (except for the
occasional transfer to a spouse); because of the limited access, it does not
provide the worker with precautionary balances, neither will it confer 'King
Midas benefits',3 ie, the utility normally associated with the accumulation of
wealth. Therefore, it is unlikely that private pension wealth can be regarded as
a perfect substitute for other (fungible) wealth. 4 A second point relates to
characteristic (v); this implies that pensions impose a cost of changing jobs that
would not otherwise exist. Pensions may be seen, therefore, as contributing to
labour immobility, something which is probably not accidenta1. 5 A final point
might be to suggest that characteristics (ii) and (iii) could lead to the distortion
of the life-cycle pattern of labour supply.
It is readily apparent from the foregoing that the six characteristics apply to
the private provision of pensions. Indeed, comparison of these points with the
details on the private provision of pensions in Chapter Two will confirm this
conclusion. Additionally, it should be noted that these characteristics are also
very largely applicable to the State-administered scheme, as comparison with
the details of Chapter Four will reveal. It would seem to be the case, therefore,
that there is a great deal of similarity between the private provision of pensions
and that by the State.
1.3 Why Pensions?
The obvious, 'though rather facile answer to this question is: to provide
individuals with an income during their retirement years. However, it should
also be noted that in the frictionless world of neoclassical economic theory,
where there are a complete set of efficient markets, pensions would simply be
irrelevant. That is to say, workers would be indifferent between receiving all of
their earnings now or having some fraction of their earnings deposited in a
pension fund; for every Pound accumulated in the fund the worker would
simply reduce his private wealth holdings by the same amount. Thus, it can be
seen that in such a world pensions would be (in a sense) neutral. The proof of
this 'neutrality of pensions' rests on five basic assumptions:
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(i) There is no uncertainty.
(ii) There is no government intervention in the economy. Thus, there
are no taxes, no government-imposed pension systems, and no
laws regulating the provision of (private) pensions.
(iii) Capital markets are perfect.
(iv) Every worker is paid an amount equal to the value of their
marginal product. Some of this is received now, in the form of
explicit wages (w), while some of it is paid as contributions to a
pension fund (p). Thus, w + p = marginal product.6
(v) There is no compulsory retirement, neither is it necessary to retire
to receive the pensionable benefits.
From the viewpoint of the firm, £1 in w and £1 in p are equivalent, the only
difference being that the former is paid to the worker while the latter is paid
into an account with the worker's name on it. Suppose that the worker will
retire at age R, and is currently t years of age. Thus, each £1 now paid into the
fund on his behalf will be worth (1 + r)R-t at retirement, where r is the rate of
interest. From the worker's viewpoint, with perfect capital markets and no
uncertainty this will be compared to £1 of current wages by calculating its
present value, which is precisely £1, of course.
To see that in this neoclassical world pensions do not affect savings we
compare two workers, identical in all respects with the exception that Ms. A
receives Wt in wages and has no pension while Ms. B receives w t
 in wages and
has pension contributions of p t. It follows from assumption (iv) that Wt = wt
 +
Pt in each year. So, while Ms. B is 'forced' to save a fraction of her earnings, pt,
each year, Ms. A can save as little or as much as she pleases. Ms. B would be in
the same position as Ms. A if she voluntarily withdrew an amount p t
 of her
personal savings each year, or borrowed it in the perfect capital markets at an
interest rate of r, paying it back at age R when she receives p t(1 + R)R-t by way
of pension, which is exactly how much will be needed to repay the loan. Thus,
given the assumption of free capital markets this cannot affect Ms. B's
behaviour, because in this world the desired pattern of consumption depends
upon the present value of lifetime income. Because each of the two workers are
receiving the same present value of lifetime income, the imposed pension
scheme will not affect the desired pattern of consumption. Put simply in other
words, non-pension saving will exactly offset pension saving on a pound-for-
pound basis.
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It can also be seen that in this neoclassical world pensions will not affect the
work/leisure decision nor the retirement decision. It is well known that utility
maximisation requires that the marginal rate of substitution between income
and leisure be equated to the wage rate (which, traditionally is equivalent to the
marginal product of labour). As we have seen, workers only consider the sum
w t + pt
 M their decision-making; they are not concerned with its division.
Hence, their lifetime labour supply pattern, including their retirement decision,
cannot be affected by the provision of pensions.
Obviously, the frictionless world of neoclassical theory is somewhat
removed from reality. If we are to answer the question "Why Pensions?" we
need to extend the theory to make it closer to the world we ourselves must
inhabit. If our theory is to serve any useful purpose it should be able to answer
the question under all circumstances; thus, it should not only be able to explain
why private pensions exist currently, but also why they were very few and far
between before the Second World War.7
1.3.1 Why Pensions Don't Exist
Under the assumptions outlined above we were able to show that both
workers and firms were indifferent among all combinations of w t
 and Pt,
providing wt + pt
 = constant. Graphically, this would give rise to indifference
curves such as the straight line AB in Figure 1-2 (a). This will not be the case if
the assumptions of the neoclassical model are violated. For example, consider
the case of imperfect capital markets. One of the major imperfections in capital
markets is when the interest rate earned by lending is less than that paid on
borrowing. Another imperfection is the denial of credit to those below some
lower (income) limit. We shall concern ourselves with the case of non-unique
interest rates.
Recall Ms. B from our earlier example. Suppose she now wishes to borrow
against the p t
 deposited into her pension fund. She must now pay an interest
rate r' which is higher than the rate at which the pension fund is accumulating
(r). Thus, she will owe p t(1 + 6114 when the loan comes due, but will only
receive pt(1 + r)R-t from the pension fund upon retirement. Thus, Ms. B cannot
duplicate the consumption pattern of a worker who has no pension, such as
Ms. A. This is bound to detract from the desirability of Ms. B having a pension.
Thus, we conclude that capital market imperfections can destroy the neutrality
of pensions. But, we should also note that this is not necessarily the case.
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It must be recognised that capital market constraints may not always be
binding. Consider the case where the 'forced' pension savings are less than the
amount which the worker would have saved anyway. Here the pension is
irrelevant. The curve ACD in Figure 1-2 (b) shows the indifference curve for
a worker subject to the borrowing constraints, such as Ms. B above. However,
to the left of C the constraints are not binding. The conclusion here is that as
the pension becomes larger the burden it places on consumption becomes
larger, and so the less desirable it becomes. Thus, small pensions may be
neutral, larger ones will not. For this reason, workers (in the course of
negotiations) will shun pensions that push them beyond C.
Against this, it should be recognised that capital market imperfections also
may increase the desirability of pensions. For example, (as we shall see in
Chapter Two) pension funds can achieve lower transactions costs and more
diversified portfolios than the individual. In fact, these capital market
imperfections are one of the major raisons d'etre of pension funds and other
financial intermediaries. So, when capital markets are imperfect, pensions may
cease to be a perfect substitute for private financial assets, but this need not
always be the case.
In the frictionless neoclassical world there is no need for pensions to be
vested, funded or even portable because of the assumption of certainty. If we
introduce uncertainty these factors come into play. Ignoring capital market
imperfections and assuming risk neutrality, how does uncertainty affect
pensions? First, pension assets assume three types of risk: the risk of death
before receiving benefits, the risk of bankruptcy before benefits are vested and
funded, and the risk of leaving the firm (quitting, or being fired) before benefits
are vested. Therefore, from the worker's viewpoint, the expected value of a E1
contribution will be some number X < 1. If firms have the same expectations as
workers then X will also represent the firm's expected cost of a E1 pension
contribution, in which case uncertainty does not interfere with the neutrality
proposition. This situation is shown graphically in Figure 1-3 (a), where AE
rather than AB represents both the worker's indifference curve and the firm's
isocost curve. Thus, to the worker pensions are less valuable than straight
wages, while the firm finds pensions less costly than wages.
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Suppose we now assume that workers are risk averse while firms are risk
neutra1.8
 Under this asymmetry firms still view X as the cost of a E1 pension
contribution, but now workers view its value as X. w = O7, where 0 < 1
represents a risk discount factor that increases with the size of the pension.
Graphically, the worker's indifference curves will be convex as in Figure 1-3
(b). Thus, the contract curve will correspond to the vertical axis, and the
optimal pension will be zero. 9
 Blinder takes this point a stage further by
relating it to his observations on the United States economy:
One of the outstanding facts of macroeconomic history is that the business cycle
has been far tamer in the postwar period than in the prewar period. The risk of
bankruptcy must therefore have been lower in the postwar period. It would not
surprise me if perceived bankruptcy risk fell steadily over the period, say, from
1950 to 1974. If so, then 0 was probably rising. If these surmises are correct, then
the principle reason for not having a pension plan was growing weaker over time.
This may be one factor contributing to the postwar growth of pensions.
(1983, p.13)
These stylised facts would seem to apply equally to the British economy over
the same time period. Indeed, it might also account (at least in part) for the fact
that many pension funds found themselves greatly underfunded during the
recessionary periods following both oil crises, when the risk of bankruptcy was
increased.
1.3.2 Why Pensions Do Exist
From the foregoing we were able to isolate some reasons why pensions
should not exist, and it would seem that these have been in some decline over
the course of the twentieth century, and particularly since 1945. We now turn
our attention to look for some more positive reasons why workers and firms
should desire the existence of pensions. One of the reasons cited for the growth
of pensions in Chapter Three on the history of pensions' provision concerns the
structure of taxation; how does this stand up to analysis?
Obviously, by placing a fraction of total compensation, pt, into a pension
fund, the worker can at least defer the payment of taxes on income. For
workers who have quite some time prior to retirement this amounts to a
considerable saving because it will accumulate at a tax-free rate of interest, r,
while savings in other (non-pensionable) financial assets only accumulate at an
after-tax rate of interest of r(1 - x ), where 'c represents the rate of income tax.
Thus, it can be seen that E1 of earnings that is taxed then placed in (eg) a bank
account will grow to (1- t )[1 + ra- t 0-1 at retirement. Compare this with El.
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placed in a pension fund and taxed when it is withdrawn (at a rate T . ),
giving a sum of (1 - T')[1 + r] 11.-t, which is obviously preferable. A second point
is that when the tax is finally paid at retirement no other taxes are due (eg,
payroll taxes such as National Income contributions, etc), and most workers
will be in lower tax brackets than they were during their best earning years.
Thus, for most workers < T, and consequently not only is the tax deferred but
also it is reduced. Blinder shows that these savings can be quite substantial by
considering various values for r, and R-t under the assumption that T . = -
0.10. We reproduce his findings here as Table 1-3.
Table 1-3: The Accumulated Value of VI Saved in a Pension Fund
Relative to that of E1 Saved Outside a Pension Fund*
Tax Rate:	 r= 4% r= 8%
Years to
retirement t = .20 t = .40 t = .20 t = .40
10 1.22 1.36 1.31 1.58
20 1.32 1.59 1.52 2.12
30 1.42 1.86 1.76 2.87
40 1.53 2.17 2.05 3.89
	* Computed as [1 - t + 0.111  1 + r	 	 R-t
1-t	 [1 + r(1 -
Taking the findings of the foregoing discussion into account, we find that
the worker's marginal valuation of a E1 pension contribution increases to X w =
k0X, where sample values for the tax factor, k, are shown in Table 1-3. Now,
since it is entirely possible to find k> 1 then it will also be the case that X,w > 1
for workers who are relatively young or in high tax brackets. Indeed, it is very
likely that Xw
 > 1. Thus, demand for pensions will occur whenever k0 > 1,
which will be the case when workers are subject to relatively high taxation and
are not particularly risk averse. 10
 Graphical representation of the optimal
pension is presented in Figure 1-4 (a). Previously, the worker's indifference
curves were as AD, but with the introduction of the 'tax distortion' they
become like AF. This is extended in Figure 1-4 (b) to present the resulting
contract curve, which no longer lies along the vertical axis.
Again, applying some stylised facts from history to the preceding analysis
we are able to arrive at some interesting explanations of the growth of pensions
provision in the post-War period. For example, Blinder notes that
Except for very high income workers, the tax distortions favoring pensions over
straight wages were negligible prior to World war II simply because the income tax
was negligible. ... In addition, typical marginal income and payroll tax rates on
Page 27
earnings have increased over the postwar period, thus exacerbating the tax
advantage.	 (1983, pp.15-16)
Blinder also observes that during the post-1945 period
...nominal interest rates have increased phenomenally. You can see in Table 1 that
the tax advantage of pensions is greater at higher nominal interest rates.
(1983, page 16. Table 1 refers to Table 1-3 below)
The reader will note that these economic circumstances seem to apply equally
to the British economy as to the United States economy. More detailed
confirmation can be found, once again, through the material covered in
Chapter Three.
In the foregoing we have been able to illustrate some of the reasons why
there has been a phenomenal growth in the provision of pensions in the post-
1945 period, which was not exhibited in earlier epochs of history. Blinder
(1983) takes this material much further by applying it to look at the various
implications of pensions provision. Among the issues he considers are the
impact of pensions on labour mobility, human capital development, savings
decisions, retirement decisions, etc, as well as the private-versus-public
provision of pensions debate. However, these issues do not fall within the
focus of this particular study, so let us now consider the impact of pension
funds on saving in the United Kingdom.
The importance of financial intermediaries in channelling savings into
productive investments is considered in detail in Chapter Two. However,
because the pension funds deal with funds of such a great magnitude, their
ability to affect the macroeconomic performance of the domestic economy via
their ability to affect domestic capital formation has become both an economic
and a political issue. In recent years the economies of several developed
nations, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, have
experienced quite dramatic reductions in their savings rates. While the savings
rate of the economy is usually fare for specialists and the financial press, the
declining savings rate has become a cause for concern of the "popular press".
The neo-classical view takes the position that savings precedes investment; in
other words, for an economy to experience growth via capital formation there
must first be resources which are not being consumed, ie savings. One
argument that follows from this is that if the pension funds employ their funds
abroad, it reduces the amount of capital formation that can occur in the United
Kingdom. This is not to suggest that if an economy has a high savings rate it
will automatically experience high levels of investment (capital formation); but
under this view it is the rate of interest that provides the equilibrating
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mechanism for savings and investment. The alternative approach—often
identified with Keynes or the post-Keynesians—takes the position that
investment precedes savings. Under this view an increase in the level of
investment will bring about increased Gross National Product which, in turn,
will call forth the increased savings. Here it is GNP which is the equilibrating
mechanism. This view applies to the monetary economies of the modern
world; it cannot apply to an economy in which the only means of financing an
investment is by the deferred consumption of real goods (ie, real savings).
However, in a monetary economy, an economy in which there exists credit,
investments can be undertaken without first deferring consumption, being
financed through the credit mechanism. Under each of these views of the
savings-investment process it is easy to see that there is a crucial role played by
the pension funds. Under the neoclassical view the pension funds provide a
repository for society's savings which they can then offer for use in financing
productive investments. Under the post-Keynesian view, by offering financing
at reasonable rate the pension funds can increase the economy's capital
formation leading to economic growth and increased savings.
What then are the effects of pension funds on the level for savings in the
economy? As we shall see below, the rigorous analysis of traditional
microeconomic theory suggests that there should be zero impact; individuals
would treat savings entrusted to the pension funds in the same manner they
would treat more discretionary savings. In one of the earliest studies of this
issue, George Garvy takes a slightly different view:
...there seems to be good reasons to expect that, on balance, the net effect of the
spread of private pension plans will by itself result in an increase in personal
savings, which, however, may possibly be offset to a small extent by a reduction of
corporate savings.	 (1950, page 226)
He goes on to elucidate the conclusion reached by James Duesenberry in his
Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior (1949), that the savings ratio
had remained fairly constant over lengthy periods of time despite rather
considerable changes in the institutional structure of the (U. S.) economy as
well as other cultural and social changes.
More recently there have been a few published studies examining the
influence of pension funds on the savings rate of the United Kingdom
economy. Thus, in his 1982 article, Francis Green uses a model of the life-cycle
hypothesis to consider
the portfolio response of individuals who have to join occupational pension
schemes as a condition of taking or keeping a job with particular employers."
(page 136)
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The results of Green's tests show that pension saving is not a substitute for
other types of saving, a result that he suggests is generally consistent with the
findings of Cagan's 1956 NBER occasional paper, The Effect of Pension Plans on
Aggregate Saving.
In his February 1982 NIER paper, "The Measurement and Behaviour of the
UK Saving Ratio in the 1970s", K. Cuthbertson is attempting to empirically
determine the factors which affect the saving rate in the United Kingdom.
Unlike the late 1980s, when commentators are worried about a low savings
rate, the early 1980s saw high savings rates giving cause for concern, concern
that the high rate would prevent or dampen economic recovery. From CSO
data Cuthbertson establishes that "committed saving"—ie contractual saving
primarily through life insurance and pension funds—accounts for the bulk of
United Kingdom saving, about 70 to 80 per cent. Typically during the 1970s
"committed saving" accounted for around 4 to 5 per cent of GDP, a figure
which remained fairly stable. Cuthbertson, therefore, attributes the rise in
personal saving in the late 1970s to increased discretionary saving. For
Cuthbertson then, because of the stable nature of "committed saving" it is
changes in the rate of discretionary saving that will bring about changes in the
general level of economic activity. From this we might deduce that, provided
the long-term financial intermediaries (insurance companies and pension
funds) maintain a stable long-run pattern of financial investment behaviour,
they are unlikely to bring about dramatic changes in the general behaviour of
the British economy. However, it should also be recognised that this stable
bulk of U. K. savings through the contractual financial intermediaries does
provide a stable flow of funds to the financial sector, that in earlier periods of
history did not exist. It might therefore be argued that the establishment of
contractual savings through life insurance and pension funds has played a
major role in the reduced business cycle fluctuations experienced by the British
economy since World War IL
In a more recent paper, Christos Pitelis (1985) examines the effects of
contractual saving on other savings in the U. K. economy. To a large extent this
paper brings together the elements of the Green and Cuthbertson studies. Once
again, use is made of the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) to test the degree of
substitutability between contractual and other forms of saving. Based on his
econometric evidence, Pitelis concludes that
Our results suggest that individuals do not take into account their contractual
savings ... when framing their consumption-saving decisions. This result is ... in
stark contrast to the implications of the LCH.
	 (page 227)
Page 31
Indeed, Pitelis finds that increases in the flow of funds into life insurance
companies and pension funds tend to increase other forms of saving on a one-
to-one basis. In other words, increases in the flow of funds to the contractual
intermediaries generally tend to increase aggregate financial capital
accumulation, but ceteris paribus may result in reduced consumption, reduced
effective demand and a "typical Keynesian unemployment equilibrium",
unless those funds remain invested domestically.
In summary, the evidence would appear to suggest that the British do not
regard their contractual and discretionary savings as substitutes, somewhat in
contradiction of neoclassical theory, and with important macroeconomic
implications. These are issues best explored elsewhere, so let us now move on
to an overview of the post-War growth of the pension funds in the United
Kingdom.
1.4 The Growth of Pension Funds
In Section 1.0 and Table 3-1 we have presented evidence that the life
expectancy of an individual has increased during the course of this century. If
an individual is living longer now than would have been the case in the past,
then he will require an income for a longer period of time than his counterpart
in previous generations. Consider for a moment the contemporary elderly
person; what are the means by which he (or she) might obtain such an
incremental income? The first option is for the individual to remain in
employment during old age, and continue to work for a wage or salary.
However, the possibility of this depends upon both the individual's ability to
work—old age often brings with it infirmity—and the attitude of society
towards the employment of the elderly. If, for either of these reasons, an
elderly person could not obtain employment then a second option is for his (or
her) family to keep him (or her). This option, however, depends upon the
goodwill of the individual's offspring, etc, which for various emotive or
practical reasons may not be forthcoming. A third possibility is that the elderly
individual had both the foresight and wherewithal to save a portion of his
income during his younger working days in order to finance his own
retirement. This option has been analysed above. The fourth and final option
is that the individual receives during his retirement years a pension from the
State (or one of its agencies) or from one of the many private schemes in
existence. In fact, this option is often nothing more than an institutionalised
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version of the third option, the individual using the State or a private pension
plan as the vehicle by which he saves to finance his retirement.
In virtually every one of the so-called developed countries as well as in a
goodly number of less developed countries (LDCs) the State operates a pension
scheme for which all citizens are eligible. In addition, an individual often has
the option of supplementing such a State pension by recourse to one of the
many privately-administered occupational pension schemes. It is also often the
case that the State pension offers an additional earnings-related supplement as
an optional extra. This seems to be the case in most of the countries of western
Europe as well as in the United States. In the United States (eg) the federal
government operates and administers pensions ("social security" in U.S.
parlance) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
In addition, there also exists a wide proliferation of retirement pension schemes
operated by employers, both in the private and public (ie, State, federal and
municipal) sectors, as well as by trades unions, fraternal associations, and so
on. Individuals have also been encouraged by the 1981 Reagan tax reforms to
provide for their own pensions by investing in an Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) such as offered by many banks and thrift institutions. 11 As we
shall see in later chapters, the system of pensions provision in the United
Kingdom is not unlike that of the United States. Likewise, the pensions
systems in France and West Germany are similar to that in the United
Kingdom, although the methods of financing pensions in those European
countries are quite different. We examine this issue in detail in Chapter Three.
Regardless of whatever country we shall be concerned with, or who is
responsible for the administration of the retirement income scheme, the
particular institutions responsible for the provision of pensions will be referred
to hereafter as pension funds. This is in spite of the fact that in many cases
there is not actually any fund in existence, as we shall see.
All things considered, the pension fund movement is far and away the
largest form of institution in the United Kingdom geared to consider the needs
and wants of the elderly. In fact, as the elderly have come to account for an
increasing proportion of the population, the pension fund movement has also
grown in size. Indeed, the increasing size of the pension funds has brought
them more and more into the public eye. In Figure 1-5 (below) we illustrate the
market value of administered pension fund assets over the period 1962-1984.
This data is shown for all three sectors (private, local authority, and other
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public) both individually and aggregated together. 12
 We can see that total
pension fund holdings of assets has increased from around £4 billion in 1962 to
over £190 billion in 1986. This upward trend in holdings seems to apply
equally to all three groups of pension fund. What is also noticeable from Figure
1-5 is that this growth seems to have occurred without fail in almost every year,
with the exception of those immediately following the first oil-price shock
(1974, 1975). 13
 This provides us with one rather dramatic view of the growth of
the pension funds in the last twenty or so years.
Figure 1-5: Market Value of Pension Fund Holdings
Source: CSO tabulations
The rise and growth of the pension funds, especially in the latter part of this
century, may be seen as directly attributable to the increasing population of
elderly people. However, it would seem to be the case that their growth has
been at an ever-increasing rate, outstripping even the growth in the elderly
population. Indeed, because of their growth from such apparent obscurity, it is
only in more recent years that we find the pension funds referred to as a
separate independent body of financial intermediaries in either the academic
liturgy or the financial press. Certainly prior to the 1970s the pension funds
would almost invariably be aggregated together with the insurance
companies. 14
 Nowadays they increasingly warrant mention as a separate
entity, even in the tabloids (the so-called 'popular press'). Consider by way of
example the urban riots in Liverpool and Manchester, etc, in 1981, and that on
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Broadwater Farm Estate, Tottenham in 1985. Following these disturbances
there were frequent calls made by government officials and the press for large
sums of money to regenerate the areas of inner city and urban decay; these
pleas went out to the "...large financial institutions such as the pension funds
and insurance companies." 15 Two of Britain's better financial journalists,
Hamish McRae and Frances Cairncross (1985), refer to the pension funds as "a
new barony". Like Blinder, they believe that a large factor underlying the
growth of the pension funds has been the tax structure (page 102). However,
they feel that the pension funds hide behind a legally-enforceable wall of non-
information that limits their accountability:
There is virtually no information about the size of most pension funds, their
investment policies or their performance. Read through the Yearbook of the
National Association of Pension Funds and you find that some funds give
considerable detail...Others...merely offer the name and address of their registered
office.
Worse, there are often no adequate figures on performance available to the
company's shareholders, sometimes even to the members of the pension scheme
itself.
The reason for this extraordinary lack of information is partly that legislation
has not caught up with the growth of the pension funds as an important part of our
financial system, and partly that there is no natural competition between the funds
to try to deliver improved performance. 	 (1985, page 106)16
They paint a picture of the growing power of the funds with a few well-chosen
journalistic anecdotes that are also intended to convey the impression of a low
degree of accountability:
The people who invest these enormous sums for the giant public and private sector
funds are—to put it mildly—not well known. They are honoured guests at
stockbroker lunches, for the business of a large pension fund has been immensely
profitable for the brokers under the fixed commission system. And they attend
City seminars on investment policy. But most of the time they remain incognito,
watching the millions roll across their desks and flow into investments around the
world.
On the rare occasions when they do appear in public, it is usually because they
intend to make waves. Ralph Quartano, the donnish chief executive of the Post
Office fund, will sometimes make a point in person at a shareholders' meeting.
When he does so, he invariably chooses his words carefully to make sure that his
views get maximum publicity; he was once a journalist himself. (1985, page 104)
Other examples abound:
The National Coal Board's funds... were managed by Hugh Jenkins.. .The Coal
Board's fund has occasionally made investments which have not been to the liking
of the National Union of Mineworkers, but independence from the NUM (or
indeed the NCB) was one of Hugh Jenkins' most fundamental tenets. The NUM
took the Mineworkers Pension Fund to court in 1983 to try to stop Jenkins
investing so much in the United States. It lost.	 (1985, pp. 104-105)
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McRae and Cairncross are not lost for examples. But all of this remains scant
and insubstantial evidence of the phenomenal growth of the pension fund
movement; rather it is a reflection occasioned by it. Let us proceed from here
and consider their growth in a more objective manner.
In an objective study of this nature it is important to see the growth of the
pension funds in some perspective, and to this end we offer two particular
angles. First, the growth of the pension funds should be seen as a response to
the increasing demand for their services by an increasingly aging population.
And second, the growth of the pension funds should be viewed as part and
parcel of the secular growth in the financial sector as a whole. Let us consider
these points in more detail:
1.4.1 Demographics
In Table 1-2 (above) we saw that in the United Kingdom in 1985 pensioners
accounted for some 30 per cent of the workforce, a figure in excess of that for
most other OECD countries. This figure represents the latest in a trend that has
seen an increase in the number of pensioners in both absolute and relative
terms, as evidenced by Figure 1-5 and the data in Table 1-4 (below).
Table 1-4:
Investment
Funds
£m
Total	 Total
Income Expenditure
£m
Employees
in schemes
£m
Number of
Pensions
m
1955 2,200 300 260 7.7 1
1965 8,000 1,400 700 11 2
1975 21,200 6,200 2,700 11.5 3.4
1979 53,000 13,550 5,450 11.8 3.7
1982 86,907 12,856 5,443 n/a n/a
1983 111,375 13,869 6,091 11.1 5
Source: The Money Observer, no. 1 5, October 1 9 8 1.
CSO tabulations	 Government Actuary's reports
We can consider the evidence offered by Table 1-4 in much further detail by
examining the data in greater depth. Firstly, consider the time-series data on
the age and sex of the population of the United Kingdom in Table 1-5, as
reproduced from the Annual Abstract of Statistics via the Wilson Report (1980).
These figures show that the growth in the number of elderly has been at a
slightly higher rate than for the population as a whole, and especially for the
workforce.
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Further evidence is offered by data from both the Wilson Committee and
the Government Actuary, which we reproduce here as Tables 1-6 through 1-7.
Although, as we have seen, there has been a rise in the number of people of
pensionable age, equally, their demand for pensionable benefits has also been
on the increase over the post-War period. Table 1-6 shows that the numbers of
active members (those enrolled and paying in contributions) of pension
schemes has risen from some 2.6 million in 1936 to 7.7 million in 1955 and to
over 11 million currently. This figure is expected to rise to almost 14 million by
the turn of the century. Similarly, the numbers of pensions being paid show an
upward trend, with some one million pensions being paid in 1955, up from
200,000 in 1936, compared to some five million currently. This is expected to
increase by some 500,000 by the end of the century. In addition to the
increasing numbers of pensioners, the Wilson Committee also believe that
The explanation of the growth in pension funds, and in the pension business of the
life assurance companies, lies largely in the improved level of benefits provided by
occupational pension schemes—almost all schemes in the private sector, as well as
those of the local authorities and most nationalised industries being funded. In
particular, there has been a steady increase in the number of employees whose
pension is related to their earnings at or near retirement, and there is an increasing
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tendency to make some provision for raising pensions after retirement to
compensate in whole or in part for the effects of inflation. 	 (1980, page 92)
The increasing trends in the number of pensioners, the number of
contributors, and the value of pensionable benefits manifest themselves in the
pension funds' balance sheets. By way of illustrating the growth of pension
funds via their balance sheets, Table 1-8 presents data on their income and
expenditure for selected years. Here we can see that between 1967 and 1982 the
pension funds' income rose from £1,745 million to £14,646 million, while their
expenditure rose from £935 million to £5,674 million. Similarly, in the four
years to 1986, income grew to £18,960 million while expenditure grew to £8,931
million, giving the pension funds a net growth of some £10,029 million during
1986.
Table 1-5: Population of the United Kingdom
millions
Sex Aoe 1955 1965 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2015
Men 15-24 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.3 3.7 3.6 4.3
25-34 4 3.5 3.9 4 4 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.1
35-44 4 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.3 3.4
45-54 4 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.2
55-64 2 3.1 2.9 2.9 3 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.2
65-69 1 1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.4
70+ 1 1.5 1.8 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
Women 15-24 3.3 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.1 3.5 3.3 4
25-34 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.4 4 3.8
35-44 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.3
45-54 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.7 4.2
55-59 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8
60-64 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6
65-69 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.6
70+ 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.5
Source: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions: Appendix (1980)
Table 5.10, page 539. Taken from
Annual Abstract of Statistics; Population Projections 1977-2017, prepared by the
Government Actuary, OPCS Series PP2, no. 9.
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Table 1-6(a): Employees in Pension Schemes, 1936-1983
(millions)
Year
Private	 Sector
Men	 Women
Public	 Sector
Men	 Women Total
1936 1.3 0.3 0.8 0.2 2.6
1954 2.5 0.6 2.4 0.7 6.2
1963 6.4 0.8 3.0 0.9 11.1
1967 6.8 1.3 3.1 1.0 12.2
1971 5.5 1.3 3.2 1.1 11.1
1975 5.0 1.1 3.7 1.7 11.5
1979 4.7 1.5 3.8 1.8 11.8
1983 4.4 1.4 3.4 1.9 11.1
Source: Government Actuary
Table 1-6(b): Employees in Pension Schemes, 1955-2000
(millions)
Private
Year	 Sector
Public
Corporations
Local
Government
Schemes
Total
Funded
Schemes
Non-
Funded
Schemes Total
1955 4.2 1.3 0.5 6.0 1.7 7.7
1960 6.0 1.4 0.6 8.0 1.8 9.8
1965 7.2 1.2 0.7 9.1 1.9 11
1970 7.0 1.7 0.7 9.4 2.2 11.6
1975 6.1 1.8 1.1 9.0 2.5 11.5
1980 7.0 1.9 1.1 10.0 2.6 12.6
1985 7.4 2.0 1.1 10.5 2.8 13.3
1990 7.5 2.0 1.1 10.6 2.8 13.4
1995 7.7 2 1.2 10.9 2.8 13.7
2000 7.7 2 1.2 10.9 2.8 13.7
Source: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions: Appendix
(1980), Table 5.8, page 538.
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Table 1-7(a): Pensions in Payment, 1936-1983
(millions)
Year
Private	 Sector Public	 Sector
Total
Former	 Widows &
Employees	 Dependents
Former	 Widows &
Employees	 Dependents
1936 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.2
1954 0.2 - 0.6 0.1 0.9
1963 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.2 1.8
1967 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.2 2.3
1971 1.1 0.2 1.3 0.3 2.9
1975 1.1 0.2 1.7 0.4 3.4
1979 1.2 0.2 1.8 0.5 3.7
1983 1.8 0.3 2.2 0.7 5.0
Source: Government Actuary
Table 1-7(b): Pensions in Payment (including widow pensioners)
(millions)
Private
Year	 Sector
Public
Corporations
Local
Government
Schemes
Total
Funded
Schemes
Non-
Funded
Schemes Total
1955 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.0
1960 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.6 1.5
1965 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.3 0.7 2.0
1970 1.2 0.5 0.2 1.9 0.8 2.7
1975 1.3 0.9 0.3 2.5 0.9 3.4
1980 1.6 1.0 0.3 2.9 1.1 4.0
1985 1.8 1.1 0.4 3.3 1.2 4.5
1990 2.1 1.1 0.4 3.6 1.4 5.0
1995 2.2 1.1 0.5 3.8 1.5 5.3
2000 2.3 1.0 0.6 3.9 1.5 5.4
Source: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions: Appendix
(1980), Table 5.9, page 539.
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1.4.2 The Secular Growth of Financial Intermediation
The growth of the pension funds as part of a secular growth of financial
intermediation per se can also readily be illustrated. The Wilson Committee
believe that the growth of financial institutions (since the Radcliffe Committee)
...has resulted principally from the substantial rise in personal saving, which has
been under way throughout the post-war years but has been particularly marked
since 1973.	 (1980, page 19)
They also make the following observations:
The changing pattern of saving within the economy over the past 20 years ... has
greatly increased the role of the financial institutions in transferring funds from
those in surplus to those in deficit. The amounts the financial institutions have
borrowed from and lent to the non-financial sectors of the economy have grown
substantially not only in money values but also in real terms. 	 (1980, page 65)
They illustrate this point with reference to statistics which we reproduce here
as Table 1-9. It can be seen that the flow of net savings to financial institutions
rose from some 5.5 per cent of GDP in the years 1958-1962 to over 11 per cent
in 1979. In absolute terms this can be seen as a rise from about £1.5 billion in
1958-1962 to £22 billion in 1979. A similar and more recent picture of the
secular growth of financial intermediation is presented in Figures 1-7 and 1-8,
where we can see the growth of many of the major financial intermediaries in
terms of their year-end holdings and their net acquisitions of (financial) assets
respectively. From Figure 1-7 we can confirm the almost monotonic trend of
long-run growth of the financial intermediaries since 1962. However, it is
noticeable that the trend for the investment intermediaries—the investment
trusts and the unit trusts—seems to be rather more volatile than that of the
contractual intermediaries—the insurance companies and pension funds. This
can be attributed to the fact that the contractual intermediaries are guaranteed
to receive savings from the public by contract (ie, pension contributions or life
insurance premia) whereas the savings that are channelled to the investment
intermediaries are more by way of voluntary actions on the part of savers. For
example, when the economy is in recession savers are more likely to reduce the
amount of savings they place with investment or unit trusts than to cease
paying premia on a life policy in mid-term; it is almost impossible to reduce
contributions to a pension fund, except in the case of redundancy.
RV' 4
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Figure 1-7: Year-end Holdings of Financial Institutions
(market values)
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Table 1-8: Income and Expenditure of Occupational Pension Schemes,
selected years
	 £ millions
1967 1975 1978 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Contributions: members
employers
346
920
1200,
3,150
1,800
4,500
2,183
6,613
2,250
6,806
2,288
6,894
2,451
6,749
2,603
6,585
Interest earnings (net) 480 1,850 2,700 5,850 6,593 7,939 8,763 9,772
Total Income 1,745 6,200 9,000 14,646 15,649 17,121 17,963 18,960
Pensions:
retired employees 570 1,540 2,350 5,110 5,675 6,410 7,080 7,987
widows & dependents 160 250
Other benefits & expenses (net) 365 1,000 1,400 564 741 783 946 944
Total Expenditure 935 2,700 4,000 5,674 6,416 7,193 8,026 8,931
Net growth of funds 810 3,500 5,000 8,972 9,233 9,928 9,937 10,029
Sources: Government Actuary
D. Fanning (1981) (1978 estimates)
Business Monitor MQ5, 1983.111, Table 8, page 6
Business Monitor MQ5, 1984.111, Table 8, page 6 (see Table 7-1, Chapter 7 for details)
Business Monitor MQ5, 1987.11, Table 15, page 7
Table 1-9: Domestic Intermediation by the Financial Institutions, 1958-1979
(additions to liabilities* to domestic non-financial sectors) (Per Cent of GDP at market prices
1958-62 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77 1978 1979
Banking Sector 1.1 1.8 3 3.1 3.1 3.6
Savings Banks
(investment accounts) 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5
Building Societies 1 2 2.8 3.4 3 3.1
Finance Houses 0.1 0.1 - 0.1
Life Assurance Companies
and Pension Fur ds 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.3 4.6 4.9
Unit Trusts 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
TOTAL 5.5 7.7 10.2 11.2 11.3 12.2
* Excluding issues of share and loan capital, a substantial but unguantified proportion of which is
taken up within the financial sectors.
Source: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions: Report
(1980), Table 15, page 65, from:
Financial Statistics and Bank of England
The same conclusion can be reached by considering the growth of financial
intermediation by looking at their net acquisitions over the 1962-1985 period.
Unsurprisingly, although this data shows much the same pattern of long-run
growth, the trend is rather more uneven in almost all cases. For example, the
building societies show quite dramatic decreases in their net acquisitions in the
years 1968, 1976, 1978 and 1981. Again, the contractual intermediaries seem to
be on a rather more stable growth path than their investment counterparts.
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By way of a brief digression, it should be noted that the growth of financial
intermediation is only partly attributable to an increasing savings ratio over the
post-War era. It is also partly due to an increase in intermediation per se. That
is to say, people choosing to place their savings with the financial inter-
mediaries rather than invest them directly. Perhaps the most dramatic and
easily obtained evidence relates to investment on shares. Figure 1-9 shows how
the percentage of shares held directly by individuals has decreased from 58 per
cent in 1963 to 25 per cent in 1983. At the same time it is readily apparent that
the percentage of shares held by the financial intermediaries has grown, and
combined with the increase in market capitalisation from £27 billion in 1963 to
£145 billion in 1983, this makes for a substantial growth in the quantity of
financial intermediation in the United Kingdom. These conclusions are backed
up by the data presented in Table 1-10 (below). Here we can see that the
pension funds increased their holdings of British quoted equities from a meagre
3.4 per cent in 1957 to a substantial 20.4 per cent in March 1978, and so on.
Although we do not present them here, similar patterns emerge in the markets
for almost all financial claims in the United Kingdom. By way of example, we
reproduce here as Figure 1-10 a series of pi-charts from de Moubray and Taylor
(1974), which provides an illustration of the growth of the pension funds
between 1930 and 1970. Further details on the growth of the pension funds are
presented and examined in Chapters Seven and Eight.
As with most economic agents, and particularly the financial institutions,
the individual funds that make up the pension fund movement vary a great
deal in terms of the number of members they have, the amount of funds they
control, and so on. To illustrate this point, Table 1-11 presents a breakdown of
the pension funds in the private sector by number of employees. In Table 1-12
we present a list of the (1980-1981) "Top Fifty" pension funds in terms of
market value of asset-holdings. These figures are not as comprehensive as they
might be, because in a few instances they relate to book value, due to data
availability. It is readily apparent that the pension fund movement is
dominated by the nationalised industries who fill eight of the top ten placings.
The best position that the private sector funds can manage is seventh, with
British Petroleum. Even in the top twenty only eight private sector funds get a
look in! (Although, with the division of the Post Office and the privatisation of
its telecommunications division, this 'League Table' probably looks a little
different today). To put the size of these larger pension funds into some kind
of perspective we note that the investment manager of the National Coal Board
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fund was responsible for some E1.5 million of assets in 1981; this was more
than the gross total assets of the National Coal Board itself, a situation that
reportedly still exists today. Similarly, according to The Economist,
the Post Office pension fund is so large that it could take over the conglomerate
Peninsular and Orient Steam Navigation, Vickers, and Pearl Assurance, with a
single year's cash flow, were all three for sale at their present stock market prices.
(November 4, 1978, p.11)
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Hire Purchase Companies (less than 1%) 	
Trustee Savings Banks (2%)
Friendly Societies
Building Societies
Nation
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Banks and
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Companies
1930
1
E 5,799 million
Lite Insurance
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Companies
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Investment Trusts (3%)
Sunerannuatinn Funds
1951 
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E 17,046 millioP
25%	 Life
	 41%
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£20,395 million1
National Savings Bank Investment Account (less than 1%)
Finance Houses (1%)
Special Finance Agencies (less than 1%) 	
Trustee Savings Banks (2%)
Unit Trusts * (2%)
Investment Trusts
Superannuation Funds
1970
E 87,825 millioq
*
Assets of Financial Institutions
Finance Companies (less than 1%) 	
Trustee Savings Banks --7
Friendly Societies
7 IN
National Savings
and P. O. S. B 2
Building Socii)tles
Including Property Unit Trusts
1 Source: The Growth and Role of U.K. Financial Institutions by David K. Sheppard. Methuen.
Excludes U.K. business of overseas banks, assets of investment trusts, unit trusts, private
trusts, superannuation funds and accepting houses.
2 Excludes accrued interest on National Savings Certififcates
3 Source: Economic Intelligence Department, Bank of England
Extracted from Strategic Planning for Financial Institutions, by
G. de Moubray and B. Taylor (editors), page xxix
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In March of 1979 the British Rail pension fund put a ceiling of £40 million on its
purchases of fine art-just one of the more widely-publicised assets in its
portfolio-shortly after the appointment of a new general manager, John
Morgan. At that time from their incursions into the art market they had
already purchased some 1,600 items costing around £28 million, the most
famous being "Still Life with a Dish of Oysters and a Bottle" by Jean-Baptiste
Chardin (National Gallery) and "Horses Watering at a Trough" by
Gainsborough (Kenwood House). Although these art purchases seem
substantial, it should be noted that they only accounted for some five per cent
of the fund's cash flow in any year. To illustrate this point a breakdown of the
holdings of the British Rail pension fund can be found in Table 1-13. One of the
major issues we shall be trying to resolve in this study concerns where these
percentages, and the absolute monetary values they represent, come from. For
example, why does the British Rail pension fund hold more than half of its
assets as equities rather than any other form of financial claim?
Table 1-10: Beneficial Ownership of British Quoted Equities
er cent
1-Jul 31 Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Dec. March 31 Dec. 31 Dec.
1957 1963 1969 1975 1978 1981 1984
Insurance Companies 8.8 10.0 12.2 15.9 17.2 20.5 22.0
Pension Funds 3.4 6.4 9.0 16.8 20.4 26.7 29.0
Investment Trusts 5.2 7.4 7.6 6.1 5.4 7.1 6.0
Unit Trusts 0.5 1.3 2.9 4.1 4.1 3.6 4.0
Banks 0.9 1.3 1.7 0.7
Finance, Stock exchange
and non-profit sector 4.4 6.1 10.6 6.7 6.6 2.2 2.0
Non-financial companies 2.7 5.1 5.4 3.0 4.1 5.1 5.0
Public sector 3.9 1.5 2.6 3.6 4.0 3.0 5.0
Persons, executors
and trustees 65.8 54.0 47.4 37.5 33.2 28.2 23.0
Overseas 4.4 7.0 6.6 5.6 5.0 3.6 4.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Capitalised market
values (£ mn) 11,600 27,498 37,850 44,600 72,420 92,000 200,000_
Sources:	 J. Moyle (1971)
Financial Statistics
Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (1978)
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Table 1-11: Scheme Coverage by Size and Sector of Employer, 1983
Sector
Contracted-Out
Schemes	 Members
Not Contracted-Out
Schemes	 Members
Total
Schemes Members
Private Sector:* (thousands) (thousands) (thousands)
1 - 12 7,400 50 63,400 390 70,800 440
13 - 99 8,250 460 7,500 280 15,750 740
100 - 999 2,320 960 470 180 2,790 1,140
1,000 - 4,999 385 800 110 220 495 1,020
5,000 - 9,999 75 510 10 80 85 590
10,000 and over 70 1,710 10 150 80 1,860
Totals 18,500 4,490 71,500 1,300 90,000 5,790
Public Sector: 180 5,310 - - 180 5,310
Totals 18,680 9,800 71,500 1,300 90,180 11,100
* by number of employees	 Source: Government Actuary
Table 1-12: The Top Fifty Pension Funds
(£ thousands, market values)
Post Office	 * £ 1,760,000
National Coal Board
	 * £ 1,486,792
British Rail	 £ 1,151,000
British Steel	 £ 1,100,000
Vauxhall Motors
Rolls-Royce
Ford Motor Co.
Allied Breweries
E
246,000
242,401
233,817
231,448
Electricity Supply	 * £ 991,224 London Transport 218,594
British Airways	 £ 751,000 British Aerospace 210,000
British Petroleum	 £ 717,040 Bank of England 200,531
British Gas	 £ 661,700 Civil Aviation Authority 200,000
ICI	 * £ 639,652 W. Yorkshire Metropolitan CC £ 200,000
Barclays Bank	 £ 626,323 Philips Electronics 194,000
Universities' Superannuation £ 622,850 Sun Alliance 186,000
Imperial Group
	 £ 615,000 Merseyside CC 166,200
Shell	 * £ 604,022 Esso Petroleum 165,000
National Westminster Bank	 £ 595,432 Courtaulds 159,000
Unilever	 £ 521,000 Tube Investments 148,328
Lloyds Bank
	 £ 426,511 Distillers 147,216
Merchant Navy Officers	 £ 369,000 Grand Metropolitan 144,900
Greater London Council 	 £ 365,000 Dunlop E 142,000
National Water Council 	 £ 347,823 IBM UK 138,000
BBC	 * £ 340,000 S. of Scotland Electricity 131,981
British Leyland	 £ 300,000 Lancashire CC 126,000
Greater Manchester Council 	 £ 299,420 S. Yorkshire CC £. 126,000
Strathclyde Regional Council £ 264,800 Kent CC 113,565
W. Midlands County Council £ 251,850 Tyne and Wear CC E 110,405
Reed International	 £ 250,000 Essex CC 107,400
* relates to book value only
Source: The Money Observer, no. 15 (October 1981).
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Table 1-13: British Rail Pension Fund Holdings at June 30, 1981
	 ( cY0 of total value)
UK equities	 56
UK property	 17
UK fixed interest	 13
Foreign securities	 9
Foreign property	 2
Works of art	 2
Cash	 1
Source: The Money Observer, no. 15 (October
1981)
1.5 The Wrap-Up
In this chapter we have presented an overview of some of the issues we
shall be considering in this Thesis. We spent some time considering the theory
underlying the existence of pensions, and briefly related it to some stylised
facts. We have also considered a large body of stylised facts relating to the
growth of the pension funds, and seen how this growth can be attributed to
increasing longevity and the growth of financial intermediation that usually
runs parallel to the economic development of a country. The illustrative
highlights we have just presented also bring to mind a concern which will
remain with us throughout this Thesis. It seems to be the case that most
pension funds do not publish any detailed accounts of their activities, either for
their members or for the general public. Although this is not true of all funds,
it does seem to be only the very large funds, and predominantly those in the
public sector, that publish anything that could begin to be described as
comprehensive. Although the pension funds have been taken to task on this
issue many times, not least by the Wilson Committee, it is only as of November
1, 1986 that they will be legally required to be more accountable, especially to
those who pay contributions. This improvement in the rights of contributors is
due to regulations embodied in the 1985 Social Security Act. Nonetheless, this
does mean that much-needed information cannot be easily obtained for a study
of this nature.
The major purpose of this Thesis is to investigate the factors which motivate
the investment (and debt, where relevant) behaviour of the pension funds in
the United Kingdom. From this investigation we would hope to construct a
model that quantitatively reflects this. It is a belief of this author that such
models are vital to understanding fully the complexities of the financial
economy in which we live. Its more practical considerations lie in the ability to
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analyse the various policy actions of the government, the way in which they
impinge on the financial institutions such as the pension funds, and the way in
which the actions of the institutions affect the policies instituted by the
government, and therefore our lives. We begin our investigation in Chapter
Two by taking a look at the methods by which a pension fund may finance and
organise its operations, as well as the role that they play in the economy. In
Chapter Three we take an in-depth look at the history of pensions provision in
the United Kingdom, with a special focus on the development of pension
funds. We trace out the development of provision for the elderly from the
"Poor Law" of Tudor England up to the present day system which attempts to
integrate schemes in both public and private sectors. Then, in Chapter Four,
we analyse the current position of pensions' provision in the United Kingdom
from both the legal and institutional aspects as embodied in the 1975 Act of
Parliament. In Chapters Five and Six we commence our move towards
quantification by surveying the literature: Chapter Five examines the literature
on the theory of investment decision-making; Chapter Six considers the
literature on modelling the investment behaviour of various financial
intermediaries in the United Kingdom. In Chapter Seven we analyse the flow
of funds through the pension funds in detail, and in Chapter Eight we look at
the role and position of the pension funds in the capital markets of the United
Kingdom. In Chapter Nine we construct and estimate our model of the
investment behaviour of the pension funds, and in Chapter Ten we draw all of
our findings and afterthoughts together by way of conclusion.
Chaptar One EncMotes
1 The Economist, June 14 1986, page 67. Further evidence on the aging of the population in the
United Kingdom is reproduced in Table 3-1.
2 For an elaboration on this see the definitions of defined benefit and defined contribution
pension plans in Chapter Four, page 4-8.
3 Blinder defines "King Midas benefits" as "...the power and psychological satisfaction that
some people derive from accumulation of wealth." (1983, page 5)
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4 If this point is true then we would not expect the level of savings for pensions' provision
(ie, contributions) to have much of an effect upon the level of savings for other purposes. In
other words, if there were an across-the-board increase in contributions levels to pension plans
we would not expect there to be a commensurate decrease in other forms of savings, ceteris
paribus. For further details and evidence on this point see (eg) Browning (1982) or Threadgold
(1978).
5 Employers, in particular, often use pensions as a means of attracting and keeping
employees. Certainly, in occupations where employers are undertaking the training and
educating their workforce, one way of ensuring that they will reap the benefits themselves is to
create hurdles that reduce the prospects of losing trained workers. The lengthy vesting of
pensions is such a hurdle. For further analysis see Blinder (1983), page 16 et seq.
6 From this it follows and is therefore implicitly assumed that pensions are defined
contribution and that the market for labour is a spot market.
7 The reader can confirm this for her- or himself by reading Chapter Three.
8 This is simply a strong form of the proposition that workers are more risk averse than
firms, a proposition that would seem to be borne out by observation.
9 Note that here the cause of the non-existence of pensions is not uncertainty, but the
asymmetric risk aversion of workers and firms. The literature on the organisation of the firm is
replete with reasons why such asymmetries might and do exist.
10 Note that the age of workers is likely to have ambiguous effects. For example, although
young workers tend to have a higher k, ceteris paribus, they are also likely to be at a farther
remove from the ages at which vesting and retirement occur, giving them lower A.
11 Perhaps the best study of pensions in the United States is the book Pensions in the American
Economy edited by Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Daniel Smith (1983). Also worthy of examination
is Alicia Munnell's The Economics of Private Pensions (1982).
12 The reasons for adopting such a disaggregation are manifold: in the first place, it makes for
much easier handling of the data, as this is the form in which it is found 'raw'. Secondly, as we
shall discover in Chapter Three, there is quite a lot of difference between private sector pension
funds and those in the public sectors. This is especially true of investment policy, where the
local authority and other public sector funds tend to adopt a more cautious approach than their
counterparts in the private sector. Other differences include the degree of participation;
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (1977) only two out of five private sector
employees belong to pension schemes while in the public sector the figure is as high as 75 per
cent. This division also reflects the historical development of the pension fund movement, as
highlighted in Chapter Three.
13 This point is elaborated upon in Chapters Two and Seven, in particular.
14 This is not entirely surprising when one considers the major role played by the insurance
companies in the administration and provision of pensions in the United Kingdom. See
Chapter Three for details.
15 Indeed, as Wolanski (1979) commented in his survey of pension fund investment:
...Last year could well go down in the history books as the year in which the
public was made aware of the enormous size and power of the pension funds.
With Sir Harold Wilson acting as their main publicist, there was more newspaper
comment about pension funds in 1978 than in previous years.
	
(1979, p.3)
16 Data pertaining to the availability of information to pension scheme members is presented in
Appendix 1-A.
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AppencliN 1-A:The Availability of Information to
Pension Schema Member% 1176
	 (thousands)
Schemes	 Private Sector Public Sector
Members	 Members
Detailed Rules:
	
yes	 14,130	 5,340
	
no	 150	 110
	
n/a	 60	 100
	
no answer	 9,160	 230
Trust Deeds:
5,300
	
yes	 10,320	 4,660	 1,210
	
no	 3,020	 580	 20
	
n/a	 680	 260	 4,070
	
no answer	 9,480	 280	 10
Annual Reports
	
yes	 4,170	 3,390	 2,200
	
no	 5,020	 1,160
	
n/a	 4,600	 920	 3,100
	
no answer
	
9,710	 310	 10 
Annual Accounts
	
yes	 5,120	 3,860	 3,370
	
no	 5,480	 1,180
	
n/a	 3,240	 390	 1,930
	
no answer	 9,960	 350	 10 
Actuary's Reports on
Valuations
	
yes	 2,500	 1,630	 3,590
	
no	 5,660	 2,750	 430
	
n/a	 5,660	 1,030	 1,280
	
no answer	 9,680	 370	 10
Information about
scheme investments
	
yes	 2,670	 2,300	 2,810
	
no	 4,710	 1,980	 630
	
n/a	 6,490	 1,170	 1,860
	
no answer	 9,630	 330	 10
Total Number of Schemes 1	23,500	 5,780	 5,310
and members
1 Schemes with 25 or more members
Source: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions,
Report, (1980), Table 48, page 321; reproduced from:
Occupational Pension Schemes 1975: Fifth Survey by the
Government Actuary, (1978) HMSO. (No similar table is published in
the 1986 Government Actuary survey).
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Chipter Two: Egodus Operanl
2.0 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to consider what a pension fund
actually does, and how they go about doing it. In this way we would hope to
be able to locate some of the major features which characterise the United
Kingdom's pension fund movement. As the reader will ascertain, this is by no
means an easy task, as there are numerous diverse ways in which a pension
fund might organise itself, and most of these seem to be currently in operation
in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, as we pointed out in Chapter One, 1 the
pension fund industry may be disaggregated into three sectors—private, Local
Authority, and other public sector—whose objectives and methods of
organisation tend to differ. Nonetheless, in spite of such difficulties it is
necessary, nay vital, that we locate those characteristics which appear to be
common to all (or, at least a majority of) pension funds if we are to succeed in
constructing a model that accurately represents their behaviour, as that is the
task of this paper.
It is with these thoughts in mind that we embark on this chapter by first
taking a look at the process of financial intermediation in general, the raison
d'etre of financial intermediaries, the manifestations they assume, and so on.
The latter part of this chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the methods
by which a pension fund may organise and finance its operations, such as Pay-
As-You-Go, funding, et cetera.
2.1 Financial Intermediation
2.1.1 Financial Intermediaries
The financial sector of an economy exists to fulfill an extremely important
function, that is the allocation of capital among alternative uses. It is through
the financial sector that the savings of one section of the economy are put to
good use as the investments of another section. It has also been suggested on
many occasions that the efficiency of the financial sector may influence the
overall consumption-versus-savings decision of the public, and therefore the
level of economic activity. But how do the component parts of the financial
sector—the financial intermediaries—operate to allocate capital among
alternative uses? And from where do they acquire this capital in the first place?
These are the issues with which we now concern ourselves.
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According to Herman E. Krooss and Martin R. Blyn, a financial
intermediary is defined as
...an enterprise whose assets and liabilities consist almost exclusively of financial
instruments. Su-h instruments would include loans and mortgages, stocks, and
bonds, bank deposits, savings and loan shares, insurance and pension contracts,
commercial paper, shares in investment companies, and so forth. The functions of
financial intermediaries are associated with "savers," and their assets tend to
define investors.	 (1971, p.3)
Such a description would appear to suit the pension funds in the United
Kingdom admirably. They continue:
Those who operate financial intermediaries do not produce or exchange goods.
They are not farmers, manufacturers or tradesmen. They deal in paper—in
evidences of debt and shares in equity. Consequently, it is easy for analysts to skip
over them in their models of economic growth. Economic growth is ordinarily
pictured as a process in which business entrepreneurs combine various amounts of
labor and capital on a fixed piece of land to produce as many goods and services as
they are able to. Financial intermediaries do not fit easily into this picture; yet few
would deny that their role is important. Nevertheless, most writers seem to
suggest that the financial system somehow adjusts passively to the needs of the
real sector	 (1971, p.3)
That we avoid such a myopic view in this paper is paramount; our analysis of
the function and role of financial intermediaries is best served by an initial
consideration of a very primitive economy, and then an historical look (at least,
schematically) at the different stages of development of a financial system.2
2.1.2 A Schematic History of the Financial System
Suppose that there were an economic system that had no financial assets at
all; not even money. In such a simple society—let's call it a primitive
economy—each individual (or family group) produces all they consume, and
consumes all they produce; they have no occasion to exchange the products of
their labours with others. The order of the day is self-sufficiency. Under such a
system the level of economic activity is very small, barely subsistence, and thus
there is almost no investment. This approximates to man's earliest existence on
the planet. Now, if we consider a slightly more advanced system in which
there is a small degree of specialisation in production, gains could be made
according to David Ricardo's "Principle of Comparative Advantage".3
However, under such a system the gains would be small owing to the
inefficiencies of the barter system, and especially the required 'double
coincidence of wants'. That is to say, if a fisherman desired furs, for example,
he must have fish to trade and then find a hunter who desires fish and has furs
to trade; they must then be able to come to an agreement as to how many fish a
fur is worth, and vice-versa. Historically, even under the most highly
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developed forms of barter there was no adequate means of storing purchasing
power. Thus such an economy would tend to have a very low level of
investment, and even that would probably be misallocated. To illustrate:
under a system witii no financial assets, any individual would be obligated to
invest in real goods whatever part of their current income was not consumed,
which is that individual's savings. 4 Thus, no individual could invest in excess
of their savings, there being no mechanism to finance such excess expenditures.
Additionally, no individual could invest less than their savings, there being no
financial assets in which to store such excess savings. Consequently, every
individual is forced to maintain a balanced-budget position, with their savings
being equal to their investment. This leads to relatively low levels of saving,
and hence low levels of investment, which inhibits the growth of national
product. Investment misallocation, therefore, is highly probable; some
investments with high expected returns will not be undertaken because a
single individual might be unable to finance such projects; other individuals
with excess savings would be `forced' to invest, possibly in projects with much
lower expected returns than are otherwise available. (Inventories of real goods
often carry a zero or negative return due to the opportunity costs of storage,
etc). This type of economy approximates to man's pre- and early biblical eras.
The first real stage of development can be seen as originating with the
general use of commodity money, such as cowrie shells, cattle, or the precious
metals such as gold and silver. Objects such as these developed into a
generally acceptable medium of exchange because of several attributes: their
ease of recognition and measurability, their scarcity, their portability, and, in
particular, their ability to retain their value, ie, to act as a store of value.5 With
a given object acting as a medium of exchange it became efficient to denote the
prices of goods in terms of that medium, and so the medium of exchange quite
naturally also became the numeraire, thus reducing the total number of prices
with which traders needed to be familiar. In addition, because this medium of
exchange possessed intrinsic value, it performed well as a store of value. Thus,
the medium of exchange can be seen to possess all three of the traditionally
defined functions of money: a generally acceptable medium of exchange, a unit
of account, and a store of value. However, even in such a world of money,
deficit-financing would not be possible. Economic units could now save in the
form of money balances, and the removal of the inefficiencies of the barter
system (especially the requirement of a double coincidence of wants for trade to
occur) increases the potential growth of the system. Suppose we increase the
sophistication of this system slightly by the introduction of government which
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issues money (legal tender, or perhaps "fiat money", that is to say money that
has no intrinsic value) when it makes purchases; what happens? As with
commodity money, individuals with promising investment projects can finance
in excess of their current savings by drawing down upon previously
accumulated money balances, while individuals with no currently favourable
opportunities could add to their money balances in the hope of better times yet
to come. By this method, investment misallocation is somewhat reduced, and
could be reduced even further by the pooling of accumulated savings by
groups of individuals wishing to undertake business on a 'partnership' basis.
Due to the increase in both savings and investment, output growth will be
generated, leading to an increased demand for money balances. Government
can satisfy such demands by the further issue of money which increases
government purchases of goods and services, ie, more resources are in the
government's hands. The government can either increase social capital (ie,
publidy-owned capital) or finance further private investment through transfer
payments. Either method leads to increased savings and investment and,
therefore, output.
The next major stage of the development of finance is when borrowing (and,
equally, lending) begins to occur. This allows individuals with excess savings
to lend their surpluses to those who desire to invest in excess of their own
savings. Thus, deficit-financing becomes possible by allowing individuals to
draw down on other people's accumulated money balances. The borrower
achieves this by issuing an interest-bearing financial claim to the lender in the
form of a bond, mortgage or loan; such claims are known as primary securities
because they are issued by the ultimate borrower to the ultimate lender. In
addition, savings are encouraged by means of the interest payment and even
further funds can be called upon for investment purposes. Nonetheless, the
issuing of a primary security is still very much dependent upon the existence of
a 'double coincidence of wants', albeit of a highly specialised nature. The
prospective borrower must seek out a lender who wishes to lend the same
amount and they must then agree on the price of the loan, ie, the rate of
interest. In this sense all loans are bilateral. Thus, although the issue of
primary securities is likely to increase the level of savings and investment, it
will not fulfill its potential without increased sophistication in the area of
distributive techniques. This should manifest itself primarily through the
broadcast of information to borrowers regarding lenders' asset preferences, and
vice-versa. Such a development requires the bringing together of borrowers
and lenders; we usually refer to such a congregation as a market. The
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development of markets in financial claims appears historically to have been
contemporaneous with the issue of primary securities. This development
greatly enhanced the desirability of primary securities to lenders because it
increased the liquidity of any such financial claim; the lender no longer needed
to hold the security until maturity. We can see, therefore, that the development
of distributive techniques raises the level of saving and investment by
increasing the marginal utility of the last pound's worth of financial claims to
the lender, and reducing the marginal disutility of the last pound's worth of
debt to the borrower. Such development also makes for increased allocative
efficiency by making different investment opportunities compete for the
available loanable funds.
There is also a second element to this development. The borrowing we have
considered so far still leaves the ownership of the real capital (physical assets)
in the hands of the borrower. The borrowing/lending process evolved further
when the administration of businesses could be divorced from its ownership by
the issue of equity securities. Lenders who obtained primary securities in the
form of equities were entitled to a share of the profits of the business without
having the problems of managing it on a day-to-day basis. With the
introduction of Limited Liability (incorporation), equity-holders' liability was
reduced to only that amount that they had subscribed in a business, thereby
making equities a far less risky venture than they might otherwise have been.
Because an equity implies ownership of physical assets, it also offers a good
hedge against inflation. As with the market for primary securities such as
bonds, the development of a market for equities, or stock exchange, further
enhanced the liquidity of lenders.
Thus far everything in the garden appears rosy, but the story is still some
way from ending. Certainly distributive techniques get primary securities
distributed efficiently from borrower to lender and from lender to lender, but
so far we have failed to take into account the fundamental conflict of objectives
between borrowers and lenders. In general, this conflict comes about because
borrowers prefer to 'borrow long' (ie, over a long period of time) while lenders
prefer to 'lend short' (ie, over a short period of time) so that both borrowers and
lenders reduce the amount of risk that they incur with the loan. It is to resolve
this fundamental conflict that we find the development of financial
intermediaries occurring. Financial intermediaries are institutions that place
themselves between ultimate borrowers and ultimate lenders by purchasing
the primary securities of borrowers and issuing claims against themselves to
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lenders; these daims are known as secondary or indirect securities. Thus, it can
be seen that debt is the stock-in-trade of the financial intermediary; in contrast
with the real assets that characterise the commercial or industrial firm's balance
sheet, the assets of intermediaries are mainly composed of paper claims issued
by non-financial borrowers. The margin between interest paid for loanable
funds (from savers) and interest rates earned on loans granted (to borrowers)
constitutes the intermediary's profits (or surplus).
The role of the financial intermediary is, therefore, two-fold: it eliminates
the need for borrowers and lenders to seek each other out, thereby eradicating
the 'double coincidence of wants' requirement; and, in addition, their existence
goes a long way toward resolving the fundamental conflict between borrowers
and lenders, this being via the issue of secondary securities that appear
attractive to lenders and by allowing borrowers to issue primary securities that
are well-adapted for their business requirements. Thus, like earlier distributive
techniques, the introduction of financial intermediaries raises the marginal
utility of the last pound's worth of financial assets to the lender and reduces the
marginal disutility of the last pound's worth of debt to the borrower. In this
way, intermediaries serve to raise the levels of saving and investment and to
allocate scarce savings optimally among alternative investment options. This
process is further enhanced by the fact that because intermediaries tend to
specialise in certain markets they are able to obtain information at much lower
costs than would be incurred by an individual due, eg, to economies of scale.
Other risks are also reduced by the existence of intermediaries; for example,
insurance companies provide 'risk pooling', while investment intermediaries
allow individuals to invest in more widely-diversified (and, therefore, less
risky) portfolios than would otherwise be possible. Nonetheless, again
following Krooss and Blyn, we need to recognise that the evolution and
development of the system of financial intermediation has not always occurred
smoothly:
It would be a mistake to imagine, however, that this process has been without
disturbances, an automatic response of the financial system to the needs of deficit
units. In most countries at some time, there have been long periods when the
financial system has failed to adapt itself to the needs of deficit units. While it is
legitimate partly to abstract from the problems of finance when we are looking at
the basic working of the macro-economy and to concentrate on the fact that saving
and investment are always identically equal, we should never forget that the levels
of saving, investment and income which are realisable depend on the development
of the financial system.	 (1971, p. 28)
Thus, it is conceivable that there have been periods of time when the excess
funds of some surplus units in the economy were unable to find suitable
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employment in the hands of deficit units due to the inadequacy of the system of
intermediation. This should hardly strike us as surprising as entrepreneurs
usually respond to the demands of consumers with a lag, usually to see if the
demands are transitory or more permanent. Such a lag is more likely to occur
in the financial sector where the ability to sell depends much more on the
confidence and trust of the public in the particular institution and its products.
The manifestations that financial intermediaries assume are usually
determined historically; they reflect the financial system's adaptation to the
needs of borrowers (deficit units), notwithstanding the fact that their needs are
not always immediately catered to. Thus, for example, when there is a great
demand for finance in order to build residential housing, we find the Building
Societies beginning to appear on the scene. There are three major types of
financial intermediary that are traditionally distinguished:
(i) depository intermediaries: the major characteristic distinguishing
depository intermediaries (or, in Bank of England parlance, "deposit-taking
intermediaries") is the high degree of liquidity of the liabilities they issue.
Basically, depository intermediaries borrow funds on a short-term basis, ie, on
a 'time' or 'demand' basis. In the United Kingdom the major depository
intermediaries are the clearing banks and the building societies. Traditionally,
the banks have been considered different from other financial intermediaries
because of their ability to 'create' money via the multiplier. This ability existed
because the liabilities issued by the banks have been considered to be a good
medium of exchange by the public, to the point that many bank liabilities are
now considered as being money rather than simply close substitutes. It is on
this foundation that the 1979 Banking Act distinguished between banks and
other "licensed deposit takers" (LDTs).5A This distinction has rapidly eroded,
partly as a result of the general climate of deregulation of financial markets that
occurred during the 1980s and partly as a result of the increasing moneyness of
(eg) building society liabilities.
(ii) contractual intermediaries: these intermediaries are those which issue
liabilities of a long-term or contractual nature. Thus, contractual intermediaries
borrow funds on a long-term basis under contract to provide benefits at some
point in the future. The major contractual intermediaries are the insurance
companies and the pension funds.
(iii) investment intermediaries: whereas the public will deposit their funds
with (eg) a bank to safeguard their liquid assets or with (eg) a pension fund to
safeguard their retirement income, funds lodged with investment
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intermediaries are there solely to increase future consumption possibilities, ie,
to be invested and increase the owner's wealth. The major types of investment
intermediaries in the United Kingdom are the investment trusts and the unit
trusts.
It is often the case in the British literature (and, therefore, British textbooks
on the U. K. financial system) to lump together the contractual intermediaries
with the investment intermediaries. This practice follows from the traditional
distinction between banking and other (the non-bank) financial intermediaries
in the United Kingdom. The separate categorisation of contractual and
investment intermediaries seems to be far more common in the United States.
In this Thesis, the latter approach is adopted because it seems to offer a more
realistic set of groupings of contemporary financial intermediaries in terms of
common assets/liabilities. It would seem to be the case that the liabilities
issued by the contractual intermediaries are in return for funds from savers on
a contractual basis; that is to say, there is an element of 'compulsion' attached
to the inflow of funds. If a payment is not paid into a life insurance company
or pension fund the saver is likely to find himself penalised heavily. With (eg)
a unit or investment trust, the saver is not usually subject to a commitment of
regular payments. However, because of the British practice, much of our
quantitative analysis in later chapters will compare the activities of pension
funds with those of both contractual and investment intermediaries.
In this paper our focus is on the pension funds, thus we shall largely be
ignoring depository and investment intermediaries. The scenario for the
introduction and development of pension funds is laid out in Chapter Three.
That a pension fund is a financial intermediary is surely beyond doubt; their
income consists primarily of the savings of individuals against which they issue
a secondary security in the form of a pension contract—a promise to provide
an individual's retirement income at some specified date in the future—and
this income is used to purchase both the primary and secondary securities
issued by both private sector borrowers and the various arms and agencies of
the government.
2.2 Pension Fund Operation
Before commencing a survey of the methods of organisation and financing
adopted by the various pension funds in the United Kingdom, it is worthwhile
to give some consideration to those organisations responsible for running
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pension schemes. By such an approach we may be able to shed a little light
onto the subject and locate common methods adopted by similar entities in the
running of pension schemes. In the United Kingdom there are (and, almost
always, have been) three basic categories of pension scheme operators: the
State, the employer, and all others. Let us now look at each of these in turn:
The first, and perhaps major, operator of any type of pension scheme is, and
always has been, the State. 6 As the governing power in the economy, pensions'
provision under any form of State-run scheme typically forms part of a much
wider system of social welfare benefits, or National Insurance as it is more
commonly known in the United Kingdom. The pensions provided under these
schemes are virtually under the direct control of the central government even
though they are usually administered through existing governmental agencies
such as the Post Office, etc.
The second operator of pension schemes is the employer who may be
thought of as providing 'deferred wages' in the form of a pension to retired
employees and/or their dependents. The employer in this category need not
necessarily come from within the private sector. Where the provision of
pensions is concerned, the employer is just as likely to take the form of a Local
Authority or perhaps even the State, either per se or in the guise of a
nationalised industry or Quango. 7 Nonetheless, this form of pension provision
is not usually directly controlled by the employer, but rather by some form of
Trusteeship set up by the employer.
The third and final category of pension scheme operators is the ubiquitous
"all others". This category is likely to include Provident Funds, Friendly
Societies, private schemes offered by the Insurance Companies, and so on. The
kind of pension provided by institutions falling into this category are for those
people who, acting as private individuals, wish to provide for themselves extra
income during the period of their retirement. This would be similar to an
individual providing for the care of their dependents in the event of their
untimely demise via life insurance. The manner in which institutions
providing pensions within this category tend to operate is very similar to that
employed by pension funds within the second category. Indeed, as we shall
see, many employers do not actually set up their own self-administered trust
fund, preferring instead to employ the already-existing facilities of (eg) the
insurance companies for pensions' provision.
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The workings of the State-run scheme, both in the past and currently, as
part of the wider system of social welfare benefits are covered in detail in the
following two chapters. In this chapter we shall be more concerned with the
methods of organisation and financing adopted by providers of pensions
within the second and third categories outlined above.
The basic idea underlying any form of pension is the provision of income to
an individual who, for various reasons, is considered to be above that age at
which work is a "requiremenr. 8 Such a person is said to be retired from work.
However, in order to provide such retired persons with a pension, a quantity of
money is required, ie, the pensions have to be financed. It is to the various
sources from which this financing may be obtained that we now turn our
attention.
2.2.1 Pension Fund Financing: Sources
If we ignore, at least for the present moment, any income by way of return
on investments, then any pension scheme will obtain the majority of its income
from contributions. 9 We find that there are three possible sources from which
such contributions may be obtained:
(i) contributions to the pension scheme may only be levied from the
employees, ie, that individual who (or whose dependents) will eventually
receive the pension benefits;
(ii) contributions to the pension scheme are paid solely by the employer for
the later benefit of the employees. This type of scheme is called non-
contributory as the beneficiaries are effectively not contributing to the scheme,
although in effect the employer may actually be deducting employee
contributions at source;
(iii) contributions to the pension scheme are paid jointly by both employer
and employee, although not necessarily to the same degree. This case is
probably the most common method employed by pension funds in the United
Kingdom today. Even under the current State scheme, both employer and
employee pay given percentages of the employee's wage/salary as National
Insurance contributions.10
Just as there are three possible sources of contributions, there are also three
possible methods of calculating the levels of such contributions:
(i) the contributions may be levied at a flat rate. Here contributors would
pay a given amount each week regardless of all other circumstances;
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(ii) contributions may be levied dependent upon salary range. In this case,
contributions will be levied at a given rate if the employee falls within a
particular salary range—the higher the salary range the higher the level of
contributions;
(iii) contributions may be levied as a percentage of salary. This is usually
the most common method employed, especially in schemes where benefits are
graduated to relate to earnings. For example, under the State scheme
contributions are levied as follows: 10 per cent of gross salary from the
employer and 6.5 per cent from the employee.
Having established that the inflow of funds to any pension scheme will
consist of contributions plus the return on any investments, we should now
turn our attentions to a consideration of the possible ways that such a fund may
be utilised. In other words, in what ways may a pension fund organise itself?
As we shall see, there are several major methods available, many of which are
currently in use, either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
2.2.2 Pension Fund Financing: Methods
The financing of a pension fund refers primarily to the regular inflow of
funds (other than investment income) that is required to enable the retiring
members of the scheme to receive their pensions and pay the administrative
costs of running the scheme.
(i) Perhaps the simplest way for any pension scheme to operate would be to
take in the current contributions from members, employers, etc, and from this
immediately pay benefits to existing pensioners, with any residual after
deducting administrative expenses being put into investments. Such a method
of financing occupational pensions is known as Pay-As-You-Go. It involves an
immediate transfer of savings from today's workers to provide retirement
incomes to today's pensioners.
(ii) The major alternative form of financing occupational pensions is known as
funding. In essence, funding is simply an institutionalised form of individual
saving. When the savings resulting from abstinence are put into a pension
fund, the "consumption later" will be as a result of the pension to be received.
Pension funding may take several forms:
(a) Investment Funding: Here, the fund which has been built up from
contributions, etc, is invested in assets outside the company involved. For
example, if the Marks and Spencer Pension Fund were investment funded, then
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it would not hold any financial assets issued by the Marks and Spencer
company, neither would it lease or rent any property from them. In other
words, the pension fund would be completely independent from its parent
company, except in the levying of contributions.
(b) Book Reserve Funding: this second method of funding is exactly the
opposite of investment funding, in that the fund is wholly invested in the
parent company. In effect, this approach means that there is not really an
actual fund being run by an organisation independent of the company, but
rather that the company operates and administers a pension scheme which it
finances simply by recording in its accounts a liability for pensions. Usually,
owing to the various tax reliefs obtainable, such a method means that a pension
fund has effectively invested in its parent company.
It is interesting to note that the book reserves method is most common in
West Germany, Pay-As-You-Go is most highly favoured by the French, while
investment funding is the predominant method of financing occupational
pensions in both the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This
begs the question as to why there is such a divergence of methods employed,
especially among the European countries? The most apparent reason for this
divergence appears to be the hyper-inflationary experience of both France and
Germany between the two World Wars. During this period, the investors of
these two countries saw the values of their capital funds eroded into oblivion in
a short period of time. This experience was not shared by the United Kingdom,
however. Moreover, around the turn of the century, the United Kingdom
possessed well-developed capital markets, vastly superior to those elsewhere,
and so the British financial intermediaries were more able than their foreign
counterparts to find suitable and adequate investment outlets with low risk
levels.
Before moving on to a critique of the various methods of financing
occupational pensions we have outlined, it would seem appropriate to point
out that beyond this chapter, very little attention (if any) will be paid to the
Pay-As-You-Go system; to quote Professor Jack Revell:
...we are concerned in this book only with those schemes which are funded, that is
which have funds equivalent to the actuarial liability invested in income producing
assets; unfunded schemes have no assets and cannot be counted as financial
institutions.	 (1973, p. 406)
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2.2.3 Pension Fund Financing: Evaluation
We have considered thus far three possible methods of financing operations
that are available to a pension scheme. In deciding which method to adopt, the
fund must take the following principal factors into account:
(i) the security of pension rights;
(ii) the cost;
(iii) inflation proofing;
(iv) demographic pressures; and
(v) savings and investment.
Many theoretical arguments can be found to justify adoption of each of the
three methods of financing the provision of pensions. However, despite the
evolution of various practices to meet some of the shortcomings of each
method, there still appears to be certain defects which emerge as an intrinsic
failing of that particular method. Therefore, we now consider each of the
methods by evaluating them in terms of the five criteria above.
(i) the security of pension rights: At the present time in the United Kingdom
there are about 65,000 separate pension funds. The principal factor behind
their development is the security of pension rights. With the vast majority of
schemes being investment funded, contributing members and existing
pensioners still have their pension rights maintained in the event of the parent
company being declared bankrupt or demising for any other reason. For those
who remain in the employ of a single company for the whole of their working
life, the investment funding method of financing occupational pensions
provides good security (notwithstanding the ravages of inflation).
Nonetheless, there are two major criticisms which can be levelled against the
the security argument: firstly, although it appears very reasonable on a micro
scale, when applied on a macro scale there would appear to be vast 'over-
insurance' against the prospects of bankruptcy; secondly, due to its highly
decentralised nature, the system in the United Kingdom has failed to guarantee
adequately the pension rights of those employees who (eg) regularly change
jobs, unless they are in the nationalised industries. This would appear to have
been one of the major factors contributing to the low level of labour mobility
among the British workforce. Under the current system—the Castle
schemell—much has been done to rectify this problem, although there is still
much more that could be done. Both the Pay-As-You-Go and book reserve
methods afford less security than the United Kingdom's investment funded
method of financing occupational pensions. Under Pay-As-You-Go, workers
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(and, therefore, contributors) are dependent upon the goodwill of future
generations for the provision of their pensions. On a micro scale, this might
well lead to problems if, for example, a company got smaller, or on a larger
scale if an entire industry experienced a decline. The French, who are the major
exponents of the Pay-As-You-Go system, try to combat these problems by
organising on a federated basis across industry groupings. This also helps to
ensure the pension rights of those mobile workers who change jobs more
frequently, as it is less likely that an employee would change industries when
changing jobs. Thus, the mobile worker tends to be protected by remaining
within the same federation. Nonetheless, the Pay-As-You-Go system still
depends wholly on the will and ability of future generations to pay.12
Under the book reserve system the problem of the security of pension rights
may be considered as a case of "putting all of one's eggs into one basket"! With
the fund effectively invested in the parent company, the cash-flow of the parent
company is greatly improved compared to that of (eg) a similar British
counterpart. However, especially from the viewpoint of the prospective
pensioner, there are all of the problems associated with non-diversification of
investments, but in West Germany these have been combatted by the setting up
of the Pension Security Institute (PSI). By paying a premium of 0.15 per cent of
its per annum pensions liability to the PSI, a company effectively insures its
employees' pension rights in the event of its own insolvency. On a macro scale
this would appear to be a more effective and logical method of safeguarding
the pension rights of workers. There are those who advocate this form of
organising pensions on the grounds that the extra benefits due to the improved
cash-flow experienced by firms (which improves their industrial performance
and thus their competitiveness over the longer term, enabling society to
provide better pensionable benefits) outweighs the increased costs imposed by
'self investment'. Evidence for this, however, remains scant and, at best,
anecdotal, relying mainly on the (dubious) argument that this form of
organisation of pensions' provision underlies the rather better performance of
the West German economy than that of the United Kingdom over recent
decades.
(ii) + (iii) the cost and inflation proofing: For obvious reasons the criteria of
cost and inflation proofing must, to a certain extent, be linked, and so we shall
consider them together. In a non-inflationary environment the difference in
costs between a funded system (such as that used in the United Kingdom) and
Pay-As-You-Go is partly one of time scale. In its early stages, a funded scheme
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will be the more expensive as the fund is being built up, but in the longer run,
it becomes cheaper as the advantages of compound interest, etc, bear fruit. This
would appear to contradict the currently popular misconception that, because a
fund must somehow be built up, the U. K. funded system is more expensive
than the Pay-As-You-Go system. However, let us look at what happens when
inflationary conditions prevail. It is entirely because both France and West
Germany have experienced hyper-inflation, and consequently, seen huge funds
of assets eroded away in very short periods of time, that they are against using
the funding system for their pension schemes. This is in direct contrast with
the U. K. experience. Such an erosion of capital values is a prime cause of the
concern that has arisen over the cost of funded pension schemes. With a Pay-
As-You-Go system, inflation per se is not so important because (for example)
1985 pensions are being paid for with 1985 pounds (£s) from 1985
contributions, rather than with pounds accumulated over a working lifetime
which are open to a high rate of depreciation.
Consequently the need for pensions to be inflation proofed has become one
of the strongest weapons in the armoury of advocates of the Pay-As-You-Go
system of financing occupational pensions. The ability of a funded scheme to
guarantee inflation-proof pensions depends wholly on the real rate of return
that the fund can obtain on its investments. In fact, as part of the Castle
scheme, the United Kingdom government is required to provide inflation
proofing once a fund's pensions are in payment up to the level of the
guaranteed minimum pension (GMP). 13 Nonetheless, with everything
considered, on a cost basis the Pay-As-You-Go system would appear to be
preferable, particularly under inflationary conditions.
(iv) demographic pressures: When considering the impact of demographic
pressures on the various methods of financing occupational pension schemes, it
is clear that the funded method enjoys a distinct advantage over its Pay-As-
You-Go rival. For example, if the population of a country were declining and,
therefore, the proportion of dependent old people increasing—as is currently
the situation in many western nations—then funding may be seen as a way of
levelling out the increasing cost of providing pensions. On the other hand,
Pay-as-You-Go creates an increasing burden on contributions, with a smaller
working population supporting an increasing population of the elderly. A
similar impact is, and has been, brought about by progressive reductions in the
average age at which retirement begins. Under a much more stable
demographic situation, such as where the age distribution of the population
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remains largely unchanged over time, Pay-As-You-Go would be far simpler to
operate than a funded system because no (actuarial) assumptions would have
to be made about future rates of return on investments, of retirement, of
inflation, and so on. Indeed, perhaps the major advantage of the Pay-As-You-
Go method of financing occupational pensions is that, even from its very
beginnings, it can provide pensions for existing retired people, and also that
improvements in benefits can be implemented and be immediately effective.
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that demographic pressures do exist such
that under current circumstances in the United Kingdom (the United States,
too) the funded scheme is at a distinct advantage over its Pay-As-You-Go
counterpart.14
(v) savings and investment: Although under many of the previous criteria we
have considered Pay-as-You-Go appeared to enjoy a measure of superiority
over funding as a means of financing occupational pensions, we find that when
it comes to the savings/investment criterion "the boot is on the other foot"!
Here we are looking at the overall economic impact of the way in which
pension schemes are financed. Contributions to funded schemes are essentially
additions to savings, and may be regarded as a transfer of resources between
the personal sector of the economy and the corporate and public sectors
through various financial intermediaries.15 The economic impact of pensions
will be largely determined by the nature and extent of the various transfers of
resources, but serious analysis requires a lengthy discussion which is more
purposefully pursued elsewhere in this paper.16 If a pension scheme is
investment funded then the contributions which go to make up the fund are
free to be invested in whatever is likely to yield the greatest return, ie, to be
efficiently allocated among competing investments. As is usually the case in
the United Kingdom, these funds are thus invested in a whole spectrum of
financial assets, property and so on. A funded scheme which operates along
the lines of the West German book reserve system has its 'contributions'
invested in the parent company. To judge which of these funded methods is
the more efficient, it is necessary first to determine whether or not the parent
company can internally generate a higher rate of return than it might obtain by
investing the fund externally; we have seen earlier in this chapter how 'self-
investment' might lead to a misallocation of resources. On a micro scale there
might appear to be little to choose between the two types of funding, as the
only effective difference lies in the mechanism for distributing the funds for
investment purposes, but on the macro scale it can be seen that, under a
savings/investment criterion, funding is much superior to Pay-As-You-Go,
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with investment funding being preferable to the book reserve method on
grounds of allocational efficiency.
At this juncture in the narrative, it is convenient to pause for a brief
consideration of those pension funds in the public sector. Most of these
schemes, which are usually operated by the Local Authorities and public
corporations, are funded and may therefore be incorporated into the overall
analysis of occupational pension schemes considered earlier in addition to
being separated out from the rest of public sector finance. However, there is a
small group of pension schemes within the public sector which are said to be
funded but essentially operate on a Pay-As-You-Go basis. These 'notionally
funded' schemes include the 'funds' for school teachers, National Health
Service staff, etc, and appear in public finance records by 'leading' the
difference between their income and outgoings; this appears as a receipt in the
public sector capital account. In the United Kingdom public sector there also
are a number of non-contributory Pay-As-You-Go schemes (eg, the Civil
Service, the Armed Forces, etc) and, as with all Pay-As-You-Go schemes, we
must regard these in a very different light to funded schemes. To recall once
again the thoughts of Professor Reve11, 17 a pension scheme which operates as a
Pay-As-You-Go system cannot in any way be considered as a financial
institution; its existence does nothing to enhance the savings-investment
process.
Che_par Two Endnotas:
1 See Chapter One, page six.
2 Much of what follows is based upon arguments expounded in the seminal work by J. G.
Gurley and G. S. Shaw (1960), Money in a Theory of Finance.
3 According to Ricardo's 'Trinciple of Comparative Advantage", even if one country (or
individual) has an absolute advantage over another country in the production of all goods, it
should specialise in the production of those goods in which it has a comparative advantage, ie,
those goods in which its production is least inefficient compared to other countries (or
individuals). Comparative advantage is usually measured in terms of lowest opportunity cost.
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It can be shown that if countries specialise in producing goods in which they have a
comparative advantage then total production will be increased. If trade then occurs some
countries will be made better off, with all being at least as well off as before. Coverage of the
Principle of Comparative Advantage, complete with numerical examples, can be found in
almost every textbook on the basic principles of Economics.
4 Although it is theoretically possible for the borrowing and lending of real wealth to occur,
it is unlikely to occur to an ^ignificant degree (eg, titles to real wealth are less easy to establish
legally than titles to payment of debt) and we may, therefore, ignore it for the purposes of our
analysis here.
5 According to Menger (1892) the main characteristic that creates a medium of exchange out
of any particular commodity is its high degree of saleableness (Absatzfahigkeit). Alchian (1977)
presents a similar argument, in that a commodity becomes used as a medium of exchange
because most people are 'experts' in that commodity; ie, their costs of acquiring information
about that commodity (its quality, etc.) are relatively low. Thus the medium of exchange
reduces transactions costs. Brunner and Meltzer (1971) present a similar line of argument. All
of these arguments can be seen at work in a very human way in Radford's famous article on the
organisation of a prisoner-of-war camp during World War 11 (1945).
5A This legal distinction was later repealed under the 1987 Banking Act.
6 See Chapter Three for historical details, and Chapter Four for an analysis of the current
position.
7 Quasi-Autonomous National Government Organisation. Basically an agency of the
government that is, to all intents and purposes, autonomous in its decision-making.
8 For example, medical, social, cultural, etc.
9 This is most certainly true of any new scheme, even without putting investment income to
one side.
10 See Chapter Four, page 4-4 and Tables 4-1 to 4-3.
11 See Chapter Four.
12 That :his might be a prol)lem can be seen by considering recent events in the United States
concerning its ERISA program.
13 See Chapter Four for a fuller explanation of this point.
14 See Chapter Three, especially Table 3-1.
15 There are some who might argue that contributions to funded schemes are really a hidden
form of taxation, because they are essentially 'compulsory'.
16 See Chapter Four.
17 See page 2-13.
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Chaptar Thras: A
	 HIstory	 ol	 tha
	 Pansion
ProvIslons Industry
3.0 Introduction
"On the evening of the twelfth of April, just as I was about quitting my desk to
go home, (it might be about eight o'clock), I received a summons to attend the
presence of the whole assembled firm in the formidable back parlour. I thought,
now my time is surely come; I am going to be told that they have no longer
occasion for me. L-, I could see, smiled at the terror I was in, which was a little
relief to me, when to my utter astonishment B-, the eldest partner, began a formal
harangue to me on the length of my services, my very meritorious conduct during
the whole of the time (the deuce, thought I, how did he find out that? I protest I
never had the confidence to think as much). He went on to descant on the
expediency of retiring at a certain time in life (how my heart panted!), and asking
me a few questions as to the amount of my own property, of which I have a little,
ended with a proposal, to which his three partners nodded a grave assent, that I
should accept from the house, which I had served so well, a pension for life to the
amount of two-thirds of my accustomed salary—a magnificent offer!"
In such a manner did Charles Lamb, in his essay "The Superannuated Man"
(1825) describe a scene that must have been common (although perhaps not the
outcome!) around the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It is a
mark of how far we have come in our thinking towards social welfare that
nowadays, unlike the subject of Lamb's essay, we regard the provision of a
pension as something of a norm; a right rather than a privilege. By way of
corollary to this norm lies public acceptance of the huge volume of funds
managed by the various pension funds in the United Kingdom, currently
estimated in excess of some £190 billions! Yet even a century ago—a mere
three generations—the provision of pensions was regarded as an unexpected
charitable gift, as so vividly illustrated by Charles Lamb (above). Pensions
were a luxury for a very few lucky individuals only, and the small handful of
pension funds that did exist at that time controlled but a mere pittance by way
of funds. One of the objectives of this chapter is to trace out the development
of the pension funds from their humble beginnings as local savings clubs to
their current position, when they control funds in excess of the GDP of many
small countries. * At the same time we shall be seeking to discover why there
has been such a radical alteration in public attitudes towards pensions over
such a relatively short space of time; indeed, even up to the Second World War
pensions were generally regarded as a privilege rather than a right.
* Hong Kong's 1991 GDP forecast is US$79.5 billion; for New Zealand US$41 billion (The World
in 1991). In 1985 the pension funds holdings were some £157 billion (Appendix A-1).
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It has been suggested elsewhere on many previous occasions that the
primary purpose of the pursuit of knowledge is to view the present in the light
of the past so that we may draw some conclusions about the future. In keeping
with this adage we shall, in this chapter, be bathing ourselves in the light of the
past prior to a consideration of the current position of pension funds in the
United Kingdom. We should then be in a position to construct a model of the
past and the present and, hopefully, derive some conclusions about pension
funds in the future.
As illustrated by the opening quotation to this chapter, the systematic
provision by employers for the retirement and old age of their employees is by
no means entirely a recent innovation, and has a very much longer history than
many people might imagine. It would probably be fair to date the origins of
pensions proper to the early Industrial Revolution years, although, no doubt,
there were probably one or two schemes around even before this time. When
one talks of pensions prior to the twentieth century, the reference is to
provisions made for the care and upkeep of the aged. Demographic data
shows that the proportion of the population considered to be elderly has been
increasing (by and large) since Mediaeval times, and at a phenomenal rate in
the current century. Table 3-1 (below) illustrates (for example) that the
proportion of the population of England, Scotland and Wales over the age of
sixty-five has increased from 5% in 1851 to 11.0% in 1951 and 15% in 1981. By
turning back the clock we hope to obtain some ideas of the response of various
institutions to the increasing needs of the growing population of the elderly
prior to our own experience.
For the sake of clarity, the history of pensions provision presented here has
been divided into six major eras, with the current situation being covered in
detail in the chapter following. In addition, at the end of the chapter there is an
Appendix in which the major developments in the provision of pensions in the
United Kingdom are presented chronologically, including brief details of some
of the more important legislation.
3.1 Scenario and Genesis
Before the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, any person who lived to an age that
we would now regard as old (say sixty-five) was indeed a rare exception.
Individuals constituting such exceptions would be totally reliant upon either
continued health and mobility during old age or the goodwill of their family to
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Table 3-1: Age	 Structure	 of	 the	 Population	 of	 England,
Scotland and Wales
(figures in thousands)
Age 1851 0/0 1901 % 1951 % 1981 '3/0 2001 %
0 - 4 2,720 13% 4,250 11% 4,189 9% 3,305 6% 3,899 7%
5 - 9 2,432 12% 3,980 11% 3,560 70x, 3,578 7% 4,214 7%
10 -14 2,231 11% 3,811 10% 3,199 7% 4,288 8% 4,232 70/0
15 - 64 12,466 60% 23,226 63% 32,575 67% 35,077 64% 36,093 64%
65+ 968 5% 1,734 5% 5,331 11% 8,139 15% 7,990 14%
20,817 37,001 48,854 54,387 56,428
Age Structure of the Population of England and Wales
(figures in thousands)
Age 1851 % 1901 % 1951 ok 1981 Ok 2001 %
0 - 4 2,348 13% 3,717 11% 3,718 8% 2,980 6% 3,542 70/0
5-9 2,092 12% 3,487 11% 3,162 7% 3,226 70/0 3,819 7%
10 -14 1,913 11% 3,342 10% 2,812 6% 3,858 8% 3,823 7%
15 - 64 10,743 60% 20,465 63% 29,241 67% 31,742 64% 32,799 64%
65+ 830 5% 1,518 5% 4,825 11% 7,413 15% 7,287 14%
17,926 32,529 43,758 49,219 51,270
Age Structure of the Population of Scotland
(figures in thousands)
Age 1851 % 1901 % 1951 % 1981 OA 2001 %
0-4 372 13% 533 12% 471 90/0 325 6% 357 7%
5-9 340 12% 493 11% 398 8% 352 7% 335 8%
10 - 14 318 11% 469 10% 387 8% 430 8% 409 8%
15 - 64 1,723 60% 2,761 62% 3,334 65% 3,335 65% 3,294 64%
65+ 138 5% 216 5% 506 10% 726 14% 703 14%
2,891 4,472 5,096 5,168 5,158
Sources: Mitchell, B. R. and Deane, P. (1962), Abstract of British Historical
Statistics, pp. 12-13.
Central Statistical Office (1980)
Winter, J. M. (1982), "The Decline of Mortality in Britain 1870-1950"
in
Barker, Theo, and Drake, Michael (eds.), Population and Society in
Britain, 1850-1980.
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provide for them in their twilight years. Of course, the social structure then
was very much different from that of today, especially with regard to the
family. Indeed, up until fairly recent times, it was not an uncommon practice
for the whole of the extended family i to live together as a single unit, both
socially and economically. Consequently, it was considered as a regularly
accepted practice for the care of, and provision for, the elderly to be
undertaken by their offspring and/or younger siblings. Cities then were much
smaller and less prolific than now, with people being very much tied to the
land by the Feudal system. However, for those elderly unable to fend for
themselves and having no offspring (or, for one reason or another, having no
contact with their families) there was no provision; they would remain as
vagabonds and tramps, outcasts from society, searching for some remnant of
food in somebody else's garbage—usually hopeless cases who died of neglect
and starvation before too long. Yet this was not a destiny reserved exclusively
for the elderly. With a much lower level of Gross National Product, and more
inequitable distribution of income and wealth than today, poverty was rife in
pre-Elizabethan England.
The economic policies of the immediate predecessors of Elizabeth I had left
the English economy in tatters. Successive debasements of the coinage2 by the
monarchy had hit Tudor England hard, resulting in both high inflation and a
high level of unemployment that left a large proportion of the population
'living' below subsistence level. The reforms instituted by Elizabeth I tried to
remedy the situation and alleviate some of the misery that had befallen such
large sections of the English populace. As well as outlawing debasement of the
coinage, (a longer-term 'monetarist' remedy?) the Elizabethans also brought
into being the institution of the "Poor Law". Part of the enactment of this law
was the creation of the "Workhouse", an institution whose sole task was to
provide its 'residents'—the poor, including the elderly poor—with (barely)
subsistence levels of nourishment and clothing for which they would, in
return, have to work at various tasks for an unbelievable number of hours each
day, often in sub-human conditions. Life in the Workhouse was indeed
wretched and often torturously hard, but nonetheless preferable to 'living' on
the streets—just!
Although a significant proportion, it is indeed fortunate that, at this time,
only a minority of the populace were afflicted by poverty and destitution, with
most people able to obtain enough employment to (at the very least) scrape a
living and prevent having to endure the misery of the Workhouse. However,
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even in those days of yore, it was realised that there was an age beyond which
an individual could not, or should not be required to work and yet would still
need the provision of an income. To reiterate, for centuries such provision had
been considered a family responsibility, but the times they were a-changing-
albeit slowly—with the Civil Service at the forefront of progress.
The first real recognition of the necessity of providing some form of income
to 'worn out' employees came in the late seventeenth century. Initially H. M.
Customs and Excise adopted a pensions system whereby any new recruit was
forced to pay one-half of his salary to his predecessor; a very crude form of
Pay-As-You-Go! However, the impracticability of this system had become
very clear by the eighteenth century. Indeed, those employees at the lower end
of the salary scale found this system rather overwhelming! In consequence, a
new funded scheme was brought into operation. All customs officers in certain
grades were charged a levy of 2.5 per cent of their salaries which went to make
up the fund. The contribution rate was fixed on a straight, Pay-As-You-Go
basis, although the burden was spread over the whole Customs and Excise
workforce. Nonetheless, as the ratio of pensioners to contributors increased (ie,
as more officers retired), the fund began to decline. This decline was initially
being subsidised out of Exchequer revenues. However, by the middle of the
eighteenth century the fund had become solvent and could be said to be on a
funded basis in the modern sense of the word, although not adequately
funded.
The scheme had spread slowly to other areas of the Civil Service, but by the
latter part of the eighteenth century it was in a chaotic state. Thus it was in
1785 that a Commission was set up with the object of enquiring into the "fees,
gratuities, perquisites and emoluments" of public office. Upon completion of
their enquiries the Commissioners reported that they found wide abuse of the
system of the payment of pensions. In particular, they had found pensions
being given as favours to favoured officers, mistresses and the such-like. There
was also little or no public accountability as to how the funds were spent. The
outcome of all this was the first Act of Parliament to concern itself solely with
pensions. The 1810 Superannuation Act made the pension scheme for Customs
and Excise officials non-contributory, with benefits payable by the Exchequer.
Three major motives accounted for the establishment of a scheme of this type
in the public sector: firstly, there was a desire to prevent abuse and corruption;
secondly, with the institution of pensions there was less reason to keep older,
inefficient staff in employment and so efficiency would benefit; and thirdly, it
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was believed that the attraction of pensions would greatly reduce staff
turnover, although this motive was not wholly adopted until the middle of the
century when the next developments took place.
In 1834 a second Superannuation Act was passed by Parliament. This Act
gave statutory definition to a non-contributory pension scheme for male Civil
Servants. Benefits of up to two-thirds of salary were payable at age sixty-five
after a qualifying period of forty-five years' service under the Act. However,
this was just the beginning, as further developments were in the pipeline. In
1859 the basis of the Civil Service scheme was altered with the retirement age
being reduced to sixty, and qualification for benefits changing to a system
whereby for each year of service an employee became entitled to a benefit of
1/60th of salary, subject to a maximum of 40/60ths.
With the central government paying pensions to its employees, it was clear
that this would be a practice that other employers would need to adopt if they
were to compete for labour services. Many Local Authorities were quick to
follow the Civil Service lead, setting up very similar schemes. And yet, it was
not until 1874 that a scheme for the Armed Forces was set up; 1890 for the
Police Force; 1898 for teachers; and as late as 1925 for the Fire Service. Not all
of the public servants' schemes—or statutory schemes, as they are formally
known—were established along the same principles as the Civil Service
scheme. In those cases where employees were paid directly out of the
Exchequer revenues there seemed to be no reason for not financing their
pensions in the same manner. Equally, there was no need for these schemes to
be funded on a "security of pension rights" grounds, as the security of the
pension was dependent upon the Chancellor's ability to raise taxes.
Following not too far behind the public sector in the provision of pensions
were a few of the more progressive concerns in the private sector (although
still a tiny minority). Originally, as in the public sector, these concerns gave
pensions on an ex gratia basis, ie, by employers acting in a spirit of benevolent
paternalism. 3 Those few pension schemes that did actually exist in the
nineteenth century tended to be confined to the banking and insurance
industries, and to the railway companies. Yet, for the poor, such as the
unemployed and especially the aged poor, the situation that had existed
during the time of Elizabeth I, still prevailed now, in the reign of Queen
Victoria. Indeed, things were perhaps worse as the public regarded the Poor
Law and the Workhouse as an immutable part of everyday life in England.
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3.2 The Victorian Era
The Victorian attitude towards poverty and the poor had been conditioned
by several centuries' existence of the Poor Law, as well as the prevailing moral
attitudes of the time. Thus, it would not be unfair to describe the Victorian
attitude as being a "Poor Law mentality"; that is to say, that because the Poor
Law and its attendant institution, the Workhouse, existed and had done so for
many, many years, they were accepted as being correct—the norm. To
compound this, the Victorian mores were such that poverty in old age was
widely regarded as being the result of moral laxity during a person's working
life; there could be no other cause! However, along with the Industrial
Revolution and its attendant new technology, there was thrown up a new
breed of social reformer determined to alleviate the misery and drudgery that
had been created as a side-effect of industrialisation. And these reformers
came from many different walks of life. For example, in addition to more
radical, predominantly academic reformers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, there were also more 'commercial' writers such as Charles Dickens
who would 'research' by living temporarily amongst the poor and needy, the
old, and the down-and-outs. Appalled by what they saw and experienced,
they would try to bring about changes by bringing these vile conditions—to
which the poor were subjected often through no fault of their own—to the
attention of the general public, usually via their written works. 4 These
publications, aimed at increasing public awareness of contemporary social
problems, would occasionally make people sit up and take notice, and
sometimes led to more 'serious' work being undertaken to help the
underprivileged and especially the aged poor.
Perhaps one of the more widely regarded authors of such serious research
was Charles Booth who, in the late 1800s, produced voluminous reports on the
prevailing social conditions in London. In his Old Age Pensions and the Aged
Poor, published in 1899, he exposed the Victorian Poor Law mentality as the
narrow-minded and self-righteous bigotry that it was. This exposé was
achieved by proving that, at the lower end of the scale, wages were so low as to
be insufficient for saving—below even the subsistence level described by Marx
and Engels (1848) earlier—moral laxity did not even enter into the issue!
However, as we have already seen, for those not on the bottom-most rung of
the socio-economic ladder, various pension schemes did exist, although these
were the exception rather than the rule. Consequently, Booth was prompted to
write:
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Everywhere a good deal is done for old servants. Their care is a recognised charge
on all industrial or commercial undertakings of character and long standing.
And also:
There are many old people in the receipt of industrial superannuation allowances
more or less charitable in their character, though very often given as an
acknowledgement and recognition of past services.
This would be a fair representation of the general nineteenth century view of
pensions provision—a benevolent charity on the part of the employer.
Although such charity had become a fairly widespread practice, the security of
any pension in the private sector relied solely upon the goodwill of the
employer. Of course, for many years the Guilds and Friendly Societies had
existed, organising collective protection against retirement as well as various
pension schemes to provide for widows. However, for the most part these
owed their existence to professional bodies of one kind or another, and did
little or nothing to alleviate the plight of the aged destitute.
Both the lack of security of pensions provision in the private sector and a
distaste occasioned by the system of Poor Law relief prompted Charles Booth
to become one of the first and most tireless advocates of national
superannuation—a State pension scheme. The type of scheme that he
envisaged did not embrace the principle of universality—ie, he did not
prescribe the automatic payment of an old age pension to all citizens. What, in
fact, he did propose was a State pension that would be available to all citizens
without the need for a plea of destitution or the possibility of commitment to
the dreaded Workhouse. He suggested the scheme be non-contributory,
financed out of general taxation, providing pensions of 7/- (35p) a week for
men and 5/- (25p) a week for women, both payable from the age of seventy.
Booth regarded a scheme of universal pensions as impracticable because it
would place such a burden on the Exchequer as to prevent an adequate
pension being paid to those who really needed it. He also rejected the idea of
contributions as he felt that this would give contributors the impression that
they had purchased the right to draw a pension, and also because he
considered that the advantage of financial savings would be outweighed by the
costs of collecting contributions and other administrative expenses. Booth
hoped to limit the payment of the pension to those who needed it by use of
social pressure, for he was most certainly not in favour of a means test. The
right to draw a pension at the stipulated age was to be the right of every
citizen, but Booth hoped that a man of means who actually drew the pension
would be regarded as an offender against the good will of the community.
Nonetheless, to bolster this he suggested that the pension be paid at a fixed
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time each week to the pensioner in person on attendance at the Post Office,
proxy payments being made only on production of a medical certificate of
inability to attend in person. The idea was that a lady or gentleman of wealth
would be ashamed to be seen entering a Post Office to collect their pension
whilst their carriage waited at the door.
Despite the fact that the work of Charles Booth and others was creating a
changing attitude towards poverty, especially during old age, British
politicians seemed slow to latch on to this newly emerging mood. Perhaps the
only exception was Joseph Chamberlain who, like Booth, produced a scheme
for the provision of old age pensions by the State. Chamberlain's proposals led
to the creation of a Royal Commission to look into the plight of the Aged Poor.
This led to a further enquiry, but Britain was already lagging behind
Bismarck's recently united Germany, where the Law of Insurance against Old
Age and Infirmity, passed in 1889, stood as a shining example of social welfare
for the rest of the world to follow.
In the private sector, things were now progressing just a shade faster.
Around the turn of the century, two notable large employers, Rowntrees and
Lever Brothers, set up their own private contractual pension schemes. This
should have been a spur for like-minded enterprises to follow suit, but it was
not until shortly after the first World War that private sector pension schemes
began to spread with any speed. However, throughout this period when
employers were beginning to establish formal pension schemes, premiums
paid by individuals towards life assurances or deferred annuity policies were
exempt from tax by statute while, on the other hand, the exemption of
payments of pensions by employers generally, and payments to pension
schemes in particular, had no statutory definition for taxation purposes, and
relied heavily upon their acceptance as trading expenses. In fact, this had been
the case ever since 1853, and intermittently before that but subsequent to 1799,
and may be regarded as one of the major factors which inhibited the growth of
private sector occupational pension schemes at that time.
3.3 The Early Welfare State
The increasing complexity of industrial life, the rapid growth of the Labour
movement and the Trades' Unions, and the example of the German experience
all provided a stimulus to the already-changing attitude of the British public
towards social welfare policies. In the private sector, as we have already seen,
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the disadvantages of a system which relied upon charity had been recognised
by a number of employers. Other continuing developments took place by
means of trust funds—schemes under which contributions were invested in
insurance policies—al Ed provident funds. The latter were usually financed by
joint contributions (ie, from both employee and employer), although some
were more in the nature of thrift clubs to which the employee was the sole
contributor. However, the benefits provided by these schemes were invariably
meagre, and usually took the form of a lump sum payable upon death,
incapacity or retirement. Despite their inadequacy, however, such schemes
were responsible for helping bring about enough of a change in public opinion
to allow David Lloyd George to introduce in 1908 the Old Age Pension Act as
part of an overall State programme of social welfare for the needy.
Immediately prior to the 1908 Act, the Local Authorities had been
providing poor relief at an average rate of half-a-crown (ie, 2/6d, or 12.5p) per
week to (about) one-third of the population above the age of seventy. Yet some
two-thirds of these poor relief recipients would be included under a present-
day definition of old-age pensioners. With Lloyd George's new law, a pension
of up to 5/- (25p) a week was to be provided to each person over seventy years
of age. But, against the earlier advice of Charles Booth, even this was subject to
a means test. With an average weekly wage of £1-10/- (£1-50p) at the time, it is
clearly obvious that the pension was still regarded as no more than a
'charitable' means of preventing absolute destitution—it was intended to
supplement whatever could be provided by other means, such as savings, etc.
The 'Poor Law mentality' still held sway.
A year later, in 1909, the Civil Service pension scheme was altered such that
benefits at retirement became a pension of 1/80th of salary plus a cash
payment of 3 /80ths of salary for each year of service, subject to a maximum
qualifying period of forty years. Simultaneously, a lump-sum death benefit of
one year's salary was also introduced. There can be no doubt that this latter
action, the effective commutation of part—approximately one quarter—of the
pension as a tax-free capital sum was a most outstanding development in the
field of pension schemes, and one which was to have important and wide-
ranging repercussions on future legislation and pension scheme thinking in
general.
In 1911, by which time the State pension scheme had been in operation for
three years, there were more than 900,000 recipients of the State pension and a
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total of 02 million was being paid out of general taxation. With this increased
burden on the Exchequer, and with an ever-increasing number of pensioners,
the need to finance the scheme outside of general taxation revenues became
greater. And thus, Lloyd George laid before Parliament a new Bill, which was
duly passed. Again, following the lead of Bismarck's Germany, a system of
National Insurance was set up. Under this system an obligatory deduction was
made from each person's wage or salary by way of a National Insurance
'premium' to provide cover against ill-health and unemployment. Although it
was not until 1925 that the National Insurance scheme was extended to cover
widows, orphans and old age pensioners, the 1911 Act was a landmark which
prompted further developments in other areas which enabled the private
occupational pension schemes to perform more efficiently and, at the same
time, made it more worthwhile for an employer to provide some form of
pension scheme for his workers.
In 1916 the Finance Act made certain provisions concerning pension funds.
Nonetheless, because of the First World War these provisions were not
consolidated until the Income Tax Act was passed in 1918. Under this latter
Act, limited tax relief was granted on premiums paid to secure either life
assurance benefits or deferred annuities under a bona fide pension scheme.
However, the scale of this tax relief, which is shown in Table 3-2, was subject to
various restrictions: for example, no allowance was given in respect of any
part of a premium paid towards an assurance securing a capital sum at death
which was in excess of seven per cent of that capital sum; if the contract was
for a deferred annuity, a further limit of £100 was placed upon the premium in
respect of which an allowance may have been claimed. It is interesting to note
that many of these restrictions were still in operation in the mid-1950s!
Table 3-2:
Amount of Annual
Premium
Part of Premium Qualifying for
Relief from Tax at Standard Rate
Up to £10
£10 - £25
Over £25
The Whole
£10
Two-fifths
Under the terms of the 1920 Finance Act, the operations of the 1918 Act
were extended to include certain widows' and orphans' schemes. Tax relief on
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premiums paid to secure widows' and orphans' pensions under a compulsory
scheme as a condition of employment was granted according to the scale
shown in Table 3-3. However, these developments were of relatively minor
importance unlike the changes that were about to unfold upon an
unsuspecting British public!
Table 3-3:
Total Income of
Contributor
Rate of Tax at Which
Relief is to be Allowed
Not Exceeding £100
£1,000 - £2,000
Over £2,000
Half Standard Rate
Three-quarters Standard Rate
Standard Rate
3.4 Between the Wars
Following representations made to it by interested parties, the Royal
Commission on Income Tax made certain recommendations in it's 1920 report
which were implemented in the following year's Finance Act. As the
Commission noted, there had been a gradual increase in the numbers of trust
fund types of pension scheme, under which system contributions, whether
made jointly or by the employee only, were invested under a trust, mainly in
trustee securities, of course! However, such funds did not enjoy any special
taxation privileges at that time and were, therefore, at a disadvantage in
comparison with insured schemes, under which employees' contributions
received some relief from tax. Section 32 of the 1921 Finance Act granted, inter
alia, that both employers' and employees' contributions be given full relief
from tax as allowable expenses. Furthermore, in cases where the fund was
privately administered, its investment income in the hands of the trustees was
freed from all liability to tax. However, in order to qualify for these
concessions, a fund had to satisfy elaborate conditions, mainly:
(a) that the fund was a bona fide scheme, established under irrevocable
trusts;
(b) that the sole purpose of the fund was for the provision of annuities
for members, or for their widows, children, or other dependents;
(c) that the employer was a contributor to the fund; and
(d) that both the employer and the employees were aware of their rights
and obligations in connection with the fund.
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The following year saw Parliament pass the Local Government and Other
Officers' Superannuation Act. This enabled Local Authorities to provide for
the superannuation of their employees if they wished to do so. Following so
closely behind the provisions of the 1921 Finance Act, there can be no doubt
that this further legislation helped to spread a general interest in pensions'
provision, and increasing numbers of properly constituted superannuation
funds came into being. Initially, it seemed that insurance companies could
play no part in the development of this budding industry, but some years later
it was established that the trustees could invest in deferred annuity policies
without affecting the employees' expense relief, provided that they had the
option and were not compelled to do so. This initial uncertainty, coupled with
the fact that, at the time, insurance companies were liable to tax on the
accumulated funds representing such deferred annuities, doubtless postponed
their entry into the pensions' provision industry.
While all of these major developments to improve the lot of those in
occupational pension schemes were occurring, there were, however, no similar
improvements in the pension arrangements for the majority of the elderly
population, ie those reliant upon the State pension. Their benefits were still
subject to the provisions of the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act and its 1911
amendments, but this was not to be the case for very much longer. In 1925
Parliament passed the Contributory Pensions Act, which extended the
coverage of the National Insurance scheme to include widows, orphans and
old age pensioners. This Act also introduced contributory State pensions for
manual workers and others earning up to £250 per annum. With pensions
increasingly becoming contributory in nature, the means test was discarded,
and with it the conception of a pension as a privilege faded; the pension was
beginning to acquire the status of a right. Fixed at 10/- (50p) a week, the State
pension was payable to each and every person above the age of sixty-five
years, irrespective of their contributions record. However noble, this system
would not have been able to work if it had been financed solely from
employers' and employees' contributions; a large subsidy from the Exchequer
was still required to make it viable. Once again, the relatively low level of
pension benefits indicates that, although the 'Poor Law mentality' had largely
been eradicated, the pension was still regarded as only a basic protection
against complete poverty and utter destitution—a safety net barely above the
ground!
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Worthy of note, but of not quite so much importance in regard to the
provision of pensions, was the Trustee Act of 1925. This defined the range of
investments permissible to a trustee in cases where no specific powers had
been authorised undei the terms of the trust. Nonetheless, the deed governing
pension funds usually incorporated much wider investment powers than those
specified in the Act.
With the alterations in the tax laws that had been passed in the early 1920s,
there had been an ever-increasing number of pension funds springing up in
both the public and private sectors of the economy. In response to their
growing numbers, Parliament passed the Superannuation and Other Trust
Funds (Validation) Act in 1927. This provided for the registration of pension
funds which might otherwise have been declared invalid owing to the rule of
law against perpetuities. As an alternative to registration, the Act gave
pension funds the option of including in their trust deeds a clause limiting
operations to a specific time period.
The next major landmark in the history of pensions' provision actually
occurred outside the United Kingdom, but did not take too long to catch on
here. This development was the introduction of the Group Life and Pension
scheme (to use its British title) in the United States of America. This type of
scheme was the first designed specifically to solve the problems of providing
pensions for a group of employees via the medium of insurance. And it was as
a result of such a scheme that the first major entry of insurance companies into
the field of pension provision occurred. The Group Life and Pension scheme
involved two separate contracts—one providing pension and the other life
assurance benefits. The most important advance afforded by this scheme lay in
the fact that benefits for a whole group of employees could now be secured
under a single master policy, issued by the insurance company to the
employer, whereas previously this would have taken the form of separate
policies in the names of the individual employees. Thus, the insurance
companies were able to make substantial savings in their setting-up costs, etc,
enabling lower premium rates to be charged, whilst employers could also
benefit by saving time and incurring less trouble.
Once an employer had decided to establish a Group Life and Pension
scheme, they could seek legislative approval along two avenues. Firstly, they
could seek approval of their pensions section as a superannuation fund under
the provisions of the 1921 Finance Act. This could be achieved by simply
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setting up the fund on precisely the same lines as a privately administered
fund, but also giving the trustees the option of investing in the purchase of
deferred annuities on the lives of members from an insurance company. This
would be in addition to the more usual investment powers relating to the stock
exchange, securities, property, and so on. Approval under the 1921 Act
ensured that any contributions by employees—and the Group Life and Pension
scheme was almost inevitably installed on a contributory basis—would be
allowed in full as an expense for taxation purposes.
The second alternative was for the employer to rely on the provisions of the
1918 Income Tax Act, allowing employees to claim the limited tax rebate
attributable to life assurance premiums on the amount of their contributions. If
this latter course of action were taken, then no specific approval of the scheme
was required. It is worth noting that the general tendency was for schemes for
higher-paid staff (ie, those earning around £500 per annum, or more) to be
approved under the 1921 Act, while those for lower-paid staff and works'
employees to be established under the 1918 Act. This was because it was
generally considered that the question of tax relief was of little importance to
those who paid little or no tax. A second factor related to any member who
changed his employment and wanted a refund of his superannuation
contributions. Under the 1921 Act, on such a refund, tax was liable at one-third
of the standard rate of income tax (this was later amended to one-quarter in the
1930 Finance Act). The relative merits of the 1918 and 1921 Acts for different
employee categories were fairly well understood by employers, and thus it was
not uncommon to find two similar schemes operating within a single
company—a 1921 Act fund for senior staff, and a 1918 Act fund for the
remainder. In essence, of course, there was no fundamental difference save the
tax relief on employees' contributions.
At this juncture in the narrative, it would appear convenient to consider
briefly a further facet of the private occupational pensions movement in the
1930s. From its early beginnings, the Provident Fund had altered very little,
except that quite a number were now instituted on the basis of insurance
policies—usually endowment assurances. For the Provident Fund, the use of
such policies was the only way in which tax relief could be secured for
employees' contributions because uninsured Provident Funds were unable to
claim tax relief under either the 1918 or 1921 Acts.
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In the latter part of the 1930s another type of pension scheme based on
endowment assurances began to gain in popularity. Whereas Provident Funds
were only concerned with providing lump sum benefits, the new type of
scheme carried a guaranteed annuity option at maturity. Thus, although under
the new scheme the benefits could be taken as a lump sum, the insurance
company underwriting the scheme would, at the time of the member's
retirement, exchange the lump sum for a pension based on a rate of exchange
guaranteed at the outset of the contract, if the member so desired. Known as
Endowment Assurance Schemes, they were almost always non-contributory as
they could not qualify for approval under the 1921 Act and, therefore, tax
relief for employees' contributions, because of the lump sum death benefit
which formed an intrinsic part of the contract.
In 1937 a further boost to pensions' provision came in the form of the Local
Government Superannuation Act. This made it obligatory for Local
Authorities to establish superannuation funds for all officials along specified
lines. The detailed operation of such funds came to be governed by
subsequent amending Acts and numerous prescribed Regulations.
And so, by 1938, in addition to the State scheme, pensions were being
provided by funds set up by the Local Authorities as well as by private
employers under various trusts and by the use of insurance schemes such as
Group Life and Pension Endowment Assurance. Yet despite the vast
improvements that had taken place between the two World Wars, the
provision of pensions was still sadly lacking. For example, there was still a
large proportion of the population not covered, and the benefits that were
payable under any scheme were nearly always unsatisfactory. In 1938 there
were 600,000 non-contributory pensions under the 1925 Act, with almost
twenty-one million people paying compulsory National Insurance
contributions, as well as an unknown number of people receiving benefits from
private occupational schemes. But it was not until the end of World War II that
we finally find a radical move away from the still-prevalent Poor Law
mentality regarding the provision of pensions.
3.5 The Beveridge Era
It would be a perfectly natural course of action to assume that no further
progress was made in terms of social welfare during the course of the second
World War, all government efforts being directed towards the hostilities.
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However, in June of 1941 the government of the United Kingdom set up a
Committee under the chairmanship of Lord (then Sir William) Beveridge. Its
task was to undertake a complete review and survey of all existing national
schemes of social insurance, and to make recommendations. The document
that this Committee produced a year later—the Beveridge report—suggested
what it saw as a rationalisation of the whole system of National Insurance.
Due to the War, these suggestions were not able to be implemented
immediately, but following the cessation of hostilities they resulted directly in
the 1946 National Insurance Act. Under the provisions of this Act, the means
test was finally abolished and the principle of universality instituted for all
social welfare schemes. All benefit levels (including that for old age pensions)
were raised so that all contributors to National Insurance were guaranteed a
minimum subsistence income as of right. The level of pension benefits were
fixed—initially at 26/- (£1-30p) for a single person, and £2 for a married
couple, payable immediately to existing pensioners, and to others after only a
short period of contributions. As can be seen in Table 3-4, periodic
adjustments were made to the level of benefits by successive governments,
mainly to keep pace with inflation, but also to provide for a slight
improvement over and above inflation. Payable at age sixty-five for men and
sixty for women, the pension took no account of need if the person had retired
from regular employment. If, however, part-time earnings in retirement
exceeded a specified amount, a reduction was made in the level of benefits.
The full pension was payable unconditionally at age seventy for men and sixty-
five for women.
There are those who see the recommendations of Beveridge as the late
bloom of the nation's social conscience following the traumatic horrors
inflicted during the Great Depression.
Table 3-4:
Date of Increase
Weekly Pension Increase for:
Single Person	 Married Couple
1948 26/- 42/-
1951 30/- 46/-
1952 32/6d. 54/-
1955 40/- 65/-
1958 50/- 80/-
Source: Pilch and Wood (1960) Pension Schemes
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Naturally, as the level of pension benefits were increased, so were the rates
of contribution. These rates were (and, indeed, still are) calculated by reference
to the actuarial figure required to produce the given pension at age sixty-five
for a young man commencing National Insurance payments at age sixteen.
This has usually meant that the value of the benefits provided under this
scheme have far and away exceeded the amount paid by any individual in
contributions, and, with every increase in benefits and contributions, this
margin was widened. Consequently, the cost of providing pensions under the
1946 Act was still being borne ultimately by the Exchequer out of general
taxation revenues. This was because, although the term "insurance" was freely
used in connection with the scheme, unlike an insured pension scheme, there
was no question of the member's contributions being retained and
accumulated in a fund to provide for his own benefits when he ultimately
retired. No fund as such was built up, except for those occasions when the
contributions paid in exceeded the pension benefits being paid out. Thus,
although possessing the appearance of a funded scheme, the "Beveridge" State
pension actually operated on a Pay-As-You-Go basis, with members' current
contributions being used contemporaneously to pay the pensions of those
currently retired.
With the adoption of the recommendations of the Beveridge report, Britain
became a Welfare State proper, finally dispelling the remnants of the Poor Law
mentality that still hung over from times past. During the late 1940s and early
1950s there existed a kind of 'official euphoria' due to the notion that, with the
institution of Beveridge, Britain led the world in the provision of welfare
benefits and services. Indeed, for a short time it probably did. However, by
the mid-1950s the United Kingdom had slipped some way down the Welfare
'League Table', mainly due to official complacency, political haranguing and
the relatively low growth rate of the United Kingdom economy, and so the
problem of poverty in old age still had not been adequately solved. Under
Beveridge, State pensions were only intended to provide a subsistence income,
the individual being encouraged to provide extra for himself by means of
private occupational schemes:
The principle of the scheme is to ensure for everyone income up to subsistence
level in return for compulsory contributions, expecting him to make voluntary
provision for any income that he desires beyond that. 	 (1944, p. 298)
In fact, as we have seen, both before the War and after there had been a
flourish of new occupational pension schemes, but there still existed a large
number of people whose only possible provision for old age was the State
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pension. For many people, and more particularly for salaried staff, economic
conditions in post-War Britain had changed completely, in many cases for the
worse. Higher rates of personal taxation had affected almost every section of
the community, but the burden fell most heavily on the professional and
managerial classes, and although it would be ludicrous to pretend that poverty
or actual hardship was the case, their differentials had certainly been squeezed
making them feel worse off. Relentless trade union pressure had brought
wage-earners a standard of living well above that of pre-War days, with wages
for unskilled labour being higher relative to prices than they had ever been
before, in particular. However, for the middle classes there no longer appeared
to be any margin between current expenditure and income after tax out of
which they could save for retirement. This represented an opportunity which
sympathetic managements were not slow to take. For, although salaries were
not as competitive against wages as they had been in pre-War days, employers
could at least make up this 'discrepancy' by funding in advance various
pension schemes. The very factor which had prevented the employee from
being able to save for his own retirement—namely, the higher rates of tax—
encouraged the employer to save on his behalf, since the whole of any
premium paid by an employer to a pension scheme was normally allowed as a
charge against profits for tax purposes. Consequently, the net cost of setting
up a pension scheme was proportionately less owing to the high rates of tax
prevailing at the time. On top of all this, the post-War period saw successive
governments pursuing policies designed to reach and/or maintain "full
employment" leading (sometimes) to an excess demand for labour. Thus, an
employer who could offer membership of a pension scheme as part of his
conditions of employment had a distinct advantage over his competitors; it
was generally recognised that a properly funded pension scheme represented
prudent finance and good business for the employer.
The increasing ability of many employees to save for themselves and the
correspondingly enhanced ability of employers to save on their behalf resulted
in an important shift of emphasis in the objectives of a pension scheme. Prior
to the War employers stressed that any pension scheme they operated was
intended to supplement, not replace, any private pensions provision the
employee had made for himself. After the War, many employers still openly
expressed this sentiment, whilst their pension schemes were actually planned
to operate on the assumption that they would provide substantially the whole
of an employee's income at retirement, apart from any entitlement under
National Insurance. Therefore, a new concept was gradually developed—that
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all remuneration could be divided into two parts: 5 the first, an immediate
taxable portion, sufficient to provide for current expenditure; and the second,
a deferred portion, to be accumulated free of tax to provide for a man's
retirement, or for his dependents in the event of his death. In other words, the
pension was coming to be regarded as "deferred wages", and the purpose of a
pension scheme was to spread a man's earnings over the whole of his life
rather than to confine them to his working years only. One result of this new
conceptualisation was a trend in favour of non-contributory schemes. This was
because contributions from employees could be more easily deducted at source
rather than clumsily going through the motions of collecting contributions.
With salaries adjusted, the whole of the cost of the pension scheme could be
paid directly by the employer. Nonetheless, even with these improvements, it
was still the case that the majority of the British population received nothing
but the flat-rate State pension, as many employers did not realise the
importance of pensions or did not possess the wherewithal to implement such
schemes.
In the latter part of the 1950s all of the major political parties came to
recognise the need for earnings-related benefits with regard to pensions'
provision. It was argued that if such a scheme could be established, then
pensioners would not have to suffer a sudden intolerable drop in their living
standards upon retirement, as had been the case in the past. The major
difficulty to overcome was to initiate a scheme that produced a satisfactory
marriage between the State scheme and the already strong and still developing
private occupational pensions movement.
3.6 Towards A Fully-Integrated Scheme
The first entry of the State into the provision of earnings-related pension
benefits—previously the sole domain of the private sector—came with the
passing of the 1959 National Insurance Act. Prior to looking at the provisions
of this Act it is interesting to note the background that led to its introduction.
As previously mentioned, the feeling in the mid-1950s was that the problem of
poverty in old age had not been adequately solved. Indeed, this was borne out
by the fact that about one-quarter of all pensioners at that time were also in
receipt of National Assistance. 6 As a result of this, in 1957 the Labour party,
then in opposition, published the booklet "National Superannuation", setting
out their plans for pensions were they to find themselves in office. These plans
included the provision of pensions of up to one-half of earnings, and threw out
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a political challenge which, rightly or wrongly, the Conservative government
felt obliged to meet. Their reply was the Boyd Carpenter scheme, the
embodiment of which was the 1959 National Insurance Act.
The 1959 Act set up a scheme whose effect was to superimpose on top of
the existing basic pension a system of graduated benefits and contributions,
both related to earnings. Both the additional contributions and the additional
benefits applied to those earning £9 or more per week, with those earning in
excess of 05 paying maximum contributions and receiving maximum benefits.
The scheme also gave companies the option of "contracting out" of the
earnings-related element of the pension if they themselves operated a
satisfactory occupational pensions scheme. Considered in this way, the Boyd
Carpenter scheme appears quite an attractive proposition and a definite
improvement upon previous arrangements. However, the 1959 Act (which,
incidentally, did not come into force until 1961) was actually more concerned
with improving the financial position of the National Insurance scheme rather
than with seriously assisting those not covered by occupational schemes. For,
although the new scheme was not insured or funded, in the strict sense of the
words, (as had been the case with all previous State schemes) due to the fact
that higher contributions were being used to pay out a maintained level of
benefits to existing pensioners, the element of Exchequer subsidy was very
largely removed. It is therefore possible, and wholly justifiable, to view the
Boyd Carpenter scheme as a politically astute vehicle for increasing
contributions without immediately raising benefit levels! At the time this was
considered a very important development as the cost of providing the State
flat-rate pensions had been rising considerably under increasing demographic
pressure.7 The simple method of reducing this burden would have been to just
levy higher contribution rates on better-paid employees, but to do this while
maintaining only a flat-rate pension would have been difficult politically,
especially for the then Conservative government. Consequently, earnings-
related benefits became a feature of the State pension.
Initially, the benefits under the Boyd Carpenter scheme were fixed at
extremely modest levels: for every joint contribution (contributed 50/50 by
employer and employee) of 05 for men and E18 for women the graduated
pension was 6d. (2.5p) a week, or £1-6/- (£1-30p) a year. In most cases this left
the pensioner below the levels of reasonable subsistence set by the government
via the Supplementary Benefits Commission, unless they possessed some other
means of support, which was frequently not the case. This was a situation that
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persisted for the best part of ten years, for it was not until the emergence of the
proposed "Crossman scheme" in the late 1960s that the government really
developed plans to significantly improve upon the Beveridge scheme.
Developed by the Labour party's Richard Crossman, upon publication his
proposals encountered virulent opposition from the growing private
occupational pensions movement. Their criticisms were manifold and harsh,
although in retrospect many of them appear justified as, in particular, the
Crossman scheme failed to meet the challenge of adequately marrying the State
scheme and the private occupational pensions movement. The scheme
proposed by Crossman was of a highly complex nature, and the private
pension funds felt unable to comply with its provisions which most certainly
would not have been in their best interests. In many ways the Crossman
scheme could be regarded as a nationalisation programme for the pensions'
provision industry. For example, under the Crossman scheme there was little
or no incentive for the member of an occupational scheme to "contract out" of
the State scheme. This would have created a problem for the already existing
private schemes, as well as imposing an increased financial burden on the State
if it was to take over what had previously been in private hands. However,
these criticisms soon became redundant when Labour was ousted from office
by the election of a new Conservative government in 1970, and the Crossman
scheme became another shelved set of proposals.
Although very much opposed to the proposals set out in the Crossman
scheme, the Conservatives nonetheless recognised the need for Beveridge to be
improved upon. So they set about developing their own plans for pensions'
provision which resulted in the "Joseph scheme", and was later passed into
law as the 1973 Social Security Act. The Labour opposition felt unable to
support this scheme, which was due to come into operation in April 1975, and
loudly voiced their criticisms. They felt that, in common with the earlier
Conservative (Boyd Carpenter) pension scheme, the Joseph scheme did not
provide adequate benefits for those who were not in private occupational
schemes and it also leaned a little too heavily in favour of the private pensions
movement. The Conservatives argued that the reason for the poor level of
benefits under the Joseph scheme was that it was intended to fund the State
Reserve scheme and, as this fund had to be built up from nothing, initial
benefits had to be set at very low levels. But, once again, before the Joseph
scheme could come into operation there was yet another change of
government, with Labour taking office once more in 1974. As they had
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promised in their manifesto, the incoming Labour government swiftly repealed
the Joseph scheme so that, by and large, the Beveridge scheme was still in
operation nearly forty years after its inception!
During the early 1970s the United Kingdom economy was in a state of
turmoil. Uncertainty was rife, and the twin evils of unemployment and
inflation were at unprecedentedly high levels, and on an upward trend. The
crescendo occurred in the winter of 1973, when the British public became
subject to a three-day working week, power cuts due to the electricity workers'
strike, lack of coal due to a mineworkers' strike, lack of transport due to a train
drivers' strike, and goods from bread and candles to toilet rolls in short supply.
This was all in addition to the four-fold increase in the price of oil and
petroleum products due to the embargo imposed by 0. P. E. C.8 With such a
vast number of problems to contend with (plus one or two others not
mentioned here) the government was faced with a quandary. Various
economic policies were attempted, both fiscal and monetary, but government
always seemed to come back to a favourite of the 1960s, the incomes policy.
Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to categorise the decade of the 1970s as
one of (almost) continuous incomes policies! One result of incomes policies
was that it became very difficult for companies to offer high wage
remuneration to attract labour or for trades unions to bargain for higher wages.
For, although unemployment was at a post-War high, there remained (as still
seems to be the case) a shortage of skilled workers of almost every description.
Inability to compete or bargain in terms of wages due to incomes policies
meant that the two sides of industry turned their attentions to collective
bargaining in terms of other attractions and inducements. The perks
(perquisites) of a job, such as a company car, longer holidays, etc, came to be
advertised with as much, and often more, prominence than the pay. Included
as one of the more lucrative perks were the pension arrangements. Indeed,
almost as a direct result of incomes policies, pension arrangements for
employees tended to improve dramatically, especially in the private sector.
Many firms that had not previously offered pension plans began to do so. This
was the final stage in pensions being recognised as deferred wages and, as
such, a form of remuneration that managed to remain outside the scope of
incomes policies. In fact, it was a rather dogged pursuit of incomes policy
against the will of the voting public that helped create the turmoil of winter
1973, and which led to the eventual downfall of Edward Heath's Conservative
government in 1974.
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During its time in opposition in the early 1970s, the Labour party had had
time to reflect and reconsider the Crossman scheme in light of the criticisms
that had been levelled against it at the time of its publication. They agreed, in
retrospect, that the criticisms had been justified and set about developing a
new plan for pensions provision. This culminated in the 1975 "Castle scheme",
which the Labour government adopted and won all-party support for;
something which had eluded all previous schemes. The Castle scheme
became law as the 1975 Social Security Pensions Act, which came into
operation in April 1978. The major details of this scheme, which is currently
still largely in operation, will be considered in the next chapter, but suffice it to
say here that the Act was primarily concerned with eradicating the ever-
widening divergence between the retirement incomes of those in good
occupational schemes and those in either poor schemes or no scheme at all.
This was achieved by the State offering a system of (optional) earnings-related
benefits set at more adequate levels than before, without harming or infringing
upon the domain of the private occupational pensions movement. Developed
by the late Brian O'Malley (minister responsible for pensions under Barbara
Castle), the 1978 Act represented a genuine compromise between a State
scheme and the private sector schemes, and the much sought after
improvement upon Beveridge.
By way of conclusion, the reader will no doubt have noticed that the Civil
Service pension scheme has not been deemed worthy of mention for quite
some time; indeed, since 1859! In fact, since the 1834 and 1859 Superannuation
Acts this scheme has remained largely unchanged up to the present day, except
for minor refinements such as the 1909 Act introducing death benefits, the 1949
Act granting widows' pensions, and various pensions' increases Acts,
particularly the 1971 Act, which index-linked the Civil Service pension to
protect it against the ravages of inflation.
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Chapter Three Erndnotas:
1 That is to say, a family spanning about three generations on average, and probably
including 'horizontal' relatives, such as siblings of the head of household, etc.
2 A favourite policy of (eg) Henry VIII to finance his marital proclivities. Debasement of the
coinage occurred when the government (usually the monarch) tried to extend their seigniorage
by creating a larger nominal money supply by reducing the purity of the precious metal (gold
or silver) content of the coinage by introducing lead into the new coins or shaving the edges of
existing coins.
3 See the opening quotation to this chapter by way of example.
4 See, for example, Oliver Twist, Bleak House, Hard Times, etc.
5 That is to say, both wages/salaries and pensions. See Chapter One, section 1.2 for a
theoretical analysis.
6 The forerunner of today's "Supplementary Benefits".
7 The number of old age pensioners in both absolute and relative terms was, and had been,
rising rapidly.
8 The Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries—a price-fixing international cartel of
predominantly Third World countries. The oil embargo of 1973 - 1974 is often referred to
nowadays as the first oil-price shock, a second shock occurring in 1981 following the Iranian
revolution.
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Chaptar Four: Tha Currant PosMon
4.0 Introduction
Although the main objective of this paper is to consider and analyse the
investment behaviour of the pension funds in the United Kingdom, it is a
necessary prerequisite for us to examine the environment in which they
operate. We therefore commence this chapter by looking at the current position
of the State scheme as defined under the 1975 Social Security Pensions Act and
its subsequent amendments. Although the State-operated scheme technically
does not merit inclusion as a pension fund the details of its operation under the
1975 Act (or the "Castle scheme", as it is sometimes known) are wholly
relevant to the current activities of the pension funds in the United Kingdom.1
Indeed, as we shall see, the Act also embodies legislation regulating the
operations of the pension funds in such a way that the State scheme may be
viewed as being the provider of the legal minimum in pensions' provision
above which all other pension schemes are obligated to operate.
4.1 The Castle Scheme
Under the Castle scheme the State aims to provide a pension which consists
of two elements: the first element is the basic State pension, which is every
citizen's statutory right; the second element consists of an earnings-related
supplement to the basic pension. 2 The former element provides a flat-rate
pension which is intended to provide the pensioner with a (minimum)
subsistence income, and operates on the Pay-As-You-Go principle as part of the
system of National Insurance. Compulsory contributions for this are deducted
from both employers and employees. The earnings-related element, as its title
suggests, provides a graduated pension of an amount determined according to
an individual's contributions record, in addition to the basic State pension.
Further, the earnings-related element possesses the qualification of being
optional for any individual who is already (or wishes to be) in a private or
statutory pension scheme, providing such a scheme offers earnings-related
benefits that are at least on a par with those offered by the State scheme. An
individual who participates in the earnings-related element of the State scheme
is said to be "contracted in"; an individual who chooses to opt out of the State's
earnings-related scheme is said to be "contracted out". Unsurprisingly, the
level of contributions that an individual pays by way of National Insurance
depends upon whether they are contracted in or out. At its inception, for a
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person who had been earning at the level of the national average, the basic
pension amounted to approximately twenty-five per cent of final earnings,
while the earnings-related element (for a contracted-in individual) would bring
the pension up to about forty-five per cent of final earnings; this assumes a
fully paid-up contributions record of at least twenty years. Let us now proceed
to consider the Castle scheme in greater detail.
4.1.1 The Castle Scheme—The Main Provisions
As previously mentioned, the major aim of the Castle scheme was to
narrow the divergence of retirement incomes between those in statutory or
good private occupational schemes and those in poor schemes or no scheme at
all. The Castle scheme as embodied in the 1975 Act also seeks to achieve a
sense of balance between the State scheme and the various statutory and
private schemes in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Act also embodies
legislation which sets out to ensure that the benefits offered by the statutory
and private schemes at least match the benefits on offer in the State scheme. To
this end the Act set up the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) to effect the
Act's regulations on the control of pension schemes. Like many other Acts of
Parliament the 1975 Social Security Pensions Act is a highly complex piece of
legislation. Nonetheless, one is able to distil from it seven main provisions
concerning the system of pensions' provision in the United Kingdom:
1) Equal Access: one of the major principles underlying the operation of the
State scheme is that it should be available to both men and women on equal
terms. That is to say, men and women will earn basic and earnings-related
pensions and will contribute at the same rate. 3 Consequently the same is
required of occupational pension schemes; as the Act states, "membership of
the scheme is open to both men and women on terms which are the same as to
age and length of service needed for becoming a member and as to whether
membership is voluntary or obligatory." As we shall see, this provision can
affect the finances of contracting out and, additionally, means that in deciding
whether to contract in or out schemes cannot discriminate other than by nature
of employment. Thus it is wholly possible, for example, to contract out manual
staff and contract in white-collar workers, but it is not possible to contract out
only male staff with female staff being contracted in.
2) The Basic Pension: all contributors with an adequate record of
contributions4 are entitled to a basic flat-rate pension. 5 This acts as the lower
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earnings limit of the scheme, and is to be annually increased to keep it constant
in real terms.
3) The Additional Earaings-Related Pension: this optional element of the
State pension relates to earnings between the lower limit (as defined above)
and the upper earnings limit, which is approximately one and a half times the
national average earnings level, or about seven times the lower limit. For those
retiring after April 1978 benefits were set at the rate of 1/80th of earnings per
year of contributions; only post-1978 contributions apply. It was originally
intended for an employee with a record of more than twenty years'
contributions to have their additional earnings-related pension calculated on
the basis of their best twenty years' revalued earnings; this was abolished
before it ever became pertinent. As with the basic pension, the earnings-related
element is to be increased annually to account for inflation.
4) Married Couples' Pensions: if a pensioner's spouse does not have
sufficient contributions for their own basic and additional earnings-related
State pensions, they will still be entitled to a supplement of about half the fully-
contributing spouse's basic pension.
5) Widows' and Widowers' Pensions:
(i) death in retirement: in this case the widow receives the husband's
basic and additional earnings-related pensions plus whatever her own
contributions entitle her to, subject to the maximum payable on an individual's
contributions record. Naturally, the same conditions apply to a widower.
(ii) death in service: provided the widow is over fifty years of age, she
receives her husband's basic and additional earnings-related pensions earned
by his contributions up to a year before he died. At age sixty she will receive
the full basic single person's pension plus the aggregate additional components
earned by both herself and her husband, again subject to the maximum payable
on an individual's contributions record. If the widow is less than fifty years of
age the benefits are reduced proportionately until she reaches age sixty. This
applies similarly to widowers.
6) Contributions: contributions are paid by both employer and employee at
the rate of ten and 6.5 per cent of salary respectively. This is supplemented by
an Exchequer subsidy of some eighteen per cent of the combined contributions.
These contributions only apply between the two earnings limits defined above.
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7) Contracting Out: the basic element of the pension is compulsory for all
employees. However, an employee may contract out of the earnings-related
element of the State scheme, their contributions being lowered accordingly, if
they are in an occupational pension scheme which has obtained its
"contracting-out certificate" from the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) upon
meeting certain minimum requirements, which we now examine.
4.1.2 OPB Contracting Out Requirements
If an occupational pension scheme wishes to enable its members to contract
out from the earnings-related element of the State pension scheme—as
presumably it does—then it must first obtain a contracting-out certificate from
the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB). In order to obtain this certificate the
pension fund must be operating subject to a series of six minimum
requirements:
1) Benefits: to contract out a scheme must pass two basic tests with respect to
employees' pension benefits:
(0 the requisite benefits test: to pass this the scheme must be
providing an annual pension accruing at the rate of at least 1 /80th of final
pensionable pay per year of contracted out service. For this purpose it is
permitted to use average annual pay over the whole period of contracted out
service rather than final pay; indeed, each year's earnings may be revalued in
line with the increase in general earnings up to the year of retirement. The
definition of what constitutes pensionable pay is subject to annual approval by
the OPB, but need not be total earnings.
(ii) the guaranteed minimum pensions (GMP) test: to pass
this test the scheme must never pay a pension less than that which would have
been provided via both components of the State scheme, had the employee
been contracted in. This has to be related to total earnings between the upper
and lower earnings limits. Consequently GMP may exceed the minimum
requisite benefits if the scheme does not recognise total earnings. In calculating
GMP the "best twenty years" rule does not apply; this is for administrative
reasons. However, the contracted-out employee does not lose out because, if
they would have earned a higher pension than the GMP, any extra pension that
would have arisen under a "best twenty years" rule is provided by the State.
These two requirements, taken either individually or together, illustrate
quite clearly that pension plans in the United Kingdom are legally required to
be defined benefit plans (see Section 4.2 below).
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2) Widows' Pensions: any contracted-out scheme must pay widows'
pensions for death in service and in retirement. Widow's GMP is set at one-
half of that which accrued to the spouse. As with employee benefits, both GMP
and requisite benefits "Lests must be satisfied. Here the requisite benefit is
1 /60th of spouse's pay per year of service at time of death. Again, if widow's
GMP is higher than the requisite benefit then the widow's pension will be
based on GMP.
3) Inflation Protection: for any GMP already in the course of payment,
responsibility for protection against the ravages of inflation lies with the State.
If a member leaves a contracted-out scheme having paid more than five years'
contributions then GMP must be preserved; it may be revalued in one of three
ways:
(a) in line with the Retail Price Index (RPI);
(b) at a fixed rate of 8.5 per cent per annum; or
(c) at a maximum rate of five per cent per annum plus payment of
a special premium to the State to cover any revaluations in excess of
five per cent.
If a member leaves a contracted-out scheme having paid less than five
years' contributions, a "contributions equivalent premium" can be paid by the
scheme to buy them back into the State scheme. This amount is equal to the
difference between the member's paid-up National Insurance contributions
and those the member would have paid had they not been contracted out. This
effectively buys the individual back into both elements of the State pension—
almost as if they had never contracted out—and the employer's liability then
ceases. Thus, in essence, all contributors to pension plans in the United
Kingdom have vested benefits.
4) Contributions: for a scheme that is contracted out the full rate of 16.5 per
cent applies on earnings up to the lower limit. For earnings above the lower
limit and below the upper limit there is an abatement of contributions to the
State scheme, but only on the earnings-related element.
5) Consultation: as a condition for contracting out, employers are required to
give at least three months' notice to employees and their Trades' Unions that
they are seeking to contract out. During this period the employer must consult
with all independent Trades' Unions recognised for collective bargaining on
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behalf of the employees concerned. This does not mean that negotiations must
take place; rather that consultation is seen to have occurred by the OPB.
6) No Discrimination'. any contracted-out scheme cannot discriminate on
grounds of age, sex or levels of pay. Only discrimination on the grounds of
the nature of employment is permissible.
If a pension fund, therefore, satisfies the above six conditions it may operate
a contracted-out scheme if it desires. In fact, the majority of pension funds
which operated occupational pension schemes prior to the introduction of the
Castle scheme soon satisfied the OPB and were granted their contracting-out
certificates.
To summarise, then, the Castle scheme offered a good compromise in many
respects after years of political controversy in the field of pensions' provision.
Equally, while the State provision of pensions to those not well-covered by
occupational schemes is a vast improvement over previous provisions, it is not
punitive to those who are contracted out. However, the State scheme still only
promises a modest level of benefits and is, therefore, unlikely to appeal to those
who are able to participate in good occupational schemes.
The State scheme also has one or two other shortcomings which are not
necessarily shared by the private schemes. For example, only twenty years'
service counts, and this must be in the post-1978 period. The pension accrual
fraction is only 1/80th in the State scheme whereas many private and statutory
schemes operate using 1/60th. No lump-sum benefits are payable on either
death or retirement under the State scheme, again unlike many private and
statutory schemes. Similarly, criticisms have been levied at the lower and
upper earnings limits which are a feature of the State scheme usually not found
elsewhere. Finally it should be borne in mind that although the Castle scheme
places many restrictions on pension funds (some of which did not previously
exist), they are still less stringent than those under which the insurance
companies operate. For example, there is no obligation for any pension fund to
produce a set of annual accounts, thereby divulging how it has disposed of its
funds. This is still an area where pressure may yet bring further legislation,
although nothing seems to have materialised in the wake of the
recommendations of the Wilson Committee (1980).
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4.1.3 Modifications Since 1978
By the Summer of 1986 no major modifications to the Castle scheme had
been implemented. Inevitably, there have been some minor modifications
especially in terms of the level of benefits, mainly to reflect changes in the
underlying economic conditions. In April 1986 the Conservative government
of Margaret Thatcher proposed making changes to the Castle scheme that
would have largely left the State flat-rate pension unchanged while making it
more attractive for people to contract out of the State earning-related scheme,
into either an occupational pensions scheme or one of the private schemes for
individuals being offered through banks, etc. The tax provisions of the 1986
Budget made it more attractive for financial institutions such as banks to offer
these "Personal Pensions" to individual members of the public as a financial
service. These proposals, like earlier Conservative pension proposals such as
Boyd Carpenter and the Joseph scheme, would have shifted the weight of
pensions' provision more into the private sector, in line with general 'market
oriented' ideology traditionally espoused by the Conservative party. These
ideas came more fully to fruition within Chancellor Nigel Lawson's 1989
Budget.
Under the taxation provisions of the 1989 Budget the existing broad
framework for treatment of pensions remains largely unchanged. However,
the Chancellor proposed a number of significant alterations which are
described below. He also suggested that he (and therefore presumably the rest
of the government) had no plans for further significant alterations following
implementation of the 1989 changes.
One result of the 1989 Budget is that employers are now able to provide
"top-up" schemes without all the usual tax advantages. Such schemes can
provide more generous benefits than the tax rules allow. However, the tax
treatment of these schemes broadly follow from existing legislation.
Consequently, contributions to a funded scheme are taxed as the employee's
income. Benefits from unfunded schemes are taxed only upon payment.
The 1989 Budget provided for a ceiling on the total tax relief available for
occupational pension schemes. For new schemes (set up on or after 14 March
1989) and new members of existing schemes (those joining on or after 1 June
1989) the maximum pension payable from a tax-approved occupational scheme
is £40,000 a year (ie, two-thirds of £60,000). As before, some of this may be
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commuted for a tax-free lump sum, subject to a ceiling of £90,000. The £60,000
will be increased annually to account for inflation.
The Chancellor also allowed for pension schemes to be simplified. In
particular, subject to completion of twenty years' service, the employer may
pay a maximum of two-thirds final salary to employees between the ages of 50
and 70. Additionally, the maximum tax-free lump sum can be the greater of
3/80 of final salary for each year up to 40 years or 2.25 times the amount of
pension before commutation.
The Chancellor also simplified the procedure for paying Free-Standing
Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs). For payments up to £2,400 a year,
the AVC provider will make a few simple checks without involving the
employer, and for larger amounts the employer's scheme will need to provide
the employee with information. Further checks before retirement will not
usually be required.
Upon retirement, any 'excess' benefits above the allowed limits will be
returned to the employee, but subject to a tax charge broadly corresponding to
the tax relief received on contributions and the build-up of funds. This applies
to all excess AVCs.
Personal Pensions are subject to change. It will be easier for those in such
schemes to have a greater say in where their funds are invested. Additionally,
new contribution limits took place from 6 April 1989; based on a £60,000
earnings limit, these are as follows:
Age on 6 April % of earnings Cash Limit (£)
below 36 17.5 10,500
36 - 45 20 12,000
46 - 50 25 15,000
51 -55 30 18,000
over 55 35 21,000
The tax-free lump sum which may be taken at retirement from a Personal
Pension changed from 25% of the total fund build-up including any "protected
rights" to 25% of the total fund build-up exclusive of protected rights but
inclusive of dependants' benefits.
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Employee Rate	 Employer Rate
Weekly Earnings	 Not contracted out	 Contracted out 	 Not contracted out 	 Contracted out
£43 - £74.99
£75 -£114.99
£115 - £164.99
£165 - £324.99
over £325
5.00%
7.00%
9.00%
9.00%
9.00%
£29.25 per week
(maximum)
3.00%*
5.00%*
7.00%*
7.00%*
9.00%
£23.61 per week
(maximum)
5.00%
7.00%
9.00%
10.45%
10.45%
1.20%*
3.20%*
5.20%*
6.65%*
£23.24 per week
plus 10.45% on
earnings over
£325 per week
Employee Rate
Weekly Earnings Not contracted out 	 Contracted out
£0 - £42.99
	
NIL
£43 - £325
	
2% up to £43
9% from £43 to £325
over £325
	 £26.24 per week
(maximum)
NIL
2% up to £43
7% from £43 to £325
£20.60 per week
(maximum)
Finally, the 1989 Budget introduced new rates of National Insurance
contributions as illustrated below:
* Note that the contracted-out rate applies only to that portion of earnings between the lower
and upper earnings limits (£43 and £325 respectively). Contributions on earnings below the
lower limit or above the upper limit are assessed at the not contracted out rate.
Under the provisions of the 1989 Budget, these rates only apply until 5
October 1989, when the structure of employees' contributions (only) are
changed as shown below:
4.2 Pension Fund Characteristics
Elsewhere in this paper we have considered the various methods by which
a pension fund may organise and finance its activities, while in this chapter we
have devoted our attentions thus far to considering the legal implications of the
1975 Act for the liabilities and contribution income of a pension fund. We now
continue by looking at the other characteristics of occupational pension
schemes in the United Kingdom. These may be divided into three categories:
(i) the nature of contributions;
(ii) the nature of benefits; and
(iii) the nature of the investment portfolio.
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By considering these in turn we would hope to be able to derive a picture of the
'typical' British pension fund, which might be used for modelling purposes in a
later chapter. Because its analysis comprises a major part of this paper in its
own right we devote the whole of Chapter Seven to a consideration of the
nature of the pension funds' investment portfolio. However, before proceeding
it is also best to mention that we shall not be dealing with the statutory
schemes in this chapter; most of the details pertaining to their activities have
already been covered in Chapter Three. The remainder of this chapter focuses
primarily upon the private sector pension funds, and draws heavily upon the
findings of the various surveys by the Government Actuary, as well as those
organised by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). Because
these surveys have employed samples of widely differing sizes and
composition, direct comparisons are tenuous and this should be borne in mind
when the reader is considering the likely trends indicated by the survey
statistics.
Over the years concern has often been voiced about the financial soundness
of the United Kingdom pension funds. This concern deals with the
relationship between the three characteristics mentioned above, with the
investment portfolio providing the link between contributions and benefits. In
general terms there may be said to be two basic pension types: defined
benefit and defined contribution. A pension plan may described as
defined contribution when the employer's obligation is completed when it
makes contributions to the pension fund (or other retirement investment
vehicle) in trust for the employee. Although in many cases the employee may
have some input into the investment decision, it is the employee who bears the
entire risk of the performance of the investment portfolio. The amount of
pension to be received by the employee upon retirement therefore depends
upon the investment performance of the pension fund. Thus, defined-
contribution plans are always fully funded by definition. A defined-benefit
plan, on the other hand, consists of a (corporate) promise to pay pensionable
benefits based upon the retiring employee's historic earnings levels and
number of years of employment. These benefits may be surrendered if the
employee leaves the company, but more often are guaranteed if employment
continues beyond a minimum number of years. When benefits are thus
guaranteed they are said to have become "vested". Employers are thus
obligated to set aside funds (usually tax-deductible) to meet these future
pension liabilities. The vested accrued pension liability of a firm is considered
an enforceable legal claim, while in some cases this is also true of the unvested
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portion. In a defined-benefits plan the employer may be able to reduce his
contributions if the fund has an impressive investment performance, although
he may equally be called upon to increase his contributions (ie, "top up" the
fund) if the fund is not yielding adequate returns on its investments. Under a
defined benefits plan the risks, therefore, are borne predominantly by the
employer.
In the United Kingdom it is the case that almost all pension plans are
defined-benefit, as evidenced by recent outcries against pension fund
surpluses,6 as well as by gripes by employers when pension funds required
"topping up" during the 1980-1983 recession. For comparison purposes, in the
United States in 1980 some 65 per cent of plans were defined contribution, but
the defined-benefit plans tended to be much larger and covered some three-
quarters of pension plan participants.7
4.2.1 The Nature of Contributions
To reiterate, a pension fund is said to be contributory in nature when the
employee is contributing into the fund. The usual case, such as occurs with the
State-run scheme, is for both employee and employer to contribute. Of course,
it is possible for an employer (technically) to deduct an employee's
contribution prior to payment of their gross earnings, thereby giving the
pension scheme the appearance of being non-contributory. Although many
occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom are contributory this is
by no means true of all schemes. However, it is interesting to note that since
1967 the number of non-contributory schemes appear to have gone into a rapid
decline leaving less than twenty-five per cent of all schemes currently
operating on a non-contributory basis. Further analysis reveals that, by and
large, non-contributory schemes have tended to be operated for white-collar
workers rather than manual staff and are typically far more prevalent in the
public than the private sector. Such divergence between the types of scheme
operated for blue- and white-collar workers even appears to pervade the
nature of the employers' contributions, as illustrated in Table 4-1. It used to be
suggested that differences between the remuneration levels of various
employment categories were the prime cause of such a divergence, but the
evidence, such as in Table 4-2, suggests that employers tend to treat manual
staff less generously with regard to pensions than staff employees at the same
salary levels. 8 For completeness Table 4-3 shows the absolute levels of
employer contributions to pension funds between 1967 and 1983.
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% of salary
Contributory schemes:
staff	 9.7
all	 8.0
Non-contributory schemes:
staff	 14.1
Table 4-1: Employer Contributions in Respect of Those Earning
23,000+ per annum
Source: NAPF Survey, 1975
Table 4-2: Aggregate Contributions in Respect of Those
Earning £3,000+ per annum
staff manual all
Contributory:
employer 9.7 5.2 8.0
employee 5.0 3.7 4.7
aggregate 14.7 8.9 12.7
Non-contributory schemes:
aggregate 14.1 6.5 11.1
Source: NAPF Survey, 1975
Table 4-3: Employer Contributions to Pension Funds, 1967 - 1983
(L millions)
19671968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 1983
Public Sector 91 102 115 170 190 300 396 492 763 1,048 960 3,210 5,700
Local
Authorities 62 63 66 73 97 114 148 171 296 413 401 *
.
Private Sector 265 305 342 375 420 460 560 780 1,015 1,058 1,233 3,580 6,224
* included with Public Sector
Source: CSO Tabulations, Government Actuary
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Table 4-4: Nature of Members' Contributions in the Private Sector
% of schemes % of members
1955 1933 1967 1971 1975 1955 1933 1%7 1971 1975 1979 13
Contributory 73 70 70 65 79 63 65 65 75 83 78 82
Flat Rate 13 17 20 9 7 11 21 15 9 8
Dependent upon 40 27 20 20 23 21 10 10 3 2 1
Salary Range
Percentage of 17 15 25 34 72 21 12 35 46 69 76 79
Salary
Other Basis 3 11 5 2 8 11 5 10 2 2
Non-contributory 27 30 30 35 21 37 35 35 25 17 22 18
Sources: Government Actuary Survey Reports, 1956, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1986
NAPF Survey, 1975
There are a number of ways of calculating the amount to be levied by way
of contributions, and these may be categorised under three broad headings:
(i) flat rate;
(ii) dependent upon salary range; and
(iii) percentage of salary.
These categories are fairly self-explanatory, and Table 4-4 above shows the
trend in popularity for each of these methods since 1956. As can be seen, the
flat-rate contribution has been in decline since 1963, being levied upon only
nine per cent of all members of occupational pension schemes in 1971. It is a
method that finds more favour with the smaller pension funds who, no doubt,
find it administratively superior. The salary range method is also more widely
used by the smaller pension funds and especially curries favour amongst the
insured schemes. However, in recent years there has been a waning desire for
insured schemes, and this undoubtedly accounts for the declining popularity of
the salary range method of levying contributions.
The percentage of salary method appears to be the most common and is
steadily increasing in popularity. The most common percentage levied is
between five and six per cent of salary. However, over the last two decades or
so the rate of contribution has increased on average from 3.1 to 4.7 per cent in
1977 to between 5 and 7 per cent in 1983. 9 Amidst all this it should still be
borne in mind that about forty per cent of schemes operated in the public sector
are non-contributory while, except for annual workers who pay flat-rate
contributions, all other schemes are operated on a percentage of salary basis.
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Finally, it should be recognised that the increase in the contribution rate, for
both employer and employee, has occurred over the years mainly in response
to the increase in benefits, and it is to this area of pensions' provision that we
now turn.
4.2.2 The Nature of Benefits
The ultimate aim of any pension fund is the provision of benefits to its
membership, and we can consider best the nature of benefits provided by
occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom by categorising them
under eleven broad headings, ranging from pensionable age to transferability:
1) Pensionable Age : schemes in the public sector usually have a normal
retirement age of sixty, whilst the private sector typically adopts sixty-five for
men and sixty for women.9A According to the 1975 NAPF Survey about
ninety-one per cent of schemes had a provision allowing for early retirement
for reasons other than ill-health, usually on a pension that has been reduced pro
rata. 10 Similarly, most schemes allow for late retirement, paying an increased
pension when it is eventually claimed. About ninety per cent of schemes in the
private sector do not take contributions after normal retirement age, although
no such distinctions are typically made in the public sector.
2) Pension Basis: pension benefits in the United Kingdom have generally
accrued under one of four basic formulae:
(a) final salary basis: benefits here are equal to a proportion of the
average of the last few years' salary times the number of years of service;
(b) salary range basis: here benefits accrue according to the
member's salary over their whole career. This is achieved by linking pension
accrual in any year to the salary range pertaining to that year;
(c) flat-rate basis: a self-explanatory category whereby a constant
level of benefits accrues per year of service;
(d) money purchase basis: here benefits are calculated on the
amount directly purchased by contributions, with very few guarantees
provided.
Over the years the final salary method (a) of calculating benefits has become
increasingly more popular, whereas the flat-rate (c) and money purchase (d)
methods, which were previously prevalent among manual workers' schemes,
have almost completely disappeared. Due to the impact of inflation it has
become increasingly apparent that, in nearly every case, anything other than a
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pension which is linked to salary in the final years of service is likely to be
inadequate. Table 4-5 below illustrates this trend beyond any shadow of a
doubt:
Table 4-5:	 Numbers of Private Sector Members According to Pension
Formula
Pension Formula Contracted-out	 Not Contracted-out Total
Final salary 4,370 860 5,230
Revalued average salary 110 — 110
Unrevalued average salary — 20 20
Fixed amount per year of service — 60 60
Money purchase — 240 240
Other basis 10 80 90
No pension - 40 40
Totals 4,490 1,300 5,790
Source: Government Actuary Survey Report, 1986
3) Level of Pension Benefits: under the Castle scheme all contracted-
out pension schemes must calculate benefits on a final salary basis. This was
already the predominant method employed in the public sector, where the
accrual rate is 1/80th of salary per year of service plus a lump sum of 3/80ths
of salary per year of service. In fact, most private schemes pay pensions
accruing at between 1/80th and 1/60th of salary per year of service.11
4) Integration with the State Scheme: in order to take account of the
State pension many schemes calculate final pensionable benefits after having
deducted either the amount of the State pension or an amount of about £300 -
£400 (in 1978) £200 - £500 (in 1983).
5) Ill-Health Retirement Benefits: despite improvements over many
years, the private sector has tended to lag behind the public sector. In most
public sector schemes the full accrued pension to the time of retirement is paid.
While this was also true of nearly all private sector schemes in 1983, 12 they
have typically been less generous even though they virtually all provided ill-
health benefits of one kind or another. Indeed, by 1983 private sector schemes
covering some 20 per cent of members were providing ill-health pensions
based on full potential service, ie, without reduction for early payment of the
pension.
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Death in Service: this is one aspect of pension benefits that had
Iproved considerably in the years before the Castle scheme, yet there still is
aple room for improvement. In the private sector widows' pensions have
ten, for the most part, an innovation of the 1970s; in 1971 only thirty-nine per
.nt of all male Members of occupational schemes had widows' pensions
ttitlements for their spouses, yet by 1975 this figure had increased to fifty-
ree per cent, a trend which has continued. By 1979 this figure had climbed to
) per cent, and to 90 per cent in 1983. Of this, some two per cent returned the
ember's contributions with the pension, twenty-six per cent offered a lump
im and return of contributions, whilst thirty-three per cent offered just a lump
Average widow's benefits in 1975 were approximately one-half of the
Lember's pension. Under the Castle scheme, contracted-out pension funds are
Dliged to offer as widow's pension 1/160th of final pay per year of the
eceased member's service. By 1983 some 44 per cent of women were in
rivate sector schemes which provided for widowers on the same basis as they
rovided for widows.
) Death in Retirement: this is not so very different from the case above.
the public sector most schemes provide for unconditional widows' pensions
n death during retirement and, indeed, have done so for many years. In the
rivate sector things have taken a bit longer, with only ten per cent of schemes
ffering unconditional widows' pensions in 1971, these being predominantly
ae larger schemes. By 1975 this figure had risen substantially to seventy-four
ier cent. Once again the average widows' benefits were approximately one-
lf of the member's pension. By 1983 some 98 per cent of male members were
a schemes containing some provision for a widow's or dependent's pension
In death after retirement.
0 Commutation: this is the process whereby a member of a pension
cheme can obtain part of their pension benefits in the form of a lump sum.
vIany public sector schemes have offered lump-sum benefits unconditionally
or many years, while the 1970s has seen a dramatic increase in the number of
vivate sector schemes offering commutation (see Table 4-6 below). In fact, the
nland Revenue imposes a maximum limit of 3/80ths of final salary times forty
/ears' service on any lump-sum benefits. 13 In 1983 the average lump sum paid
vas around £6,000. Of course, it should be noted that the State earnings-
elated scheme does not offer any form of commutation.
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Table 4-6: Numbers of members According to Lump Sum Benefits
at Retirement (private sector)
1975 1979 1983
Lump sum in all cases 0.3 0.5 0.4
Commutation option 4.2 5.1 5.0
Neither of the above 1.3 0.5 0.4
Totals 5.8 6.1 5.8
Source: Government Actuary Survey Report, 1986
Dynamism: this is the term used to indicate an increase in benefits
iring the course of the pension being in payment. Such facilities are usually
fered as a means of offsetting the ravages of inflation, and was first
troduced into public sector schemes in the 1971 Pensions Increase Act. In the
ivate sector this was becoming rapidly introduced by the vast majority of
hemes prior to the advent of the Castle scheme, under which inflation-
oofing of contracted-out pensions already in payment is the responsibility of
Le government. Under the legislation in force in 1983 there was no
!quirement for preserved pensions to be increased to allow for inflation.
.onetheless, according to the 1986 Government Actuary's survey, in 1983 two-
tirds of pensioners in private sector schemes received increased pensions in
)83, the increase being "slightly in excess of the increase in the cost of living"
)age 3). However, "this was because many schemes were making up for less
enerous increases in previous years when the rate of inflation was much
igher" (page 3).
0) Conditions of Entry: there are three common conditions of entry to
lost occupational schemes:
a) minimum entry age: in the public sector this is usually less than
twenty-one, as is the case with the Civil Service scheme. In the private
sector things are usually more restrictive, and we find that for men the
normal age of entry is twenty-one while for women the most common age
of entry was twenty-five, but this was only true for some fifty-five per
cent of schemes in 1971. Table 4-7 below shows the situation in 1983:
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Table 4-7: Numbers of Members by Minimum Entry Age
(thousands)
Age Private Sector Public Sector Total
16 (or none) 1,720 1,750 3,470
18 900 3,190 4,090
20 790 290 1,080
21 1,530 10 1,540
24 210 30 240
25 and over 590 40 630
At discretion 50 — 50
Totals 5,790 5,310 11,100
Source: Government Actua Surve Re ort, 1986•
Table 4-8: Numbers of Members by length of Service
Required Before Entry (thousands)
Service Private Sector Public Sector Total
None 3,350 4,990 8,340
Up to 1 year 940 250 1,190
More than 1 year,
but less than 2 1,160 40 1,200
Over 2 years 300 30 330
Other 40 — 40
Totals 5,790 5,310 11,100
Source: Government Actuary Survey Report, 1986
) qualifying period of service: in most public sector schemes there is
no qualifying period of service; the exception is the Civil Service scheme,
where a minimum of ten years' service must be completed in order to
qualify for any normal retirement benefits. In the private sector the
details of this condition are subject to wide variations from scheme to
scheme. However, the most common qualifying period of service for both
men and women is one year or less. Table 4-8 below shows the situation
in 1983:
:) compulsory/voluntary membership: with the exception of new
schemes which cannot be made compulsory for existing employees, most
employers tend to make membership of the pension scheme a condition
of employment. This is especially true in the public sector where the
membership of the relevant pension scheme is compulsory as soon as
eligibility conditions have been met. According to the 1975 NAPF Survey
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in the private sector some eighty-five per cent of schemes for men had
compulsory membership, as did seventy-one per cent of schemes for
women. Table 4-9 below shows the situation in 1983:
Table 4-9: Numbers of Schemes and members by Sector and
Conditions of Entry
Private Sector Public Sector Total
Entry Schemes Members Schemes Members Schemes Members
Condition (thousands) (thousands) (thousands)
Compulsory 19,000 4,340 120 5,310 19,120 9,650
Voluntary 15,000 960 — — 15,000 960
By invitation 53,000 440 — — 53,000 440
Closed to new
members
3,000 50 — — 3,000 50
Totals 90,000 5,790 120 5,310 90,120 11,100
Source: Government Actuary Survey Report, 1986
.
11) Transferability and Exit From Schemes: this is an area likely to
be of concern to anyone in the position of changing employment, for it is likely
that as a result they will desire to leave the pension scheme offered by their
erstwhile employer in favour of that offered via their new employment. As a
result of the Castle scheme, all schemes must offer at least a frozen pension, ie,
benefits payable upon retirement based on record up to exit from the scheme.
Furthermore, these benefits must be either index-linked or increased at annual
rate of 8.5 per cent. Prior to 1980 a pension fund could alternatively offer to
refund a member's contributions (net of tax, of course). It is now illegal for a
scheme to offer a member no benefits whatsoever upon their withdrawal from
the scheme.
4.3 Conclusion
This completes our consideration of the nature of contributions and benefits
provided by the pension funds in the United Kingdom. Most of the restrictions
placed upon the operations of a pension fund from external sources come from
legislation and, more specifically, currently from the 1975 Act We may
perceive of a pension fund having two basic sources of income—contributions
and investment income—and one major use of outgoings—pension benefits.
The legislation places certain constraints upon contribution income and
pension benefits which are bound to reveal themselves in the way the fund
Page 115
obtains its investment income, ie, the manner in which it allocates its funds
among various alternative investment outlets to obtain the optimal returns. It
is the solution of this which is the major objective of this paper—to explain the
investment behaviour of the United Kingdom pension funds.
Chaptar Four Endrittac
1 This point is dealt with in both Chapter One and Chapter Two.
2 In recent years this second element has become familiarly known as serps, which is simply
the acronym for state earnings related pension.
3 This provision does not extend (at least, at the time of writing) to provide for the retirement
of men and women at the same age; women can retire at sixty whilst men must work until
sixty-five years of age.
4 See category 6 below (page 4-4).
5 This was set initially in 1978 at £15.30p for a single person.
6 See (eg) The Financial Times, Wednesday 29th May, 1986, page 15.
7 See Zvi Bodie and John B. Shoven, "Introduction" in Bodie, Zvi and Shoven, John B.
(editors), Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System, (1983).
8 More recent studies of occupational pension schemes, such as the 1986 Government
Actuary's survey (based on 1983 data) make no distinction between various categories of
employee.
9 These figures, like most of the data in this chapter, are taken from various editions of the
Government Actuary's reports on occupational pension schemes. These survey reports
provide a greater breakdown of the data for interested parties.
9A The disparate treatment of men and women has been under scrutiny for some time and
could alter at any moment (literally). One result of the 1986 Sex Discrimination Act was to
make it illegal for women to be "forced" out of employment earlier than men. Further, the case
of Barber versus the G.R.E. (European Court of Justice) concluded that, because under Article
119 of the Treaty of Rome pensions are regarded as part of payment to labour, men and women
should be treated equally when made redundant prior to retirement age. This ruling was to be
"not retrospective". Nonetheless, there has been a trend towards equal treatment of men and
women in pensions' provision. According to Mike Brown, Director of Information Services,
National Association of Pension Funds, some forty-three per cent of private funds now offer
both sexes retirement at age 65.
10 The 1986 survey by the Government Actuary suggests that the early retirement option is
almost universal. Thus, for example:
Most private sector schemes have provision for retirement on immediate pension for any
member over a certain age (eg, 50), or within a certain period of he member's normal
retirement date (eg, five years). Such early retirement may require the consent of the
employer. Some schemes have special provisions for early pensions on redundancy. ...(page 54)
11 See Chapter 7 of the 1986 Government Actuary's survey of occupational pension schemes
for further details.
12 See Chapter 8 of the 1986 Government Actuary's survey.
13 See page 4-9 for the changes introduced in the 1989 Budget.
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Chapter Frive: The Pare Theory of Portto[no Salettim
5.0 Introduction
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide an illustration of how the
literature has approached the problem of investment portfolio selection from a
purely theoretical standpoint. In particular, we shall be concentrating on those
ideas which have left the deepest impression, all the while keeping in mind
that any one of the theories considered here may provide us with a suitable
vehicle for modelling the portfolio behaviour of the United Kingdom pension
funds—our ultimate objective. However, at this stage in the proceedings no
explicit judgments will be made as to any theory's suitability for the task in
hand; nonetheless, in order to fully understand the nature of the modelling
process finally adopted, it is absolutely necessary to view it in light of its
competitors. This requires a fairly complete (if not totally rigorous) survey of
the relevant literature. Therefore most of what follows is presented in terms of
a schematic history of the literature on portfolio selection theory.
5.1 Opening Comments
The area of economics known as portfolio (selection) theory l is still both
young and rapidly developing; indeed, although earlier works do exist, it was
the publication of Markowitz's seminal work (1959) that opened up portfolio
theory as a major area for research. Following a similar approach to that of
Markowitz, Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1958) laid the foundations for what has
become known as the inventory approach to portfolio selection. In some
quarters these works are regarded as the formalisation of a line of inquiry first
begun by Sir John Hicks in his famous paper, "A Suggestion for Simplifying
the Theory of Money" (1935). However, in more recent years this approach has
come in for much heavy criticism, leading to a debate in the literature which
has stimulated further growth and expansion in the field of portfolio theory.
Prior to embarking on our journey through the literature there are one or two
points worthy of note. Firstly, it should be remembered that the theory of
portfolio selection is a fairly small part of the wider field of decision-making
under uncertainty; according to Hicks, the theory of portfolio selection
...may be defined as that part in which the chooser is taken to be operating upon a
perfect market -- in the 'perfect competition' sense that the prospect of return on a
unit of money placed in a given manner is taken to be independent of the number
of units of money that are so placed. 	 (1967, p.103)
Page 117
Of course, at first glance this may appear to be a somewhat unreasonable
assumption, especially in view of the fact that the United Kingdom pension
funds (and other financ i al institutions) hold such substantial proportions of the
market for many financial assets. 2 However, at this early stage it is an essential
assumption if we are to derive any worthwhile conclusions from the theory of
portfolio selection. Indeed, as we find ourselves able to increase the degree of
sophistication of our approach we may even reach a point where we can relax
this seemingly unreasonable assumption, but for the present we shall let it be.
A second point of note is to recall that investments can be of two major
types: real and financia1. 3 When considering the investments made by the
United Kingdom pension funds we should bear in mind that they are almost
exclusively financial in nature, and therefore it is this type of investment
portfolio selection with which we shall be concerned for the most part in this
chapter. By way of a corollary to this we should add that all investments are
demanded as a means to an end. They are not demanded for their own sake,
hence the demand is indirect or derived. All investments are demanded
because of the future income (or other benefits) that they are expected to yield
to their owner. As a result of this indirect nature of investment demand, it is
apparent that any utility gained from an investment will be indirect; the utility
coming from the increased future consumption possibilities that the yield on
the investment (hopefully) brings about. This may turn out to be an especially
important point, as the consideration of a problem which falls under the
general heading of decision-making under uncertainty usually involves the
adoption of the basic maximising rule—ie, the expected utility maxim as
originally developed by Bernouilli (1738), and promulgated by Ramsey (1927)
and, in more recent years by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). 4 Indeed,
because the final outcome of any investment is uncertain, its undertaking is
bound to involve risk to some degree. 5 Consequently, in this chapter we shall
only concern ourselves with those methods of portfolio selection which take
risk and uncertainty into account. Such elementary Discounted Cash Flow
methods as Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return (Marginal Efficiency
of Investment) will not be considered.
Finally, it would be remiss to leave this section without making mention of
that other seminal work which gave rise to the modern theory of portfolio
selection, Lord Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
(1936). Indeed, the works of such as Tobin would appear to owe rather more
to this source than to Markowitz. For our own purposes the most relevant area
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of The General Theory... is that on Liquidity Preference, to which we turn
shortly. Before that, however, we commence our survey with a brief glance at
some of the more heuristic methods of portfolio selection.
5.2 Naïve and Early Approaches
Most of these approaches involve the use of the concept of the time value of
money, and frequently appear in various texts on Capital Budgeting. The basic
premise underlying these approaches is that, to a rational individual El today
is not worth the same as El next year, even in a non-inflationary environment.
Indeed, the El today will usually be preferred because (in the extreme) its
receipt today is relatively certain, whereas the likelihood of its receipt next year
is less certain due to (eg) death. Because of this "time preference" for money,
the rate of interest is called into being, and this provides a reinforcing effect for
the time-preference phenomenon. 6 A financial investment may be regarded as
if it were a loan involving the payment of interest. In what follows in this
section, all investments are considered solely in terms of outlay and income,
with little or no attention being paid to risk. We shall consider the investment
decision under conditions of risk in the section following. We now consider
some of the early approaches to making the investment decision:
(a) payback period: using this criterion, those investments which
recover the principal (ie, the initial capital outlay) in the shortest period of time
are selected. The payback period criterion is usually criticised as a method of
investment appraisal because it fails to take into account the time value of
money. However, in practice it is often combined with (eg) a discounted cash
flow technique as a risk filtering device.
(b) the finite horizon criterion: this involves the setting of a
terminal date beyond which any prospective developments are neglected. The
major rationale behind this approach is that not only is the future uncertain,
but the greater is that uncertainty the further into the future one attempts to
delve. Both this and the payback period criterion depend heavily on an
arbitrarily chosen period of time and are, therefore, likely to lead to some
rather peculiar and often indefensible conclusions.
(c) the risk-discounting approach: this approach is an extension
of the simple Net Present Value (Discounted Cash Flow) method of investment
appraisal. Whereas under the latter all costs and revenues are discounted by
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the investor's required rate of return (often the market rate of interest is used),
this method involves discounting the cash flow by the sum of the required rate
of return plus a risk factor. This risk factor may be determined by various
means, such as using a statistical measure of the dispersion of historic returns,
although in practice it is often subjectively determined. This subjective
determination forms the major grounds for criticism of this approach?
(d) the Bernouilli criterion: also known as the expected utility
maxim, this approach postulates an individual to behave as if:
(i) they assign estimates of utility to each alternative in their
opportunity set, and
(ii) they choose that alternative (or group of alternatives) that maximises
their expected utility.
The major problem with this criterion lies with the first postulate, which
requires the probability distributions of asset returns to be known (either
objectively, or subjectively with perfect certainty). Furthermore, without
making specific assumptions about the shape of the probability distributions of
the returns (eg, whether normally distributed, etc) or the nature of the utility
function (eg, quadratic), the Bernouilli criterion is likely to lead to unacceptable
results. A nice exposition of this criterion can be found in Baumol (1977).
(e) Liquidity Preference: although primarily a theory of the
demand for money, Keynes' theory of Liquidity Preference is included here for
two reasons. Firstly, it is the starting point for much work on portfolio
selection per se, and secondly, it treats the demand for money as being
synthetical to the demand for other financial assets, which Keynes aggregates
together under the "bonds" banner. This applies mainly to Keynes'
speculative demand for money, whereby (part of) the demand for money is
inversely related to the rate of interest. This is because there exists two
substitute financial assets: money, which bears no interest but is riskless, and
bonds, which bear interest but involve risk, particularly that of capital
gain/loss. Further, money possesses an immediate command over goods and
services (ie, it possesses liquidity) which bonds do not. Therefore, the rate of
interest represents the opportunity cost of holding money, whilst liquidity is
the opportunity cost of holding bonds. Hence, a fall in the rate of interest is
likely to bring about an increase in the demand for money relative to the
supply. The major problem with this line of approach is that it implies (Keynes
explicitly postulates) that every individual has some idea as to what the
"normal" rate of interest should be; if the actual rate deviates from this, the
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logical outcome is that an individual investor will hold a portfolio of all money
or all bonds accordingly. Obviously, this contrasts with the diversified
portfolios we observe as everyday phenomena. Nonetheless, one should
recognise that the kinds of problems which Keynes was addressing in using
Liquidity Preference are very different from the kinds of problems that we are
examining in this Thesis.
5.3 The Mean-Variance Approach
5.3.1 Tobin 8
In his famous 1958 article, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards
Risk", Tobin sets out to show that the basic assumption underlying Keynes'
Liquidity Preference schedule was that of risk aversion. Indeed, there are
many who regard this work as an extension of Keynes' theory of Liquidity
Preference. Following Keynes, Tobin divides an individual's total money
balances into two broad categories: transactions balances and investment
balances, which broadly correspond to Keynes' L i
 (Y) (transactions and
precautionary demands) and L 2(r) (speculative demand) respectively.
Similarly, Tobin regards the influence of interest rates on transactions balances
as existing but being negligible. Yet this is not the case for investment
balances, which have a non-zero interest elasticity of demand. The alternative
forms to cash in which savings may be held are considered to possess a
variable market yield; they are obligations to pay stated cash amounts at
future dates with no risk of default. Tobin refers to these as "other monetary
assets", and suggests that Liquidity Preference theory
...takes as given the choices determining how much wealth is to be invested in
monetary assets and concerns itself with the allocation of these amounts among
cash and alternative monetary assets..
	 (1958, Section 1.2)
Thus, there is a sequential decision-making procedure, with the savings-
versus-consumption decision being made first, 9
 and followed by a decision as
to how savings should be held, in "money" or "alternative monetary assets".10
According to Tobin, there are two possible sources of Liquidity Preference, and
these are not mutually exclusive: they are inelasticity of expectations of future
interest rates, and uncertainty about future interest rates. Following Tobin, we
shall consider each of these in turn, but first we need to clarify a few basic
notational definitions which he employs.
Like Keynes, Tobin assumes the existence of only a single monetary asset
besides cash, which he takes to be a Consol; that is to say, for every $1 invested
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today the Consol promises to pay the sum of $r per 'annum' in perpetuity. The
yield of cash is defined as being zero. If the investor's cash balance is A 1
 and
his Consol balance is A2, then the decision (A1 , A2) fixes the portfolio for a
'year'.
(i) inelastic expectations: given inelastic expectations of future interest
rates, two types of inelasticity may be distinguished: firstly, they may be
perfectly inelastic, in which case we have fixed expectations; alternatively,
expectations may be only relatively inelastic, which gives the case known as
"sticky" expectations.
(a) perfectly inelastic expectations: let re
 be the rate of interest on
Consols that the investor expects to prevail at the end of the year. This
expectation is held with perfect certainty. Note that r e
 is independent of the
prevailing rate of interest, r. Consequently, over the course of the 'year', the
investor expects with certainty that for $1 invested in Consols he will earn $r in
interest plus a capital gain (or loss) of $g, where:
g = (r /re) - 1
The conclusion is that if (r + g) > 0 then the individual invests totally in
Consols, holding no cash; alternatively, if (r + g) < 0 only cash will be held.
This condition can be expressed in terms of a critical rate of interest, rc, where:
r
r=  
e 
1 + re
If r > rc
 then the investor will hold only Consols, and if r < r c
 then he will hold
only cash.
(b) "sticky" expectations: under fixed expectations re
 was assumed to be
independent of r; with sticky expectations this assumption is modified such
that re
 = 'P(r). Correspondingly, Tobin now derives a new critical rate of
interest:
IP rc =
1 + Ill
Figure 5-1 reveals that this function has only one intersection with the 45 0
 line,
at which its slope is less than unity. Under these assumptions, the intersection
determines a critical rate of interest, r c, such that if r > rc
 the investor holds no
cash, whilst if r < r c
 the investor holds no Consols.
Thus it would seem that the portfolio held by the investor with inelastic
expectations (either fixed or "sticky") of the future rate of interest consists of
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either only cash or only Consols; such an investor does not hold a diversified
portfolio.
(ii) future interest rate uncertainty: under this possible source of
Liquidity Preference, uncertainty implies the proposition that an individual is
not certain of the future rate of interest on Consols; that is to say, he does not
possess perfect foresight! This is a very different animal to the 'uncertainty'
that Keynes used to explain Liquidity Preference in The General Theory..., (1936)
where
...the greatest emphasis is on the notion of a "normal" long-term rate, to which
investors expect the rate of interest to return. When he refers to uncertainty in the
market, he appears to mean disagreement among investors concerning the future
of the rate rather than subjective doubt in the mind of an individual investor.
(1958, Section 2.6)
For Tobin, however, uncertainty denotes subjective doubt about the future rate
of interest in the mind of an individual investor. Thus, any investment in
Consols involves the risk of a capital loss (equally, there is the 'risk' of a capital
gain). Hence, the greater is the amount invested in Consols, ie, A2, the greater
is the risk that the investor assumes, but also the greater is the investor's
expected return. Previously, for any given rate of interest, r, the investor had a
definite expectation of g from investing $1 in Consols (see Figure 5-1).
However, now the investor has uncertain expectations of g and, therefore,
bases his actions on his estimate of the probability distribution of g. Tobin
assumes that this probability distribution has an expected value (mean) of zero,
and is independent of the level of r. Thus, because by definition A 1 + A2 = 1
and both A1 and A2 are non-negative, the return on the portfolio is:
R = A2(r + g)	 (5-1)
Because g is a random variable with zero mean, the expected return on the
portfolio is given by:
E(R) = lir = A2r	 (5-2)
The standard deviation of the return, aR, is used as a measure of the risk
involved in investing in Consols) 1 A high GR implies high risk; a GR of zero
implies no risk, ie, a certain prospect, such as would be the case with money.
The standard deviation of the return on the portfolio is defined as
aR = A2ag	 (5-3)
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2
1 + re
r,
Thus, it can now be seen formally that A2 determines both fir and O. By use
of (5-2) and (5-3) the terms on which an investor can obtain a greater expected
return at the expense of assuming greater risk can be derived:
PR = (i.
 / ag)GR
	 (5-4)
where 0  (YR  ag. Tobin plots this inverse relationship between risk and
return on an "opportunity locus" such as the various OC curves depicted in
Figure 5-2. In this diagram 0C 1 is the relevant opportunity locus when the
prevailing rate of interest is r 1 . At a higher rate of interest, such as r2, the
relevant opportunity locus would be 0C 2, and so on for r3, etc. The slope of
any opportunity locus OCi is simply the ratio ri / ag. The relationship between
the level of risk assumed and the percentage of the portfolio invested in
Consols, ie, equation (5-3), is illustrated by the line OB.
Tobin makes the reasonable assumption that an investor will possess a scale
of preference between risk and expected return; in particular, for any given
level of risk he assumes that an investor will always prefer a greater expected
return to a smaller. As with standard consumer theory, these preferences may
be represented by a utility function and hence by indifference curves. 12
 These
appear as I I , 12 and 13 in Figure 5-2. Tobin distinguishes between two broad
categories of investor: the risk-lover and the risk-
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averler. The former category consists of those investors who are willing to
accept a lower value of expected return for the chance of a higher capital gain;
their preferences will be represented by negatively-sloped indifference curves.
The latter category of investor may be one of two types, both of which possess
positively-sloped indifference curves. If, as illustrated in Figure 5-2, the
indifference curves have a concave shape then the risk-averter will be a
diversifier, holding a combination of both cash and Consols in his portfolio.
However, if the investor's indifference curves are linear or convex then a
corner solution will obtain. Such an investor is termed a plunger and holds a
portfolio consisting entirely of cash or entirely of Consols. In fact, Tobin is able
to demonstrate that a risk-averter's indifference curves must be concave
thereby eliminating the possibility of the existence of plungers.13
Thus far, the rate of return, R = A 2 (r + g), has been considered with g
possessing a subjective probability distribution with zero mean and a standard
deviation of G g. However, in the absence of restrictions on these subjective
probability distributions, the relevant distribution parameters are found by
considering the restrictions imposed on the utility function. Tobin shows that
two parameters are determined by the choice of scale for the utility function; if
the specification of the utility function requires no additional parameters then
all the relevant information in the probability distribution can be summarised
by one parameter. For example, if a linear scale was chosen for the utility
function, such as U(R) = R, then MN =E(R). This implies a maximum return
in a certain world. However, if the utility function required one additional
parameter then the subjective probability distribution will require two. Which
parameters these turn out to be is entirely dependent upon the exact form of
U(R); for example, a focus on the mean and standard deviation of the return
is justified by a quadratic utility function such as:14
U(R) = (1 + b)R + bR2
	(5-5)
If 0 < b < 1. then the investor is a risk-lover; for a risk-averter -1 < b < 0.
However, because the marginal utility of return, U'(R), must be non-negative,
then (1 + b) + 2bR 0. This gives the following conditions:
R >1+b	 b > 0	 .>	 risk-lover
2b
R<1+b	 b > 0	 .>	 risk-averter	 (5-6)
2b
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(5-7)
(5-8)
Tobin extends this simple analysis to the case when there exists many
financial assets as well as cash. Suppose that, in addition to cash, an investor
may hold a combination of up to m other financial assets in his portfolio. If xi
(i = 1, 2, 3,..., in) is the amount invested in asset i, and x i is always non-
negative, then /,xi = A2  1. If ri
 is the expected yield on asset i, and g i is the
capital gain/loss per dollar invested in asset i, then E(g) = 0 for all i. The
covariance between capital gains/losses on any two distinct assets is defined
as:
= cov(gi, gi)
= E(gigi)
Consequently the over-all expected return on the portfolio is:
[IR = A2r
=
 Ix-r-1 1i
Similarly, the over-all variance on the portfolio return is:
_2 A 2 2
uR = 1--120g
= I xixiv ii	 (5-9)
i
As with the simple cash/Consols case, Tobin constructs a constant-return
locus, consisting of those xi points such that Ix iri is constant. He also
constructs along similar lines a constant-risk locus, consisting of those x i points
such that oi is constant. On the assumption that i = 2 (ie, there are only two
alternative financial assets to cash), these loci can be shown in diagrammatic
form, such as in Figure 5-3. The line from 1.1/z/r 1 to p.R /r2 through C is a
,
constant-return of pa locus. For a higher return, say 11R, the locus runs from
[IR / r 1 to IIR/r2 via C', and is parallel to the first constant-return locus.
Unlike the constant-return loci, the constant-risk loci turn out to be
ellipsoidal in shape rather than linear. For a risk level of CYR, the constant-risk
locus runs from 6R / Vv22 to c5R/ Vv11 via C. Similarly, for a higher risk level,
0R, the locus runs from (YR /11v22 to cYR / Vvii via C. The points of tangency, C
and C', exemplify the dominant combinations of x1 and x2; ie, the highest levels
of expected return for any given level of risk. Note that all dominant sets lie on
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Figure 5-3:
the ray through the origin, OCC'E. At some point along this ray, eg, point E,
holdings of non-cash assets will exhaust the investor's balances. Thus, at E no
cash is held and Exi = 1. However, between 0 and E the ratio between cash
and non-cash assets is shown by the ratio of distances such as OC and OE. The
implication is that the mix of non-cash assets held by the investor is
independent of their aggregate share of the investment balance—a separation
theorem of sorts.
Despite the conceptual elegance of his analysis, Tobin's approach suffers
from a major drawback in not going into any detail of the determination of the
non-cash assets segment of the portfolio. Of course, it should be recognised
that his prime objective was to examine closely the factors which underlay
Keynes' theory of Liquidity Preference rather than an examination of the
investor's portfolio selection decision per se, and so consideration of how an
investor would distribute his investment balances among the various non-cash
assets requires us to look farther afield, which we now do.
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5.3.2 Markowitz
In many respects the approach of Markowitz to portfolio selection is very
similar to that of Tobin. However, although Markowitz's seminal work in this
area did not appear until 1959, a large proportion of it is an elaboration of his
1952 article in the Journal of Finance. Perhaps the major difference between the
work of Markowitz and that of Tobin is that the latter does not consider how
an investor selects the combinations of non-cash assets that make up his
portfolio (as we have just seen). Markowitz, on the other hand, examines this
in great detail by the use of programming methods, which we now examine.
According to Markowitz, the process of selecting a portfolio can be divided
into two stages. The first stage involves the formation of beliefs about the
future performance of the various securities available. These will be based on
the investor's observations and experience. The second stage is the actual
selection of the portfolio; the choosing of the various securities that go to make
up the portfolio. This will be determined by the investor's beliefs about future
performance. Because of the uncertain nature of the future, the formation of
beliefs about future performance is an entirely subjective process. Thus, the
return associated with any security (or portfolio) will be an expected return, as
will the associated levels of risk. Thus, if xi is the quantity of security i in the
portfolio, and ri is the return associated with with security i, then the return on
the portfolio, R, will be defined as:
n
R = I xiri
i
when there are n securities, and the expected return on the portfolio is:
n
E(R) = I x. E(r.)1-	 1
i=1
Markowitz points out that because the r i's are uncertain events rather than
random variables, the various operators (such as E, variance, covariance, etc)
are based on probability beliefs rather than on objective probabilities. Because
of this there will not be a zero covariance between any two securities. Hence,
diversification will only serve to minimise risk, and not eliminate it entirely.
With a portfolio being defined as a combination of securities, Markowitz then
considers the concept of an efficient portfolio.
A portfolio is defined as being inefficient if it is possible to obtain a
higher expected return with no greater variance (ie, at no greater risk), or
obtain a greater certainty of return with no less expected return. Consideration
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Xi
of the simple case of a three-security portfolio enables diagrammatic
illustration. If Xi is the fraction of the portfolio invested in security i, then X 1 +
X2 + X3 = 1. Standard portfolio analysis also requires that no short sales be
allowed, ie, Xi  0 for all i. Now, because X3 = 1 - X2 - X1 , all legitimate
portfolios can be shown geometrically. These are represented by the shaded
area 1"11161111 in Figure 5-4. Portfolios that lie within the shaded area but not
on the boundaries contain all three securities. Thus, it can be said that the
choice of portfolio is constrained by legitimacy. However, Markowitz shows
that it is possible to impose additional constraints. For example, suppose that
due to the investor's probability beliefs there is a minimum income
requirement from the portfolio of 0.003. Then, if the current incomes for the
three securities are 0.04, 0.02 and 0.03 respectively, there is a further legitimacy
constraint of:
0.04X1 + 0.02X2
 + 0.03X3 0.03
Using X3 = 1 - X2 - X1 , this becomes:
0.01X1 - 0.01X2 0
which is illustrated in Figure 5-4. So, with this additional constraint, legitimate
portfolios are to be found in the shaded area below the line 0.01X 1 - 0.01X2 = 0.
Figure 5-4:
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In addition to the notation used above, Markowitz introduces the
following:
E = the expected return on the portfolio
fli = the expected return on security i
V = the variance of the return on the portfolio
6.. = the covariance between returns on securities i and j.ij
It is, therefore, apparent that E = Xi i.ti + X2 1.t2 + X3 j13. Using X3
 = 1 - X2 -
X 1 , this becomes E = X i (j.t i - I13) + X2(p. 2 + 11 3) + 11 3 . By way of example
consider the case where pt. 1 = 0.1, 112 = 0.05 and 113 = 0.07. Then E .-- 0.03)(1 -
0.02X2 + 0.07. If the investor required E = 0.08 then an iso-mean line 15 of 0.01 =
0.03X 1 - 0.02X2 will occur. Providing that the g i's are not equal a system of
parallel iso-mean lines will obtain, as illustrated in Figure 5-5.
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In a similar manner Markowitz derives the following formulation for the
variance of the return on a portfolio:
2V = Xi(
'all - 2a13 + a33) 4- X22(a22 - 2a23 -4- a33) + 2X1X2(a12 -
 a13 - a23 - a33) +
2X1 (1:513 - a33) ± 2X2(a23 - a33) + a33*
If we consider an example such that an = 022 = 0.01, 0 33 = 0.04, 012 = 0.005
and al3 =a23 = 0, then we obtain V = 0.05X1 + 0.05X2 + 0.09)(1 )(2
 - 0.08X1 - 0.08X2
+ 0.04. If the investor required (say) V = 0.01 then we would find that 0.05X 12 +
0.05X22 + 0.09)(1)(2 - 0.08X1
 - 0.08X2
 + 0.03 = 0 which is an iso-variance ellipse16
such that V = 0.01. It is possible for an iso-variance ellipse to be a circle, 17 but
regardless, all iso-variance ellipses will have the same centre (point c in Figure
5-6), the same orientation and the same ratio of longest to shortest diameter.
Point c represents that portfolio with minimum possible variance (ie, least risk)
and may be either legitimate or illegitimate.
Figure 5-6:
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By superimposing the iso-variance curves onto a map of iso-mean lines
Markowitz obtains Figure 5-7. Ignoring legitimacy temporarily, there are a
series of points of tangency between the two sets of curves. Markowitz calls
the locus of these points, -I L the critical line. Such a locus is the set of all points
which minimise variance among portfolios with the same expected return, and
may or may not pass through the set of.legitimate portfolios.
Markowitz uses the critical line to illustrate the concept of efficient
portfolios. He defines an efficient portfolio, P, as being such that:
(1) P is legitimate,
(2) if there is another legitimate portfolio with greater E it must also
have greater V, and
(3) if there is another legitimate portfolio with smaller V it must also
have smaller E.
Examples of sets of efficient portfolios are illustrated in Figure 5-8.
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Of course, such a diagrammatic illustration of the derivation of efficient
portfolios (using the mean-variance criterion) is a sizeable abstraction from
reality where a portfolio may consist of many more than three securities. It is
possible to extend this illtstrative analysis to the case of four securities by use
of "three-dimensional" diagrams and, in fact, Markowitz does this, replacing
critical lines with critical sets and so on. We shall not consider this here,18
preferring instead to concentrate our attentions on Markowitz's use of
programming methods to derive a set of efficient portfolios in the more general
case when there are n securities. This is done by use of matrix algebra.
By using the "critical line/set" method of deriving efficient portfolios one is
effectively processing the means, variances and covariances of a number of
securities to find the set of efficient portfolios. Following Markowitz, we now
show that this process can easily be shown algebraically. The portfolio is
represented by:
Xi
X=I
Xn _
such that Xi _ 0 for all i, and also:
all X1 + a12X2 + • • • + alnXn .,_ b1
:
am X1 + am X2 + ... + am Xn
 = bm
1	 2	 n
This second set of constraints can be represented more easily as AX = b.
The expected return on the portfolio, E = Exilii = Rex where 1./ = (I.11, 112, -...,
1ln). The variance of return on the portfolio, V = I,E,X iXjaii = X'CX where C =
[ Ic5 . )] and is symmetric. Define M as an (m+n) by (m+n) symmetric matrix such
that:
m=L CA'
A0
Define R' = [0, b] and S' = 41, 0]. Markowitz also defines a Unit Cross as an
intersecting column and row with zeros everywhere except for a unit at the
intersection. A similar definition applies for a Zero Cross.
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Now, the set of efficient portfolios is composed of segments from the critical
lines. Associated with any critical line will be a set of variables which are "in",
ie, those securities held in the portfolio. The formula for a critical line is:
M X 1 = R + -§-XE
- A.	 (5-10)
,_._.
where: M = M with rows and columns corresponding to "out" variables
being replaced by unit crosses. 19 Also, IVI is assumed to be non-
singular (ie, its inverse, M -1 , exists).
5 = S with zeros corresponding to out variables.
XE is a number (not a matrix).
If XE is specified then (5-10) can be solved for X. Rewrite (5-10) as:
[ XI= (F\-4) - iR + () -i-v--i rgxE
X	 (5-11)
Define N(i) as M -1 with zero crosses in out positions, and rewrite (5-11) as:
[ X I
=N (i)R + N(i)S XE
A.	 (5-12)
— -1This is now the formula for the critical line. Replacing M by N(i) means that
S can now be used instead of g.
At this point we shall not be going into full detail of Markowitz's procedure
for computing efficient portfolios by the mean-variance criterion, save to make
the following points." The basic procedure adopted by Markowitz involves
the application of linear programming techniques. This means using an
algorithm which moves around the set of efficient portfolios, considering one
critical line at a time, until it arrives at that portfolio which, for a given
expected return, minimises the risk involved. This iterative procedure begins
by locating that efficient portfolio which, regardless of risk, has the greatest
expected return. By moving along the critical lines the algorithm trades off risk
for lower expected returns until the most efficient portfolio in terms of both
risk and return is located.
In addition to the variance Markowitz also considers other statistical
measures of risk, such as the semi-variance, but rules them out of the reckoning
on the grounds of cost, convenience and familiarity. By way of example, it
should be recognised that the procedure which uses the semi-variance is not so
very different from that which uses the variance as a measure of risk, and for
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his reason we do not consider it in this paper. He goes on to consider in more
letail the basis on which his portfolio selection procedure is founded, ie,
rational behaviour in the face of risk and uncertainty. In much the same way
as Tobin, Markowitz considers (and rejects) the maximisation of expected
return rule and then proceeds to look at the expected utility maxim. Like
Tobin, he finds that if the utility function has quadratic form then the investor
will select a portfolio which is efficient by mean-variance criterion. Yet it must
be pointed out that there is no inevitable connection between the mean-
variance and expected utility approaches. In extending the basic expected
utility approach to a multi-period analysis Markowitz finds that the same
(substantive) results are obtained as from a sequence of single time-period
analyses.
The high degree of similarity between the work of Markowitz and that of
Tobin is obvious. However, a major difference is that the Markowitz approach
offers a detailed consideration of the procedure for selecting the various non-
cash assets. Yet it is striking that his results do not differ vastly from those
obtained by Tobin, given that both authors began by considering different
problems; while Tobin was concerned with finding an underlying explanation
for Keynes' theory of Liquidity Preference, Markowitz was more directly
concerned with explaining the observed phenomenon of the holding of a
diversified portfolio.
Before moving on to consider some of the criticisms which have been levied
against the mean-variance approach to portfolio selection, as well as more
recent work in this area, we shall first consider some measures of risk aversion.
5.3.3 Risk Aversion
We commence this section with a consideration of the Bernouilli criterion,
ie, the expected utility maxim. Although not explicitly dealt with in this paper,
it is an accepted proposition that if an investor obeys a particular set of axioms
then she acts to maximise the expected utility of (uncertain) wealth, 21 ie:
maximise E[U(Y)]
where Y is wealth (a random variable), U( ) is the investor's utility function and
E is the expectation operator. Any analysis of the nature of risk aversion must
involve a discussion of the form of the investor's utility function. We shall
continue to assume that it is (at least) twice continuously differentiable,
bounded, and that utility increases with wealth.
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(i) certainty equivalent wealth: the certainty equivalent wealth, Y c, is
:hat level which, if received with certainty, is such that the individual is
indifferent between Yc and the uncertain prospect Y. That is to say:
E[U(Y)] = U(Yc)
We can now say that an individual is:
a) risk-averse if E(Y) > Yc
b) risk-neutral if E(Y) =;
c)risk-loving if E(Y) <''c
The implications of these three possibilities for the form of the utility function
are now examined. We begin by expanding U(Y) in a Taylor's series about -17,
dropping all terms higher than of second order:
U(Y) = U(Y) + I.J'(-)(Y-V) + 0.5U"(.)(Y - V)2
Taking expectations:
E[U(Y)] = U(-1-2) + 0 + 0.5E[U"(.)(Y -V)2]
Using E(U(Y)) = U(Yc) we obtain:
U(Yc) - UR-7) = 0.5E[U"(.)(Y - V)2]
Hence if:
U"(.) > 0 then U(Y ) > U(Y) implying Yc >Y ..> risk-lover
U"(.) =0 then U(Yc) = U(2) implying Y c =V ==> risk-neutral
U"(.) < 0 then U(Yc) <U(() implying Yc
 <' --=.> risk-averse
Thus an individual who is risk averse for all Y > 0 will have a (strictly) concave
utility function. Conversely for a risk lover, etc.
(ii) absolute risk aversion: this is a local measure of risk aversion
widely used throughout the literature, and is defined as follows:
Ra(Y) = - U"(Y)
U'(Y)
If we assume that the investor is holding a risky security, the outcome of which
is represented by the random variable z, and that E(Z) a--  Z = 0, with 6z2 being
finite, then the certainty equivalent wealth, Yc, is defined as before:
EfU(Y + Z)) = U(Yc)
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rhe risk premium of absolute change, TCa, is defined as that amount which an
.nvestor would be willing to pay to rid himself of the risk associated with
holding the security with outcome z when he holds wealth Y; ie:
It is easy to show that TCa is approximately proportional to G z2. Begin by
expanding U(Y + Z) about the level of initial wealth, Y:
U(A + Z) = U(A) + U'(A)Z + 0.5U"(A)Z2
Taking expectations:
EffU(A + Z)} = U(A) +0 + 0.5U"(A)Gz2
Similarly, expanding about Y:
U(Y ) = U(A) + U'(A)(Yc - Y)
ie,
	 U(11c) = U(A) - U'(A).1ta
Taking expectations:
EfU(Y + Z)} = U(A) - IY(A). TCa
Combining (5-13) and (5-1.4) we obtain:
4J(Y) na = 0.5U(Y)Y2
	
2	 2
-U"(Y) az _ Ra(Y) GzIla =-
	
U'(Y) 2	 2or
(5-13)
(5-14)
From this we deduce that for an investor's given subjective assessment of Gz2,
the larger is Ra(Y) then the larger will be the risk premium; that is to say, the
greater is the wealth the investor would be willing to give up to avoid bearing
risk.
(iii) relative risk aversion: like absolute risk aversion, this is a local
measure widely used throughout the literature, and is defined as:
Rr(Y) = -U"(Y) .Y = Y.Ra(Y)
U'(Y)
Consider an individual whose entire current wealth, Y, is subject to risk. Also
let Q be a random variable taking on only positive values such that E(Q) = -0 =
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1 and 02Q is finite. The certainty equivalent wealth, Y c, is defined as being such
that:
E(U(YQ)} = U(Y)
The risk premium of proportional change, 7tr, is defined as the percentage of
current wealth that the investor would be willing to pay to get rid of the risk
imposed by Q when he has the wealth Y. le:
lir = Y - YcY
By a method exactly analagous to that used for absolute risk aversion we
obtain:	 -U"(Y).Y. G2	 (52
. z	 =	 zlir—
	
U'(Y) 2	
Rio()2
From this we deduce that for an investor's given subjective assessment of 5z2,
the larger is Rr(Y) then the larger will be the risk premium of proportional
change; that is to say, the greater is the percentage of his current wealth that
the investor would be willing to give up to avoid bearing risk.
It should be borne in mind that the two measures of risk aversion are not
independent, because R (Y) = Ra(Y).Y. However, they do describe slightly
different characteristics of the utility function. For example, while dRa /dY  0
implies dRr /dY  0, it is entirely possible to have both dR a /dY < 0 and dRr/dY
> 0. Arrow (1965, pp. 96-97) put forward two hypotheses relating to risk
aversion:
a) increasing relative risk aversion,ie, dRr/dY > 0, and
b) decreasing absolute risk aversion, ie, dRa/dY < 0.
Without going into any detail here, Arrow claims this to be closely related to
the boundedness of the utility function. Some of the more commonly assumed
functions are dealt with in Appendix 5-2. However, we now move on to
consider some of the criticisms which have been levied against the mean-
variance criterion for portfolio selection.
5.3.4 The Critics
Many of the criticisms levied against the mean-variance approach to
portfolio selection stem from what both Markowitz and Tobin point out as
being restrictions upon the approach. For example, it is often cited that to use
the variance (or standard deviation) as a sole proxy for risk ignores the
possibility that the distribution of returns may well be skewed. Yet, although
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other measures of risk do exist, Markowitz (eg) rules them out on grounds of
"cost, convenience and familiarity." Other critics point out that the mean-
variance approach is dependent upon the probability distributions of security
returns being normal; some do not accept the existence of indifference curves
in the risk-return (mean-variance) plane. Two of the better critiques of Tobin-
Markowitz mean-variance analysis both appeared in the January 1969 edition
of the Review of Economic Studies, and we now consider each of these in turn.
(i) K. Borch: "A Note on Uncertainty and Indifference Curves":
If x is a series of stochastic variables representing monetary gains, with
distribution functions F i (x), F2(x),..., Fi(x),..., then the investor's problem is the
establishment of a preference ordering over all of these distribution functions.
If this preference ordering is consistent (in the sense defined by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947)), then it can be represented by a utility function, U(x),
such that:
f.	 .	 00
U(x) Hi(x) > f U(x).aFi (x)
-00
if and only if	 F(x) > F1(x)
If the initial set is a family of distributions, F(x, a l , a2,..., an), completely
determined by n parameters, then the problem is to establish a preference
ordering over the set of vectors (a 1 , a2,..., an). This may be represented by U(ai,
a21 ..., an) and analysed by regular economic analysis. This is the foundation of
the theory of risk. Apart from degenerate cases, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between al , a2,..., an and the first n moments, m l, m2,..., mn,
of the distribution. We can therefore assume the preference to be represented
by U(ml , m2,..., inn). This represents the 'old' approach to the economics of
uncertainty, under which heading comes the Tobin-Markowitz method of
portfolio selection. Combining this with a (von Neumann-Morgenstern)
consistent preference ordering over a family of distributions, Borch shows that
there exists U(x) such that
U(mi , m21..., mn) = re U(x).dF(x, m l, m21 ..., mn)
However, this can only be satisfied if and only if U(x) is a polynomial of degree
n and U(m i , m2,..., mn) is linear,22 ie:
U(x) = x + c2x2 + c3x3 + cnxn
U(mi, 	 ,m) — m1 + c2m2 + c3m3 +  + Cnaln
where c2, 	 / cn are constants.
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Now, according to Borch, if U(x) represents the utility of money, one would
expect Ut (x) to be positive and U"(x) to be negative, but this contradicts U(x)
being a polynomial. Thus, the 'old' approach to the economics of uncertainty
(and therefore mean-variance analysis) must violate either the von Neumann-
Morgenstern consistency conditions or the usual assumptions about the utility
of money. This contradiction should have acted as a discouragement to
following the 'old' approach, instead of which expected utility was analysed in
its simplest form, ie, when n = 2. Some approaches used a first approximation,
implying U(x) to be a polynomial with Ut (x) > 0 and U"(x) < 0 valid at certain
intervals, thereby establishing a consistent preference ordering based on the
moments of distribution functions concentrated on those intervals. If this is not
possible then only contradictions will result.
For the case where n = 2 one obtains U(x) = x + cx2 and U(mi, m2) = m1 +
cm2 = E + cE2 + cS2, where E = m 1
 = expected gain, and S2 = m2 - m 1 2 =
variance of the gain. This implies that the indifference curves in the mean-
standard deviation (E-S) plane are concentric circles centred on the S-axis. This
is obviously not accepted by either Markowitz or Tobin. Borch goes on to
show that by use of "preference absolue"—a condition of von Neumann-
Morgenstern consistency—E-S indifference curves cannot exist.
(ii)	 M. S. Feldstein: "Mean-Variance Analysis in the Theory of
Liquidity Preference and Portfolio Selection":
According to Feldstein, the objectives of his paper were to correct three
assertions made by Tobin, these concerning (1) that a risk-averse investor's
(mean-standard deviation) indifference curves are concave downwards, (2) the
ranking of risky and riskless assets in terms of such indifference curves, and
(3) the general possibility of mean-variance analysis without further
qualification.
Feldstein believes that Tobin over-simplifies by stating that preferences
among portfolios can be represented in terms of expected return and its
standard deviation. He suggests that this can only be justified if the
underlying utility function is quadratic, or if the (subjective) probability
distributions pertaining to all possible portfolios are members of a two-
parameter family with finite mean and variance. From here he goes on to deny
the existence of quadratic utility functions on the grounds that they contradict
the Arrow hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion. 23 Feldstein
suggests that decreasing absolute risk aversion would lead to non-convex
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indifference curves, despite Tobin's proof of the convexity of a risk-averse
investor's indifference curves (1958, Section 3.3.1). Feldstein is keen to point
out that the Tobin24 proof assumes that any two-parameter probability
distribution f(x; il, 6) can be put into a "standard form" such as f(z; 0, 1), where
z = (x - In fact, this is not possible for all two-parameter probability
distributions, only some. For example, this procedure could not be adopted for
probability distributions such as the beta or lognormal. Therefore, continues
Feldstein, Tobin does not prove that risk aversion implies convex indifference
curves. He suggests that this will only be the case in that area of the mean-
standard deviation plane where G /p. is less than (0.5)0.5 = 0.7071068;
everywhere else they will be concave. It therefore follows that if indifference
curves are not convex, then there is little rationale for holding a diversified
portfolio; a bonds-only portfolio may well be optimal. Feldstein shows that
this will be the case if (6/0 2  p - 1.
Feldstein continues by pointing out in Section 3 of his paper that if there is
more than one risky asset (ie, an asset with strictly positive variance) then it is
not possible to define a preference ordering on portfolios only in terms of
means and standard deviations. 25 Feldstein argues the case that money cannot
be regarded as a riskless asset, and so there is more than one risky asset.
Consequently, with two risky assets no preference ordering can be obtained.
Excluding the cases of linear and quadratic utility functions, a preference
ordering can be defined if and only if
...each asset has a distribution such that any linear combination of these variables
(assets) has a distribution with only two independent parameters. (1969, Section 3)
This is a very restrictive requirement, but it is satisfied by (eg) normal
distributions. Other distributions, such as the beta or lognormal, are
inadmissible. The implication of all this is that if there is more than one risky
asset then it is impossible for the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework of
utility theory to be used as a basis for portfolio selection via the mean-variance
criterion. Thus, the only other possibilities are quadratic utility—which, for
reasons already cited, is highly restrictive—or the existence of normallf
distributed returns—a possibility that would appear contrary to the available
evidence. Therefore, Feldstein concludes, the only hope for a truly general
theory of portfolio selection is a modification of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern consistency conditions.
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Bearing in mind the foregoing criticisms we may then summarise that there
are three possible rationalisations for specifying portfolio theory in terms of
means and variances of returns; these are:
1) quadratic utility,
2) normally distributed returns, or
3) asset returns that have "compact" distributions; ie, those with
"small" variances.
Samuelson (1970) has shown that even if (1) and (2) don't hold, mean-variance
analysis may still be used owing to (3). This possibility arises because the
smaller are the variances then the better is mean-variance analysis as an
approximation. With the restrictions imposed upon the use of mean-variance
analysis by these rationalisations in mind, we now press on and consider
portfolio theory in the case where there are many risky assets.
5.4 Portfolio Theory—Many Risky Assets
Thus far we have only considered portfolio theory under the assumption
that there are only two assets, one of which has a certain return while the other
is risky.26 We have also explicitly assumed that for decision-making purposes
there is only a single time period. Thus, it is as if the assets are purchased at
the beginning of that period and mature at the end, with no other time horizon
taken into consideration. Common experience informs us that such a one-
period analysis is wholly unrealistic, partly because different assets are
possessed of different maturities, and because in practice the problem of timing
investment purchases is often considered as important (if not more so) than the
asset selection problem. Nonetheless, as a first step it provides a convenient
simplification. To break down the single-period assumption we must first
consider the assumption concerning the existence of a mutual fund, which we
do in this section. We begin by characterising the optimal portfolio.
Consider an individual investor who faces a set of assets with a (gross) rate
of return of O i on asset i in state 0 (where i = 1, 2,..., n). 27 The individual
possesses an initial wealth of Wo, of which a i represents the proportion
invested in asset i. So, I ai
 = 1. The usual assumptions relating to the
maximisation of expected utility are made, and also:
i) short sales are permitted; ie, a i <> 0;
ii) the returns from any security cannot be dominated by a linear
combination of any of the remaining securities, otherwise the
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individual would believe it possible to attain terminal wealth
with probability one;28
iii) there is one asset which yields the same rate of return in each
and every state of nature. Thus, p i (0) = pm for all O. This asset
is denoted as "asset number one" and is called "money".29
Now, the terminal wealth that arises in state 0 is:
W( 0) =	 aipi(0).W 0
i=1
= (1 -	 ai)pmW 0 +	 aipi(0)W 0
i=2	 i=2	 (5-15)
where (1 - a i)p m W 0 corresponds to money (ie, the safe asset) and
Eaipi(0).W 0 corresponds to the set of risky assets. This can be simplified to
obtain:
W(0) = [Pm +
	 ai[Pi(0 ) - Pm]]W 0
i=1
Now, let no represent the (subjective) probability of state 8 occurring. Then
the investor chooses the a i's to maximise his expected utility of terminal
wealth, ie:3°
maximise EtU[W(0)]}
U[W( 0)] 110
Also
E1U[W( 0)] = E U[ [pm + 	 ai[pi(0) -	 oil
i=1	 (5-16)
Differentiating this expression with respect to the a i 's we obtain the following
first-order conditions for an optimal portfolio:
E{IYM(0)}.(pi(9) - pm}) = 0
for i = 2, 3, ..., n. Given this characterisation of the optimal portfolio we move
on to look at Separation or Mutual Fund Theorems; that is simply to say, under
what conditions are the al jEa independent of the level of initial wealth, Wo?
These conditions will be either restrictions on the utility function, or
restrictions on the structure of returns.
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The restrictions that must be imposed upon the utility function for
separation to hold are:
(i) U'(W) = (a + bW)c, where a, b and c are parameters; 31 or
(ii) U'(W) = aebW.
In either case the demands for securities, a iWo, are all linear in initial wealth;
ie:
aiWo = pi + yiWo
for all i = 1, 2,...,n, and P iii = p iyi for all i # j. The implication of this is that,
regardless of the nature of returns, aggregates of risky assets can be formed (ie,
separation holds) by imposing restrictions on the utility function alone.
What, then, are the restrictions that must be imposed upon the structure of
returns for separation to hold? Or, in other words, what class of distributions
of asset returns permit separation? Because a portfolio is defined as a linear
combination of assets, it is only necessary to consider those distributions which
are such that any linear combination of random variables (ie, asset returns)
with such distributions is a member of the same class. The only class for which
this turns out to be true is that of the Pareto-Levy distributions. Indeed, the
only member of this class which has a finite variance is the normal
distribution. 32
 The implication of this is that, regardless of the utility function,
separation holds by imposing restrictions on the structure of returns.
In summary, the three rationalisations for specifying portfolio theory in
terms of means and variances are as seen on the top of page 144. We now
proceed to a consideration of a separation theorem for mean-variance analysis.
As usual, we define the parameters of the investor's utility function as
2being the expected return, vw, and the variance of the return, saw, where W
represents terminal wealth. The investor's objective function, therefore, is
Defining W(0) as in equation (5-15), we therefore have that ilw =
E[W(0)1 and G \2AT = Et (W(0) - E[W(0)12}}. We assume V 1 to be positive and V2
to be negative,33 and also the objective function to be concave. Similarly,
defining p i(0) from (5-15), we may now define:
E[p i(0)] = ili
OH = E t{Pi(e) - Ili}2 }	 and
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csij = E({pi(0) - [ti}lpi (e) - pi)}
for all i, j = 2, 3,...,n, and i  j. Using these definitions we may obtain:34
n
PAA/ = [Pm ± E ai[I-Li - Pm]l W 0
i=1
and 35
	
GW
2
 = 
w
0
(52
.
For V to be a maximum the following first-order conditions must obtain:
n
V 1W o[p,i - pm] + V 2W 61, ai crij = 0
j=2
for all i = 2, 3,..., n.36 Writing the chosen or optimal a i as
ai = K 1± vij[iii - pm]
j=2
where [v ii] = S2-1 and K = -V1 /V2W0. Now, consider the ratio of any two asset
holdings, ai* and ak
* 
, where i  k:
i IN [1-ti - Pm]
ali. _ j=-2
n
ak 1 U kj[1-1  - Pm]j=2
From this it is apparent that all risk-averse investors with utility functions
expressed solely in terms of means and variances will hold the same relative
proportions of risky assets in their optimal portfolios.
5.5 Portfolio Theory—The Multi-Period Case
In much the same way as the single risky asset case was thought to be
unrealistic and requiring further investigation, the same is true of the single-
period portfolio analysis with which we have contented ourselves thus far.
Given that the ultimate motivation for investment is to increase future
consumption, the single-period analysis we have considered may be thought of
as modelling an investor who plans to make no changes in his portfolio
between the date of the original investment and the date of resulting future
consumption, ie, as if the investor were pursuing a "buy and hold" policy.
This might be seen as an obvious and, perhaps, over-simplified application of
the single-period approach. However, a brief glance at (eg) Chapters Seven
and Eight reveals that the pension funds, in common with other financial
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*
ai we derive:
institutions, rarely hold a portfolio that is fixed over any length of time,37 and
so a multi-period approach is called for. It should be borne in mind that any
decision to change the portfolio will not be costless. The major costs perceived
by (eg) a financial institution will be the transactions costs, such as brokers'
fees, commissions, etc, although costs in the wider sense (opportunity costs)
should also be taken into consideration. Naturally, if the costs of altering the
portfolio are seen to outweigh the benefits then an unchanged portfolio will
result. As a result of these costs the length of time within which portfolio
changes are uneconomical will be different for different investors. For
example, larger investors may be able to reduce costs as a result of exploiting
economies of scale in financial transactions; their size alone may make for
easier access to the various capital markets. The investor's valuation of the
costs of portfolio shifts will be implicit in their utility function. Consider by
way of example an investor of a similar nature to a pension fund; such an
investor will possess a long time-horizon and, therefore, his relevant choices
will be among various portfolio sequences rather than among simple
portfolios. This implies that the choice is about investment flows rather than
investment stocks. If the planned liquidation of the portfolio is, say, fifteen
years hence, then the utility function will represent valuation of the various
consumption prospects fifteen years from now. The risks, returns and
expectations can all be valued over that fifteen years. Because this approach
requires dealing with sequences each of the possible portfolio sequences will
have a probability distribution of (in this case) a fifteen-year return. From this
the relevant expectations and risk may be derived. In an analogous manner to
the single-period case, the investor chooses that portfolio sequence with the
highest expected utility.
However, it is not usually the case that any investor holds a portfolio so
that at the end of the time-horizon (only) increased consumption may occur.
The case where an investor selects a portfolio with which they remain until it
matures is a distinct possibility in the Arrow-Debreu-Hahn world, where there
are a complete set of efficient markets, but is much less likely in the world in
which we have to live. In this world it is more likely that the investor hopes to
increase his consumption along the whole period up to the time-horizon, not
solely at the portfolio's terminal liquidation. In the Arrow-Debreu-Hahn
world this can be achieved by borrowing from the complete set of efficient
markets, but for most of us in this world this prospect is not readily available.
These comments apply equally to the individual or institutional investor. For
example, in the case of pension funds, partial liquidations would not be
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regarded as occurring for (direct) consumption purposes, but rather for the
payment of current liabilities such as pensionable benefits. Hence it is
necessary to explicitly include consumption in an extension of portfolio theory
to the multi-period case. Thus, we begin by including consumption into a
single-period model and then extending the model to the multi-period case.38
In the single-period model with consumption, the investor begins with an
initial wealth of A of which an amount C is used for current consumption. Of
the remainder, an amount a is invested in a risky asset (ie, "bonds"), each unit
of which has a net rate of return of X, and an amount m is held in a safe asset
(ie, "money"). 39 Thus:
Y=A-C+aX	 (5-17)
We define the proportion of the portfolio invested in bonds as 0) = a / (A - C).
The proportion of the portfolio invested in money is, therefore, (1 - ()). The
investor possesses a utility function, V, such that:
V(C, Y) = U(C) + H(Y)
where V is a concave function which is strictly increasing in both arguments,
and is (at least) twice continuously differentiable. The decision variables for
the investor are C and a, which are chosen to maximise the expected value of
utility, ie:
maximise E[V(C, Y)]
= U(C) + E[H(Y)]
ie,	 maximise [U(C) + E[H(A - C + aX)]}	 (5-18)
Differentiating with respect to the decision variables the following first-order
conditions are obtained:
U'(C) = E[H'(Y)] 	 (5-19)
E[H'(Y)X] = 0	 40 (5_20)
When considering the multi-period model there are two simplifications
which aid the exposition. These are:
(i) H(Y) = a.U(Y), where a is a (subjective) discount factor, and
(ii) U(Y) = (1 /7)117, ie, constant relative risk-aversion.
Substituting these into the one-period model gives:
E[V(C, Y)] = (1 /7)CY
 + ( a/y)(A - C) .Y.E[(1 + °A))
	
	
41 (5_21)
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(e)(1/y-1)
C - ." 	 A
1 + (4)(117-1)
OA
(5-27)
Due to the assumption of iso-elastic utility, co is independent of C, and is chosen
to
maximise E[(1 + coX)71	 (5-22)
Accordingly, the first-order conditions are:
E[(1 + coX)7-1X] = 0	 (5-23)
If (0* is defined as the optimal value of (0 (ie, that value which solves (5-23)),
and we define
= [(1 + co*X)1	 (5-24)
then the consumption choice problem becomes:
maximise [(1/7)C7 + (a/7)(A - C).Y. 4]
Here the first-order conditions are:
CY-1 - a(A - C)7-1 = 0	 (5-25)
C = ( 4)(i/y-i) (A - C)ie,	 (5-26)
defining 8 implicitly. Therefore, under iso-elastic utility the following results
are obtained:
(a) the portfolio decision is independent of the consumption
decision;42 and
(b) the consumption function is proportional in wealth, but the
factor of proportionality depends on co", the optimal
proportion of the portfolio invested in bonds.
As we shall see shortly, both of these results carry over to the multi-period
model. However, before we move on to that model, a final comment is
warranted concerning the expected utility function, E[V(C, Y)]. It should be
noted that this may be written as a function of initial wealth, A, as follows:
J(A) maximise E[V(C, Y)]
= (1 /y)87A7
 + ( a/y)(1 - 0)7A7.	 (5-28)
= (1 Py)[87
 + a(1 - 6)7 UA'Y
	(5-29)
This function is also iso-elastic.
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We now extend the model to the multi-period case. The notation remains
!ssentially the same, save for the introduction of the suffix t = 0, 1, T to
ndicate the relevant time-period, where 0 indicates the current period. Now
he investor's utility function is:
V(CO3 C1,..., CT) = E at.U(Ct)
t=0
where U is a concave, monotonically increasing function of C. Once again the
investor's objective is to maximise his expected utility subject to his "inter-
period budget constraint". Expressed formally this appears as:
maximise E[V(Ci,..., CT)]
subject to W t+1 = (Wt - C t)(1 + co tXt) for all t.
W 0 is taken as given historically. Obviously, (W t - C t) is equivalent to the
investor's savings during period t, while (1 + 0.) tXt) gives the gross rate of
return on those savings during period t. In common with the single-period
model, the investor's decision variables are consumption, (Co, C 1 ,..., CT,i), and
the proportion of the portfolio invested in bonds, (0) 0, ()p..., am). At time t =
0 the investor has to decide on his consumption and portfolio allocation
knowing the value of Wo, but facing the uncertain prospects (X 0,	 XT4).43
In order to characterise the solution to this intertemporal decision problem it is
necessary to invoke the use of a dynamic programming technique. This
involves commencing at the termination of the investor's time-horizon and
working backwards through the sequence of time-periods up to the current
decision. We begin, therefore, at the start of period T-1.
At the start of time-period T-1 the investor chooses CT4 and 0OT-1 • The
solution to this is exactly the same as for the one-period model we considered
previously. Therefore, analogously to (5-18), the investor chooses CT4 and 0.31,4
to maximise his expected utility, ie:
maximise (U(C T_i) + cc.E[U(WT)]} (5-30)
where WT = (Wri. - CT4)(1 + c0r_1 XT4 ). The first-order conditions here also
are analogous to (5-19) and (5-20) yielding solution values of CT_i* and (0T4*.
Substituting these into (5-30) gives:
Ji (WT_i) U(CT_1 4.) + a E(u[(WT_I. - cr_1 *)(1 + ar_1 *xr..1)1} (5-31)
Now, by the envelope theorem:44
Ji t(WT-1) a.E(U1[(WT)]}=1-r(CT-1*)
	
45 (5_32)
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This characterises the solution to the decision problem for the ultimate time-
period, ie, that time-period immediately prior to liquidation. The decision
problem for the penultimate time-period involves a decision on CT_2 and corr_2,
and may be framed as:
maximise (U(CT_2) + cc.E[ J1(W11)I})1}	 (5-33)
where WT4 = (WT_2 - CT_2)(1 + 01r_2XT_2). Expressed in this form, the two-
period problem46 has been reduced to a one-period type problem. This
simplification is achieved by recognising that J i (Wr_i ) embodies the
implications of the fact that optimising actions were taken in the final period.
That is to say, that all information required for the decision to be made in
period T-2 is summed up in terms of a knowledge of WT4 and the functional
form of J1 . Hence, once again (5-33) may be treated as a basic single-period
problem and the corresponding first-order conditions, etc, written down for
each and every time-period.
It follows from the foregoing that the individual's implicit one-period
problem corresponding to any period, t, may be set up as follows:
maximise tU(C) + oc.E [ h-t-1(Wt+1)1}
	
(5-34)
where Wt+1 = (Wt - Ct)(1 + co tXt). The corresponding first-order conditions
are:
u(C) = E[ Tr_t_i'(/Vt+i)]
	
(5-35)
E[ JT-t-1 i(Wt+1) *Xt] =
	 (5-36)
To interpret (5-35) substitute it into (5-32) as applied to the relevant time-
period, t:
Ut(Ct*) = E[U(Ct±i*)] 	 (5-37)
In other words, the individual equates his marginal utility from current
consumption to the (discounted) expected marginal utility of his consumption
in the next time-period.
Thus far the main implication has been that the individual's multi-period
consumption/investment decision problem may be interpreted as a sequence
of one-period problems, thereby simplifying the general problem substantially.
However, much of this simplification is more apparent than real as typically
the J(.) function will depend on the period in question; that is to say, the
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sequence of single-period problems applies to an expected utility function
which changes from period to period.
By way of a final simplification, one further assumption may be introduced,
viz:
U(Y) = (1/7Y '
	(5-38)
The implications of assuming constant relative risk-aversion are clear if we
refer back to the one-period framework:
*	 *	 *	
* Thisi)	 coo = oh = ... = 0..) ,T4 = (.0T . T i  is due to (5-23), remembering that
identical probability distributions exist for the X t
 in every period;
ii) the level of consumption is proportional to the level of wealth, the
factor of proportionality being dependent upon the time-period;
iii) the JTC) function is iso-elastic for all time-periods, t = 1, 2,...,T.47
Once again the factor of proportionality is dependent upon the time-
period;
iv) it can, therefore, be seen that the individual acts as if he were a
single-period expected-utility-mwdmiser with an iso-elastic utility
function.
Before concluding this look at multi-period portfolio theory there are one or
two generalisations that should be borne in mind. Like the standard Tobin-
Markowitz model of portfolio selection, this model assumes only two assets.
That is to say, it is assumed that separation holds. However, for purists the
extension of the multi-period model to explicitly include choice among
multiple risky assets is very similar to that extension of atemporal portfolio
theory. Additionally, although thus far we have assumed a stationary
distribution of asset returns, this model can be adapted to allow for the
influence of past asset prices on the distribution of current returns. Although
the conditions are derived easily enough, interesting results appear to be non-
existent. It is also possible to introduce a non-additive utility function,48 under
which the individual acts as if she is only interested in current consumption
and next period wealth if, and only if, her lifetime utility function is concave.49
An uncertain period of liquidation may also be introduced; this induces a
"state dependency" into the utility function. A final generalisation might be
the inclusion of labour income into the model. Of course, if such an income
stream is certain this becomes a trivial case. It is interesting to note that
generalisation to the case of uncertain labour income does not yet appear to
' have been researched.
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5.6 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPm)
The Capital Asset Pricing Model represents a step nearer the original work
of Markowitz. Indeed, it is derived directly from the mean-variance approach
to portfolio selection. Recall that under this approach, to select a portfolio it is
necessary first to estimate the variance-covariance matrix for the set of possible
investments. Thus, if there are n different securities there will be (n/2)(n-1)
covariances. However, in his two articles W. F. Sharpe (1963, 1964) presents an
approach that vastly reduces the time and effort required to obtain the
variance-covariance matrix. Under the Sharpe method, instead of directly
calculating the large number of covariances, it is assumed that the return on
each and every security is related to the level of a general market index.51 In
such a manner only the covariance of a security's return with that of the market
need be calculated, a total of only (n + 1) covariances.
As with the Markowitz model, Sharpe assumes investors to be consistent,
risk averse, single-period expected utility maximisers. Thus, an investor will
require additional expected return to induce him to undertake more risk. If
is the expected return on asset i, and 6 i quantifies the uncertainty associated
with asset i, then the riskiness of asset i is measured by the coefficient of
variation, G i / Il i. According to Sharpe, this risk has two components:
unsystematic risk refers to that element of risk that can be (at least partially)
eliminated by Markowitz diversification; and systematic risk, which is that
element of risk still present in an efficient portfolio and, therefore, reflects how
investments in the portfolio are correlated with the market.
Sharpe defines the Market Portfolio to be that which exactly models the
market. Thus, if the ordinary shares of company Z represented 0.0125 per cent
of the value of the equity of all companies, then 0.0125 per cent of the Market
Portfolio would consist of ordinary shares in company Z. It is further assumed
that the prices of all securities in the market have adjusted so that an investor
could not earn a higher return for the same or a lower risk-level in some other
form of investment. 52 Finally, it is assumed that there exists some
(government-issued) security which does not involve any risk of default, a
characteristic which distinguishes it from all other securities. Such a security is
referred to as the risk-free or riskless asset.
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Following Sharpe, we now consider a portfolio which is composed of both
the riskless security and the Market Portfolio, the fractions being (1 - a) and a
respectively. The following notation is used:
rf =	 the rate of return on a riskless security maturing in the next
period
-I'm =	 the expected return from $1 invested in the Market Portfolio
G =	 the standard deviation of the return on the Market Portfoliom
17p =	 the expected rate of return on that portfolio consisting of both
the riskless security and the Market Portfolio
G =	 the standard deviation of rP	 P
Using this notation we obtain an expression for the return on the portfolio:
Fp = (1 - cc)rf + (I'm	 (5-39)
ie,	 Fp = rf + ocfm - rd	 (5-40)
The risk attached to the portfolio and the Market Portfolio are related in the
following manner:
(5-41)a = a.GmP
Solving (5-41) for , and substituting into (5-40) gives:
rm	- rfl
fp = rf +	 ar,
ram (5-42)
This illustrates the relationship between the expected return of a portfolio, Fp,
and its standard deviation, ap, which is illustrated in Figure 5-9. Here AD is
called the Capital Market Line. If the portfolio consisted entirely of the risk-
free asset (ie, a = 0) then the expected return on the portfolio would be exactly
rf, with a standard deviation of return of u p = 0. This corresponds to point A.
On the other hand, if all funds were held in the Market Portfolio with none in
the risk-free asset (ie, a = 1) there would be an expected return on the portfolio
of frn, with a standard deviation of return of Gm. This corresponds to point C.
Obviously if the value of a lies between 0 and 1 then the portfolio is a
combination of the risk-free asset and the Market Portfolio, as illustrated by
points such as B. For points on the line beyond C, such as D, to be held an
investor must be able to borrow funds at a rate of rf.53
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Figure 5-9:
Expected rate
of return
Standard
deviation
of return
am
It must be borne in mind that the Capital Market Line applies only to that
very special category of portfolios consisting entirely of combinations of the
Market Portfolio and the risk-free asset. Yet it is plausible that an investor
might obtain a better combination of risk and expected return by altering his
holdings of a particular risky asset. If this were at all possible the implication
would be that the market was not in equilibrium. Thus, if v is the equilibrium
price of a particular security, then the rate of return earned by holding that
security for one period would be:
r* = (w/v) - 1	 (5-43)
where w is the sum of dividends received plus the end-of-period value of the
security. Similarly:
r = (W/v) - 1	 (5-44)
where	 is called the required rate of return. If the market is in
equilibrium then e must satisfy the following:
r
-▪ 
= rf + 	
 cov(r*, rm)
cqja J	 (5-45)
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13=
cov(r* , rm)
cqn (5-46)
Because Sharpe's objective is to compare the cov(r *, rni) for a particular
security with the variance of the return on the Market Portfolio he takes the
ratio, defining:
The ratio, 13, is known as the beta coefficient for that particular security.
Substituting (5-46) into (5-44) gives:
r
*
 = rf + (fm - rf)13	 (5-47)
Thus, it can be seen that if a security has a beta coefficient of unity it will have
the same systematic risk as the Market Portfolio. A security with a beta
coefficient greater (smaller) than one will be more (less) risky than the Market
Portfolio. By this method the number of calculations necessary for mean-
variance portfolio selection are greatly reduced, and the beta coefficient is
introduced as a new measure of risk.
By way of a closing note it should be added that the use of beta coefficients
as a tool for reviewing investments is, and has been, becoming increasingly
popular, especially among the institutional and professional investors. They
have been in use in the United States for many years and are a familiar part of
Wall Street's institutional set-up. In the United Kingdom, however, things
have proceeded at a much slower pace. In December 1978, City stockbrokers
Rowe Rudd began offering the beta coefficient method of risk analysis to its
clients, following swiftly behind the service offered by the London Business
School. According to Mr. Jason McQueen, Rowe Rudd's risk analysis
department manager,
if the pension fund manager takes advantage of what modern portfolio theory
has to offer by way of evaluation of risk he will find that with a small part of his
fund, say ten per cent, he can, in fact, take a much greater risk than any he has
contemplated so far and still not expose the fund to a greater aggregate risk than
at present. 54
It is suggested that by being rigorous about risk, quantifying it, identifying it,
and evaluating it, fund managers could enlarge the scope of their investments
in those areas where out-performing the market is more likely, such as the
smaller, more innovative companies operating in (eg) high technology
industries where high risk exists. If such a change in institutional investment
policy were to take place the consequences for the economy would be
considerable, but analysis of this is a task best left for another occasion. Finally
a warning: lest the reader should be left with the impression that beta
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coefficients are the greatest thing since sliced bread, one should remember that
the Capital Asset Pricing Model is essentially a derivative of the Tobin-
Markowitz approach to portfolio selection and is, therefore, subject to the same
shortcomings and criticisms to which that was subject. In particular, it should
be noted additionally that because the CAPM emphasises default risk it should
be the case that the distribution of returns should have a cut-off point at the
point of default, whereas in fact the CAPM is built on the assumption of
normally distributed returns. Nonetheless, in practice the CAPM does appear
to have established quite a good track record in its application to the
investment portfolio selection decision.
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Chapter Flys Sac:Motes
1 In many places this field of study is referred to as the theory of finance, itself now a major
area of concentration.
2 See Chapter Eight for details.
3 Real investment refers to an increase in the (productive) capital stock, whereas a financial
investment simply refers to the purchase of a financial claim. See Chapter Two for further
details.
4 In recent years the use of expected utility maximisation as a basis for decision-making
under uncertainty has been called into question. Perhaps the first person to question the
validity of the approach was Maurice Allais in his 1953 article "Le Comportment de l'Homme
Rationnel Devant le Risque; Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine", (Econometrica,
volume 21, pp. 503-546). In short, the validity of expected utility maximisation as a basis for
decision-making under uncertainty rests on three essential axioms concerning preferences:
ordering, continuity and independence. Experiments performed by Allais in 1953, and more
recently (1979) by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky ("Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk", Econometrica, volume 47 pp. 263-291) show that in practice people have a
tendency to violate the independence axiom. This has led researchers into alternative theories
of decision-making under uncertainty, such as "disappointment theory" and "regret theory".
For an elegant summary of some of these approaches see Robert Sugden (1986) "New
Developments in the Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty", (Bulletin of Economic Research, 38:1,
pp.1-24). More complete surveys of this literature can be found in M. Machina (1983) "The
Economic Theory of Individual Behavior Toward Risk", Technical Report No. 433, Institute for
Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, California, and P.
Schoemaker (1982) "The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and
Limitations", Journal of Economic Literature, volume 20, pp. 529-563.
5 For an elaboration on this point and definitions of the terms see Chapter Seven.
6 If I wish to borrow El from another individual who, presumably, prefers El today to El
next year, then I must offer them more than El next year to entice them to lend me that El
today. The extra amount above the El. that I pay the lender is the interest payment.
7 It is possible to estimate the risk premium using some statistical measure of the
distribution of the investment's historical returns, but there is no consensus as to which
statistical measure is optimal, neither is there agreement on the degree to which past
distributions are a good reflection of future distributions.
8 Similar results to those of Tobin were also obtained by A. D. Roy in his 1952 paper, "Safety
First and the Holding of Assets". In that paper, Roy "...considers the implications of
minimising the upper bound of the chance of a dread event, when the information available
about the joint probability distribution of future occurrences is confined to the first- and
second-order moments." Although taking a very different line of approach in this less well-
known article, Roy ends up with what is essentially a Tobin-Markowitz mean-variance model
of portfolio selection.
9 This sequential decision-making procedure differs greatly from the approach postulated
by Friedman in (eg) "The Quantity Theory of Money: A Restatement" (1952), where decisions
are essentially taken simultaneously. For Friedman there is no separation theorem.
10 This implies aggregation in a manner which requires the validity of a Separation Theorem,
an issue to which we shall return later in this chapter. See also Appendix 5.2.
11 The standard deviation is a statistical measure of the spread of a probability distribution;
the greater the spread the higher the standard deviation. It also provides a measure of how
likely it is that a variable will deviate from its mean (or expected) value. Thus, with a
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distribution of (potential) rates of interest, the standard deviation provides a measure of the
likelihood that the actual rate will differ from the expected rate, ie, the riskiness of the
investment. It is worth noting that the standard deviation is not the only possible statistical
measure of risk, rather that it is arguably the most convenient and practical measure.
12 An indifference curve is a locus of points (pR, 0-) along which expected utility is constant.
Under given postulates it can be shown that an individual's choice among probability
distributions can be represented by maximisation of the expected value of a utility function.
Such a utility function has to be (at least) twice continuously differentiable, bounded, concave,
and unique up to a linear, increasing (affine) transformation. See (eg) J. von Neumann and 0.
Morgenstern (1947).
13 This stems from the assumption of declining non-negative marginal utility of return; ie,
U(R) > 0 and U(R) < 0. See Section 3.3.1.
14 A point to which we shall return in this chapter on more than one occasion.
15 This corresponds to Tobin's constant-return locus.
16 This corresponds to Tobin's constant-risk locus.
17 An iso-variance ellipse will not be an ellipse if one or more of the following conditions
hold:
(i) al 1 - 2a13 + a33 = 0, ie, (r1 - r3 ) has zero variance;
(ii) - 20-23 + o-33 = 0, ie, (r2 - r3 ) has zero variance;
(iii) (r1 - r3) and (r2 - r3) have a correlation coefficient of +1.
(i) occurs when o-ii = o-33 = 0, or when r1 and r3 are perfectly correlated. Similarly for (ii).
18 See instead Appendix 5-1, section I.
19 le, those variables corresponding to securities not held in the portfolio.
20 This is dealt with in Appendix 5-1, section II.
21 For full details see J. Marschak and R. Radner, Economic Theory of Teams, Chapter One.
22 If U(x) is not a polynomial of degree n, then the preference ordering depends on
distribution properties not described by the first n moments.
23 See Appendix 5-2, section I.
24 Recall that Tobin uses f(R; pR, aR) in his notation.
25 Up till now we have been assuming that the risky assets may be aggregated and treated as
if they were a single risky asset.
26 The mean-variance approach of both Tobin and Markowitz did allow for a large number of
risky assets. However, much of their analysis proceeds on the assumption that there is a
Separation Theorem, ie, that (under certain conditions) a single mutual fund of these risky
assets can be formed and analysed as if there were a single risky asset.
27 This is analogous to the method used by (eg) Markowitz, whereby each asset is
characterised by a probability distribution of its returns. Here we consider a possible return on
asset i as pi. The future will bring with it one of a number of possible "states of nature" (or
"states of the world" as they are also known). Associated with each of these possible states
will be a (gross) rate of return. Thus, pi(0) denotes the (gross) rate of return on asset i in state 9.
Page 160
[
i ai[Pi (0 ) - l 
2]
i=2
_j.2 i..---2
i aiaj[Pi(0)-1-ti][Pj(0)-1-91]
28 This is a technical assumption which guarantees an interior solution.
29 This assumption can be relaxed without unduly affecting the conclusions.
30 This assumes that there are only a finite number of states of nature. If there were an
infinite number of states then I would be replaced by J.
31 Special cases of this restriction occur when:
(a) c = 1. Here U'(VV) = a + bW; ie, the utility function is a quadratic.
(b) a = 0. Here U'(W) = bWc; ie, there is constant relative risk aversion. In this case
the demand for each security, including money, is proportional to initial wealth. This
restriction may be compared with the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion utility function
shown in Appendix 5-2.
32 Thus, if all portfolios differ only in terms of means and variances, then because variances
are assumed to be finite, a normal distribution is implicitly assumed when using mean-
variance analysis.
33 That is to say, we assume aviam > o and aViaolw <0.
34 See equation (5-16).
	
n	 n	 . .35	 G2w = .NVI:).E E aiPi(o)-	
2
E ad-Lij ]
	
- [i=2
	 i=2
W. L E aiaraii
j=2 i=2
, 2 2
= vv 0 -°-
where cs2
 = ana, Si = [aip, and a = [a2, a3,...,anr.
36 Note that these are linear equations.
37 This is particularly apparent from the evidence presented to the Wilson Committee. See
the Appendix to Chapter Seven.
38 This model, and the multi-period version which follows, owe more than a little to
Samuelson's 1969 article, "Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic Stochastic Programming".
39 The rate of return, X, is considered to be a random variable.
40 Compare this with equation (5-2-2) in Appendix 5-2.
41 This is because Y = (A - C)(1 + coX). Now co replaces a as a decision variable.
42 This does not occur with other specifications of the utility function.
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43 At this stage it is necessary to assume that the (subjective) probability distributions for all
Xt's are stationary. In other words, the probability distribution of XI is independent of the
outcomes on Xt for all t 
 'r , and also that the probability distribution of Xt is identical for all t.
44 See Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis, (1947) page 34. Put simply (sic!), the
derivative of the optimised value of the objective function, Ji (WT4 ), with respect to a
parameter (here WTI) is equal to the partial derivative of that function; ie, we may ignore the
fact that Or_i* and 0.)-r_ i*
 may depend on WT.i.
45 The second equality follows from the first-order conditions of (5-19) as applied to (5-30).
46 That is, periods T-2 and T-1.
47 This follows directly from (5-29).
48 See E. F. Fama (1970), "Multiperiod Consumption-Investment Decisions".
49 See also E. J. Elton and M. J. Gruber (1974), "The Multiperiod Consumption and
Investment Problem and Single Period Analysis".
50 See Fama (1970).
51 For example, the Financial Times ordinary share index, Dow Jones industrial average,
Hang Seng index, etc.
52 That is to say, the market is assumed to be efficient, with prices adjusting swiftly to
account for new information. Additionally, it should be noted that the risk level associated
with the Market Portfolio may be too high (or low) for any individual investor.
53 If such a case existed, and the investor (eg) was willing to take up a level of risk
corresponding to a value of ap = 2am, then the investor would be buying $2 worth of the
Market Portfolio for every $1 of equity he owned, obtaining the necessary funds by borrowing
an amount equal to his equity. In other words, he would be buying the Market Portfolio on a
fifty per cent margin at an interest rate of rf.
54 See Financial Weekly, 23rd March, 1979, page 26.
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D
APPENDIX 5-A: TM WIErkowitl Elaw-Varianca Approach
to Portiorio Se%Minn
I) The Four Securities Case:
This is essentially nothing more than an extension of the three-securities
case presented in the main body of the chapter. We can still represent the
analysis in geometric form by use of "three dimensional" diagrams, and using
X 4 = 1 - X3 - X2 - X1 . Instead of a triangle, the legitimate set is now a
tetrahedron as shown by abcd in Figure 5A-1.
_
Figure 5A-1:
A subset of portfolios is now a subspace, defined without regard to the
constraint Xi  0 for all j. We consider only those portfolios such that X 1 + X2 +
X3 + X4
 =1. We define a subspace S1.24 such that the following conditions are
satisfied:
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p-,
Similarly for (eg) S2.3.4:
1) X3
 = 0;
2) Xi + X2 + X3
 + X4
 = 0;
1) Xi
 = 0;
2) + X2 + X3 + X4 = 0;
and so on. Altogether there are fifteen possible subspaces which may be
summarised as follows:
a 3 dimensional subspace (hyperplane);A) S123.4
B) S1.2.3, S2.34, S1.24, Si.34 = 2 dimensional subspace (plane);
C) S1.2, S 1.3, Sm, S2.3, S24, 534 = 1 dimensional subspace (line);
D) Si, S2, S3, S4 = 0 dimensional subspace (point).
Analogous to the critical line used in the three-security case, we now use a
critical set which is defined using the notation above. For example, 1 1.2.3 is the
critical set associated with the subspace S12.3 . To pursue the analysis we need
to assume that the iso-variance sets will be ellipsoids.*
The nature of 1 1.2.3.4 will depend on whether:
1) il l = kt 2
 = 1,1 3 = 11 4, ie, all securities have the same expected return. Thus,
1 1.2.3.4 will be a point representing that portfolio (not necessarily legitimate)
with minimum variance; or alternatively
2) at least two g's have different values. Here it is possible to find portfolios
with any level of expected return (again regardless of legitimacy). We need to
find values of Xi for all i which satisfy E = p 1 X1 + g 2x2 + g 3x3 + 1.1 4X4 for any
value of E. So we define 1 1.2.3.4 as the locus of all points, P, which satisfy the
following:
(i) P is in S1.234; ie, X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 = 1;
(ii) of all portfolios in S1.2.3.4 with the same E as P, P has minimum
variance. These conditions apply whether or not the	 are equal. If
they are equal then the locus consists of a single point.
Similarly, 1 1.2.3 will be those points, P, such that:
1) P E S1.2.3, and
2) of all portfolios in S1.2.3 with the same E as P, P has minimum
variance. Similar conditions apply for all 1 1.2, 1 23, etc. Figure 5A-2
illustrates the critical sets system.
* This corresponds to the technical assumption that the covariance matrix of (r1-r4), (r2-r4) and (r344)
is non-singular.
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Figure 5A-2:
Let X be that legitimate portfolio with minimum variance. If c is legitimate,
then X E c. Every efficient portfolio is on some critical line; the converse is not
true. The computing procedure begins at X and travels along the critical lines
in the direction of increasing E. When an intersection of two critical lines is
reached, the critical line is changed and movement continues in the direction of
increasing E. This process goes on until the point X, with maximum E, is
reached. Every point passed through is an efficient portfolio.
It is apparent that this is simply an extension of the three securities case.
We can extend it even further to include many more securities, although
beyond this stage diagrammatic representation would not be possible. The
basic features required are the definitions of, and notations for subspaces and
critical lines, and the tracing of the set of efficient portfolios along the critical
lines.
We now turn our attention to the Markowitz computing procedure for the
derivation of portfolios which are efficient by the mean-variance criterion. An
example is used for illustrative purposes.
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and S =
II) The Computing Procedure:
The computing procedure takes means, variances and covariances and
processes them to calculate a set of efficient portfolios. Using the three
securities case and those definitions given in Chapter Five we have:
r.062
I-I- =	 0.1461
0.128
C= I
0.0146	 0.0187
0.0187
	 0.0854
0.0145	 0.0104
0.0145
0.0104
0.0289
and hence, M =
0.0146 0.0187 0.0145 1.000 -
0.0187 0.0854 0.0104 1.000
0.0145 0.0104 0.0289 1.000
_ 1.000 1.000 1.000
	 0
Also, R =
0.062--
0.146
0.128
o
Step 1: This finds the efficient portfolio, X (1), with maximum expected return.
Because the only constraints are Xi  0 for all j and EXi = 1, this portfolio will
consist entirely of that security with the greatest expected return. Thus we
have:
0 1
X(1) =[ 1
0
When the constraints are of the more general form AX = b the relevant method
used is that of linear programming.
Step 2: At present the only security in the portfolio is the second; ie, j = 2 is the
IN variable. Thus, j =1,3 are OUT. We now proceed to find the formula of the
critical line associated with the portfolio X(1). Thus ivi x[	 is:
.R+SXE
X,
1 0 0 0
_
X1
_
0 -	 0
0 0.0854 0 1 X2
_
_ o
+ xE
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
X30
1- -
0.146
_
_
_	 0	 -
Using the method described in Chapter Five we derive:
0	 0	 0	 0
(m) -1 ,....	 0	 0	 0	 1
0	 0	 0	 0
_	 0	 1	 0	 -0.0854_
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Now, T(1) = N(1).R =
12/11.2
and also
intersection: here we have anXi G12X2 (3.13X3 ± X1 ki1XE
[ X T(1) + XE.U(1)
X
Combining we get I
-an, an, a13, 1] [T(1) + A,E .U(1)] = giXE (5A1)
and thus, N(1)
- 0	 0	 0	 0
0	 0	 0	 1
0	 0	 0	 0
0	 1	 0	 -0.0854
0
0 - 0
1	 and U(1) = N(1).S =
	
0
0
-0.0854	 _0.146_
- 0	 0
And [= T(1) + XE.UW	 1=	 + XE1
X	 0	 0
_ -0.0854	 0.146
Step 3: Having found the formula for the critical line associated with X 0), we
now need to find those values of X E at which the critical line intersects those
critical lines with the properties:
(1) all IN variables are also IN on the first line;
(2) one additional variable is IN; and
(3) all other variables are OUT.
As our first critical line was 1 2 we are looking for values of XE when 12
intersects 1 1.2 and 1 2.3 . We consider these intersections in turn:
0	 0
ie, [ 0.0146 0.0187 0.0145 1.000
-0.0854	 0.146_
10	 + xEl 0° . 0.062XE
0.0187 - 0.0854 + 0.146XE = 0.0624
Hence,	 XE = 0.794.
12 /12.3 intersection: here we have Gm; + 632X2 +	 + X3 =1-1.3XE.
Using the same method by which we obtained (5A-1) we find:
0	 0
1	 0[ 0.0145 0.0104 0.0289 1.000	 + XE.
0	 0
..-0.0854.
	 0.146_
-0.075 + 0.146A,E = 0.128XE
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. 0.128XE
Applying these definitions to our example we obtain:
B=
-
_ 
0.0145 _
0.0104 = -0.06460.0289
1.000 _
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0.0145 -
1 0.0104
0 0.0289
-0.0854 _ 1.000
b =[	 o	 1	 0	 -0.075
-
-
=
-
N(2) =
-
N(2) =
Hence,
	
XE = 4.166666.
Using these calculated values for XE we only consider that intersection for
which it has the greatest value; in this case that is 12/12.3. Thus we are
moving from critical line 1 2 to 1 2.3 . This means that j = 3 is now an IN variable
and so we proceed to compute the formula for the new critical line.
Step 4: Because j = 3 is now IN we need to move from N(1) to N(2). To do this
we must first establish a few additional definitions:
Let cin be the joth column of M. Then, B = N(i).9 n, b = 39 n
and c = ml• al• - b
'
 where Mj nj n is the (jojo)th element of M.
n 
Now, if fij E N(i) and gij E N(i+1) then gi ni n = 1 / C
gij n = gj ni . -bi /c, for all i  jo, [bi] =B
gii = f 	 (bibj /c), for all i  jo and for all j # jo.
c = 0.0289 + 0.0646 = 0.0935
Applying the definitions for the various gii we obtain:
0	 0	 o	 o
o	 1	 -1	 1 0.075 0.0935	 0.0935	 0.0935
0	 -1	 1	 0.075 
	0.0935	 0.0935	 0.0935
0	 1 0.075	 0.075	 +
	
0.0935	 0.0935	 -0.0854 (-0.°75)2 0.0935 _
_ _
0 10.695187 -10.695187 0.1978609
0 -10.695187 10.695187 0.802139
0 0.1978609 0.802139 -0.0252395_
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+ XE
Xi
X2
X3
1
-ie, + 0.1408044 -
0
Now, T(2) = N(2).R = 0.1978609
0.802139 and also U(2) = N(2).S =
0
0.1925133
--0.0252395 -0.1925133
-0.1315614
[The formula for the critical line is x
= T(2) + XE U(2), hence:
X
[ :1
-	 0	 -
0.1978609
0.802139
-0.0252395
0
0.1925133
-0.1925133
_ 0.1315614
When XE = XE (1) = 4.166666 then we find (approximately) that X1
 = X3
 = 0 and
X2 = 1. As the value of XE declines, X2 will also decrease and X3 will increase.
The points generated by the critical line formula are efficient for XE = 4.166666
down to that value of XE
 at which the present critical line intersects another (or
XE = 0).
Step 5: This finds the first critical line which intersects the present critical line
as the value of XE declines. Currently we are on critical line 1 2.3, whence we
arrived from 12, so we only need to consider the intersections with 1 3
 and
11.2.3:
12 .3/1 3 intersection: X2
 = 0.1978609 + 0.1925133XE = 0,
ie, XE < 0.
1 2.3 /1 1.2.3 intersection: here we have ra a
-- 11 , - 12, a 13 , 1 ] [T(2) +
U(2).XE] = iaiXE
-0.0099084 + 0.1323699XE = 0.062XE
Hence,	 XE = 0.1408044
So the first critical line to intersect the current critical line is 11.2.3 at a value of
0.1408044 for XE. The portfolio at this intersection will be such that:
[ X i = T(2) + U(2) XE(2)
_
0
0.1978609
0.802139
_-0.0252395
0
0.1925134
-0.1925134
_ 0.131564 _
0
0.2249676
0.7792563
-0.006715 _
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0	 0	 0 0.0146 - 0
10.695187 -10.695187 0.1978609 0.0187 0.2427806
-10.695187 10.695187 0.802139 0.0145
=
0.7572193
0.1978609 0.802139 -0.0252395__ 1.000 -0.0099084
_ 	_
0.0146
0.0187
o	 0.2427806 0.757192 -0.0099084] 0.0145 = 0.0056112
1.000
b=[
^
=B
-
Thus, when XE = XE (2) = 0.1408044 we have a portfolio consisting of
(approximately) twenty-two per cent of X2 and seventy-eight per cent of X3,
with no X1 being held.
Step 6: Using the same method as Step 4 we proceed to calculate the formula
for the critical line 1 1.2.3 . Now j = 1 is IN, so we move from N(2) to N(3):
N(3) =
c = 0.0146
, 111.24955
-27.00923
-84.24031
1.102313
- 0.0056112	 =	 0.0089888
-27.00923 -84.24031	 1.102313
17.252504 9.756726 -0.0697573
9.756726 74.483575 -0.0325476
-0.0697573-0.0325476-0.0143174
_
1.102313 _ -7.8286351
Thus, T(3) = N(3).R = -0.0697573 and also, U(3) = N(3).S = 2.0931542
-0.0325476 5.7354803
--0.0143174 0.0539927
The formula for the critical line is [ X i = T(3) + XEU(3), hence:
X
[ : ] + XE
_
1.102313
-0.0697573
-0.0325476
-0.0143174-
-7.8286351
2.0931542
5.7354803
0.0539927
Step 7: Here we repeat the method of Step 5 to find the first critical line to
intersect our current critical line as X.E declines from 0.1408044. At present we
are on 1 1.2.3 whence we arrived from 1 2.3, thus:
12.3/13 intersection: X2 = -0.0697573 + 2.0931542A. E = 0,
ie, A,E = 0.0333264.
X3 = -0.0325476 + 5.7354803X E = 0,
hence, ?LT = 0.0056747.
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N(4) =
So the first critical line intersection occurs when XE = XE(3) = 0.0333264, and the
next efficient set lies along 1 1.3 . The portfolio at this intersection will be:
	
[X11 L1 .102313
	
[7.8286351
	
X2 = 0.0697573
	
]
+ 0.0333264 2.0931542
X3	 -0.0325476
	
5.7354803
	
0.8474127	 0.8414127
= -0.0000000058692 I a	 0
	
0.1585953	 0.1585953
Step 8: Here we proceed as we did with Steps 2,4 and 6 to find the formula for
the critical line 1 1.3
•
 The first task is to calculate N(4). Because j = 2 is no
longer IN a zero cross will appear in the second row and second column. In
addition, as no new variable is INT, we cannot define cj, hence we require a
new formula to calculate N(4); this appears as:
+ fij o.fj oi kgii = q
From this we obtain:
68.965919
-68.965919
0.9931027
-68.965919 0.9931027
68.965385 0.0068984
0.0068984 0.014599	 _
-0.9931027
-4.5516636
Thus , T(4) = N(4).R o
0.0068984 and also U(4) = N(4).S = 4.5517244
0.014599 0.0624553
E xThe formula for the critical line is	 = T(4) + EU(4), hence:
X
_
0.9931027 _
[
X I	 0
=-
X	 0.00689840.014599 _
-4.5516636
4.5517244
_ 0.0624553
Step 9: Following Steps 5 and 7 we are looking to find the first critical line to
intersect the current critical line (11.3) as XE declines from 0.0333264. However,
as we move along 11.3 in the direction of the declining value of XE, we find•
that XE reaches zero before we reach the next critical line intersection (le, XE is
negative at the next intersection). Thus our efficient set ends at:
X 
= T(4) + O.U(4) = T(4)
X,
Page 171
This implies that T(4) gives us that portfolio from the efficient set which
minimizes the variance of the portfolio. In this case we find that
[0.9931027 1
[x] =	0
0.0068984 i
Thus, by using the Markowitz selection procedure we have selected that
portfolio which consists of (approximately) ninety-nine per cent of security X1,
nothing is held by way of X2 , and one per cent of security X3 . Obviously the
three-securities case is a limited example, but provides a useful vehicle for
showing the selection procedure; an example using more securities would only
result in a lengthier, more tedious Appendix along similar lines. So, our three
securities example should have maximised the reader's understanding while
minimising the effort required to achieve such an understanding!
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APPEINDOX S-B: Portfolio Selection — A General
Mathematical Approach
I) A Secure and a Risky Asset:
In this section we assume that there are only two assets which may be held
in the portfolio: bonds, which bear interest and are a risky proposition, and
money, which bears no interest but is a safe prospect (ie, its return is certain).
Notation:
A = initial wealth (denominated in money terms)
a	 = amount invested in bonds; so, 0  a  A
m = amount invested in money; so, m = A - a
X = net rate of return on bonds
(1 + X)a = terminal value of bonds
Y = terminal wealth; so, Y = m + a(1 + X) = A + aX.
The Model:
The investor's objective is to maximise E[U(Y)], where U is a monotonically
increasing, concave utility function; ie:
maximise E[U(Y)] = E[U(A + aX)] E--- W(a) 	 (5B-1)
First order conditions: 	 W'(a) = E[U'(Y).X]
Second order conditions:W"(a) = E[U"(Y).X2] < 0, since U" < 0
	 (5B -2)
Three possible optima exist:
i) maximum occurs at a = 0. Here we find W'(0)  0, as illustrated in
Figure 5B-1(a), and W(0) = E[U'(A).X] = U'(A).E(X). So, a = 0 if
E (X)  O.
ii) maximum occurs at a = A. Thus, only bonds are held—a plunger—
as illustrated in Figure 5B-1(b), and W'(a)  0.
iii) interior maximum, ie, 0  a  A. Here the investor holds a
diversified portfolio, as illustrated in Egue5B-X0, so E[IXYPQ =0.
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0 A
W(a)
Figure 5B-1:
W(a)4
(b)
	a,..... a
We now consider some special cases—in terms of the form of the utility
function—which lead to an interior maximum and, therefore, a diversified
• portfolio:
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U (a) i
........
1
i
b/2
1/b A
(1) Quadratic Utility:
U(Y) = Y - (b/2)Y2, where 0 <Y < 1/b.
First order conditions:	 E[U1(Y).X1 = E[(1 - bY)X1
=E[(1 - bA)X - abX2 1 = 0
Define ux F- E(X) and 6x2 E Et[X - E(X)]2).-=-- E(X2) - [E(X) 21. Thus, the first
order conditions become:
(1 - bA)lix - ab( Gx2 ± px2) .= 0
This is tantamount to the mean-variance approach, and we obtain
a= 
(1 - bA)gx 
>0 iff A < 1
2)
b(0-2x+ ux	 b
According to this, the greater the initial wealth the lower will be the investment
in bonds. Also, the riskier the bonds the lower the investment in bonds. If Gx2
> 1.tx2 then an increase in expected return will lead to an increased investment
in bonds. Conversely, if Gx2 <x then an increase in expected return will lead
to a decreased investment in bonds.
For completeness it is often assumed that when Y  1/b the utility function
takes the form U(Y) = b/2. This quadratic utility function is illustrated in
Figure 5B-2. If we consider the measures of absolute and relative risk-aversion
referred to in Chapter Five we find Ra(A) = b/(1-bA). Note that this violates the
Arrow hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk-aversion. However, dR a /dA is
positive—dRa /dA = b2 /(1 -bA)2 > 0—which is consistent with Arrow's
hypotheses.
Figure 5B-2:
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U(a) i
A
(2) Iso-Elastic Marginal Utility:
U(Y) = (1 tY)Y7, where y < 1 and y  0,
U(Y) = log A where 1 = o. 1
This is illustrated in Figure 5B-3. The first order conditions are:
ERY(Y).X] = E[X(A + aX)7-11 = 0
Writing the proportion of initial wealth invested in bonds as w = a/A, the first
order conditions become:
EDC(A + coAX)7-11 = A7-1 .E[X(1 +(t.)X)1-1] = 0
From this we can see that Co is independent of the level of A. This is the
simplest case of a class of propositions known as Portfolio Separation
Theorems. Considering only those cases where y < 1, we obtain the following
for absolute and relative risk aversion measures:
Ra(A) = (1 - ?VA
This implies decreasing absolute risk aversion, which is consistent with
Arrow's hypotheses; and also:
Rr(A) = 1 - y
This implies constant relative risk aversion, contradicting the Arrow
hypotheses.
Figure 5B-3:
1 For a further consideration of this point see L'HOpital's rule.
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(3) Exponential Utility:
U(Y) = (-1 /i)e-TlY
This is illustrated in Figure 5B-4. The first order conditions are:
ERY(Y).X1 = EtX.e41(A
 + aX)) = e41A.Ete41AX.X) = 0
Here, the amount investea in bonds, a, is independent of the level of initial
wealth, A. This is closely related to another of the class of Portfolio Separation
Theorems. The following measures of absolute and relative risk-aversion are
obtained:
Ra(A) =11 > 0
This implies constant absolute risk aversion, in contradiction of the Arrow
hypotheses; and also:
Rr(A) = T1A
which implies increasing relative risk aversion, which is consistent with the
Arrow hypotheses.
Figure 5B-4:
U(a) i
0
(4) Hyperbolic Absolute Risk-Aversion (HARA) Utility:
U(a) = 1 - y {13a + rir
7	 1 - 7 1
where 0 < y< 1 and r, pi > 0. This utility function exhibits both increasing
relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion, and is wholly
consistent with the Arrow hypotheses, which appear:
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Ra (A) = 1
A + i1
	
(1-7)	 13
Rr(A) = 1
1 4. 11]
(1-7) [3a
Although this utility function is of a general nature, it does have the following
special cases:
(0 if T1 = 0 then HARA reduces to the iso-elastic marginal utility
function;
(b) if y = 1 is permitted then U(A) is only well-defined for
(7- 1)11 O<A<
13.
Then if Ti = 1 and y = +co, HARA reduces to the exponential utility
function;
64 as with (ii) above, if T1 > 0 and? = 2, then HARA reduces to the
quadratic utility function.
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Ghamer	 T Thatry AppHad
(or Tha Uterature So Far)
6.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter we surveyed a number of the more highly regarded
works in the area of portfolio selection theory. We propose, in this chapter, to
extend that survey, and hence move nearer our ultimate objective, by
considering those works concerned with the application of the portfolio
selection theory to the investigation of the investment behaviour of financial
institutions. The reasons for separating a chapter on portfolio theory from its
application to financial institutions are numerous. Firstly, traditional portfolio
(or asset-holding) theory of the Markowitz-kind is usually concerned with the
selection of individual assets within broad asset-groupings (classes), whereas
we shall be more concerned with the wider issue of the selection across asset
classes. However, traditional portfolio theory of the Tobin-kind is concerned
with portfolio selection across asset-groupings for, as we have seen, such
theories frequently assume the existence of two broad asset classes: money and
fixed interest securities ("bonds"). These theories attempt to explain the
behaviour of investors possessing positive net wealth, who desire to maximise
the net return (in terms of yield and capital gain) at a given target date in the
future (often one 'period' hence). The individual's investment behaviour is
hypothesised as being influenced by his net wealth, the relative yields and
expected future prices of assets, and the individual's degree of risk-aversion (ie,
the degree of certainty with which these expectations are held). However, this
type of theory is not always directly applicable to the portfolio decisions of
financial institutions because they face different circumstances from those
assumed for the individual investor. 1
 As an example, we might highlight the
assumption that any individual may purchase or sell unlimited quantities of
any asset without any significant influence on its price. Clearly, this
assumption does not hold for financial institutions who frequently dominate
certain financial markets. 2 A third reason for the existence of this chapter is
that traditional portfolio theory talks about desired and expected levels of asset
demand, yields, rates of interest, etc, whereas it may be more desirable to
concern ourselves with their rates of change; after all, as we note elsewhere in
this Thesis, the pension funds do tend to accept their existing portfolio as if it
were historically given, and move toward their desired portfolio by the
allocation of incoming new monies.
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Also in this chapter we shall, for the most part, be limiting ourselves to
consider only that part of the literature on the portfolio behaviour of financial
institutions that directly concerns itself with the United Kingdom. This
decision has been taken in spite of the fact that there exists a large body of
literature on financial institutions in other countries. 3 Yet we shall not
completely ignore this "outside literature"; indeed, a large amount of it has
been responsible for stimulating much of the domestic research that we shall be
surveying in this chapter, while many of the ideas and concepts that we shall
come to use owe a great debt to this body of outside literature. Nevertheless,
because the pension funds (and, indeed, all other financial institutions in the
United Kingdom) operate in a rather different environment—in terms of
history, legality, custom, etc—from those faced by their counterparts in other
countries,4
 it is important for us to concentrate our attention on those works
directly concerned with the United Kingdom.
In Chapter Five one of the most striking features of the literature surveyed
was its relatively contemporary authorship. Yet, as we shall see, although
portfolio selection theory is a new and developing area of study, its application
to the behaviour of British financial institutions is even more recent, for the
most part having been published in the past decade or so.5 Despite not being
as prolific as its American counterpart, there is a substantial body of British
literature on the behaviour of financial institutions and like many other areas of
Economics it divides rather neatly into two broad approaches, which we have
chosen to label the "Essex School" and the "Sheffield School", on the basis of
their geographical origins.
It is worth digressing for a moment or two to speculate upon the reasons
why financial institutions were not considered either important or interesting
enough for economists to investigate in depth before the 1960s, by which time
many of them had been in existence for a century or more. One possible
argument is that no work on the behaviour of financial institutions could occur
until some breakthrough had been made in portfolio selection theory. As we
saw, this did not occur in earnest until 1958. Yet an equally convincing case •
could be made for the view that had the financial institutions been regarded as
important or interesting enough to study earlier in history, because of the very
nature of their operations we might well have seen an earlier breakthrough in
portfolio selection theory than that of Markowitz (or Roy). It is also
noteworthy that despite the fact that behavioural studies of financial
institutions did begin to appear shortly after the beginnings of their rapid
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growth in the post-War period, this is not to be regarded as the prime factor
that opened up this area of research. The major impetus would appear to be
more truly attributable to two publications around the turn of the 1950s: in the
United Kingdom the report of the Radcliffe Committee (1959), and in the
United States the seminal work of Gurley and Shaw (1960). 6 In brief, this
impetus occurred because these two works brought about a whole new sense
of the importance attaching to the concept of liquidity. 7 Because financial
institutions were regarded as possessing a direct influence on the liquidity of
the economy, their degree of importance (and interestingness!) 8 rapidly grew,
bringing with it a wave of work in this newly-opened area for research.
Perhaps the first piece of work in this area is the 1962 Clayton article,
"British Financial Intermediaries in Theory and Practice", which in many
respects may be regarded as being almost a direct consequence of the Radcliffe
Report (and, to a lesser extent, Gurley and Shaw). In this article Clayton
compares and contrasts the ability of banks and other financial intermediaries
to 'create' credit via the multiplier, and thereby their ability to affect the degree
of liquidity in the U. K. economy. Unlike later articles, which examine the
underlying motivations for the investment behaviour of British financial
institutions, the major focus of this article was a concern as to how monetary
policy might be affected by the behaviour of financial institutions.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that this work laid the foundation of academic
interest in the study of financial intermediary behaviour for Clayton (and later
the Sheffield school, as well as others), for shortly afterward he was again in
print, this time as a co-author with F. P. R. Brechling, investigating the portfolio
behaviour of the commercial banks (1965). 9 It is, therefore, entirely warranted
to view Radcliffe and Gurley and Shaw as being directly responsible for the
growth of literature on the economics of financial institutions. As a footnote of
interest, it is also worth noting the coincidental timing of these earlier
publications with the seminal works of Markowitz, Roy, et al, on portfolio
theory, thereby giving a two-pronged impetus to research work on financial
intermediation.
Although by 1970 the work of Clayton on financial intermediaries was only
just gathering momentum, the impetus of Radcliffe had not yet waned and a
new approach appeared on the scene. This was the "Essex school" which,
under the guidance and leadership of Michael Parkin, established a different
approach to investigating the investment behaviour of financial institutions.
Whereas the Sheffield approach had been predominantly empirical, the asset
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demand functions to be tested being constructed from the observed behaviour
of the institutions under investigation, the Essex school adopted a more
rigorous theoretical foundation, with the explicit statement of an institution's
objectives and constraints from which the relevant asset demand functions to
be tested were derived. Fisher (1978, Chapter Five) shows how the basic Essex
school approach is really an extension of the Tobin mean-variance model of
portfolio selection.
Publications on the investment behaviour of financial institutions by the
Essex school continued up to the mid-1970s (at which time Parkin had moved
on elsewhere, both academically and geographically), when the work of the
Sheffield school was still very much in its stride. Under the guidance and
leadership of Clayton, the Sheffield approach remained somewhat more ad hoc
than that of Essex, an issue to which we shall return later. For most of the late
1970s and the 1980s there has been very little work in this area, although
publications are increasingly appearing on a more regular basis largely, it
seems, as a response to the apparent failure of the "monetarist experiment" of
the Thatcher government.
During the course of the 1970s the impetus and influence of the Radcliffe
Report and Gurley and Shaw waxed and waned, partly as a result of the
incoming "monetarist counter-revolution", but mostly as a result of the normal
movement of academics, both geographically and intellectually. By the mid-
1970s the Essex school had come to a close while the Sheffield school became
far less prolific in its output. Since those heady days few other discernible
sources of research in this area have really emerged. We now turn our
attentions, therefore, to survey many of the works of these two schools in some
detail. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to this task, and is divided into
sections corresponding to the type of financial institution being investigated.
This enables us better to compare and contrast the two approaches. In what
follows, then, there is a brief review of each of the papers being surveyed,
followed by a critique and comparison at the end of each section.
6.1 Banks
6.1.1 Clayton and Brechling (1965)
As already mentioned, the first major work to appear investigating the
portfolio behaviour of banks was the 1965 article by Brechling and Clayton. In
• many respects this work appears to be a detailed extension of Clayton's earlier
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work on financial intermediaries (1962), not least because they share a common
concern for the effects of the behaviour of financial intermediaries upon the
effectiveness of monetary policy. By contrast however, the Brechling-Clayton
paper is primarily concerned with explaining the considerable variations to
which the asset holdings of the commercial banks are subject. This they do by
presenting a theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors believed to
influence the banks' choice of assets.
The authors commence by presenting a simple theoretical model of the
portfolio behaviour of the commercial banks; simple because there only exists
a single rate of interest, which the banks are unable to influence by their
actions. The model is extended later in the paper. The following choice
variables are defined for the banks:
L = L'/D	 I = I'/D	 A= A'/D
where L' represents the level of liquid assets (ie, cash, money at call, and
Treasury bills), I the level of investment (ie, predominantly government
bonds), A' the level of advances, and D the level of deposits, with L, I and A
being the corresponding ratios. The crucial assumption of the paper is that the
level of liquid assets, L', is exogenously given to the banks; that is to say, it is
fixed ('though not immovable) by the monetary authorities. The banks are
then hypothesised as performing a two-stage, simultaneous decision process.
Firstly, the bank chooses a liquid assets ratio, L, which, because L' is taken as
given, determines the level of deposits, D. Secondly, it must choose I and A to
determine the distribution of its non-liquid assets. The outcome of this
decision is three desired asset ratios, L *, I*, and A*. Because of the existence of
various constraints, these may well differ from the actual asset ratios, L, I and
A.
According to Brechling and Clayton, these desired asset ratios possess four
major determinants: the single rate of interest, i, accruable on both investments
and advances; the level of economic activity, approximated by the level of
National Income, Y; the first difference of the rate of interest, Ai; and finally,
L'. They then proceed to discuss the a priori effects expected upon the desired
asset-ratios due to changes in the parameters. However, we shall not pursue
that discussion here, save from noting that the parameter Ai is included by way
of a proxy measurement for the expected future rate of interest. This
relationship is considered to take the following form:
i t+1 = it + a6i.
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where it+i is the expected future rate of interest, a is some constant, and Ai is a
recent change in the rate of interest.
The constraints which may prevent the banks from attaining their desired
asset ratios may be either government- or market-imposed. The latter do not
affect investments, as the banks are assumed to be able to buy or sell
investment assets in unlimited quantities without affecting their price (i). This
is not the case for advances, however. These may well be constrained by the
demand side of the market, ie, the public's demand for loans. This public
demand for loans, Ap*', is postulated as taking the following form:
Ap*' = f(i, Ai, Y)
Because this needs to be compared with the banks' desired asset ratios,
Brechling and Clayton also define:
Ap* = Ap*'/D
= (1 /D11(i, Al, Y)
The government-imposed type of constraint is considered to have not
affected investments historically. However, because there does not exist any
measure of the degree of severity of government constraints (G) upon
advances, Brechling and Clayton adopt a proxy, using both i and Al, believing
G to be positively associated with both.
Brechling and Clayton proceed by using market diagrams for the three
choice assets, L, I and A, to analyse the possible positions of the two
constraints. To find out which (if any) of the constraints are binding, the
authors estimate the relationships between the three asset ratios and the four
exogenous variables over the period 1951.1 to 1963.111 using ordinary multiple
regression. Most of the data they use is self-explanatory; however, for the
single rate of interest, i, an average of short-, medium- and long-term rates is
used, while first differences in the bill rate was used for Al. In addition, a
simple time-trend, t, was used as an exogenous variable to eliminate the time-
trend from the National Income time series, Y. Finally, a series of dummy
variables, Q2, Q3 and Q4, were used to eliminate the influence of seasonal
fluctuations, each assuming the value 1 in its quarter and 0 elsewhere; the
constant being appropriate for the first quarter and altered by the dummy
variables elsewhere. The results of the estimation are reprinted here as Table 6-
1. Most of the evidence from the results tends to confirm Brechling and
Clayton's a priori expectations, apart from the coefficients on the Al being
predominantly insignificant. 10
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Table 6-1: The Brechlin -Cla ton Estimates
Equation 6 7 a 9 1 0 11
Dependent
Variable L I A L I A
Constant 14.154 88.522 -0.079 8.068 127.32 -27.9
(1.645) (9.049) (8.567) (3.244) (17.505) (17.105)
V -0.00243 -0.00338 0.00645 -0.00064 -0.01475 0.01461
(0.205) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
i 1.278 0.102 -1.964 1.222 0.456 -2.218
(0.205) (1.126) (1.066) (0.198) (1.070) (1.045)
Ar -0.2341 -0.815 1.187
-0.2939 -0.434 0.9138
(0.157) (0.861) (0.816) (0.153) (0.825) (0.807)
L 0.00114 -0.00162 0.00015 0.0011 -0.00131 0.00007
(0.001)
t
-0.151 0.965 -0.692
(0.070) (0.380) (0.372)
Q2 -0.039 1.23 -1.04 -0.57 2.41 -1.88
(0.300) (1.660) (1.580) (0.300) (1.640) (1.600)
Q3 0.12 3.93 -2.99 -0.02 4.78 -3.6
(0.350) (1.910) (1.810) (0.340) (0.830) (1.790)
Q4 -0.94 6.23 -5.55 -1.22 8.02 -6.83
(0.430) (2.370) (2.240) (0.430) (2.340) (2.290)
R2 0.89 0.77 0.81 0.9 0.8 0.83
Brechling and Clayton then extend their analysis by introducing three rates
of interest in place of the previous one. In particular, they distinguish the
Treasury Bill rate (r), the short-term rate on government bonds (R) and the
Bank Rate (p). These rates are meant to proxy the yields on liquid assets,
investments and advances respectively. The relationships postulated in the
simple model are then re-estimated with the incorporation of the three rates of
interest into the set of exogenous variables. However, the results that emerge
from this do not differ greatly from those obtained via the simple model.
Perhaps the only result of interest that does emerge from the expanded model
is the lack of any significant relationship between the Bank Rate and any of the
asset ratios. Finally, it should be noted that the expanded model indicates that
those relationships revealed by the simpler model are of a stronger nature than
originally revealed. In particular, strong relationships emerge between the
asset ratios and the Bill rate (r), the bond rate (R), and changes in the Bill rate
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(Ar). Brechling and Clayton proceed by suggesting a theoretical explanation of
these new relationships prior to discussing the implications of their findings for
the conduct of monetary policy (an issue with which we are not concerned
here).
6.1.2 Parkin, Gray and Barrett (1970)
Perhaps the major distinction between this 1970 paper (hereafter PGB) and
that by Brechling and Clayton, is that the former adopt a more rigorous
theoretical approach to the problem of portfolio selection by financial
institutions. Like most work in this area (including this Thesis!), PGB
commence with a brief review of previous work of a similar nature, which, at
the time of publication consisted wholly of the Brechling-Clayton paper. (Some
of their criticism of Brechling-Clayton is to be found at the end of this Section).
PGB compare the work of Brechling and Clayton with similar work on the
commercial banks in the United States, but they find these even more wanting
in terms of their lack of theoretical foundations. Motivated by the
shortcomings of earlier attempts, the PGB model has its foundations in a
rigorous theoretical explanation of commercial bank portfolio behaviour. They
set out to construct for a (typical) individual bank a set of structural equations
based upon the bank's optimisation of a given objective subject to various
constraints. These are then manipulated to obtain a set of reduced form
equations for the individual bank which are then aggregated over all banks and
empirically tested.11
Following Bernouilli and others,12 PGB assume that each bank has as its
objective the maximisation of its expected utility. Utility is represented as a
Freund (exponential) utility function of the form:13
U = a - ce4b11
where U is the level of utility per decision-period, II represents the real profit
per decision-period, and a, b and c are parameters such that a >< 0 and b, c> 0.
Further, the length of the decision-period is assumed to be fixed but is not
specified. 14 Drawing upon the work of both Markowitz and Tobin, PGB
assume n to be a normally-distributed stochastic variable with a mean value of
4 and a variance of cy2 • PGB formally state the typical bank's objective as the
maximisation of:
E(U) = a - c{-(1Pli+OP202)
This can be shown to be equivalent to maximising W = [t. - (b/2) 2, so the bank
, may be regarded as if it were maximising W,15
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Now, the level of actual profit per decision-period, II, will be the sum of the
products of each asset (or liability - measured negatively) level and its relevant
yield (or borrowing rate). PGB write this as:
= m'v
where m' is a (1 x k) vector of yields and borrowing rates, and v is a (k x 1)
vector of assets and liabilities.
Because each bank bases its portfolio selection policy according to values of
expected yields which determine the expected or desired levels of asset
holdings, PGB write:
m = fri + u n	 and	 v = + uv
where ra, IT are (k x 1) vectors of expected yields and asset/liability levels
respectively, and urn and uv represent the relevant vectors of forecast errors.
Using these PGB write:
IT = (11-1 + urny 6 + uv)
ie,
	 + Euv + um + u m' uv.
Thus:	 = E(H) = i1 +
	 +.iT'E(urn) + E(um'uv).
PGB assume that E(u) and E(um) are both equal to zero, with u rn and uv being
independently distributed. 16
 This gives:
= E(H) =
	 (6-1-1)
Now, by definition the variance of profit is given by:
(y2 Ei[ll _Euv2}
=	 + um'uv)2}	 (64-2)
Given the PGB assumptions regarding the distributions of um and us,, this
reduces to:
cy2 = frei'E(uvuv'f-ii + ir"'E(umum' + E(umum'uvuvi)
ie,	 o2 =
	 +	 + y
where C 	 E(uvuv i ) and Cmm = E(umuml ) are covariance matrices, and y=
E(umum'uvuv').
Before proceeding further with their analysis, PGB partition the
assets/liabilities vector, v, between those which are in the bank's choice set and
those which are exogenous. To do this they first define the elements of v:
v' = (L, T, C, B, A, S, R, Z, -D D, -DT)
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.-
VV*= [fil-Ne rax_
L cr'x
where L (call loans), T (Treasury bills), C (commercial bills) and B (government
bonds) are the assets in the bank's choice set, while A (advances), S (special
deposits), R (notes, coins and banker's deposits), Z (other items), -D 0 (current
account deposits), and -DT (deposit account deposits) are exogenous.17
Formally, this appears as follows:
= (L, T, C, B : A, S, R, Z, -D , -D ) = (vN vx)
uvi = (uL, 0, 0, 0 ; uA, us, uR, uz, up, urr) = (u vi N uvi x)
= U i,	 Cric, Crib: Cr'ia, iris, 0, 0, 0, iri d)= (friNi
= (u1 , ut, Uc, ub ua, us, 0, 0, 0, u d) = (um' N um' x) 18
At this point it is worth noting that the value of L is not deterministically
selected; rather, it adjusts to that level which takes up the departure of the
actual values of the exogenous items from their expected levels. Thus, the
bank's portfolio selection problem is to maximise W = - (b/2) 2 subject to the
following constraints:
(i) iNv N +Ixvx = 0
ie, I, assets = I liabilities 19
^^ ^(ii) R = r3( DD + TD )
(iii) g = 8630 + DT)
^ ^ ^D T(iv) R+L+T+C=VD +D)
(6-1-3)
(6-1-4)
(6-1-5)
(6-1-6)
This last constraint is the "liquidity constraint", as R, L, T and C are regarded
as the bank's liquid assets. Constraint (6-1-6) was disregarded by PGB because
upon examination of the balance sheets of eleven London clearing banks it was
found never binding. With special deposits (S) and notes, coins and banker's
deposits (B) also being exogenous, the bank's portfolio choice problem reduces
to:
given r'x, Cri, Cvv, and Crnm, choose thatiiN which maximises W =p. - (b/2)o2
subject to	 + ixiTx = 0.
To solve this problem PGB first set up the following Lagrange function,
partitioning the terms in the choice variables:
in' • n' rin NnI N
 CrIA NIn X ][
 CIN
- (b/
	 + Lv N v	 C	 Cm XmN
 mxm X 1-1X
2b1\1?	iX] [ 
vx
	
(6-1-7)
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and the principal minors of the bordered Hessian
Using (6-8) the solution vector is obtained as:
7 1•1 1	 bCmNmN
-1
iN 	 - uk_mNmxvx
02k,	 =	 iN
Because the required criterion are fulfilled for the block inversion of
-bCmNm N
	iN
i N 	 0
where A, is the Lagrange multiplier. The conditions for W to be maximised are:
aW*/av =	 - lo(CmNmi\fN +CmNm).i.x} + =0
awvax=	 iXCX 7
	 (6-1-8)
-1DCInNMN
	 iN
iN 	 0
alternate in sign, starting positive. 	 (6-1-9)
Ithen the following solution for v is obtained:
" I'l\T = (1/b)GniN - GCmNmxvX - Hix'vX
	 (64-10)
where G = [Cm NmN1-1 [CmNm iNi]	 [CniNmN1-1 
[CmNmN]
iN[cniNniN]
and H —
	
iN[CmNmN] • Because CmNmN
 is a covariance matrix, it can be
deduced that G is symmetric with zero column and row sums. Similarly, the
vector H has a column sum of zero. Thus, from (6-10):
A
GCmNm )j7)( G-CmNm a CmNm s
	0 0 : CmNmcd
-DD
_ -DT
where Cm Nm i (for all j = a, s, d) is a vector of covariances between
forecasting errors of interest rates in mN and the jth interest rate in mx.
Therefore, PGB now write:
GCmNm x x = GCmNm aA' + GCrnNm sg	 T+ GC /nNm d -D (6-1-11)
Also, from (6-1-10) they write:
Page 189
Hi;Sx = HA + Hg + HR + H2 - I-113D - HDT	 (6-1-12)
Using (6-1-11) and (6-1-12), PGB rewrite the latter two terms of (6-1-10) as:
-GCmNm x.CT‘ - HiX x X =
-(GCniNm a + H) -A' - (GCmNm s+ H)g - HR - H2 + HDD - (GCmNm d+ H)DT.
PGB now define the following:
H* [(GCmNm a H) (GCmNm s+ H) (GCmNm d+ H) 11]
*, ^ —T Z^*
vx m (A, S, -D , )
^* ^ ^ ^ T
where Z =R+Z-D and then rewrite (6-1-10) in full as:
VN
 =[1]Grn^  + 11*-4b
This gives a set of reduced form equations relevant to the individual bank.21
However, to obtain empirically implementable equations PGB find it necessary
to aggregate over all banks. 22 This step can only be taken by making the
assumption that each and every bank has the same interest rate expectations
and the same covariance matrix of forecast errors. 23 PGB suggest that there are
n banks, and define:
and
(6-1-13)
n	 n	 n
-,	 --,*
V m / V'Ni, V -== I iTNxi, and b* =-- I (1/b1)
i=1i.1 	 .	 i.1
Thus, aggregating over all n banks, PGB obtain:
Vi\T = b*Gin-N + H*iix* (6-1-14)
To move closer to their final model for estimation, PGB now hypothesise that
m N = mN, where ifiN represents the quarterly averages of actual yields
centred on the date of observation of the balance sheet. This, then, gives:
VN = b*Gi-n-N + H* -\ix*	 (6-1-15)
* -*	 -*	 *Because vx = vx + u vx*, it must also be the case that vx=vx- u* which,vx
summing over all banks, gives Eir-x* Evx* - Eu * . Defining Vx*
 = /vx*vx
and postulating forecast errors in the aggregate to be zero (ie, Euv ;( =0), PGB
obtain:
VN b*Gry-IN +	 v 2	 (6-1-16)
This describes the ideal behaviour of the banks. It is posited that their actual
behaviour will depart from this stochastically, so that:
VN =b*GE-N + H* V2* + E	 (6-1-17)
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where e is a vector of normally distributed random variables with zero means.
The authors then allow for "seasonality" by modifying (6-1-17) to:
VN = b*GfriN + H* V; + JD + e	 (6-1-18)
where J is a (4 x 4) matrix of coefficients, D is a (4 x 1) vector of dummy
variables such that i'J = 0 and Ji = 0 . So now the equations (6-1-18) represent
the commercial bank asset demand functions, in which the coefficients b* G,
H*, and J are directly estimable. The estimation procedure adopted by PGB
takes advantage of the strong a priori specifications in order to gain efficiency.
This is considered especially important in view of the multicollinearity that
inevitably arises in regressions involving large numbers of in erest rate
variables. The restrictions which may be imposed are:
1) symmetry of G;
2) i'G = 0 ;
3) i'H = -1;
4) i'J =	 ;
5) Ji = 0 .
Taking (4) and (5) together, there are some eight restrictions of which only
seven are independent. So, in all there are twenty-one independent
restrictions. PGB use the extraneous information as follows: First, they rewrite
(6-1-18) as:
DT
T gn	 g12	 g13 g14 mt h11	 hi2	 hi3
C b* g21	 g22	 g23 g24 mc h 21	 h22	 h23	 h24
g31	 g32	 g33 g34 mb h31	 h32	 h33	 h34 A
_ L _ _ g41	 g42	 g43 g44 _ _ ml h41	 h42
	
h43	 h44 _
_ z*
ill 312
	
313
	
314 di Et
321 322
	
323	 324 d2 Ec
331 332	 j33	 334 d3 Eb
j41 342	 343	 344 _ 
_ d4_ _ El _ (6-1-19)
The data generated by this model may be represented as:
=	 \-7;( 	p t + Et
= [WI VIC 15] Pc + ec
g = [1\—/I VX* 15]1313 ±Eb
= [1\71 k-7;( 15] pi +
where	 and I: are (t x 1) vectors of observations on the levels of the
—*
choice assets (T = 53), M is a (T x 4) matrix of observed interest rates, V x is a
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vectors of disturbances. These equations may be stacked
following single regression model:
to produce the
_
'f -
	[f\-4:7;(bo o o i000:000	 13t
''.	 0 0 0 i[Tviii-tx* :51:0 o o i000	 13c
=
013
_ _131 _
48x1)
+
and the vector
_
B
_1-_,
(4x1)
b =
_ 0	 0
13 t -
13 c
fib
000:000 :rivi:Vx* :51:o	 o	 0
0	 000000: [I-4	 ViX* i 15]
 (4x48)
(6-1-20)
(4x1)
et x 4) matrix of observed asset/liability levels, 5 is a (t x 4) matrix of
(seasonal) dummy variables, P t, 13c, 13b and 131, are (12 x 1) vectors of coefficients
(which are the elements of b*, G, H*, and J), and e t, cc, eb and el are (T x 1)
_PI is estimated subject to the restriction Rb = r, where R
is a (21 x 1) vector, the elements of which are known and arranged to impose
the five sets of restrictions mentioned earlier. Rewriting (6-1-111) as y = Xb + e,
and choosing 13 to minimise Etc subject to Rb = r, yields as an estimator for 13*:
./...
p . (X1X)-1X'y + (X1X)-1R, [R(xix)-1R1-1 [r ... wx,x)-1x,y1
The restricted least squares estimates of the asset demand functions thus
obtained are presented here in Table 6-2. It is immediately noticeable that the
only significant "own-rate" coefficient is that pertaining to Treasury Bills. The
own-rate coefficient in the bond equation, although not significantly different
from zero at the conventional level, does have a t-ratio of 1.86 and a positive
coefficient. This result is contrary to one of the major Brechling-Clayton (1965)
empirical findings—that the response to bond rate changes might be
perverse—a phenomenon whose concern was also expressed by various
witnesses to the Radcliffe Committee (1959). From the results obtained, PGB
calculate mean elasticities for each of the assets and find call loans and
government bonds to be complementary, as are commercial bills and Treasury
Bills, while Treasury Bills and government bonds, Treasury Bills and call loans,
and commercial bills and government bonds are found to be substitutes.
Finally, PGB consider the proximate effects of government policy upon the
behaviour of the commercial banks, an avenue which we shall not explore here.
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Table 6-2: Restricted Least Squares Estimates of London
Clearing Banks' Asset Demand Functions
Call
Loans
Treasury
Bills
Commercial
Bills Bonds
Call loan rate 31.387 -95.192 -6.931 70.736
(1030) (3.630) (0.360) (4.010)
Treasury Bill rate -95.192 71.115 64.484 -40.407
(3.630) (2.240) (3.100) (2.370)
Commercial bill rate -6.931 64.484 8.265 65.818
(0.360) (3.100) (0.360) (4.170)
Short bond rate 70.736 -40.407 -65.818 35.489
(4.010) (2.370) (4.170) (1.860)
Time deposits -0.137 -0.21 -0.018 -0.635
(negative) (3.970) (6.090) (0.510) (18.900)
Special deposits 0.307 0.142 -0.098 -1.351
(2.65o) (1.220) (0.850) (11.750)
Advances 0.078 -0.441 0.113 -0.751
(3.350) (18.927) (4.850) (32.370)
Z * 0.005 -0.403 0.045 -0.648
(0.320) (25.510) (2.870) (41.270)
Data dummy -102.3 236.297 -41.522 -92.465
(3.630) (8.450) (1.500) (3.270)
Q1 2.966 -89.823 -2.412 89.27
(0.300) (8.990) (0.240) (8.940)
Q2 -25.875 -7.214 -2.353 35.432
(2.56o) (o.72o) (0.230) (3.51o)
Q3 -32.096 51.537 -2.353 -17.088
(3.220) (5.160) (0.240) (1.710)
Q4 54.966 45.5 7.119 -107.614
(5.440) (4.510) (0.710) (10.670)
R2 0.85 0.95 0.8 0.99
( ) = t-statistic
Z * = notes and other items minus demand deposits
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6.1.3 Comments
The major criticism that must be levied at the Brechling-Clayton paper is
that at no time do the authors state what they perceive to be the banks'
objective(s). Hence it is not clear as to why the banks should choose between
investments and advances in allocating their non-liquid assets. This is in direct
contrast to the approach taken by PGB. In similar vein, the process by which
Brechling and Clayton select their explanatory variables appears to be virtually
ad hoc, although in many respects it is directly analogous to the approach of
standard demand theory, with the exception that prices are now rates of
interest, while the level of deposits proxies for income. However, the demand
for assets to hold does not occur simply because their holding adds to the
holder's utility, unlike consumption in traditional demand theory.24
Furthermore, because of the existence of uncertainty there is a need to conSider
expectations in a more satisfactory manner than that adopted by Brechling and
Clayton, but such a step is not possible without an explicit statement of the
banks' objective(s). A similar criticism on the modelling of expectations could
also be levied at PGB; both papers do little more than take the prevailing value
by way of proxy for its future expected value.
Thus, we can see that methodologically the PGB approach is less likely to be
subject to criticism than that of Brechling and Clayton. However, the
methodology of positive economics tells us that economic models are not to be
judged so much by the realism of their assumptions, but rather by the accuracy
of their predictions. A comparison of Tables 6-1 and 6-2 reveals that neither
model outperforms the other; the relative merits of the two models is virtually
the same, especially as measured by the R2 statistic. Thus, in spite of (or,
perhaps because of) the more rigorous theoretical approach taken by PGB, a set
of reduced form equations very similar to those used by Brechling and Clayton
are obtained. Were a cost-benefit approach to be applied to the two
methodologies at this juncture, then a clear preference for the Brechling-
Clayton approach would emerge. This is particularly ironic as the PGB
approach is more readily identifiable with the "monetarist/positive
economics" camp, while Brechling and Clayton would more normally be
associated with the "Keynesian" approach.
6.2 Discount Houses
The Discount House is a feature unique to British capital markets, and this
' probably accounts for there having been virtually nothing written about them
Page 194
outside the shores of the United Kingdom. Their first appearance on the
English capital market was around the middle of the eighteenth century. From
that day to this the role of the Discount House has, unlike some other financial
intermediaries, evolved and adapted to the changing economic climate.
Despite being peculiar to the United Kingdom, they are considered important
to the British financial system for two reasons: firstly, they make up a large
part of the market for short-term financial assets, such as Treasury and
commercial bills, short loans and bonds; and secondly, they are the only
institutions to which the authorities make "last resort" loans. The Discount
Houses specialise in operations in the discount markets, often alongside other
less specialised institutions performing a similar role. Currently, there are
some eight Discount Houses, all members of the London Discount Market
Association.*
The major functions of the Discount Houses are to borrow short-term funds
from the commercial banks and other institutions, and then lend these funds
against four broad classes of security: U. K. Treasury bills, commercial bills, U.
K. government bonds and "other assets".25
Published work on the Discount Houses is not abundant, and what does
exist tends to be descriptive rather than analytical. Perhaps the only exception
of note comes from the pen of Michael Parkin, and is the immediate antecedent
of the PGB paper (1970) on the debt and investment behaviour of the
commercial banks which we have just considered. The two works have a
common approach, both beginning with a set of structural equations based
upon the institution's optimisation of a given objective function subject to
various constraints. These are manipulated to give a set of reduced form
equations for a (typical) individual institution, which are then aggregated prior
to empirical estimation.
6.2.1 Parkin (1970)
As before, each individual Discount House is assumed to possess a Freund
(exponential) utility function of the form: 26
U = a - ce-bn (6-2-1)
Although, once again, the length of the decision period is fixed, in this paper
Parkin constructs two models based on alternative assumptions about its
, * This figure is correct as of Autumn 1988. Earlier in the 1980s the figure was twelve. (My
thanks to Helena Skarbek of the Bank of England and Issy Cohen for the update.)
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length. In model H(1) the decision period is assumed to be in excess of the
duration of a typical call loan, while in model H(2) the decision period is
exceeded by the duration of a typical call loan. Thus, in the first model the
decision period is between one week and three months, and in the second it lies
between one day and one week. The individual Discount House is assumed to
maximise its expected utility which, as we have seen,27
 is tantamount to
maximising
W = - (b/2) 2.
	
(6-2-2)
Parkin defines the stochastic variate, actual profit, H, to be:
= rn i v	 (6-2-3)
where m is a (1 x k) vector of yields and borrowing rates, and v is a (k x 1)
vector of assets (measured positively) and liabilities (measured negatively).
Because of the existence of uncertainty, the Discount House can only follow
policies based upon its expected yields/borrowing rates vector, m, which is
related to m such that:
m = fri + urn
where um
 is a (k x 1) vector of forecast errors. Parkin rewrites (6-2-3) as:
11 = (Et + um)ly
=	 + urn' v	 28 (6-2-4)
Now, j.i. E(II) = fif ty +	 )v. Parkin assumes E(um) = 0, so that (6-2-4)
becomes:
(6-2-5)
By definition the variance of profit is:
o2
 = Et[ll - E(n)]2}
= Ef(umi v)2}
= v'Etuniimly
 = v'Sv
where S Efuniaml; ie, S is the covariance matrix.
(6-2-6)
Parkin proceeds by writing out in full the vector of assets and liabilities:
v' (T, C, B, -L, -A) (6-2-7)
where T represents Treasury Bills, C is commercial bills, B is government
bonds, -L is call loans, and -A represents discounts and advances, all in real
terms. Similarly, he writes the vector of expected yields and borrowing rates
as:
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Using (6-2-12) the solution vector is obtained as:
1[11;11 (6-2-14)
[ v i [ -bS i
0
fn-I = ( lt, I-1-c. I-11y I-4. 1-La)
where the subscript denotes the relevant asset or liability. The covariance
matrix, S. may be written in full as:
S =	 :
1_ Gat	 Gac	 Gab Gal Gaa _ (6-2-8)
Finally, Parkin also defines:
f = Q - E (6-2-9)
where Q represents "other assets",29 and E is capital and reserves. 30 Further,
he assumes that:
(i) the elements of v constitute the Discount House's choice set; and
(ii) the elements of m, S and f are regarded by the Discount House as
being exogenous. This implies that the Discount House operates as
if it were a price-taker in all markets.
With liabilities being treated as negative assets, the only constraint is a
single (balance sheet) equality of the form:
iv + f = 0
	
(6-240)
Parkin is now able to state and solve the Discount House portfolio and debt
selection problem. This may be written as:
given m, S, and f, choose v to maximise W =1.1 - (b/2) 2 subject to i'v + f = 0.
To solve this Parkin sets up the following Lagrange function:
W* = fri ' v - (b/2)v'Sv + X(i'v + f) 	 (6-2-11)
where X, is the Lagrange multiplier. The conditions for W to be maximised are:
aw* —
= m - bSv + Xi = 0
av
aW * .t
=iv+f=0
aX,
_
I att atc Gtb ati ata
(6-2-12)
and the principal minors of the bordered Hessian
sign starting positive.
[ -bS	 i 1
ii ' 	 0 alternate in
(6-2-13)
from which Parkin derives the following solution for v:
Page 197
V,--- (1/b)GE + Hf
	 (6-2-15)
where G = S-1 
	
s4 ii's4 and H , s4i
i ' S -l i i S-l i . The equations (6-2-15) constitute the
asset demand and liability supply functions of an individual Discount House.
Parkin makes the following observations about the properties of G:
G is symmetrical. This follows directly from the fact that the
covariance matrix, S, (and hence its inverse, S 4) is symmetrical.
G has zero row and column sums. To see this for the rows, first
post-multiply G by i; this gives 	 , c4 . •' 4Gi _, [s-i _ 0 it S ],_. s4 i _ s4 i = 0.
Due to symmetry, the column sums will also be zero.
(iii) It follows directly from (6-2-13) that the diagonal elements of
	
[
-bS	 i
i' 0 will be non-positive. Multiplying by -1 to get (6-2-14)
changes the diagonal elements to all become non-negative. The
economic interpretation of this is that a ceteris paribus increase in the
own rate of interest will never lead to a decrease in the volume of
that asset held. As a result of property (ii) the sum of the off-
diagonal elements of G will be less than zero. In economic terms this
indicates that substitution dominates complementarity.
The only property of H that can be deduced in a similar fashion is that the
sum of its elements (ie, its column sum) is -1.
In order to obtain empirically estimable asset demand/liability supply
equations, Parkin first aggregates over all Discount Houses. This can only be
done (as we have already noted) on the somewhat restrictive assumption that
each and every Discount House have identical expectations and the same
matrix of forecast errors. Aggregating, then, Parkin obtains:
V = f3Ga + HF (6-2-16)
as the analogue to (6-2-15). Unsurprisingly, V = Evi, b = E(1/bi) and F = Efi for
all i = 1, 2,..., 12. However, for empirical purposes, (6-2-16) is not entirely
satisfactory. For example, the vector Ei is specified in terms of (unobservable)
expected rates of interest. Parkin also finds a need to account for seasonality,
as well as including the assumption that Discount House behaviour will depart
stochastically from that postulated by the deterministic equation. He therefore
obtains:
(i)
i's4i.
V .-- 13 -- + HF + JD +1.1	 (6-2-17)
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where ITT is a vector of observable interest rates such that Et = ff1 + e (e being a
random variable with zero mean), D is a vector of dummy variables with J its
vector of coefficients, and u represents the stochastic departure of Discount
House behaviour from that postulated by the deterministic equation.
The next step is for Parkin to rewrite (6-2-17) in full as:
gtt gtc gtb gti gta	 Mt -	 ht
gtc gcc gcb gd
 gca	 mc	 hc
= 13 gtb gcb gbb gbl gba	 mb + hb
-L	 gti gcl gbl gll gla	 ml	 hi
_ -A _	 gta gca ba gla gaa _ _ m a 	 _ ha
The data generated by this model may be represented as:
T = [M: F: D] yt + ut
C = [M: F: D] yc + uc
B = [M: F: DI yb + ub
-L = [M: F: D] + u1
-A = [M: F: D] ya + ua
where T, C, B, -L, and -A are CC x 1) vectors of observations on asset and
liability levels CE = 46), M is a ('C x 5) matrix of observed interest rates, F is a CC x
1) matrix of observations on f, D is a et x 1) vector of dummy variables, and ut,
ub , u1 and ua are (t x 1) vectors of disturbances. Also, the vectors of
coefficients are:
- bgtt- bgti
	
bgtc
	bgtb
	
bg tc 	 d
	
bgtb	 bgcc	 bgcb bgbi
	
it = 1111
 gti	 'Yc =bgcb 71D 
= bgbb
	
= bg11 	 =
	b cl 	 gbi
	
bgta
	 al
	
ht	 bgca	 bgba hihc _	 hb
_ it _	 _ 11 _
Using these definitions the equations may be stacked to produce the following
single regression model:
T -	 -[IvliF:D]:0:0:0:0-- yt - - ti t -
	C	 0i[M;F]:0;0;0	 Yc	 uc
	
B	 =p	 0:0:[m:F]:0:0	 YID ± ub
	
-L	 0:0:0:[M;F:D1:0	 'n	 III
	
_ -A	 - 0:0:0:0;[MiF] _ 11,a _ _ Ua _	 (6-2-19)
	
(5x1)	 (5x25)	 25x1)	 (5x1)
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bgta
bgca
bgba
bgia
bgaa
ha
_	 _
lit
7c
and the vector 7 = Yb
71
_Ya is estimated subject to the restriction Rb = r, where R is
a (17 x 32) vector and r is a (17 x 1) vector, the elements of which are known
and arranged to impose the five sets of restrictions mentioned earlier (eg,
symmetry of G). The restricted least squares estimates of the asset demand and
liability supply functions thus obtained are reproduced here as Table 6-3.
Table 6-3: Discount Houses' asset demand and liability
supply functions: Restricted Least Squares estimates
usin end-quarter average interest rates R 1
Treasury
Bills
Commercial
Bills
Short
Bonds
Call Loans
(negative)
Discounts and
Advances
(negative)
Treasury Bill rate 301.987 3 6.41 2 -45.394 -403.825 1 10.8 2
(6.59) (2.05) (14.25) (14.25) (3.96)
Commercial Bill
rate 3 6.41 2 0.683 133.543 -1 45 .51 2 -25.126
(2.05) (0.05) (12.50) (9.77) (1.45)
Short bond rate -45.394 1 33.5 43 75.458 -172.99 9.383
(14.25) (12.50) (5.07) (15.50) (0.69)
Call loan rate -403.825 -1 45.51 2 -172.99 7 78.70 7 -56.381
(14.25) (9.77) (15.50) (36.41) (3.09)
Bank rate 110.82 -25.126 9.383 -56.38 -38.697
(3.96) (1.45) (0.69) (3.09) (1.26)
Other assets less
capital -0.94 1.826 -0.066 -1.569 -0.251
(3.44) (6.94) (0.25) (5.81) (0.93)
Seasonal dummy 1 55.9 38 - - -1 55 .938 -
(13.12) - - (13.12)
( ) = t-statistic
It is immediately noticeable that three of the five own-rate coefficients are
positive and significant, as predicted by the theory, while the own-rate
coefficients for commercial bills and discounts and advances are not
significantly different from zero. Additionally, in this model Parkin discovers
three significant cases of complementarity: between Treasury bills and
commercial bills; between bonds and commercial bills; and between Treasury
bills and discounts and advances. The remaining assets are all found to be
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substitutes. This would appear to offer a priori evidence that, rather than
choosing a simultaneous allocation of funds among all assets, the Discount
Houses operate a sequential procedure in their portfolio selection, with
Treasury bills having a priority over their investable funds.
The Parkin model would appear to explain a goodly proportion of the
portfolio and debt changes of the Discount Houses. Nonetheless, like its
descendant—the PGB paper on commercial banks—there are a number of
problems. In particular, the own-rate coefficients in the commercial bills and
discounts and advances equations are found to be insignificant, yet Parkin
offers no explanation as to why this might be. One possibility might be to
ascribe it to 'market imperfections'. Consider by way of example a Discount
House which is unable to purchase its desired quantity of Treasury bills; it is
not unreasonable for the Discount House to regard (eg) commercial bills as an
adequate replacement asset, and to therefore purchase a quantity of them to
make up the shortfall in Treasury bills. In such a case it is a supply-side
constraint—the inability of the Discount House to purchase its desired
quantity of Treasury bills—which is the dominant factor in determining its
demand for commercial bills, not the own-rate on commercial bills. A similar
argument might be extended to account for the high degree of
complementarity between Treasury and commercial bills.
The above example also provides further evidence for the possibility that
the Discount Houses invest sequentially, but a complete study of this
hypothesis would require the inclusion of parameters such as the current level
of issues of (especially) Treasury bills as a means of testing the existence of any
supply-side constraint.
A final comment once again concerns the specification of expected interest
rates: Parkin makes various suggestions in this paper about alternative
formulations of the model, but does not even hint at the possible use of
alternative expectations-generating mechanisms in his equations (6-2-16). In
both this paper and that by PCB a vector of quarterly interest rates is used as a
simple proxy for expected rates. This would appear to be a rather nave
approach, especially in view of the sophistication exhibited by the rest of the
model.
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6.3 Building Societies
Building societies first began to appear in the British economy around the
middle of the eighteer th century. At that time they were predominantly
"terminating" societies, being wound up when, as a result of their efforts, all
members had been accommodated. The more modern "permanent" building
society began to appear in the nineteenth century and sought to attract funds
from the general public to help finance members' housing construction.
Nowadays, the societies are not directly involved with house construction, but
they still aim to attract funds from the general public to help finance members'
house purchases. Consequently, the building societies operate in two markets:
that for personal savings, and the housing market. These reflect the major
source and the major use of funds respectively. Because of the various
government constraints neither market can be considered 'free'. In the
personal savings market the building societies are in direct competition with
other financial intermediaries to attract funds. In recent years this competition
has come to be especially against the banks, although not exclusively. Indeed,
in the last few years the dividing line between banks and building societies has
become increasingly blurred. In similar vein, when it comes to selecting and
purchasing their portfolio, the societies are also in competition with the other
financial intermediaries, although this is not the case for mortgages.
The main government-imposed restrictions on building societies portfolio
and debt behaviour are that
(i) liquid assets (ie, all assets with the exception of mortgages) must
account for at least 7.5 per cent of all assets; and that
(ii) reserves should be at least two per cent of total assets.30
The major liability of any building society is its Shares and Deposits. These are
the funds attracted from the general public, on which the societies pay a rate of
interest. Although this rate is free to vary with market conditions, changes in
its level are both infrequent and irregular. This is also true of the rate of
interest that accrues to societies by way of mortgages. In fact, these rates of
interest may differ from an individual society's desired levels because, for the
most part, they are determined by (nearly) all building societies in collusion via
the Building Societies Association (BSA). Of course, these cannot be properly
determined without due regard to the prevailing market conditions, but it does
mean that building societies are essentially not price-takers in the markets in
which they operate. This is obviously an important aspect of their behavior
that needs to be incorporated into any model explaining their portfolio
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behaviour. As the banks and Discount Houses are regarded as price-takers, this
gives a new dimension to our look at the portfolio behaviour of financial
intermediaries.
There is also a second major distinction between the building societies and
most other financial intermediaries, and that concerns their objective. Unlike
most other financial institutions, a building society is a "friendly society" and,
therefore, is legally prohibited from making any profits in the traditional sense.
This is a view taken by the Radcliffe Committee (1959), and its acceptance
means that the building societies cannot be regarded as profit-maximisers, or as
deriving utility from profits. This has been a matter of some controversy
because the societies do accrue 'surpluses', which are usually used to increase
their reserves, so that some authors regard the societies as essentially profit-
maximisers regardless of legal niceties.
6.3.1 Ghosh and Parkin (1972)
Once again we find the name of Michael Parkin to the fore, this time in
collaboration with Depabriya Ghosh. The basic approach of this paper is much
the same as that of the two papers by Professor Parkin that we have already
reviewed. This paper was soon followed up by a book, The Economics of
Building Societies, in which Ghosh presented an expanded, more elaborate
version of his collaboration with Parkin. We shall, therefore, only consider
briefly some of the more salient points of the Ghosh-Parkin paper before taking
a detailed look at Ghosh's book.
Despite the law of the United Kingdom, the views expressed in evidence to
the Radcliffe Committee and one or two other quoted sources, Parkin and
Ghosh believe there to be "...certain considerations which persuade us that the
Societies are interested in profit." These are:
First, the Societies are interested in growth. Whether they want to grow to satisfy
philanthropic goals or to satisfy empire building managers, or to make bigger
profits, need not concern us here. Coupled with this desire to grow is the desire
for security. This is evidenced by the fact that the Societies regard there as being a
minimum fraction of total assets which should be backed by unborrowed funds—
what we termed General Reserves on the Balance Sheet. The desire for security is
further evidenced by the fact that the Societies hold about 15% of their total assets
in highly liquid form, compared with a 7 1 L .% minimum liquid assets ratio.
They proceed by stating:
We can capture this desire for growth, subject to some acceptable security level in
a variety of ways. The way in which we choose to do this is to assume that the
Societies aim to maximise the expected utility of reserves. The faster reserves
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grow, the faster can total assets grow, hence, a desire to grow implies a desire to
accummulate reserves. The desire for security is captured by assuming that it is
the expected utility of reserves, rather than reserves, which is maximised.
(1972, page 234)
As with the previous Parkin (Essex school) papers, a Freund (exponential)
utility function is adopted. In this case, it takes the form:
U = 1 - eOR	 (6-3-1)
where U represents utility, R is the level of reserves, and p is the coefficient of
risk-aversion. From this Ghosh-Parkin assume a single-period decision model
and write:
U = 1 - er3R0 - el311	 . (6-3 -2)
where Ro represents initial reserves (ie, at the start of the period), and II is
profit during the decision period (ie, the increment in reserves, dR). Of course,
II is assumed to be a normally distributed stochastic variate with mean 11 and
variance c72 . They then transform the origin of (6-3-2) to give:
U* = 1 - e1311	 (6-3-3)
Via the standard procedure (which we have already seen), a building
society is assumed to maximise the expected value of its utility, which is
equivalent to maximising W = it - (f3/2)c72. This expression is referred to as the
building society's "operational objective function". The only constraint is that
imposed by balance sheet considerations. By construction of a Lagrange
function, asset demand and liability supply functions are obtained from the
first- and second-order conditions. Then, subject to the usual assumptions,
these are aggregated over all building societies and the result estimated via a
maximum likelihood estimator incorporating the various through-equation
restrictions.
When the results of the estimation were tested, the restrictions were not
found to be binding at any level of significance. Furthermore, this model did
not perform as well as similarly specified models for the commercial banks and
the Discount Houses. One possible reason that immediately springs to mind is
that Ghosh and Parkin could be wrong in assuming the building societies to be
profit, or reserves, maximisers. Indeed, this is an argument that is taken up
with some vigour by the Sheffield school (Clayton (1962), especially pp.14-15
and 24-28). Certainly, the prima facie evidence would appear to lean in favour
of the Sheffield criticism; for example, as illustrated in Figure 6-1, it is a fact
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Figire 6-1: Reserves as a Percentage of Total Assets
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that historically reserves as a fraction of total assets have been declining. We
shall return to this issue later on in this section.
Source: G. Clayton, J. C. Dodds, M. J. Driscoll and
J. L. Ford (1975, page 21)
6.3.2 G hos h (1974)
As mentioned earlier, this book is primarily an extended version of the
Ghosh-Parkin paper. Once again the Freund utility function is adopted, and its
expected value maximised subject to two constraints. The first is that put
forward in the Ghosh-Parkin paper, namely that the balance sheet must
balance. The second constraint is the preservation of a (legally required)
minimum liquidity reserve ratio. Thus, the Ghosh objective function is more
sophisticated than its predecessor (ie, that of Ghosh and Parkin), and is
specified in such a manner that explicit account is taken of the Arrow risk-
aversion hypothesis. 31
 Thus, the individual building society is regarded as
trying to maximise the expected value of:
U = 1 - exp{-bil/W 8} (6-3-4)
where Wo represents initial wealth at the start of the decision period, and 0 < 8
<1.32 According to Ghosh, the usual definition of the planned addition to the
general reserve is 111W 0, but this is no longer true as one per cent of total assets
in reserves must be fixed assets. Hence the planned addition to the general
reserve ratio will be II/ W 8, which is smaller than 11/W 0 .33 The coefficient of
1-8absolute risk-aversion is b W 0-, while that of relative risk-aversion is b W 0 ,
thereby satisfying the Arrow hypotheses. Even with the inclusion of this extra
degree of sophistication, the maximisation of expected utility is still found to be
Page 205
equivalent to the maximisation of the Ghosh-Parkin "operational objective
function", W = ji. - (b/2)a2, only in this case b = b'/ W
The balance sheet constraint is written as:
i'v + f = 0	 (6-3-5)
where i t is a unit vector, v' = (t, 1, g, a, m, -s), f=C+Z-R- B, and t, 1, g, a, m,
and -s represent Treasury bills, local authority bills, government securities,
local authority securities, mortgages, and Shares and Deposits (a liability, so
entered negatively) respectively, with C, R, and B being cash and bank
balances, reserves, and government loans respectively, with Z being a
balancing item. The items in f are assumed to have zero yield, while the yields
on the items in v' are represented by the vector r.34 The items B and f are
exogenously determined, all other items being endogenous. Ghosh writes
profits as:
II = riv (6-3-6)
with r and v assumed to be independently distributed. Thus, expected profits
are:
E(II)	 p,	 (6-3-7)
where ? is the vector of expected yields, and	 the vector of expected
asset/liability levels. In a similar manner he obtains:
a2 = EfrcTs - E(? V)]2}
ie,	 02	 + PCvv? +
	 (6-3-8)
where Crr and Cvv are the covariance matrices of asset/liability levels and
interest rates respectively, and is a constant. Using (6-3-7) and (6-3-8), the
operational objective function becomes:
W = - (b/2)frcn.
	
+	 (6-3-9)
Thus, the building society's portfolio selection problem is:
given ?, Crr, Cvv and f, choose that which maximises the
operational objective function (ie, 6-3-9) subject to the balance sheet
constraint (ie, 6-3-5).
To solve this problem it is necessary to form the following Lagrange function:
L = F-C7' - (b/2)ttc1.i.- + PCvv? +
	+ X(i'v +
	
(6-3-10)
where X is the Lagrange multiplier. According to Ghosh, W is maximised if:
DT- „
= r - bCrrir' + Xi = 0
(6-3-11)
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[-bCrr i
and the principal minors of the bordered Hessian i	 0 alternate in sign,
starting positive.
From (6-3-10) Ghosh obtains the following set of asset demand and liability
(ie, Shares and Deposits) supply equations:
= (1 /b)1-6 + hf	 (6-3-12)
-1 Cl ii: 4C	 _,--1.;where H = Cir 	 rr	 rr and h =  ‘-'11.1 .
i ' C4 i'Cg. Subject to the usual assumptions,35
Ghosh aggregates over all n building societies to obtain the following set of
aggregate asset demand and liability supply functions:
V = b*I-V + hF	 (6-3-13)
where V = Ivi, F = Efi, and b* = Ebi
 for all i = 1, 2,...n. Ghosh now makes the
assumption that the vector of expected interest rates, i., may be proxied by a
vector of quarterly averages of actual interest rates, F. To this, he adds the
assumption that the actual values of V and F depart stochastically from their
expected values, so that:
—
V = V + uv	 and	 F = F + uF
where the u terms represent the relevant stochastic components. Ghosh then
rewrites (6-3-13) in terms of actual values, viz:
V = b*FE + hF + (huF - uv)	 (6-3-14)
This describes the building societies' choice of assets and liabilities in a
speculative demand model. Thus far, in constructing the model, Ghosh has
implicitly assumed that the societies are "price-takers" in all markets, yet this is
not obviously the case for, as Ghosh himself previously suggested, in both the
market for Shares and Deposits and that for mortgages the rates of interest are
set by the building societies via the BSA Council.
To alleviate this anomaly, one of the methods Ghosh considers is utilisation
of a game-theoretic approach to model the setting of interest rates in the Shares
and Deposits market (ie, rs) and in the mortgage market (ie, rm). However, he
rejects this approach in favour of the assumption that the BSA possesses a
utility function which consists of a weighted sum of the utilities of each and
every member society. The BSA is posited as trying to maximise its utility as
described by this function, taking both sides of the two markets into account. If
ai
 represents the "weight" of the ith society, then the BSA tries to solve the
following parametric programming model:
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n
maximise U .--: E oci.max[E(ui)]
i=1
n
subject to E vim  M(rs, rm, r1 ,• • •rk, 0)
i=1
nI Vis 5 S(rs, rm, r1 ,- • •rk, 0)
i'Vi
 + fi = 0 for all i = 1, 2,...n
M = M(rs, rm, ri ,•••rk, 0)
S = S(rs, rm, ri,...rk, 0)
(6-3-15)
(6-3-16)
(6-3-17)
(6-3-18)
(6-3-19)
(6-3-20)
where (6-3-19) and (6-3-20) represent the personal sector supply and demand
equations, 0 represents "other factors", r s and rm are expected rates of interest,
r1, ...rk are the rates on other relevant assets and liabilities, EVim is the sum of
all mortgage loans offered by the building societies, and EV is is the sum of all
Shares and Deposits held in all the building societies. As the rates of interest
'recommended' by the BSA are almost invariably adopted by virtually every
single building society, this completes our look at Ghosh's speculative model.
6.3.3 O'Herlihy and Spencer (1972)
This paper, which appears in the 1972 National Institute Economic Review,
possesses several characteristics that endow it with a certain value as a
curiosum. Firstly, it is perhaps the only work on modelling the behaviour of
financial intermediaries published in the early 1970s that came under neither
the "Essex" or "Sheffield school" approaches. For this reason alone, it would
seem worthy of mention, but there is an additional reason, for, in attempting to
model building society behaviour, O'Herlihy and Spencer (HS) do not make
explicit use of portfolio theory. Nonetheless, their work deserves our serious
considerations on two counts. In the first place, close examination of the HS
paper gives as an alternative to the other approaches we are considering, and
may therefore give us some insight into the pitfalls of financial model-building.
Secondly, the high standard of performance that their model achieved indicates
that there may be some features worthy of note for future use.
In their model, HS make use of a set of structural equations to try and
...describe the determination of the major fmancial flows involved in the Building Societies'
balance sheets and the two key interest rates over which they have control - the rate on shares
and deposits, and the mortgage rate.
	 (1972, p. )
According to HS, there are two major financial flows on each side of the
balance sheet: on the liabilities' side these are the outflow of withdrawals (W)
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and the inflow of new shares and deposits (D); on the assets side they are the
outflow of new mortgage advances (A) and the inflow of repayments of
principal (R). Unfortunately, the method of obtaining the structural equations
is unclear; the building societies are not explicitly hypothesised to be in pursuit
of any specific objectives, and hence the model is seen to be rather ad hoc in its
construction. This lack of objective must lead to a questioning of the raison
d'etre of the building societies: for example, why should they demand assets or
supply liabilities? And, given that such demand and supply is observed, what
rationale is there for the various explanatory variables included in their model?
What relationships do HS expect to emerge between the explanatory variables
and the asset demands and liability supplies, and why?
In Table 6-4 we have reproduced the results obtained by HS. These were
obtained by applying two-stage least squares estimation on seasonally adjusted
quarterly data. The absence of any explicit objective ascribed to the behaviour
of the building societies creates many problems, the most troublesome being in
interpreting the extent to which there is a causal relationship between the
dependent and independent variables from the estimated equations. A further
criticism may be made of HS's practice of eliminating from the final equations
those variables which are found to be insignificant in earlier regressions. This
is a particularly dubious approach, especially in view of the fact that
(presumably) the authors felt there was a good a priori case for including these
eliminated variables. A good example of the problems created by these
inadequacies is to be found in the Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford pamphlet
(1975). They point out that because of the non-existence of an explicit objective,
equations are mis-specified, leading to incorrect inferences from the empirical
results. In particular, they cite equation three:
With this equation H-S36 seek to explain New Mortgages advances by the lag of
New Mortgages Advances, Real Disposable Income, Seasonal Dummies and two
further dummy variables—D(1) and D(2)—one of which is meant to proxy "hard
rationing" and the other "soft rationing". 37 It is the inclusion of the last two
dummies that we are concerned about. The signs on the coefficients on these two
variables are both negative indicating that the existence of either type of rationing
will yield a drop in new mortgage advances. It is quite in order to draw this
conclusion if we are to take it that the estimated structural equations are more than
simple correlations and are supposed to indicate how one variable depends upon
the other. Indeed it is the apparent dependence of New Mortgage advances on
rationing which we wish to examine. H-S claim that it is
"An outstanding feature of Building Societies that they ration mortgage lending by 'non-
price' means, and apparently make little use of changes in mortgage rate as a way of
influencing demand".
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.179	 2.8	 2.37
.950	 .120	 32	 2.22
Table 6-4: O'Herlihy and Spencer Estimates
SE/
Dependent	 Constant
	
MEAN
Variable	 Term
	
Regression Coefficients	 R2	SE	 %	 DW
(1) Gross Receipts -681.8
	
+ 618 (D/P)_i
	 + .058 Y/P
	
+ 45.5 TAX - 11.53 IBR	 18.34	 7.1	 1.96
of shares and	 (4.43)	 (7.37)	 (4.05)	 (3.50)	 (338)
deposits
D/P	 + 44.06 i	 + 40.3 S(1)	 - 6.89 S(2) + 10.8 S(3)
(3.38)	 (5.36)	 (.96)	 (1.58) 
(2) Withdrawal of	 235.3	 + .080 (S/P)_ i
	- .048 Y/P
	 -16.38 TAX + 9.14 IBR	 11.08	 6.6	 1.36
shares and	 (2.81)	 (13.26)	 (5.34)	 (2.40)	 (4.53)
deposits
S/P	 - 14.23 i	 + 5.0 S(1)
	 + 5.5 S(2)	 + 6.4 S(3)
(1.51)	 (1.06)	 (1.31)	 (1.53) 
(3) New mortgage	 -23.5	 + 714(A/PH)_ 1
	+ .017 Y/P	 -18.9(3. D) (1)	 -33.1 D(2)	 .943 15.65	 8.0	 2.0169
advances	 (.92)	 (9.86)	 (2.58)	 (5.87)
	
A/PH	
- 7.7 S(1) +22.9S(2) +15.1S(3)
(1.30)	 (3.73)	 (2.62) 
(4) Repayments of	 6.4	 + .803 R_ i	+ .195 A	 - 107 k 1	..	 3.99	 3.7	 2.00
mortgages
	
(3.23)	 (12.91)	 (8.24)	 (3.39)
	
R	
-12.4S(1) + 2.5 5(2)	 + .5 S(3)
(8.10)	 (1.48)	 (.33)
(5) The mortgage
rate of interest	 .702	 + .757 i	 + .451 m_1
In	 (3.43)	 (5.94)	 (5.17) 
(6) The share and	 .638	 + .848 i	 - .193 L*	- .088 K*
deposit rate of	 (-2.33)	 (-11.84)	 (-3.15)	 (-2.55)
interest	 I
Key:
D/P	 value of new shares and deposits deflated by the consumer price index (P)
W/P	 value of withdrawals deflated by P
A/PH	 value of new mortgage advances deflated by the price index of new housing (PH)
Y/P	 real disposable income	 SIP stock of shares and deposits
i	 recommended share rate	 m	 average mortgage rate
R	 repayments	 TAX standard rate of income tax
IBR	 Bank Rate
	
S(1), S(2), S(3)	 seasonal dummies
D(1), D(2) dummies for "mild" and "strict" rationing respectively
L*, K*
	 transformations of the liquidity and reserve ratios (see HS, p.46, for details)
the subscript _ 1
 indicates variable lagged one quarter
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Now if there is rationing it would suggest  that there is excess demand.38 If the
Building Societies then decide not to let the mortgage  rate rise to 'clear the
market' 39 then they will obviously have to find some other way of allocating the
funds that they have available for advances—perhaps rationing on a first come
first served basis. Given this we could argue that it si not rationing that has caused
a decline in new advances but rather that it is a relative (to demand at the given
mortgage rate) dearth in the availability of funds that determines the decline in
mortgage lending and that, moreover, if the Building Societies pursue this type of
policy described by H-S declining mortgage lending and rationing will often occur
simultaneously, 40 but they will both be causally independent. Both variables are
in fact dependent upon the availability of funds.	 (1975, page )
With this critique in mind, let us now turn our attentions to the study that
Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford themselves produced to model the portfolio
behaviour of the building societies in the United Kingdom.
6.3.4 Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford (1975)
Published in 1975, the article by Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford (CDDF)
is one in a series of pamphlets on finance published by the Societe Universitaire
des Europeenes Recherches Financieres (SUERF), and forms a continuation of the
Sheffield school approach. The pamphlet opens with a look at the importance
played by the building societies in the British financial system. This is followed
by a consideration of previous works in the area, which at the time consisted of
the Parkin-Ghosh and O'Herlihy-Spencer models. (Some of the CDDF
comments are to be found in the section following). Unlike earlier attempts in
this area, CDDF place a great deal of emphasis on the objective(s) of the
building society movement. They attempted to resolve this controversial issue
by means of a questionnaire to various building societies which, together with
the answers they received from the Building Societies' Association (BSA), they
reproduce in the pamphlet. From this and other observations on building
society behaviour CDDF note the following about building societies:
1. they are not profit maximisers and therefore we would expect that standard
speculative models of portfolio behaviour would be inappropriate as vehicles
by which to explain their behaviour;
2 they appear to be trying to maximise the rate of growth of Mortgage assets
subject to certain constraints;
3. the ratio of Mortgages to Total Assets maintained by them appears to be a
relatively stable value of just over 80%;
4. the adjusted liquid assets ratio appears to be fairly stable implying that the
holding of liquid assets is insensitive to the structure of rates on liquid assets
and Mortgages;
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5. the main source of net additions to outstanding Mortgages and hence, given a
more or less fixed ration of these to Total Assets, of net additions to liquid
assets is the net inflow of funds from the Personal Sector of the economy.
(1975, p.29)
As a result of these points CDDF suggest that a fixed-coefficient input-output
model would provide a more appropriate characterisation of building society
behaviour than the models we have already considered. They argue in favour
of a two-stage decision-making procedure: firstly, at time t the building society
decides upon its current level of mortgage advances, given its net inflow of
funds in the previous period, t-1; and secondly, the remainder is apportioned
out among other assets according to a speculative model. However, if there
were no change in the structure of interest rates then the same asset proportion
of this remainder would remain in force. To construct such a model requires
the assumption of exogeneity of interest rates, yet the evidence here would
seem to suggest otherwise; as we have seen, the rate on Shares and Deposits is
usually fixed by the BSA Council.
CDDF argue their way round this as follows: To attract funds by way of
Shares and Deposits the building societies are in competition predominantly
with the commercial banks. The banks offer a fixed rate rate of interest on bank
deposits at a fixed mark-up over and above the Bank Rate/Minimum Lending
Rate (MLR). Thus, for a given deposit rate the BSA Council recommend a rate
on Shares and Deposits that would be expected to bring about an 'acceptable'
level of Shares and Deposits. Now, if MLR is exogenous, and the rate on
Shares and Deposits is linked to MLR, then the rate on Shares and Deposits
must also be exogenous. Hence, the model adopted is one in which the desired
holding of any asset (except mortgage advances) is determined according to the
level of the net inflow of funds and the structure of interest rates. Because it is
quite likely that these items will vary from one decision period to the next, it
follows that changes will occur in a building society's desired portfolio.
However, adjustment to a new desired portfolio cannot be instantaneous and
therefore involves a time-lag. Consequently CDDF construct a dynamic model
in which it is hypothesised that
...a constant proportion of the difference between the desired and actual holdings
of the various assets is reduced in the period following a change in the interest rate
structure or any other explanatory variable... 	 (1975, p.33)41
and the model captures this adjustment by use of a lagged dependent variable.
Using the ordinary least squares method, CDDF estimate both dynamic and
static versions of "speculative" and "flow of funds" type models. Both "level"
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and "first difference" data were employed, although only the latter were
published due to "...the extent of the multicollinearity and the ubiquitously
high R2's throughout..." the former. All in all, the performance of these models
was less than outstaqding, although the speculative model generally
performed better than its flow-of-funds counterpart. In spite of this, CDDF still
argue in favour of the flow-of-funds approach on the basis of the BSA Council's
answers to their questionnaire. They try to prove their point by testing the
predictive powers of the various models. This is done by making use of Theil's
"inequality coefficient", U,42
 which is a standard measure of a model's ability
to predict changes in variables. The value of the coefficient U may vary
between zero and infinity, the former value implying perfect clairvoyance, a
value of unity implying the model is no better than zero change extrapolation,
and a value exceeding unity implying a performance inferior to zero change
extrapolation. Unsurprisingly, this test tends to confirm the CDDF preference
for the flow-of-funds model.
6.3.5 Hendry and Anderson (1977)
Unlike the other works we have been considering, this paper does not take
the investigation of building society portfolio behaviour as its prime objective.
Rather, it is an extremely technical work whose major concern is the
methodology of econometric model-building, and so we shall only pay it scant
attention here. Briefly, the aim of Hendry and Anderson is to set up a method
for the analysis of the specification of an econometric model, so that it might
then be more properly specified. In order to make their case the authors make
use of the O'Herlihy-Spencer model, both in its original form and reformulated
in light of criticisms of their own and of others.
Published in 1977, Hendry and Anderson set out
to integrate a 'long run equilibrium' theory of the behaviour of Building
Societies with a short run control-theoretic model of their dynamic disequilibrium
adjustment deliberately designed such that the equilibrium solution of the latter
reproduces the former. The theory also suggests which data transformations may
be useful (eg, differencing, ratios, etc)
	
(1977, pages )
The Hendry-Anderson reformulation of the O'Herlihy-Spencer model is
constructed in a manner not dissimilar from the original but with a greater
degree of sophistication. Unlike O'Herlihy and Spencer, the authors do
postulate an objective for the building societies—that of minimising the
discounted value of the 'costs' of not being in an equilibrium situation. They
believe support for such an objective function is to be found in the answers to
the questionnaire published in the Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford pamphlet
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(1975). The authors are able to show that mathematical manipulation of the
necessary and sufficient conditions for minimisation of the objective function
does, in fact, lead to a short-run model of building society disequilibrium
adjustment behaviour whose equilibrium solution matches that of the long-run
theory. Indeed, this model turns out to be not unlike the original version of
O'Herlihy and Spencer. The statistical tests performed on the O'Herlihy-
Spencer model by Hendry and Anderson revealed a number of mis-
specifications, and the estimates they obtained from their reformulated model
"...suggest appropriate ways of revising the formulation of the model...". This
evidence would appear to suggest that it is entirely possible for a model that
has been constructed strictly according to the observed facts to not perform
well empirically.
6.3.3 Comments
In this section we have been able to consider several papers that attempt to
model the portfolio behaviour of building societies from various standpoints.
The works of Ghosh and Ghosh-Parkin provide a fine example of the "Essex
school" approach, the pamphlet by Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford is an
example of of the "Sheffield school", while the work of O'Herlihy and Spencer
and that of Hendry and Anderson belong to no particular stable. Once again
we can see that the Essex approach has a more rigorous theoretical
underpinning that the Sheffield approach. Nonetheless, the CDDF pamphlet
represents the first serious attempt to examine and analyse the true objective of
a financial intermediary (ie, a building society) rather than resort to more
obscure and less measurable concepts, such as maximisation of utility
functions. The papers also construct their models according to two basic views
of building society behaviour; these are speculative demand models and flow-
of-funds models.
Unfortunately, a model (such as Ghosh's) that looks only at the demand for
financial assets from a speculative viewpoint has a number of drawbacks. In
particular, its use implies that any cash held by the building societies will be at
an exogenously determined level. In many respects, this is analogous to
analysing the demand for money by ignoring the transactions and
precautionary elements and only considering the speculative component. It
also ignores any consideration of the liquidity ratio, whose value historically
has tended to be double the minimum which is legally required of the societies.
To compensate for these drawbacks, Ghosh constructs a model that
incorporates both the transactions and speculative demands for financial assets
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by the building societies. He does this by the explicit inclusion of the liquidity
constraint into an expanded form of his model (which we have just briefly
reviewed). It is interesting to note that there is not a great deal of difference
between the equations obtained by either method. As before, the model is
estimated by stacking all equations for estimation as one. Estimation is by
means of a specially devised variant of the maximum likelihood method.
Although the results that emerge represent somewhat of an improvement over
its predecessor (Ghosh-Parkin), the model still seems to underperform similar
models of other financial intermediaries, possibly for the reasons already
highlighted.
The O'Herlihy and Spencer model is most often criticised for its lack Of any
explicitly-stated objective underlying the behaviour of the building societies,
but let us redress the balance somewhat by saying a few words in its favour.
For instance, the (potential) financial model-builder should be grateful to the
authors for, in their model, they have demonstrated that it may be more useful
to explain inflows and outflows separately, rather than by way of 'net
acquisitions'. Furthermore, the O'Herlihy-Spencer model performed rather
well, far outstripping those more rigorously derived models such as we have
already considered in this chapter. Indeed, it was able to forecast ex post all of
the variables dealt with in a more satisfactory manner. Of course, this is not to
deny that in any scientific investigation, including those within Economics, a
rigorous theoretical foundation is a prerequisite by way of explaining any
observable phenomenon. Rather, it should also be recognised that there is no
reason whatsoever why the construction of such a theory should not (and
indeed, could not) be preceded by statistical tests of an empirical nature on
apparently observed (ie, derived in an ad hoc manner) causal relationships.43
Despite the rather poor empirical performance of the CDDF models it
should be noted that they were more reliably constructed according to the
observable facts of building society behaviour than those of Ghosh and Parkin-
Ghosh, who (probably erroneously) adopted profit maximisation as the
building societies' objective, and that of O'Herlihy-Spencer, who adopt no
explicit objective. In fact, Hendry and Anderson were able to show that this
might well be the case. Consequently, a large amount of CDDF models'
underperformance may be justifiably put down (eg) to the quality of the data
or aggregation problems. Nonetheless, there still remain several criticisms of
the CDDF models. In particular, in common with their various counterparts
there still looms large a question mark over the treatment of expectations in the
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models. Once again, in nearly all cases the current yield on an asset is used as a
proxy for its expected value. This could be seen as a mis-specification of the
model. In view of their very careful approach to modelling as exemplified by
their use of a questionnaire to obtain a suitable objective for the building
societies, the lack of an attempt to explain their generation of expectations
stands in marked contrast.
As a final point it may be worth mentioning that, for all of the models of
building society behaviour we have considered, a degree of their
underperformance may well be due to some methodological problem such as
mis-specification of the theory, or inappropriate use of an estimation technique.
The rather lackadaisical approach to the modelling of expectations provides
one highly possible explanation. As a footnote, it is also worth mentioning that
the environment within which the building societies operate has changed quite
considerably during much of the 1980s, such that nowadays they are much like
the commercial (joint stock) banks in many respects. It therefore follows that
the previously considered models are in need of much updating to take
account of these changes.
6.4 Insurance Companies
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that insurance companies are
probably the most widely misunderstood institution with which the general
public deals. Yet insurance is the most important method by which the
problems of risk have been handled by individuals and the business world. It
is immediately apparent that the kinds of risk that are faced by (eg) a
commercial enterprise are very different from those to which individual is
exposed. Equally, the kinds of risk against which a given individual wishes to
insure themself will vary from person to person, according to their respective
circumstances and preferences. One consequence of this is that there are very
many different forms of insurance contract in existence. For practical purposes,
however, it is convenient to divide them into two broad groupings. The first,
which we shall refer to as general  insurance, consists of all insurance except
for life contracts and is usually written on an annual (or other short-term) basis,
often with the option of being renewable. These contracts tend to be such as
insurance against fire, accident, theft, etc, and concerning possessions such as
within the household or relating to the automobile. The second group is life
insurance, which is often referred to in the United Kingdom as life assurance.
The policy here is much more long term by nature (at least twenty years in
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most cases). Although there are different types of life insurance contract, they
may all be seen as consisting to varying degrees of both a protection element
and a savings element, the latter being subject to various guarantees on capital
security and long-term yield. The distinction between life and general
insurance is not, however, purely academic for, even if an insurance company
has business in both areas, separate funds are usually maintained.
Additionally, there is a great deal of difference in the asset/liability structures
adopted by life and general funds. It is a well-established fact that the life
funds dominate the insurance industry," and consequently there is a
substantial literature on life funds yet an absolute dearth on general funds.
Thus, although this section nominally deals with insurance companies in its
broadest sense, in practice we shall mainly be looking at life insurance
companies.
Although a substantial literature on the economics of insurance companies
does exist, much of it is purely descriptive and to devote a great deal of time to
it here would not serve our purposes awfully well. Nonetheless, it would also
be folly to ignore these studies completely, so our first offering in this section is
devoted to an overview of what is arguably the best.
6.4.1 Clayton and Osborn (1965)
In their 1965 book, Clayton and Osborn set out to identify, formulate and
discuss the principles underlying the investment behaviour of life (insurance)
companies. Because this work sets out to be primarily descriptive it does not
contain any econometric specification/15 yet there are statistical analyses of (eg)
the relationship between fund size (as proxied by total assets) and the
percentage of the portfolio held by way of seven major asset classes. We
reproduce here as Table 6-5 the results for their complete sample of eighty-six
life offices of various sizes for the year 1955. Unfortunately, with the highest
correlation figure turning out at only 0.13, and with many of the estimates not
exhibiting any statistical significance, little emphasis can be placed upon these
results.46 However, it is of great interest to note that the most consistent results
that emerged were the negative correlations between mortgages and British
government securities, debentures, preference shares, and ordinary shares.
Given that the data pertains to 1955 it is not surprising that the results lack
quality, for at this time it can be argued that most portfolios had not fully
ecovered' from the imbalances which resulted from the Second World War,
neither were attitudes completely adjusted to peacetime conditions such that
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equities would be regarded in a more favourable (ie, less risky) light than had
been the case prior to 1945.
Table 6-5: Clayton and Osborn: correlation coefficients 1955
Total: 86 fife companies
2 3 4 5 6 7 a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
-0.10 -0.40
+0.08
-0.44
+0.16
-0.06
-0.40
- 0.11
+0.04
+0.24
-0.35
-0.04
-0.12
+0.20
+0.46
+0.05
-0.11
-0.29
-0.24
-0.07
+0.06
- 0.10
-0.11
+0.06
+0.13
-0.01
+p.06
+0.11
bold denotes statistical significance
Variables used:
1 Mortgages as per cent of assets 2 Loans, per cent
3 British government and guaranteed securities 4 Debentures, per cent
5 Preference shares, per cent 6 Ordinary shares, per cent
7 Property, per cent 8 Total Assets, in £ millions
6.4.2 Carter and Johnson (1976)
Although never published, the major purpose of this University of
Nottingham discussion paper was to illustrate the stock and flow magnitudes
of the life companies' portfolios. Thus, in common with Clayton and Osborn, it
was also primarily descriptive. The major outcome of this study was to suggest
that life companies are concerned with, and engage in, a highly active
investment policy rather than the more conservative "buy and hold" strategies
with which they are usually attributed. Carter and Johnson also emphasised
the substantial role played by the life companies in the various primary
markets (ie, those for new issues), a view that has found much support in the
paper by J. C. Dodds (1978). For example, in the case of debentures Carter and
Johnson find that
...when issues of debentures [X] are relatively small life offices will tend to
purchase a large share of these (76% when X = Elm.), but as the amount issued in
any one year increases their share will decrease (38% when X = £100m.).
6.4.3 Ryan (1973)
The first econometric-based study of the portfolio behaviour of life offices to
be published appears to be that of T. M. Ryan. In this study he attempts to
develop a general model of portfolio review, and offer background evidence on
portfolio behaviour. Ryan assumes the maximisation of expected yield to be
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the life companies' objective, and this leads to each life office having a desired
portfolio at each time-period. From this he constructs a speculative model with
incomplete adjustment towards the desired position in any single time-period
owing to imperfectly competitive financial markets. Because his model is
"speculative" Ryan is implying that there is substitutability across the whole
portfolio, although he does include a necessary wealth/income constraint
which is imposed by the finite inflow of funds in any time period. However,
when it comes to estimation Ryan ignores this substitutability factor by only
including own-yields ("...to improve multicollinearity"), thereby eliminating
the possibility of cross-substitution. This would appear to be a serious
weakness in Ryan's model, although perhaps not as serious as his failure to
take full account of the various constraints (both internal and external) to
which life company investment behaviour is subject. For example, no account
is taken of capital and income risk, neither is investment policy linked to the
life company's liability structure, nor are there any liquidity considerations.
These are serious omissions.
For estimation purposes Ryan uses three variant forms of his basic model,
each with a different specification of expected yield. 47 The first variant makes
use of a distributed lag proxy such that
expected yield, yt = E 2) Yt-jj=1	 (6-4-1)
for any individual asset, where yt_j is the actual yield j time-periods earlier. The
second variant incorporates a three quarters moving average of past yields,
whilst the third variant opts for "perfect foresight". Ryan estimates his models
using ordinary least squares and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the third variant
performs worst with the distributed lag proxy giving the best results. The
results obtained on this variant tend to confirm higher degrees of imperfection
in those markets with 'thin' or non-existent secondary markets.
Because Ryan intended that his models should be generally applicable to
other financial institutions, we are able to account for his abstracting from some
of the more peculiar behavioural foundations of life companies' investment,
'though this is not to condone it. Nonetheless, in spite of his inattention to
institutional factors and that his work leaves a lot of questions unanswered, it
is certainly a step in the right direction, not least because he shows that the
inclusion of explicitly modelled expectations improves the resulting estimates.
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6.4.4 Munro (1974)
A study in a similar vein to Ryan's is the unpublished University of Stirling
discussion paper by Alex Munro, although a direct comparison is not possible
due to the different asset groupings employed by the two authors. Like Ryan,
Munro takes the maximisation of expected yield as the life company's
objective. However, where Ryan was trying to construct a generally applicable
model, Munro is more concerned with constructing a model that may easily be
incorporated into a flow of funds model of the whole financial sector of the
United Kingdom. Munro makes several attempts to improve upon the
shortcomings of the Ryan model. For example, he directly links the investment
behaviour of the individual life company to its liability structure. Additionally,
to maintain substitutability over a wide range of assets (ie, to operate a
speculative model) and yet overcome the problems of multicollinearity, Munro
makes use of interest rate differentials between those on gilts and on local
authority securities. Further, in contrast with the straightforward simultaneous
allocation approach of Ryan, he adopts three sequential allocation models. The
first model adopts the simultaneous allocation scenario; the second involves a
two-stage sequence, where investment in the property sector is predetermined
in the first stage; and the third involves a three-stage sequence, with property
investment determined in the initial stage, private debt investment determined
in the second, and all other assets competing simultaneously in the final stage.
It should be recognised that this latter version denies the possibility of
substitution between private and public debt, while both sequential versions
deny the substitutability of property. In common with Ryan, Munro has a
problem specifying the relevant expected yield date which he 'overcomes'
using a mixture of proxies and extrapolative mechanisms.
When estimated, each of the three versions of the Munro model give
remarkably similar results in terms of fit and significance, so the sequential
approach appears to have little superiority over the simultaneous allocation
version, at least in the case of life companies. Thus, although the Munro
approach is more sophisticated, there does not appear to be a great deal to
choose between it and that of Ryan. However, it is worth noting that the major
difficulty faced by both authors lay in the specification of expected yields. It
would be a most tempting and interesting experiment to reconsider these
models using alternative expectations-generating mechanisms, and see if
improved results could be obtained!
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6.4.5 Dodds (1979)
Arguably the most prolific writer on the economics of life insurance
companies is J. C. Dodds. Earlier in this section we have mentioned another
study (1978) by Dodds in this general area, but in this section we shall
concentrate on reviewing his 1979 book, The Investment Behaviour of British Life
Insurance Companies. One might view this as a culmination of his other works
in this area, or alternately his other works may be regarded as being largely an
abstraction from his book. Either way we are provided with a rationale for
considering the book alone, without being guilty of omitting to review his
other works. It is also worth noting that Dodds had also co-authored a number
of works on other financial intermediaries emanating from the Sheffield school,
such as the Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford pamphlet (1975) on building
societies, and so on.
The Dodds book is a substantial and thorough piece of research work on the
economics of life insurance companies, with most of the original empirical
estimation based firmly on observed phenomena. Indeed, the book begins by
considering the actual business of life companies and the history of their
'industry'. It is from this solid institutional foundation that Dodds is able to
establish later a set of objectives of life insurance company investment
behaviour. Much of the history concerns the changing legal and financial
environments to which the life offices have found themselves subject. From
such accounts he is also able to glean information about the various (external)
constraints on behaviour faced by the life offices, as well as how they perceive
them and adapt to any changes therein. This is aided by analysing the flow of
funds through the life insurance industry in recent years. Thus, by the time
Chapter Three rolls around Dodds is able to state dearly the objectives and
constraints on life insurance company investment policy as deduced from
observation. Although he recognises that life offices may pursue more than
one objective, Dodds argues that
...the maximisation of expected yields, subject to the life office being in a position
to meet its contractual obligations, is perhaps a realistic unitary objective.
(1979, p.98)
Thus, at this stage there is no dissent from other authors in the area.
Nonetheless, because these form the foundations of the model that is to be
tested, it is worthwhile to give these constraints and objectives a thorough
consideration.
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Dodds sub-divides the constraints on insurance company investment into
two categories: those imposed externally, and those imposed internally. Of the
five external constraints the first is government regulation. For the most
part this is imposed for consumer (ie, those who pay premiums) protection,
and relates to the solvency of life offices. Also within this Dodds includes the
government's regulatory powers over the financial sector, eg, those designed as
tools of monetary policy. According to historical evidence the author suggests
that this constraint is unlikely to be effective. The second external constraint is
that imposed by the structure of taxation. For example, the current and
recent structure has been such that insurance has been widely encouraged as a
savings medium and, in common with the pension funds, the insurance
companies enjoy certain taxation advantages on their investment gains that are
not widely available to other investors. A third external constraint concerns
exchange rate risks and regulations. Many life offices receive
premiums from overseas insurees, and the insurance contracts will usually be
denominated in terms of the overseas currency. To invest all of these
premiums on the domestic capital markets would involve risking the vagaries
of exchange rate fluctuations.48
 Thus, life offices are required to maintain
minimum deposit levels in those countries from which they receive premium
payments. The fourth external constraint concerns market imperfections;
it is quite possible for a life company to be unable to purchase those assets it
deems desirable (in terms of risk, return, maturity, etc) because of supply side
constraints in the financial markets. Equally, they may also be constrained on
the demand side, being unable to dispose of assets as desired due to (eg) their
dominance in a market or the lack of a suitable secondary market. The final
external constraint relates to problems due to inflation. For example, the
existence of inflation is said to have brought about a reverse yield gap such that
a life company will have less to lose from holding (eg) ordinary shares (with
nominally denominated prices) than from holding fixed-interest securities
which involve the risk of falling real values.
As with the external constraints, Dodds also posits five major categories of
internal constraints that affect the investment behaviour of the life insurance
companies. However, unlike the external constraints, it should be emphasised
that these constraints are largely self-imposed and, in a less responsible
environment, would play no part in the behaviour of the life offices. The first
internal constraint concerns the nature of the liabilities issued by the
individual life company; different types of insurance policy will require
different investment provision to ensure the fulfillment of contractual
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obligations. One major consequence of this is that the life offices face a number
of risks, reduction (to an acceptable level) of which entails the imposition of the
next two internal constraints. (Naturally, in common with other investors, the
investment policy of a life company will be constrained by the amount of risk it
is prepared to assume.) Dodds divides these risks as faced by the life
companies into two categories, each of these corresponding to an internal
constraint. The first category is that of capital risk, and this has two major
components: default risk, which is present in most financial claims, with the
possible exception of (eg) British government securities, and market risk,
which occurs due to fluctuations in the market value of securities. Dodds
shows that the post-1945 evidence on the portfolios of life offices indicates that
the existence of capital risk does not appear to restrict the types of investment
assets purchased by them. The second category is income risk, which may
be due to either income default or the result of the investment of future
premiums. One illustration of the default aspect is the risk associated with the
income payments from investments in (eg) ordinary shares.49 A second aspect
of income risk arises because an insurance policy is a contract with a guarantee
of future income for a given premium (in pensions parlance, it is defined
benefit). This implicitly assumes a minimum rate of return will be earned
when the life company invests the premium. However, this future investment
is made at unknown future rates of interest, and so there is an element of risk
that the minimum return will not be obtained. It was partly in response to this
problem that immunisation (ie, hedging) policies have been adopted in the
past.
The fourth internal constraint relates to the life company's liquidity
position. Unlike many other financial intermediaries, life offices are not subject
to statutory liquidity requirements, but they do maintain a self-imposed
liquidity ratio as a 'cushion' against unforeseeable circumstances of an adverse
nature. The need to provide such a cushion acts as a restriction on their
investment policy. The fifth and final constraint that is internally imposed
concerns the administrative and organisational limits of the life
insurance company. For example, pursuance of an active trading policy
requires the collection and analysis of a larger body of information than that
required for a "buy and hold" policy. The former policy will involve,
therefore, substantial costs; funds spent on the acquisition of information
might alternatively have been used to purchase additional investment assets.
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In his Chapter Three, Dodds backs up his assertion that the major objective
of life companies is the maximisation of expected yield with substantial
argument. As he suggests, on the basis of its yield expectations, the life office
will assume at each point in time a desired portfolio of assets. Between these
points in time the life office will buy and sell assets in an attempt to achieve
their desired portfolio. Thus, any model of the investment behaviour of life
insurance companies needs to be dynamic to capture this adjustment process.
However, it is at this juncture that problems begin to arise for, as Meiselman
points out,
Independent evidence of interest rate expectation is virtually unobtainable and
behavior based on those expectations is revealed only by the phenomena we seek
to explain.	 (1962, p : )
As we have already noted in this chap ter,it is precisely this problem which has
led us to criticise many of the models we have already considered. However,
Dodds continues unabated by considering some of the more orthodox methods
of modelling interest rate expectations. 50
 Combining this concern with his
dynamic framework, Dodds posits a partial adjustment mechanism for
financial asset demand:
264 = At1 + a(At* - A.t 1)	 (6-4-2)
where, at time t, Aa is the actual demand for asset a and A * is the desired
holding level for asset a. Putting the term At1 on the left-hand side of (6-4-2)
gives an expression for the net acquisition of asset A. Combining this with a
proxy for expected yield gives Dodds the following formalisation of a life
company's net acquisition of any asset i:
	
n	 n
NA i = aio + I aI)- R . + I bikSkjj=1 k=1 (6-4-3)
where Ri (j = 1, 2,..., n) is a vector of yields and Sk (k = 1, 2,..., m) is a vector of
other explanatory variables and constraints. It is probably worth emphasising
here that Dodds is mainly concerned with the strategic investment decisions of
the life offices rather than their operational (tactical) decisions. That is to say,
his major concern is how the portfolio is divided between the various broad
asset groupings, rather than what determines the quantity of any individual
security that is held. The asset groupings he adopts are Corporate bonds (ie,
debentures), ordinary shares (including unit trust units), government securities
(sometimes en masse, occasionally split into maturity ranges about the fifteen-
year mark), Loans and Mortgages (again, both as a unit and split), Land,
Property and Ground Rents, and short-term assets. A residual asset class,
including such items as overseas assets and preference shares, completes the
list.
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Dodds sees the strategic decision as being influenced by four major factors:
(1) the changing liability structure and adjustment towards the desired
portfolio;
(2) issues of the stock;
(3) movements in yields and inflation trends; and
(4) the availability of funds, ie, the life office's income constraint.
He examines each of these factors in some detail before modelling them for use
in the estimation of his individual asset demand equations in Chapter Five.
Most of these take the basic structure posited in (6-4-3), and are estimated using
ordinary least squares on data running from 1963.1 to 1974.1V. Although most
of the results obtained are "disappointing" due to either poor fit or variables
turning out (unexpectedly) to be insignificant, they do represent something of
an improvement over the results of previous works on insurance company
investment, such as those by Munro and Ryan. However, these results are not
entirely unexpected because, as Dodds himself is keen to point out, these
equations are posited as if the demand for each asset was a single decision;
only the use of yield gaps allows for the existence of interdependent demand
and, therefore, substitutability.
Prior to bringing the equations of Chapter Five together, Dodds tests their
predictive abilities. Using Theil's inequality coefficient, U, 51 the individual
asset demand equations are tested against ex post data for the period 1975.1 to
1976.IV. For the most part the equations appeared to predict well as shown by
values of U less than unity throughout. In particular, the predictive power of
the Property and House Purchase Loans equations is remarkably good, but this
is offset by a poorer showing in the Government Securities and Debentures
equations. This latter result was considered particularly surprising in view of
the equation's good fit obtained in his Chapter Five estimates. The worst
equation was that for Short-Term Assets, whose predictive power was little
better than that of a zero-extrapolation model. Re-estimation of the individual
asset demand equations over the complete data period (1963-1976) threw up no
surprises, being very similar to the earlier, 1963 - 1974, results.
Following his examination of a series of individual demand equations,
Dodds moves on to consider an "...overall portfolio model of strategic
investment choice and allocation." Of course, it is not possible to combine the
individual asset demand equations into a single behavioural model without
introducing various modifications, which may well result in problems. For
example, consistency of estimation usually requires the same set of
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independent variables to appear on the right-hand side of each equation, but
this is likely to result in multicollinearity. However, avoidance of possible
multicollinearity could result in the undoing of useful work performed at the
individual specification level. Similarly, there are compelling reasons for not
maintaining the asset groupings adopted in Chapter Five. Thus, a "cost-
benefit" approach is adopted whereby the method least likely to create
problems is utilised. In the context of his overall model Dodds opts for a
sequential investment procedure, whereby Loans and Mortgages have first call
on funds and Debentures second, with all other assets then competing
simultaneously for those funds remaining after the initial allocations. No
income constraint is included as the large positive net inflow of funds to life
companies is assumed sufficient to meet any anticipated needs. Therefore,
Dodds posits a portfolio dependent upon (expected) asset yields, the liability
mix and asset characteristics. Supply constraints are also modelled by use of
an "issues" proxy where they are considered relevant.
Dodds specifies two versions of his overall model. The first is static,
suggesting that the (aggregate) portfolio of the life offices is in equilibrium.
The second is dynamic, and incorporates the stock adjustment mechanism as
illustrated in (6-4-2). This manifests itself in the reduced form equations as the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Both models are estimated using
ordinary least squares. We only reproduce here as Table 6-6 Dodds' results for
the dynamic version over the data period 1963-1974. Apart from an improved
Loans and Mortgages equation there is little difference between these estimates
and those obtained using the static version of the model.
Once again using Theil's U-coefficient, Dodds finds the predictive powers
of his overall equations to be remarkably similar to that of his individual asset
demand equations. Although the degree of fit is not particularly outstanding it
is significantly better than had been obtained by alternative formulations.
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of Dodds' overall portfolio model is the
proliferation of insignificant coefficient estimates, an even greater number than
were obtained in the individual demand specifications. A second criticism can
be voiced concerning Dodds' use of the yield on ordinary shares (R 01 ) in some
of the yield gap independent variables. This would appear to be a particularly
strange usage in view of the fact that life insurance companies (in common
with most investors) regard government securities as the most "risk free" asset,
. against whose yield all other yields are to be compared. Thus, it would seem
more appropriate when using yield gaps as independent variables to make use
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Table 6.6: Life Insurance Companies-1963-1974
Version 2	 (Dynamic)
Equation
Number 6.5(1) 6.5(2) 6.5(3) 6.5(4) 6.5(5) 6.5(6)
Variables
Dependent
Variable
Constant 24.2*
NAC
84.9*
NALM
30.0*
NA°
-16.4*
NAP
46.9*
NAG
-7.9*
NASTA
(8.0) (27.5) (15.0) (6.6) (20.3) (2.8)
It
c 0.25*
(0.04)
0
It 0.18* -0.04 0.05 -0.13(0.08) (0.03) (0.1) (0.14)
It
G
-0.01 0.0033 0.07* -0.06*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.01) (0.02)
HPIt-1 -0.1 0.19* -0.06 0.06*(0.1) (0.06) (0.19) (0.03)
STA
Rt-1 -4.8(3.3)
2.5*
(1.3)
-6.1
(4.4)
10.3
(6.3)
( RD -
 R'-)ti
-3.0
(5.4)
(R D _ R01)0 17.2*
(1.4)
(RL _ Ro1)t 6.6* 1.91 7.4 -20.5
(3.2) (1.16) (4.1) (5.6)
TNAAA1 0.21 * -0.06 0.07 0.7*(0.10) (0.04) (0.1) (0.2)
BSLiqt..1
-4.3*
(1.5)
D(2) -24.8*(7.2)
Lagged
Dependent
variable 0.02 0.6* 0.23* 0.28* -0.04 -0.22*
(0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.12) (0.1) (0.2)
-2
.76 .63 .67 .89 .50 .57
DW 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.6
Det. C .02 .6 .005 .002 .009 .01
Key:	 ( ) = standard error
-
R
2	
coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom
CM	 Durbin-Watson statistic	 Det. C
NAG net acquisition of debentures	 NALM
NAG net acquisition of ordinary shares 	 NAP
NAG net acquisition of government securities	 NASTA
I t	 net new issues of debentures
It
G
	net new issues of government securities	 HP1
RSTA interest rate on short-term assets 	 RD
RL
	
interest rate on long-term government securities 	 D(2)
RO1	 interest rate on ordinary shares 	 BSLiq
TNAAA1 total net acquisitions minus prior net acquisitions of de
correlation determinant
net acquisition of loans and mortgages
net acquisition of property
net acquisition of short-term assets
net new issues of ordinary shares
house price index
interest rate on debentures
shift dummy
building society liquidity ratio
bentures and loans and mortgages
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of the yield on government securities rather than that on ordinary shares as the
'standard'. Probably the only exception is the use of a yield gap between the
yields on two assets which are known to possess a high degree of
substitutability, and this can only be determined following the results of
estimating the equations.
Obviously there are a number of other, less serious criticisms that might be
levied at the Dodds' models. In particular, these would include questioning his
adoption of a sequential investment procedure and his use of current yields as
a proxy for expected yields. Nonetheless, it should be recognised that his
results have not yet been bettered, and although they are disappointing, the
high degree of predictive power of the models indicate that greater success is
not too far away. Indeed, the inclusion of an expectations-generating
mechanism would seem to be the logical first step in this direction. But, as we
have seen, this is a shortcoming that is not Dodds' alone.
6.4.6 El Habashi (1977)
Before leaving the realm of life insurance companies' investment behaviour
there is one final work worthy of mention. In his unpublished University of
Sheffield Ph.D. thesis, El Habashi (1977) sets out to develop both a static linear
programming model of life insurance company investment portfolio selection
and a static linear programming model of life insurance company asset-
business portfolio selection. Indeed, this latter model takes explicit account of
the life office's liability structure. The author cites the major theoretical
foundations of his thesis as Markowitz (1959) and the later, more practical
extensions such as Sharpe (1963, 1964). It follows that with these intellectual
roots the model's inputs are various measures of risk and return. However, El
Habashi feels that this is bound to create problems:
...most of the examples shown in the literature involved only equities. Because the
return on these securities is primarily influenced by market price, it appears to be a
reasonable measure of risk. This leaves unsolved, the dilemma of formulating
similar inputs for publicly-traded bonds, mortgages, real estate, and other
common investment outlets. The problem is that the return on these investments
cannot be determined reliably from price movement because of the inactive
trading in the majority of such investments. Price movements are of little concern
in debt issues that a holder plans to hold to maturity. Historical or current market
prices usually do not exist for mortgage loans. In addition government securities
yield fixed returns. Therefore, the empirical study (testing static LP investment
portfolio selection model) is limited to equities; in other words, the data is
collected for an equity portfolio only.
	 (1977, pp.8-9)
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Thus, the El Habashi model is concerned more with tactical decisions, unlike
the other works we have reviewed which considered the life offices' strategic
investment decision. Nonetheless, it is a solid piece of research showing how
the Markowitz method applies to the investment decisions by a British
financial intermediary.
6.4.7 Comments
In this section we have looked at a number of works on the investment
behaviour of the life insurance companies. Although the studies by Clayton
and Osborn (1965) and Carter and Johnson (1976) are largely descriptive, they
do enable us to see the impact that the institutional set-up has on the behaviour
of financial institutions—in this case the life offices. This is obviously 4 very
important point, which was largely ignored by Ryan (1973), while Dodds
manages to incorporate such factors, regarding them as manifesting themselves
as the internal and external behavioural constraints. Nonetheless, the Ryan
and Munro (1974) works do shed more light on the pitfalls of financial model-
building by revealing avenues likely to prove fruitful or otherwise. In fact,
these two authors are to be commended for having the courage to model the
generation of expectations. Nearly all economists acknowledge expectations as
being of paramount importance in the investment decision yet they are largely
ignored in models of portfolio investment behaviour by financial
intermediaries, as we have been noticing.
Finally, the El Habashi (1977) paper differs from the others in this section by
concerning itself with the tactical decision. It should be recognised that for a
complete view of any investment portfolio selection procedure, both the
tactical and strategic decisions should be reviewed, perhaps sequentially with
the strategic decision naturally being taken first. The El Habashi thesis offers a
great deal of insight into the tactical decision and, if the problems of
determining the risk and return on the non-equity investments could be
eliminated, the linear programming approach would offer arguably the best
prospect for modelling investment portfolio selection. However, despite much
greater investment activity on an increased number of financial markets since
1977 these problems still exist. Thus, if we are to model the strategic
investment decision the linear programming approach must still be regarded
as a non-starter.
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6.5 General/Sectoral Models
In the previous sections of this chapter we have looked at some of the more
highly regarded approaches to modelling the investment behaviour of specific
financial institutions in the British context that have appeared in the literature.
One of the features of this kind of approach is that the models often lack a
sense of generality that would enable them to be applied to other institutions.
Some of the papers we criticised for trying to be so general that they virtually
ignored the peculiar institutional constraints pertaining to a given institution
that were likely to affect its behaviour significantly. That there are differences
between the various types of financial intermediary would seem to be
indisputable but, as we saw in Chapter Two, they all play essentially the same
role in the economy, that of channelling funds from surplus to deficit units.
The question that needs to be asked concerns the degree to which financial
intermediaries are similar or different. For, if they can be regarded as largely
similar then it would be entirely possible to construct a truly general model of
their behaviour that would apply equally to (say) banks as it would to
insurance companies. It is with this thought in mind that we now consider
some of the works of a sectoral approach that have been published. As we
shall see, these studies often aggregate all financial institutions together as if
they were a single unit, on the (implicit) assumption that their similarities far
outweigh any differences. Because of the nature of modelling the whole
financial sector there is not a great proliferation of work in this area, but we
shall press on undeterred.
6.5.1 Clayton, Dodds, Ford and Ghosh (1974)
Probably the first British work in this area to appear was the Clayton,
Dodds, Ford and Ghosh (1974) econometric model of the financial sector of the
United Kingdom (hereafter CDFG). This ambitious undertaldng consisted of a
nine sector model with sixteen categories of assets /liabilities, essentially in a
flow of funds framework as epitomised by the table reproduced here as Table
6.7 The model implicitly assumes a behavioural function for each sector
whereby each institution tries to maximise "expected net revenue" or the
"expected utility of net revenue", given an endowment of net worth and its
expectations about future rates of return. Further, it is assumed that all sectors
hold the same expectations concerning future rates of return, an assumption
that deserves some very serious questioning, but we shall leave that for another
occasion. Of more importance here is the obvious similarity between this
attempt to model an individual institution's portfolio selection procedure with
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Table 6.7:	 The CDFG Model of Financial Intermediation In the
U. K.
Assets/
Liabilities Sectors
Public
Sector
1
Discount
Houses
2
Deposit
Banks
3
Other	 Building
Banks	 Societies
4	 5
Other
	 Industrial &Personal 	 Overseas
Fls	 Commercial Sector	 Sector	 Rates
6	 7	 8	 9
Currency 1
-al 1 a13 a14 a15 a17 a18 ri-(150)
Treasury
Bills 2
-121 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26 a27 a29	 r2
British
govt
securities
3
-131 a32 a33 a34 a35 a36 am a39	 r3
National
Savings 4
-141 a46 a48 14
Call Loans 5 -a52 a53 a54 a57 a58 a59	 r5
Local
Authority 6
-161 a62 a63 a64 a65 a66 a67 a68 a69	 16
Debt
Deposits
with
Deposit
7 5-71 -a73 am am an am am	 r7
Banks
Deposits
with other 8 asi -a84 a86 a87 a88 a89	 r8
Banks
Shares &
Deposits 9 -a95 a99 r9
Deposits
with OFIs 10
-110,6 a10,7 a10,8
a109
	 r10
Advances
by
Deposit
11
411,1 a11,3 -111,6 -111,7 -111,8 -111 9	 r11
Banks
Advances
by other
Banks
12
-112,1 a12,4 -a12,6 -a12,7 -a12,8 -a12 9	 112
Advances 13 a13 , 1 -a13,2 r13
Commerc-
ial Bills 14 a14, 1 a14,2 a14,3 a14,4 a14,6 "a14,7 a14,9	 r14
Mortgages 15 a15,5
-a15,8 r15
Equity 16 a16,1 a16,2 a16,3 a16,4 a16,6 _p:16,7 a16,8 a169	 r16
Changes
in Net
Worth
(residual)
17
A2 Tn3 A4 A-5 A6 A7 A8 A9
Key:
14e)
r3
r5
i7
Banks
1.9
r10
F11
r13
r15
negative rate of inflation
the rate on British Government Bonds
the rate on Call Loans
the rate on Deposits with Deposit
the rate on Building Society Shares
the rate on Deposits with Other Financial
the rate on Advances by Deposit Banks
Bank Rate
the Building Societies Mortgage rate
r2	 the rate on Treasury B Its
r4 the rate on national say ngs
r6 the rate on Local Authonty Debt
BEEnks the rate on Depos ts w th Other
Institutions (OFI's)
i12 the rate on Advances by Other Banks
r14 the rate on Commercua B s
r16 the rate on Equity
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many of those we have observed in other sections of this chapter. In almost all
cases we note that the institution is seen as allocating its net worth among
various financial assets according to its expectations of future yields (interest
rates) in order to maximise its expected yield, or the expected utility thereof.
Where the CDFG model distinguishes itself is that a given institution's demand
for (supply of) any single asset is postulated as being dependent upon the
yield on each and every asset demanded (supplied) by that institution.
However, although this might well be in accord with the tenets of neoclassical
demand theory, as we have already seen in this chapter, such an approach is
very likely to create estimation problems due to multicollinearity.
Because the CDFG model is a closed multi-sector model, supply constraints
on investment behaviour are explicitly included. The model is also static in
form,implying that each sector's portfolio is in equilibrium. CDFG estimate
their model using two-stage least squares, with each sector's demand (supply)
function for assets (liabilities) being estimated simultaneously. Given the
rather ambitious nature of the project, it is perhaps not surprising that the
results obtained vary from rather good to abysmal, with the majority being
towards the latter. (Thus, nothing would be gained by reproducing their
results here.)
6.5.2 Dodds and Ford (1974)
In one of the few studies to test well-known theories of the term structure of
interest rates using British data, Dodds and Ford use Chapter Six of their
Expectations, Uncertainty and the Term Structure of Interest Rates to present a later,
revised version of the CDFG model, of which they had been co-authors. It
should be noted that the focus they take is rather different from that of CDFG,
with the revised model being used to examine the validity of the "Hedging
Pressure" theory of the term structure of interest rates. Before we look at the
Dodds-Ford version let us briefly review the Hedging Pressure theory of the
term structure of interest rates.
Many theories explaining the term structure of interest rates are concerned
with attributing the shape of the yield curve to the expectations of investors.53
The Hedging Pressure theory stands in direct contrast to this view, its main
contention being that investors are not influenced by expectations. That is not
to say that investors do not form expectations, but rather that they do not act
upon them. 54
 Thus, according to this theory, the position of an investor is
determined solely by the structure of his liabilities; that is to say, that investors
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act to try and match up the maturity of their investment assets with those of
their liabilities, ie, they hedge. A weaker view of the Hedging Pressure theory
suggests that investors may not be fully matched because the structure of
interest rates counterbalances the investor's innate matching preference. It
therefore follows that if all investors took up a fully hedged position then
segmentation of the financial markets into distinct maturity ranges would
result. Thus, the validity of the Hedging Pressure theory can be tested by
considering the degree of segmentation that occurs in the market for financial
assets, and it is to this end that Dodds and Ford use the CDFG model.
Although not primarily concerned with the same objectives as CDFG, the
revised model used by Dodds-Ford is virtually the same as its progenitor with
the exception of the following revisions: firstly, government bonds are
disaggregated into four separate maturity ranges; secondly, the model is given
a dynamic re-specification using the same adjustment mechanism as in (6-4-2)
to account for the possibility that observed portfolios may not be equilibrium
portfolios. Although these changes are made, there is no attempt to improve
upon the use of a "static" expectations-generating mechanism, although this
may not necessarily be inappropriate in view of the highly diminished effect
that expectations play under the Hedging Pressure theory. It is not altogether
surprising that these minor amendments do bring about an overall
improvement in the results obtained, yet this is probably entirely due to the
inclusion of the adjustment mechanism as the behavioural functions assumed
for each sector are otherwise identical to those of the original CDFG model.
6.6 Closing Comments
Throughout this chapter we have concerned ourselves with a review of the
literature on the modelling of the investment behaviour of a wide range of
British financial intermediaries. What is perhaps most surprising is the high
degree of consensus exhibited on many of the issues. For example, in almost
all cases the institution was posited as having the maximisation of its expected
net revenue, or the expected utility thereof, as its primary objective. This
applies equally to studies under both the Essex and Sheffield school banners,
although the former take a purely theoretical approach to consideration of the
objective while the latter takes the objective from empirical observation and
enquiry. Pursuit of such an objective leads the institution to construct a desired
portfolio of assets based upon their expectations of future yields, with an eye to
their current and future liabilities. It is from this point that the studies tend to
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diverge. We have found both the static approach—where it is assumed that the
observed portfolio is an equilibrium portfolio—and the dynamic approach—
where the intermediary adjusts towards its desired portfolio—modelled by a
standard adjustment mechanism. Almost all of the Essex school models seem
to be of a comparative static nature, while the Sheffield school studies tend to
also include a dynamic version of the model, albeit by the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable. It is intriguing to note that in almost all of the cases we
considered the reduced form equations to be estimated were of a high degree
of similarity regardless of the underlying approach. Furthermore, these
reduced form equations were predominantly of a type that we would expect
according to standard neoclassical microeconomic theory. Thus, it would
appear that the debate between the two major methodologies is largely a
question of semantics rather than one of major importance in terms of the
progress of the discipline of Economics.
Although there is much good to be found in the fact there is a high degree
of consensus among the various studies, there is one area in which they tend
not to differ which is a cause for concern. As we have seen, a financial
intermediary will "...construct a desired portfolio of assets based upon their
expectations of future yields, with an eye to their current and future liabilities."
Despite the high degree of importance attached to expectations and the
existence of a large body of expectations-generating mechanisms in nearly all
cases no attempt was made to model expectations. In fact, the most popular
method seemed to be that whereby current yields are viewed as a good proxy
for their expected values; the so-called "static" expectations. And yet, in the
few cases where expected values were explicitly modelled the outcome was a
better set of results.
Perhaps the most worrying feature that was common to almost all the
studies reviewed is the disappointing quality of the empirical results obtained.
In many cases coefficients were wrongly signed, contradicting strongly held a
priori assumptions, or were just plain insignificant. Such results are both
disappointing and discouraging in terms of future work in the area. It is
apparent from the poor results that there is indeed something significant
missing from these models, and I would venture to suggest two major
omissions. Firstly, there seems little rationale for the use of a static
expectations-generating mechanism as commonly employed; this would
appear to have no basis whatsoever, either theoretically or empirically. It is the
argument of this writer that, in order to accurately construct a model of any
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Chapter Sht Endmotes:
1 For a complete description of these different circumstances with particular reference to the
commercial banks see Brechling and Clayton's 1965 Economic Journal article.
2 See, for example, Table 1-10 in Chapter One. Also section 6.4.5 (this chapter) and Chapters
Seven and Eight for detailed analysis.
3 In fact, much of this large body of literature is concerned with the financial institutions of
the United States.
4 For example, in France pensions are almost universally operated under a Pay-As-You Go
system, while in West Germany the State social security system provides pensions by a Pay-As-
You-Go operation with private sector pensions predominantly financed via the book reserve
method. For further details see Pension Funds in the UK (1977).
In the United States, social security pensions are essentially Pay-As-You-Go financed, with
private pensions tending to be advanced-funded much like the system in the United Kingdom.
In addition there are a substantial number of U. S. citizens who purchase their own pension on
an individual basis known as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). These are typically
offered by banks, insurance companies, etc. In common with the United Kingdom, the
relationship in the United States between publicly- and privately-provided pension schemes
and the capital market is largely determined by the tax structure (hence the popularity of IRAs)
and such institutions as the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. For further details see (eg)
Alicia H. Munnell (1982) or Zvi Bodie and John B. Shoven (1983).
5 Indeed, prior to 1970 the only work published in this area that had a direct connection to
what we shall come to refer to as the "Sheffield School", in that they were (at least partly)
penned by George Clayton, in many respects the 'guru' of that school. Perhaps the only non-
contemporary works on British financial institutions are the classics by Edgeworth (1888) and
Lavington (1921).
6 At the time of its publication this had much less of an impact in the United Kingdom than
subsequently.
7 In addition, it could also be pointed out that these works were broadly in line, both
philosophically and in terms of their conclusions, with the increasingly-popular new orthodoxy
of the post-War era—the "Keynesian revolution".
8 The user of correct English will note that the proper word here should be "interest";
however, because of the other connotations that attach to this word in this area of Economics,
in common with the practice of many economists, I have taken the liberty of 'inventing' a
different form of the word to avoid ambiguity and convey its meaning and distinction.
Apologies to purists!
9 This article is surveyed in detail in section 6.1.1 of this chapter.
10 This may well be due to its use as a proxy for the expected future rate of interest.
However, the statistical insignificance should not be interpreted as expectations having no part
in determining asset demand. A more plausible reasoning would suggest that Ai is a poor
proxy for expected future rates of interest. This is not really such a surprising result in view of
the simple specification of the expected future rate of interest adopted by the authors.
11 As will become apparent from this survey chapter, this approach is common to all the
work on financial intermediaries emanating from the Essex school.
12 See section 5-2(d) in Chapter Five.
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(3)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
13 Note that in applying the Freund model, its form appears somewhat different from the
original in Freund (1956).
14 Although the length of the decision-period is not specified in the formal model, PGB make
use of quarterly data for their estimation, implying a 90 day (ie, three-month) decision-period.
15 The bank's utility function is of the form:
U = a - ce-bn	 (1)
The bank is assumed to maximise E(U) by implicit use of the expected utility theorem.
Thus from (1):
E(U) = [a - ce-bit]  1 	 e-i( (lc-)(5M cbt
CniVi
where pi -.. 22/7 (usually 7c).
Alternatively:	 E(U) = E(a) - E(ce-bn)
= a - E(ce-139
Now, since a and c are constants known with certainty:
fE(U) = a - c e-bit  1 	 e-f((n-P.)/011 clic
szniVi
E(U) = a - cf
cr1V
==>	 1 	 e-brc-i ((rc-11)/c7)1 dic
==>	 E(U) = a - c 	 1 	 eicstbm2o2 + (7c-1.)2] clic
cn/Wil
Rewriting [brc2o2 + (rc-p.)21 by completing the square gives:
Ih7c2o-2 + (7c_02] = [7c _ ((Tc_b02)? + 2002 - b2cr4
Substituting (8) into (7) gives:
E(U) = a - c 	 1 	 e-104(7c- 0.1.-ba9 2+ 2032 - -b2cs4] dit
alrfiTi-
E(U)= a - c 	 1 	 e-pb + (b/2)202 - (-10-2)[(7c- (11-13c )1 dn
cniVi
Now, el-th + (b/2) 2152 is a constant, ie, independent of it so (10) becomes:
i	
(11-bd21
E(U) = a - cellb + ( 3/2)352 	 1  e i[ 0—F. dn
alifFi	 (11)
Note that f... is the area under a normal density curve with mean (11 - bc7) 2 and variance o-2, so
it is equal to unity. We may therefore write:
E(U) = a - ceilb + (b/2)2(72 (12)
E(U) = a - ce -1411+ (13/2)2G1
Given that b > 0 implies that the bank should try to maximise W = - (b/2)a 2, then it can be
seen that this will be the same as if the bank were maximising its expected utility, E(U)•
16 PGB believe that these assumptions may be relaxed without significantly affecting the
outcome.
Or (13)
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17 A case could be made for including A as a choice variable; however, during the PGB data
period it was subject to Bank of England control, hence its status as an exogenous variable.
18 We have taken the liberty of introducing a change of notation here! For example, whereas
,
,.......' •	 .,.....' ,	 ,...	 •	 ,
in the original PGB use lv1 : V2) we have lv N : v x), with X and N being used to indicate
the eXogenous and eNdogenous sets respectively.
19 In this 'balance sheet' constraint the vector i represents a unit vector, eg, (1, 1, 1, ...), a point
which is not made clear by PGB in their original work.
20 The criteria are:
(i) the submatrix in the upper left-hand corner, bCrn Nmi, must be non-singular; and
11' c -1(fir [b- 1N inNmi41\1 must be non-zero.
If these are fulfilled then block inversion may occur by application of the familiar formula (see
A. S. Goldberger (1966) pa e 27).
-bC	 'NmNmN
With regard to the matrix
	 iN	 0	
-, the first criterion is satisfied since
CmNmN is a covariance matrix. Also, because - [1]ii\ji Crr6N-	iN is a quadratic form in
b
C -1mNmN and CmNiriN is positive definite (being a covariance matrix), the second criteria is also
fulfilled.
21 It is interesting to note that, although derived in a far more rigorous manner, this set of
reduced form equations does not differ greatly from that used by Brechling and Clayton. In
both cases there is a set of desired asset holdings (or ratios) which are dependent upon the
expected values of their rates of interest and the expected values of those asset holdings/ratios
which are determined exogenously. However, as we shall see, the Brechling-Clayton estimates
are based upon a much more highly aggregated version of these equations than that used by
PGB.
22 This is a standard step taken in each work under the "Essex school" banner. Most
empirical estimation on financial intermediaries is performed using aggregate data; in the case
of the U. K. pension funds, for example, there is little alternative as the individual funds are not
required to publish any form of detailed accounts.
23 There are arguments both in favor and against the degree of realism exhibited by this
assumption. It could be argued that because the advisors to the various banks will have
received broadly similar training in their field and are likely to be in possession of similar
information, their calculations on behalf of their employers will lead to broadly similar
expectations and therefore to broadly similar covariance matrices of forecast errors.
Conversely, even if banks possess the same expectations it does not necessarily follow that they
will act in the same or similar manner, as their interpretations of the perceived information is
bound to vary due to risk-aversion, prejudice, sub-cultural variations, and so on.
24 For a detailed consideration of this point and its ramifications, see Section 7.3 (Chapter
Seven).
25 For a fuller, more detailed description see J.R.S. Revell (1973).
26 For an explanation of these symbols see Section 6.1.2 (Chapter Six).
27 See footnote 15 above.
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28 Note that in the PGB paper the vector v consists of both an expected component, v, and an
error term, uv.
29 Q is assumed to be exogenous for empirical reasons.
30 Reserves may be defined as the accumulated value of the excess of assets over liabilities
from all previous accounting periods.
31 See the section on risk aversion in Chapter Five.
832 The value of 8 is calculated asW 0 = 0.99W 0 . So, 8 = (log Wo + log 0.99)/log Wo.
33 This accounts for the second constraint, ie, the preservation of a minimum liquidity reserve
ratio.
34 These yields include capital gains/losses, and are assumed to be stochastic.
35 That is, r is the same for all building societies, as is Crr
36 This is the standard abbreviation for the authors' surnames employed by Clayton, Dodds,
Driscoll and Ford. Please note that I have taken the liberty of changing the numbers referring
to the original footnotes, although their contents remain quoted verbatim, replete with with
spelling and typographical errors (of which there are many).
37 The rationale for the inclusion of these dummy variables runs something as follows: The
building societies are renowned for their rationing of credit, which tends to be chronic rather
than transient. Because of this, there can be no observable demand-for-mortgages schedule. To
combat this, HS use 'prior' subjecting information (eg, newspaper reports) to formulate
dummy variables to proxy "mild" rationing, D(1), and "strict" rationing, D(2). Apart from the
Clayton-Dodds-Driscoll-Ford criticisms, this approach can be criticised because of its subjective
nature, as well as because of its implication of constant absolute magnitude effects due to
rationing.
38 (footnote 8): "To some extent this is confirmed by the insignificance of the coefficient on
the mortgage rate (not included in equation 3, but reported on in the discussion)."
39 (footnote 9): "This is a common phenomenon and usually arises because the Building
Societies do not wish to increase the burden on existing borrowers or the government use
'moral suasion' to keep the rate for that reason or for political expediency."
40 (footnote 10): "It is possible that new mortgage advances will rise and that rationing may
also exist but they will never fall without rationing taking place unless excess supply already
exists in the market for mortgages or demand falls by at least as much as the fall in advances."
41 This would appear to be questionable. It is my contention that a building society (eg) will
adjust its desired portfolio from period to period depending upon both current and expected
values of the parameters (ie, the level of the inflow of funds and the structure of interest rates).
Indeed, I would also venture to suggest that this is backed up by the BSA Council's answers to
the CDDF questionnaire. Yet the CDDF model seems to suggest that changes in asset holdings
are brought about solely by historical changes in the parameters. But this can only be assumed
to be the case if the expected values are hypothesised as depending upon their previous
historical values alone. In their estimation procedure CDDF adopt "static" expectations,
whereby current values proxy expected values.
42 H. Theil (1966), Applied Economic Forecasting. The computational formula for U is:
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where Pi is the predicted value of the dependent variable at time i, and Ai is its actual value at
that time.
43 The more fanciful reader (and student of the history of Economic thought!) may well find
an analogy with the famous case of the Phillips' curve, whereby an ad hoc relationship between
the rate of (wage) inflation and the level of unemployment was found to be statistically
significant by Professor A. W. Phillips (1958). Yet Phillips provided no satisfactory explanation
of this apparent phenomenon; theoretical justification was provided later by Professor R. G.
Lipsey.
44 See (eg) J. C. Dodds' "The Role of British Life Insurance Companies in Britain's Financial
Markets", (1979a), especially section 2.
45 This should not be interpreted as meaning that it lacks depth.
46 In fact, Clayton and Osborn 'hide' these results in an appendix, so they would appear to be
fully aware of this.
47 Note that this is the first work we have considered in which expectations are explicitly
modelled.
48 Since the time of Dodds' writing, we have seen the removal of exchange controls and the
development of many markets in forward exchange markets which would allow (eg) the
insurance companies to 'insure' themselves against exchange rate risk by hedging.
49 That is to say, the income payments (ie, dividends) from ordinary shares (eg) are subject to
wide variations, hence they are very risky. Thus, investment in such a security means the
assumption of a greater degree of income risk as compared to an asset with a certain income,
such as a fixed interest bond.
50 Many of these and others are considered in detail in Appendix 6-1.
51 See Section 6.3.4 (this chapter) on the use of this in the Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford
pamphlet (1975) on building societies.
52 Once again, despite the importance attached to expected returns in the decision-making
procedure, at estimation time they are proxied by actual current returns, ie, "static"
expectations are assumed.
53 For a rather good readable review of various theories of the term structure of interest rates
see Dodds and Ford (1976).
54 If this assertion were to turn out to be true, it would have quite serious ramifications for
virtually all of the studies we have reviewed in this chapter!
55 Much of this Appendix is due to the author's unpublished (undergraduate) project, "A
Quantitative Evaluation of Inflation and Expectations in the U. K. Since 1963", (1976)
University of Essex.
56 See (eg) my "Reading Difficulties—The Economists' Paradigm" (1986).
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57 Many of these mechanisms have also been used in the study of inflationary phenomena.
58 For this example I have taken the liberty of reconstructing Thomas Sargent's example
(1984) which pertained to American football ("gridiron") to a more European version
pertaining to Association Football ("soccer").
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APPENDIX EA: apectations-eanaratIng Filechanlarns 55
That expectations are important in the panoply of economic decision-
making is indisputable. However, in many areas within Economics it is argued
that the formation of expectations is a peripheral issue and therefore not central
to the matter in hand. Yet experience, both common and of the literature,
indicates that many controversies abound precisely as a result of disagreements
about the assumptions (implicit or otherwise) pertaining to the formation of
expectations. It is only at its most naïve level that Economics does not deal
with expectations, using the fiction of single period decision-making.
Typically, however, economic decisions are made with respect to a longer time
horizon. That this is the case has already been seen in (eg) Chapter Two, where
we reviewed the consumption-saving decision as the impetus for the growth
and development of financial intermediation. Such a decision is obviously
intertemporal and made on the basis of expectations. In a world in which there
were a complete set of forward markets then individuals would currently be
able to make contracts for all future transactions at prices determined currently.
In this case there would be no need to form views about the future, ie,
expectations, as all prices would be determined in the current period.
However, in the 'real world' information tends to be both imperfect and costly
giving rise to transactions costs and uncertainty. These factors act to restrict
the number of forward markets that can operate in practice. Therefore, it is
necessary for economic agents to form expectations to enable them to make
reasonably sensible intertemporal decisions. This applies equally to the firm or
financial intermediary as to the individual.
The importance of expectations for the decision-making process can be seen
to extend far beyond the realm of the economic decision. (Alternatively, all
decisions can be regarded as essentially economic in the sense that they are
made by the comparison of benefits with costs and may therefore be
considered with the help of economic analysis 56). It is all the more
remarkable, therefore, that Economists have not yet been able to draw on the
work of other social scientists, such as psychologists, etc, who delve more
deeply into the phenomena of individual human activity, to derive a
scientifically-derived yet empirically-based model of the generation of
expectations.
In Chapter Six we have reviewed some of the more renowned models of the
investment behaviour of British financial intermediaries. One major point of
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note was that almost all of the models considered relied on the concept of an
intermediary possessing a 'desired portfolio', ie, the portfolio of assets that a
given intermediary has decided at time t that it feels would be desirable to hold
at some point in the future, say t+1. As we have seen, the desired portfolio
may not actually be achieved due to (eg) market imperfections and therefore is
unobservable. However, the composition of an intermediary's desired
portfolio is chosen, ceteris paribus, according to the intermediary's expectations
of future rates of return (yields) of the assets in its feasible set. Thus, to be able
to specify successfully an intermediary's optimal (in its own view) investment
behaviour requires us first to specify the manner in which it forms its
expectations. Many of the models we reviewed in Chapter Six opted for the
method of "static" expectations, and this was found to be a possible reason for
poor quality estimates and a major source of criticism. In this Appendix we
shall be considering some of the more widely regarded mechanisms for
generating expectations series. 57 In particular, we shall be concentrating on the
formation of expected rates of return (yields).
6A.1 Classical (or Static) Expectations
The classical, or static, method of forming expectations posits that values
currently prevailing are expected to continue unchanged into the next time
period. In other words, under classical expectations the rate of return that is
currently expected to prevail in the future, (eg) at time t, is simply equal to the
actual rate of return in the previous time period, t-1. Thus, letting 4 represent
the rate of return that is expected to occur in period t and R t the actual rate of
return in period t, classical expectations says that
4 = Rt-1
Under this regime, even if the rate of return had been increasing over the last
fifty years (eg) the rate of return this period would still be expected to prevail
next period. This is obviously a rather unsophisticated mechanism (perhaps
naïve) that can be considered equivalent to the formation of no expectations
whatsoever. It would seem that such a process would only be valid in an
economy with a zero-growth steady state.
6A.2 Extrapolative Expectations
Under classical expectations no account is taken of the fact that economies
are usually dynamic and therefore the rate of return on an asset is likely to vary
from period to period. Under extrapolative expectations the classical
mechanism is extended to account for this variation. Here we find that the rate
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of return expected in period t is equal to the rate of return in the previous
period, t-1, less a correction factor which is dependent upon the trend exhibited
by the rate of return. Using the same notation as before
4 = Rt-i - e(Rt-i - Rt-2)
where 0 < 0 < 1 is the correction factor.
This equation can be manipulated to give an alternative yet identical
expression of this form of expectations-generating mechanism. This involves
rewriting the expected rate of return in period t as a weighted average of the
rates of return in the previous two time-periods, viz
Iq = (1 - 0)Rt_1 + ORt_2
In his book, Dodds (1979d) suggests that the following form of extrapolative
expectations is worthy of note:
Rte = Rt_i + [Rt-2 - Rt-3]
2
6A.3 Adaptive Expectations
The hypothesis of adaptive expectations was first introduced into
Economics by M. Nerlove (1958) and P. Cagan (1956). They postulated that
individuals use information on their past forecasting errors in order to revise
their current expectations. In essence their approach may be viewed as a
simple extension of the extrapolative expectations-generating mechanism, with
the expected rate of return being a weighted average of all past rates of return.
The weights are such that greater importance is attached to more recent rates of
return. The adaptive expectations approach can be formulated with varying
degrees of sophistication:
6A.3.1 first order
Until the mid-to-late 1970s this had become one of the most popular
methods of modelling the formulation of expectations in the literature. Under
this schema expectations adjust in proportion to the last recorded forecast error
alone. In notation:
lq - ni. = 0(Rt-i - ni)
where 0 < 0 < 1. By manipulation the above may also be written as
Iq --,ORt
_i + (1- 0) n1	 (1)
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It is interesting to note that this is essentially the same as the adjustment
mechanism employed in many of the studies we reviewed in Chapter Six. For
example, compare with equation (6-4-1).
6A.3.2 second order
In this slightly more sophisticated version expectations adjust in proportion
to the forecast errors of the previous two periods. In notation:
4 - 4_1
 = (1-01)(R t_i - 4_1 ) + (1-02)(Rt_2 - g2)
Or alternatively:
4 = 0144
 = (1-01)Rt-i + (1-02)Rt-2 - (1-02)1q_2
For the most part, authors seem to be content to use the first order variant in
their studies, and with good reason. Consider the second formulation of the
first order variant (1); since this must also be true one period earlier we obtain
44 = 8Rt_2 + (1-0)4_2	 (2)
This must also be true for each and every time period. Thus, by recursive
substitution of (2) into (1) the unobservable expectation term can be eliminated,
giving
4 = ORt_i + 0(1-0)Rt_2 + 0(1-0)2Rt-3 + ... + 0 (1 -0)t11-11q-n	 (3)
Because 0 is a positive fraction it follows that as n increases (1 - 0)n gets
steadily smaller, and as n reaches a sufficiently large number the final term in
(3) can be considered negligible. This means that the adaptive expectations
regime allows us to model unobservable expectations purely in terms of past
observations.
A closer look at equation (3) also serves to emphasise that, in essence,
adaptive expectations is little more than a series of weighted values of past
observations. In this lies both its tremendous appeal and the source of the
criticisms levied by its detractors.
Finally, it should be mentioned that although the adaptive expectations
mechanism can be used at higher orders, the costs (in terms of calculation time,
etc) will usually be found to exceed the possible benefits.
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6A.4 Weighted Expectations
This is often regarded as a more generalised form of adaptive expectations,
whereby the expected rate of return is a simple weighted average of all
previous rates of return. In notation:
4 = OiRt-i + 02Rt-2 + 0 3Rt-3 + - •
where 0 < ei<1 for all i. This model is often specified such that E0 1 = 1. One of
the more popular forms of this mechanism was first suggested by Almon (1965)
and is usually referred to as the Almon or polynomial lag model. It has been
found, both empirically and through practical experience, that a polynomial of
the fifth degree is usually sufficient for most purposes.
6A.5 Regressive Expectations
This form of generating expectations has its roots in the Keynesian notion of
a "normal" rate of interest, which is often represented by some fairly riskless
long-term rate. According to the theory, if the prevailing rate of interest is
above (what is regarded as being) the normal rate, then capital gains are likely
because interest rates are expected to fall towards the normal rate, and vice-
versa. Because the normal rate is determined subjectively it cannot be
measured with any accuracy. Indeed, there is no real consensus among
economists on the definition of the normal rate of interest. Nonetheless,
various attempts have been made to proxy the normal rate, for example:
6A.5.1 the Koyck transformation
Here the normal rate is constructed as a geometrically declining weighted
average of past actual long-term rates of interest. In notation:
n.N E 1+1R	 0t =	 Rt - (i+1)
i=0
where 0 < 0 < 1. The Koyck transformation gives a proxy series for the normal
rate of interest from which investors' expectations of gains or losses due to
interest rate changes can be assessed. One method of achieving this is to take a
linearised form of the difference between the actual long rate (R) and the
normal rate (RN):
NAt = a + b(R - RN)t
where NAt is the net acquisition of a given asset at time t.
64.6 Inverted-V Expectations
It could be argued that to take expectations as being either extrapolative or
regressive is to dichotomise the process artificially. According to the seminal
work by de Leeuw (1965) the two views are not necessarily divergent. By
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using a particular form of the distributed lag function the weights may be
varied such that they produce Keynesian (long-lag) and Duesenberry (short-
lag) variables. This can be modelled as follows:
Re() = Rt [ 1 i / A.Rt - iii.1-X 1 .1
where Re(X) is the expected capital gain/loss, and Rt is the yield on the relevant
asset in period t. Note that in the study X was varied from 0.15 to 0.95; set at
the former value the model is tantamount to first differences, while with the
latter value it "...is the current value in relation to a much longer average." It
is interesting to note that, according to de Leeuw, the term in parentheses gives
the normal rate of interest. He also suggests that its coefficient should be the
opposite sign to that of the coefficient of Rt.
6A.7 Rational Expectations
According to Begg (1982) the problem with the expectations-generating
mechanisms we have already considered in this Appendix is that they
...have the disturbing implication that they allow individuals to make systematic
forecasting errors period after period, without requiring any amendment to the
basis of the forecasting rule itself. 	 (1982, p. 29)
Consider the following by way of example. 58 Fans of soccer in the English
Football League's First Division may well have observed the following
behaviour by Tottenham Hotspur F. C. during the current season: when
confronted with a corner kick the ball was crossed towards the two forwards
who were positioned on the far corner of the six-yard box. At home against
local rivals, Arsenal, this occurred on all corner kicks, while the following week
against Manchester United such corners occurred 93 per cent of the time, and
later against Liverpool the same tactic was employed 100 per cent of the time,
as it was for the rest of the season. In short, on the basis of the time-series data,
Tottenham Hotspur has a tendency to play corners to their two strikers
positioned on the far corner of the six-yard box, no matter who the opposition
or the venue.
Having observed this historical record, we now wish to predict how
Tottenham Hotspur will behave on future corner kicks. Suppose that next
week they will play a League Cup game away at Doncaster, a team they have
never played before. It would seem safe to predict that they will play corners
to their two strikers positioned on the far corner of the six-yard box. This
sensible prediction is based not on any understanding of the game of
Association Football ("soccer"), but rather on simply extrapolating a past
behaviour pattern into the future.
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In many cases we would expect this method of prediction to work well.
However, for precisely those cases in which predictions are most interesting,
the extrapolative method can be expected to break down. For example,
suppose that F. I. F. A., soccer's ultimate ruling body, announced a rule change,
effective immediately, whereby players could now be in an offside position
from a corner kick. Would we still expect Tottenham Hotspur to play corners
to their two strikers positioned on the far corner of the six-yard box? Clearly
not; at least no one familiar with the game of association football! (The
defenders would no longer be likely to take up a position on their goal-line,
thereby putting the attacking players on the six-yard box in an offside
position).
What this example demonstrates is that historical patterns of human
behaviour often depend on the rules of the game in which people are
participating. Since much human behaviour is purposeful, it makes sense to
expect that it will change to take advantage of changes in the rules.
The main postulate of the rational expectations hypothesis is that
individuals do not make systematic errors in their forecasts. This is assumed to
follow directly from the usual assumption adopted by economists of rationality
on the part of economic agents. Traditionally, the assumption of rationality has
implied that economic agents always act in their best self interests, ie, to
maximise their own utility. Under rational expectations this is taken a step
further, the implication being not that individuals forecast accurately; rather
that they learn from experience and that on average and in the long run their
expectations will be fulfilled. According to Chrystal (1979)
...agents will form expectations on the basis of the best available information in the
context of the best available model. Mistakes will be made in expectations but
these errors will be random. If they were not random, some systematic
information would be being ignored, which is inconsistent with the theory.(1979, p.162)
This is not to imply that all economic agents are top-class economists, but
rather they act as if they were. This is sometimes referred to as the weak form
of the rational expectations hypothesis. Rational expectations can be defined,
then, according to the following equation:
„* , r„ i
tl-i At = F, LAt+1J
Formally, this says that all relevant information that is available on X at time t
is employed in the formation of expectations on X at time t+1. The rational
expectations hypothesis is often attributed to J. Muth (1961), whose position is
perhaps best expressed by J. Pesando:
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To be rational in the sense of ... Muth, ... expectations must be generated by a
reduced-form equation in the exogenous variables which actually generate the
variable to be predicted. 	 (1975, p.850)
Thus, in the models we have been considering, a geometric lag system of past
yield values may be rational if no other variables seem to matter. However,
many researchers would argue that other current endogenous variables matter,
as well as other predetermined variables, in predicting yields.
Arguably the best complete description of the incorporation of rational
expectations into an empirically testable model is in Chapter Four of Begg
(1982). In this chapter Begg shows how a macroeconomic consumption
function with income and wealth as arguments can be expanded to incorporate
the expected values of those arguments on a rational expectations basis.
Essentially there are two sets of simultaneous equations: the first is the
consumption function, which depends on the expected values of income and
wealth; the second is the equations whereby expected income and wealth are
anticipated rationally, using a model of the macroeconomy. This models
agents acting as if they knew how to estimate future values of income and
wealth in a macroeconomic model, and should be seen in much the same way
as we view the firm pursuing its objectives without explicitly measuring its
marginal cost and marginal revenue curves.
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Chipter Seven: TM Fltw ot Funds Through tha united
Kingcionl Pension Funds
7.0 Introduction
In this chapter it is our intention to focus on the activities of the pension
funds as financial intermediaries. In Chapter Two we considered the role of
such financial institutions in the economy; to transfer loanable funds from
savers ("ultimate lenders") to investors ("ultimate borrowers") by purchasing
primary securities from investors and issuing secondary securities to savers. In
the case of a pension fund there is only one form of secondary security issued,
and that is the contract to provide pension benefits to those savers who are
members of the scheme organised by the fund. However, as we shall find out
shortly, the securities that are purchased by a pension fund come from
virtually every group of financial claim issued. Indeed, the pension funds have
also been known to acquire real assets (other than property) for their portfolios
from their occasional forays into the more esoteric non-financial investment
markets. Obviously the holding of such a wide diversity of assets requires
some explanation of the motives of a pension fund, and the aim of this chapter
is to move in that direction by considering in detail the role played by the
pension funds as financial intermediaries. We undertake such a task via a
series of related surveys: we consider the various asset groups from which a
pension fund may construct its portfolio—its "feasible set"—and then move on
to consider the actual asset distribution of the pension funds' portfolio—what it
looks like, and how it has changed over time. We also consider the various
viewpoints expressed by government-sponsored investigations into the
financial markets and institutions of the United Kingdom. Examination of
these details should provide us with some of the insight necessary to construct
an accurate model of British pension fund investment behaviour, in particular
their objectives and the constraints to which their actions are subject. In
Chapter Eight we move on to consider the role of the pension funds in the
capital markets of the United Kingdom, as this too must surely be an important
factor in determining their investment behaviour.
7.1 Sources and Uses of Funds
We begin this chapter with a brief look at the sources and uses of funds by
the pension funds. Unlike (say) the insurance companies the pension funds'
major liability is homogeneous, ie, the payment of pensionable benefits, while
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the assets they hold come from as wide a variety that one might conceivably
imagine. Although we refer to a pension fund as a fund per se many of them, as
we have seen, are effectively operating on a pay-as-you-go basis; 1 ie, using this
year's contributions to finance this year's benefits, any surplus contributions
being invested in various types of both financial and other assets. However,
this could be construed as an over-simplification in many cases; a mere
tautology, for the fund technically invests 'immediately' its current
contributions and pays current benefits from the income it receives from
maturing financial assets and the sale of financial and other assets. But
whichever way you choose to look at it, it matters not! Either way there is a
fund which is invested. This is illustrated, for example, in Table 7-1 (below)
where we present data on the pension funds' income and expenditure for 1982
(data for some other years is presented in Table 1-8).
Turning to Table 7-1 it is interesting to note that, in terms of the pension
funds' sources of funds, the amount from employers contributions and that
due to income from investments are almost equal and comprise the lion's
share. Equally, the major expenditure is on the payment of pensionable
benefits, as we might have expected. As we suggested above, the data which
are available show that there is a surplus of income over expenditure to the
tune of approximately fifty per cent. It is this remaining amount that the funds
may be considered as using for the purchase of additional financial assets.
With regard to the pension funds' income and expenditure statistics two
other points are worthy of mention. Firstly, it should be recognised that 1982
was a recessionary year in the United Kingdom, and to a large extent this
accounts for the item "additional contributions of employers". These
contributions were exceptional payments made on a "one-off" basis to ensure
that pension schemes were properly funded at a time when normal
contributions alone would have meant that they were underfunded. During
the growth years of 1985 - 1986 this situation appears to have been reversed,
with many funds enjoying huge actuarial surpluses. The second point relates
to the administrative costs of the pension funds. For 1982 the figures for the
private, public and local authority sector funds are £30 million, £40 million and
£40 million respectively. In absolute terms the private sector funds have the
lowest administrative costs. However, when we consider that these lower costs
are incurred in administering larger sums of both income and expenditure, the
administration of the public and local authority funds comes into question. In
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Table 7-2 we present the data on administrative costs as a percentage of the
funds' income and expenditure:
Table 7-2:
Administrative costs
as a percentage of: Private Public
Local
Authority
Expenditure 1.12% 2.29% 4.00%
Income 0.4695% 1.0076% 1.8519%
Net Investment* 0.8108% 1.8018% 3.4483%
* Net Investment = Income - Expenditure
Source: Table 7-1
The data in Table 7-2 shows conclusively that the most expensive funds to
administer are those within the local authority sector, with private funds being
the least expensive by all three methods of measuring costs as a percentage of
the funds' activities. Several possible explanations can be put forward to
account for this phenomenon. The first is that the pension funds in the two
public sectors are subject to much closer immediate control and accountability
and consequently this raises their administrative costs. A second suggestion
would be that of economies of scale; that is to say, that larger funds can reduce
their costs by investing in labour-saving technology such as computers,
customised financial software, etc. However, if we recall Table 1-10, many of
the largest pension funds were found to be in the public sector. If the large
public sector funds do enjoy economies of scale then for this explanation to
hold the smaller public sector funds must be incurring huge administrative
costs. While we do not have any evidence to deny this possibility, it does seem
to be highly unlikely. A third possibility is the rather cynical view that public
sector bodies seem to be less efficient almost by nature. Without investigating
a substantial number of individual pension funds we are unlikely to be able to
decide why the larger funds seem to enjoy lower costs, so we now turn our
attention to consider in detail how these funds are invested, and in which
assets.
7.2 The Assets
7.2.1 Asset Characteristics
According to William L. Silber (1970):
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...Securities that are candidates for an investor's portfolio can be characterized by
two attributes that help determine the ultimate asset composition of the portfolio.
The two characteristics are yield and risk.
	 (1970, p.7)
As we have already seen in Chapters Five and Six, the securities that are chosen
to make up a portfolio are selected on the basis of their yield and risk
characteristics. Let us now proceed to examine these attributes in some depth:
(a) Yield: Following Professor Revell (1973), we may formally define a
financial asset as
...a claim to the payment of a future sum of money and/or a periodic payment of
money. The 'and/or' in this definition implies that either one of the payments will
be a sufficient condition, but that both may be promised. In many cases there is no
periodic payment: treasury bills and commercial bills, which are issued at a
discount and repaid at par, and national savings certificates, on which accrued
interest is paid in full when they are cashed are cases in point. Similarly there may
be no promise to repay a definite sum in the future: perpetual bonds are promises
to pay an annual rate of interest without providing for future redemption, and
ordinary shares (equities) carry no promise of redemption.
	 (1973, p.30)
Allowing for one of the forms of payment (ie, redemption or interest) to take
the value of zero we may think of a financial claim as typically carrying an
obligation on the issuer to pay interest periodically and to redeem the claim at
a stated value in any one of three ways:
(i) on demand;
(ii) after a stated period of notice has been given; or
(iii) on a given date or within a given range of dates.
The future payments of periodic interest and that on redemption may or
may not be fixed in value. For example, a bond typically has a fixed rate of
interest over its life and a redemption value ("par") stated in advance. With an
ordinary share neither payment is fixed; periodic payments fluctuate
according to the proportion of available profits which the directors decide to
distribute to shareholders; redemption value depends upon the market price
of the share at the time of sale, or by a share of the realised assets should the
company be wound up. A deposit with a bank or building society possesses a
face value sum on redemption but a varying level of interest payments. And so
on.
For a contractual right to receive either or both of these forms of future
payment to rank as a financial claim the promise to pay must be unconditional.
For this reason such items as (eg) a life insurance policy may rank the title of
"financial claim" because it promises a given payment upon death 2 or the prior
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attainment of a certain date. This is not the case with (say) fire insurance as
payment only occurs in the event of fire breaking out, which may not happen.
Some contractual obligations to make future payments are not regarded as
financial assets because they are not transferable from one owner to another.
The payment of a wage or salary under a contract comes into this category.
We regard the yield of a financial asset as being composed of the sum of
both periodic payments (ie, the total of all expected future periodic payments)
and also the redemption payment. This will give us a measure of the absolute
return on any financial asset; however, an investor will usually be more
concerned with the value of their return relative to the purchase price of the
asset, ie, its rate of return. Expressed simply, the rate of return (or yield) of an
asset is:
rate of return =  receipt - expenditure 
expenditure
where receipt is the sum of all future payments, both periodic and redemption,
and expenditure refers to the purchase price of the asset. It is usually the case
that these values are unknown except in the present and the past, thus in
formulating investment plans the expected rate of return is calculated and
utilised.3 Obviously if the expected rate of return is positive then it would
appear to be beneficial to purchase the particular financial asset (assuming for
the moment that there are no transactions costs), but this is not the whole story.
If an investor can calculate the expected rates of return on all financial assets
they can be ranked according to their expected rates of return. At first glance it
would seem reasonable to invest solely in that asset offering the highest
expected rate of return, but, as we already learned in Chapter Five, this would
indeed be most unwise. Without going into detail here, this is primarily
because there is a second characteristic of any financial asset which must be
taken into account in formulating any investment selection rules, and it is to
this that we now turn.
(b) Risk and Uncertainty: While the yield on any asset is a fairly
unambiguous concept, it is a more daunting task to determine exactly what we
mean when we talk of risk. In much of the literature the term "risk" is used
interchangeably with the term "uncertainty", although they are by no means
synonymous. Thus, for clarity, it is important for us to distinguish between
these two terms. Probably the first attempt to define the concepts of risk and
uncertainty was that by Frank Knight in his classic Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
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(1921). These definitions were also employed by Keynes in his A Treatise on
Probability (1921). According to Friedman
...Frank Knight drew a sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events
subject to a known or knowable probability distribution and uncertainty, as
referring to events for which it was not possible to specify numerical probabilities.
(1976, p.282)
Thus, drawing on the work of Knight and Keynes we may define the outcome
of a decision as involving RISK if the probability of (considerable) loss is not
small. On the other hand, the outcome of a decision is said to be UNCERTAIN
if:
(i) the various pairs of possible outcomes are difficult to compare; or
(ii) it is difficult to decide on a list of possible outcomes.
So in situations of risk there exists a well-defined probability density function,
while uncertainty implies that such a function is ill-defined, if it exists at all.
However, for such as Friedman this is a false distinction:
...I have not referred to this distinction because I do not believe it is valid. I follow
L. J. Savage in his view of personal probability, which denies any valid distinction
along these lines. We may treat people as if they assigned numerical probabilities
to every conceivable event. 	 (1976, p.282)
Thus, following Friedman, it is always possible to turn a situation of
"uncertainty" into one of "risk" by assuming that the probability density
function is at least known subjectively. The interchangeability of the terms
"risk" and "uncertainty" in much of the literature is usually based upon this
assumption. This is a view with which Keynes in his later writings was very
much at odds; when referring to "uncertainty" he argues
...The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private
wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no
scientific basis on which to form any capable probability whatever. We simply do
not know.
	 (1937, p.217)
It is largely on the basis of this position that much of the Post-Keynesian
research agenda is based, while the neo-classical paradigm (including the
Rational Expectations school) adopts the Friedman position. Because of the
large amount of time series data available on securities, and because of the
increasing use of computer-generated investment strategies (which are
implicitly based on the Friedman view) it can be argued that capital markets
can be regarded as situations of "risk" in the Friedman sense rather than
situations of Keynes "uncertainty", at least in the short to medium run. In all
that follows, therefore, we shall implicitly be adopting this convention, unless
stated to the contrary.
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It was intimated earlier that there are many different types of risk to be
encountered in the domain of finance and investment. These are all reasonably
well-defined and therefore easy to classify. Following Clayton and Osborn
(1965) we define the following five risk categories:
(i) purchasing power risk: this relates to uncertainty about the
purchasing power of the unit of currency (in our case, the Pound Sterling), and
occurs as a result of the existence of inflation (or deflation). Consider by way of
example the case of an investor who purchases a security promising a fixed
rate of interest. Because the interest is usually expressed in nominal terms (ie,
in terms of the monetary unit, such as pounds in the U. K.) the security's real
rate of interest will depend upon movements in the general price level. This
relationship can be demonstrated by use of the well-known equation first
posited by Irving Fisher:
Rreai = Rnominai - rI
where R represents the rate of interest (with the appropriate subscript) and ri
represents the (expected) rate of inflation. Naturally, the greater the volatility
of the rate of inflation the more purchasing power risk is assumed.
(ii) default risk: this concerns the likelihood that the issuer of a security
will fail to honour their obligation, due to (eg) bankruptcy. Securities whose
issuers have a long history of punctually meeting their obligations are likely to
be considered less risky than those issued by less well-known characters. In
addition, the amount of default risk may also be influenced (positively) by the
period to maturity of a security.
(iii) marketability risk: this depends upon the likelihood that a security
can be realised without much danger of loss, and relates directly to the
existence and efficiency of any secondary markets. Similarly, following Silber,
this category should explicitly include
...factors such as imperfect knowledge on behalf of participants in the secondary
market or the existence of only a small number of traders in the market account for
the fact that an attempt to sell a large block of the security requires a significant
decrease in price...	 (1970, p.8)
Marketability risk is sometimes referred to as reversibility risk, because it
relates to the ability of the investor to reverse her decision.
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(iv) capital value risk: this arises because there may be uncertainty
attached to the security of the principal (the amount of money used to purchase
the security). In other words, the greater the likelihood of the market value of
any security fluctuating over time the greater the degree of capital value risk
involved. According to Ryan (1978, p.53) this kind of risk is likely to be
encountered if an investor's assets have longer to go to maturity than his
liabilities.
(v) income risk: according to Clayton and Osborn (1965), this occurs
because "...interest income cannot be predicted with certainty beyond the
maturity and call dates of a security." Ryan (1978) suggests this type of risk to
be most likely when an investor's assets have a shorter maturity horizon than
her liabilities.
Obviously, each and every financial claim (as well as most real assets!) will
possess each of these risk attributes to some degree or another. Nonetheless,
purchasing power risk in particular has received quite considerable attention
over the past decade or so when a fairly high and often volatile rate of inflation
has been the norm. In particular, those securities possessing a fixed face value
in money terms, such as bonds, may be cited as being prone to this type of risk.
Similarly we may observe that ordinary shares are much less likely to incur any
marketability risk than (say) mortgages, for which there does not exist a well-
organised secondary market, and certainly nothing to match the London Stock
Exchange! It is readily apparent that short-term securities will possess greater
certainty with regard to capital value than their longer-term counterparts, and
will therefore assume less capital value risk. By way of corollary, this situation
is reversed when considering income risk. It should also be understood that
the different categories of risk attached to any given financial claim are not an
immutable set of characteristics. As we noted in Chapter Two, the financial
system is a particularly dynamic sector of the economy, with intermediaries
constantly seeking (eg) to innovate either to evade legislative constraints or to
improve upon the competition. Thus, (eg) with the appearance of new
financial markets and the increased competition due to more trading on older
markets most financial assets experience diminishing marketability risk over
time. It would seem to follow that the increasing internationalisation of the
world's capital markets coupled with sensible deregulation should lead to
higher potential returns for investors (especially in terms of a wider range of
options) as well as a diminution of risk within almost all of the various
Page 258
categories, and also through the option of an increased geographic
diversification.
7.3 Asset Relationships
Given the different types of risk that exist (as outlined above), as well as the
security groups to which they particularly relate, we are now in a position to
establish certain a priori hypotheses about the relationships between particular
asset classes. Following Markowitz (1959) and assuming that for any given
level of expected yield an investor will wish to minimise their risk via
diversification, we would expect securities showing the same risk
characteristics to be substitutes within a portfolio. Thus, the ordinary shares of
(eg) Tottenham Hotspur plc would seem to be a good substitute for the
ordinary shares of London Weekend Television plc, both being within the
leisure industry. Indeed, it has often been standard practice to assume all
securities to be substitutes to some degree or another/4 and to a large extent this
can be seen as the basis for applying linear programming techniques to the
portfolio selection problem. However, it would seem more reasonable to
suggest that if the risk components of different securities compensated each
other to a large extent (ie, their risk components were independent) we would
expect these securities to be used to diversify the portfolio, and hence they may
be considered as being complementary. In either case, however, we must first
formulate a rigorous definition that lends itself easily to empirical testing. We
begin this task by a consideration of the definitions adopted in 'traditional'
consumer theory, and then see how these might lend themselves to portfolio
theory.
Two commodities, x and y, are said to be substitutes if an increase in the
price of good y (Pr) brings about an increase in the demand for good x (Qx)
ceteris paribus; in mathematical notation, x and y are substitutes if aQ x/aPy > 0.
Similarly, x and y are complements if aQ x/aPy<0. In fact, traditional demand
theory also makes a distinction between the concepts of gross and net
substitutes, the former being inclusive of the income (or wealth) effect, the
latter being net of any income effect. Whether such a distinction is applicable
to the securities market remains to be seen, and so discussion of this point is
postponed as we must first translate the above definitions into a securities
market context. The obvious a priori approach would be to define two
securities as substitutes if aQx/aPy > 0 and as complements if aQx/aPy<0,
where Qx
 represents the demand for security x, and P y represents the price of
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security y, etc. However, because it is more convenient (ie, more accurately
reflects observed behaviour) we usually express relationships between
securities in terms of their yields (or interest rates). Consequently, because
there is an inverse relationship between the price of a security and its yield we
may define two securities, x and y, as substitutes if aQ x / ary < 0 and as
complements if aQx /Dry > 0, where Qx represents the demand for security x,
and r represents the interest (or yield) on security y.
Y
So far, so good; but if we are truly to extend these definitions of
substitution and complementarity from the traditional goods market to the
securities market there are certain qualifications that need to be made. In
particular we must concern ourselves with the effects of expectations upon
demand. Consumer theory typically abstracts from this, but surely we cannot
ignore the role of expected yields when discussing the demand for securities?
After all, a security is purchased because the buyer expects a positive future
yield on it, unlike a consumer good which typically yields immediate
satisfaction (utility) to its purchaser. Further, it is evident that any change in
the current rate of interest will influence expected future rates, 5 which in turn
are likely to affect the demands for securities in the current period. Therefore
we must take account of this effect in the substitution term. In other words,
aQx /ary should include the effect of ry on Qx via its effect upon expected
interest rates. This should also apply to aQx/arx. Because interest rates on
securities (especially those of similar maturity) are expected to move together
ceteris paribus, it is possible that the effects of expected interest rate changes
may cancel each other in the relative demands for two securities.
Given these definitions of substitutes and complements as applied to
securities we may now formulate their empirical counterparts. It is known that
the regression coefficients of an estimated equation are interpreted as partial
derivatives6—the coefficient a l of an explanatory variable X1 implies that a unit
change in X1 will induce a change of a l times that unit in the dependent
variable, ceteris paribus. If the demand equation for a particular security is
specified to include as arguments the own-rate of interest, the rates of interest
on other securities plus a portfolio constraint (consumers are constrained by
income, whereas a financial institution is more likely to be constrained by its
total liabilities), the estimated coefficients of the non-own rates may be
interpreted as aQx/ary. Indeed, this is the precise term that tells us whether x
and y are substitutes or complements in this particular investment portfolio.
Nonetheless it is still not obvious whether this term corresponds to the gross or
Page 260
net concept of substitution, so we must now consider whether or not the
income effect is relevant for the demand for a security by a financial
institution.7
Unlike consumer theory there is no income effect present in the traditional
theory of the firm because there does not exist any budget constraint.8
However, the situation is quite different for a 'firm' such as a pension fund (or,
indeed, any financial institution) for many reasons. Firstly, it is usually
assumed that financial intermediaries take their flow of deposits as given9—
this is obviously the case with the pension funds as we have seen in earlier
chapters—and this imposes a constraint upon their behaviour not unlike the
consumer's budget constraint. Secondly, even in the case of a firm, its demand
for financial assets is usually quite different from its demand for inputs into the
productive process. For, although the firm's scale of production may not be
limited by any kind of budget constraint, its holdings of financial assets are
likely to be limited by some form of wealth constraint (unless, of course, it can
issue its own debt indefinitely to finance its voracious demand for financial
assets!). Thus it seems likely that a financial intermediary's demand for
financial claims will be subject to an income effect.
Given the likely existence of an income effect we must consider whether or
not it is included in the estimated regression coefficients attached to the yields
(rates of interest); that is to say, are we estimating gross or net substitutability?
In the light of the foregoing it would seem correct to suggest that we are
determining gross substitutability. If we hold some measure of income (or
wealth) constant in an equation—via (say) the inclusion of the stock of
liabilities as an explanatory variable—then the effect of the rate of interest on
the demand for a security, through its impact on the value of the institution's
flow of income (or its wealth), is clearly not excluded from the coefficient on
the rate of interest.
Against this it should be noted that, in discussing the estimation of
commodity-demand equations, Wold and Jureen (1953, pp.23, 98-111, 116, 242)
point out that for market-demand equations there is no direct counterpart of
the Slutsky equation and, hence, no direct counterpart to the income effect on
an individual consumer. Similarly, when estimating his demand equations for
financial assets, Feige (1964, p.35) assumes that the income effect is negligible
and thus the coefficients on the non-own rates of interest represent the net
substitution concept. Feige models this by imposing the condition that the
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substitution term between the demand equations for any two assets is
symmetrical. This assumption (of the negligibility of the income effect) is also
implicit in those models which come under the "Essex School" banner, as we
saw in Chapter Six. Indeed, of all the models that we considered in that
chapter the only examples of net substitutability were to be found in those
models in which the symmetry of the substitution term was imposed as an a
priori restriction. Thus the empirical evidence would appear to support the
view that there does exist an income or wealth effect in the investment
behaviour of the various financial institutions.
On the theoretical side support for this premise is to be found in the 1967
article by Royama and Hamada. The authors set out to
...develop a theory of the choice of risky assets analogous to consumer demand
theory. The effect of the change in expected returns on the demand for assets can
be decomposed into two terms: the substitution effect and the income (or wealth)
effect.
	
(1967, p.27)
By using a quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the authors
develop what they refer to as a "Slutsky equation of asset-choice theory.
They are particularly keen to promote the analogy between their equation and
that of Hicks in the Mathematical Appendix in Value and Capital (1946), and
therefore suggest that "We may call the second term the (expected) wealth
effect or the future wealth effect" (1967, page 33). Royama and Hamada are
able to show quite categorically that "the substitution effect is reciprocal" (page
34), but this depends entirely on the assumption "that the wealth effect is
neglected." (page 33). In fact, early on they state that "...the sign of the
substitution effect determines whether assets are substitutes or complements"
(page 27), but this is simply another way of saying that the authors are
primarily concerned with the concept of net substitutability, not that they are
suggesting that the income effect can be considered to be negligible. Rather the
assumption of neglect of the income effect is "...For simplicity..." (page 39).
That they recognise this and that there may be an income effect in practice is
borne out when the authors state that the properties they obtain "...hardly
gives us any operational relationship with regard to the nature of demand in
actual capital markets." (page 37)
Further support, both theoretical and empirical, for the non-negligibility of
the income effect may be found in the more recent paper by V. Vance Roley
(1983). He explains that:
The symmetry restriction in a system of financial asset demands has frequently
been employed to reduce the number of independent parameters to be estimated.
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Despite the usefulness of constraint in empirical applications, the symmetry
restriction imposes a behavioral assumption on the model which may not conform
to actual portfolio behavior. In particular, a system of financial asset demands
with a symmetric coefficient matrix implies that investors exhibit constant mean-
variance risk aversion with respect to the mean of the argument of the utility
function.	 (1983, p.129)
Roley substantiates his argument with empirical evidence which he derives by
testing the symmetry restriction in a disaggregated model of the United States'
market for Treasury securities. His results "...indicated that the symmetry
restriction could be rejected at low significance levels in virtually every test."
In addition, we may also cite once again the study by Wold and Jureen (1953).
Although they refer to there being no income effect, this is with particular
reference to the market-demand equations, ie, the demand for an asset on
aggregate, rather than by a particular investor or group of investors. To
suggest that for the market as a whole there is no income effect is a very
different proposition from suggesting that an individual investor is not subject
to an income effect. Most of the models we considered in Chapter Six were
attempting to explain the behaviour of certain single elements within the
market, ie, the investor, either as an individual or institution. It would be no
exaggeration to say that in all of the papers in which net substitutability
between assets was imposed no adequate behavioural explanation was offered
for the adoption of such an assumption. Consequently, in the model we
construct later on in this paper we shall adopt the assumption that the
coefficients on the non-own rates of interest (yields) represent gross
substitutability. Obviously if we are to adopt such an approach we are
automatically ruling out the use of a model along the lines laid down by the
"Essex School", despite its apparent advantages in terms of theoretical rigour.
7.4 The Asset Categories
We have previously made mention of our concern in this paper with the
underlying motivations behind the strategic investment portfolio decision; that
is to say, how the pension funds allocate their funds across various broad
categories of asset. We shall not concern ourselves in any depth regarding the
tactical portfolio decision, ie, how the funds are allocated among the various
individual securities within any one of these asset categories, although we
concede that this is indeed an important area of study that might possibly have
a bearing on our own investigation. Nonetheless, to consider all the available
securities together, regardless of the category into which they fall, would be a
monstrous denial of our observations on the 'real world' for, as we have seen,
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this is not the modus operandi of the pension funds. To reiterate briefly: the
pension funds operate initially via a trustees' decision to allocate various
amounts of their current income (in either absolute terms or percentages) to
various categories of asset; the decision as to which individual securities are to
be purchased (or even sold off) is usually considered as one of detail and left to
either one of the pension fund's employees—such as the equities investment
manager, gilts manager, etc—for those with "in-house" investment
management, or to the fund's outside advisors—such as banks, stockbrokers,
etc—or to a combination of the two.
In common with many other studies of an empirical nature the degree of
aggregation we adopt may have some bearing on the results we obtain, and
this should be borne in mind when considering the possible interpretations of
the estimates. However, in this paper the asset categories are exogenously
determined to a very large extent by circumstances beyond the author's
control. For example, there is the problem of the existence (or, more
appropriately in our case, the non-existence!) of published data. In the United
Kingdom the pension funds are not legally required to publish annual
accounts, and many therefore do not. Similarly, many do not even respond to
the questionnaires sent out by the Central Statistical Office (CS0), 11 from
which the data for such publications as Financial Statistics are culled.
Consequently even those data which are available are (highly) suspect with
regard to measurement error. We must also remember that we are trying to
construct a model to explain the investment behaviour of the pension funds as
observed, and so the asset categories we adopt should be the same as those
used by the pension funds in their decision-making process. These asset
categories must also be chosen in such a manner that the assets within a
category are highly similar in terms of both risk and return characteristics.
Consequently the asset categories we adopt in the construction of our model
correspond with those found in the major journals of relevant statistics 12 and
are as follows:13
(0 government securities: these are bonds issued by the central government in
the United Kingdom and are often referred to as "gilt-edged" securities (or just
"gilts"), an indication of the low levels of risk that investors attach to their
holding. Indeed, these securities would appear to be subject to purchasing
power and capital value risks only. Because of the existence of a well-
organised secondary market and the apparent non-existence of default risk,
gilts are frequently viewed as a totally risk-free asset which, therefore, may be
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used as a yardstick against which the characteristics of other financial assets
can be measured. Although government securities are issued possessing a
wide variety of maturities, following the practise of data-publishers we adopt
three maturity categories: short gilts are those government securities with a
maturity of less than five years; medium gilts are those with a maturity
between five years and fifteen years ; and long gilts have a maturity in excess
of fifteen years. This latter category also includes undated gilts (including
perpetuities, such as Consols) due to published data inconsistencies. In general
it is the case that short-dated securities have low capital value risk but are
subject to a high degree of income risk (because the proceeds from redemption
must be reinvested at the prevailing rate of interest), while the reverse is true of
long-dated securities, although as we have already discussed this is, not of
particular concern to the United Kingdom pension funds. Beginning in 1981
we find the introduction of a new form of long-term gilt, that of Index-
Linked Treasury Stock. The major difference between this and the traditional
long-term gilt being that the interest payment on Index-Linked Treasury Stock
is tied to the rate of inflation in the U. K. at the time of issue.
(ii)U. K. local authority securities: in most respects these are similar to gilts,
the major difference being that they are issued by local rather than central
government. They are normally regarded as possessing more default risk than
gilts in spite of the fact that no local authority in the United Kingdom has ever
defaulted on its debt. However, they are more prone to the other types of risk
than are gilts. Because there is a smaller issue of local authority securities than
comparable gilts, and because they are traded less frequently, their market is
regarded as being somewhat 'narrow', implying a marketability risk not found
with gilts. This is compounded by the fact that a substantial proportion of
United Kingdom local authority securities are unquoted (unlisted) and
therefore not readily tradeable on a secondary market. Although U. K. local
authority securities are of various maturities they are aggregated into a single
asset category mainly because they account for such a small fraction of the
pension funds' portfolio.
(iii) overseas securities: although in theory this category comprises both
equity and debt instruments further analysis reveals it to be predominantly
composed of securities issued by overseas governments at both central and
local levels, at least in the period prior to the mid-1970s. After 1975 we find
published data on both domestic and overseas ordinary shares, and a similar
disaggregation for loans and mortgages. Obviously the demand for overseas
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assets, regardless of issuer, will be dependent upon the (risk-adjusted) yield
differential of any foreign asset and its domestic counterpart. 14
 Nonetheless,
throughout most of the period of study there has been a series of exchange
controls in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) which, in all probability, has
limited the overseas investments of the pension funds to a small fraction of
their total holdings. Certainly, the amount of overseas investment undertaken
by the pension funds has increased, in both absolute and relative terms, since
the virtual abolition of exchange controls in October 1979. 15 Before this,
overseas portfolio investment had to be financed by foreign currency loans or
by the purchase of foreign exchange from other investors who were selling
overseas assets or by swaps (the exchange of British financial asset ownership
for ownership of overseas assets). It is readily apparent that these are much
more costly (in terms of time, effort, etc) than direct investment in overseas
assets.
(iv)debentures: these are bonds of various maturities which are issued by the
private corporate sector of the economy and, issuer apart, are similar to both
gilts and local authority securities. However, unlike these latter financial
claims, it has been known for a company to default on its debt from time to
time, and so debentures are usually regarded as more risky than government-
issued securities. Demand for debentures, therefore, depends upon the
trustees' considerations of the extent to which their yields should exceed those
on gilts of similar maturity in order to offset the disadvantage of their
comparative lack of marketability and security.
(v)preference shares: these are regarded as equity assets, although the holder
of preference shares is entitled to a fixed rate of interest on their holdings. This
interest payment is a prior charge on the profits of the company and must,
therefore, be met before any dividends are distributed to ordinary
shareholders, etc. One result of this is that preference shares are often grouped
together with debentures, especially where preference shares constitute a small
fraction of the total portfolio. The issue of preference shares has diminished
dramatically since the introduction of Corporation Tax in 1965, a point which is
considered in detail on page 277.
(vi)ordinary shares: bring up the subject of equities in conversation and most
people will automatically think of ordinary shares. Unlike the holder of bonds,
the ordinary shareholder is a part-owner of the issuing company and,
accordingly, possesses voting rights which (at least, theoretically) gives them a
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say in the decisions of that company. The 'cost' of this right is that the income
to be received from holding ordinary shares is not fixed or guaranteed in any
way. Rather, the holder is entitled to whatever share of the profits after tax and
prior charges (i.e. interest payments to debenture and preference share holders)
the directors deem appropriate. Over the shorter period the price of an
ordinary share can be quite volatile as the result of speculative investment
behaviour, yet over the longer term the price of an ordinary share is more
likely to reflect the underlying value of the firm. Consequently, for the longer-
term investor ordinary shares would appear to provide a good hedge against
inflation as the value of most firms (listed on the Stock Exchange) tend to move
in tandem with movements in the general price level. They are, therefore, an
attractive holding for the pension funds.
Ordinary shares are also advocated on the grounds that dividend levels will
be affected by general economic conditions in broadly the same way as
earnings levels—although their attraction still depends upon their profitability
vis-à-vis other investments. Another attractive feature of ordinary shares is the
existence of a well-established secondary market—the London Stock
Exchange—which virtually eliminates marketability risk.
The extent to which an individual fund may invest in those companies
whose employees are its members—the 'parent' company—is not explicitly
limited by law, even where there may be a clear conflict of interests. Clearly
there can be no objection to investment in such a company to the extent
dictated by the normal requirements of a balanced portfolio, but it is
undesirable for both economic and political reasons. Firstly, such an
investment lays itself open to charges of manipulation. 16
 Secondly, if a large
part of the pension fund were invested in the parent company, then the
accruing pension benefits would not be backed up by assets whose worth was
independent of the prosperity of the employer. Thus if the employer became
bankrupt, not only would the employees lose their jobs, but also their
prospective pension benefits would be in jeopardy. This criticism only applies
with such severity to investment in the ordinary shares of the parent company.
(vii) unit trust units: the holder of unit trust units is the holder of a part-share
in a diversified portfolio of ordinary shares. Thus the main advantages and
disadvantages of ordinary share investment apply. However, unit trust units
have a special appeal to the smaller investor (such as the smaller pension fund)
who are thereby able to achieve a greater degree of diversification than would
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otherwise be possible; this is not to say that they have no appeal for the larger
pension funds. The taxation position for the pension fund remains the same as
if the ordinary shares had been purchased directly. The risks involved in the
purchase of unit trust units are the same as those pertaining to the purchase of
ordinary shares generally, although the diversification achieved via this
medium may reduce the degree somewhat. Because unit trust units are
essentially portfolios of ordinary shares, they are often aggregated in with
ordinary shares, especially where unit trust units form a small fraction of the
total portfolio held (or acquired) by a financial intermediary.
(viii)property unit trusts: this asset category is much the same as unit trust
units with the exception that here the unit trust's portfolio consists entirely of
companies which specialise in land and property. To the extent that such a
portfolio is less diversified than a more general unit trust it may be regarded as
involving more risk. Nonetheless, it is an indirect method of investment in
property (itself regarded as a good hedge against inflation) and, therefore,
holds special appeal for the smaller pension funds and those wishing to expand
the property holdings of their portfolio without incurring the necessary
expenditure on expert advice.
(ix) land, property and ground rent: the main attraction of investing in
property is that it offers an immediate yield which is often higher than that
obtainable on other assets, as well as the prospect of rent increases in the event
of future inflation. Direct investment in a property company is usually not
undertaken as the dividends paid out will be from income after the deduction
of corporation tax. Thus it is advantageous, with regard to taxation, for the
U. K. pension fund to invest directly in property or, as we have already
suggested, through the medium of a property unit trust. Because of the need
for a specialised knowledge in the acquisition and management of real estate
direct investment can only be undertaken by the larger pension funds.
Furthermore, only a large fund could purchase sufficient high-class properties
to obtain a reasonable spread. The major risk involved in the purchase of land,
property, etc. is that of marketability; there does not exist a highly efficient,
organised secondary market for property and, therefore, it is not easy to
dispose of. In addition, because property is not usually purchased by a single
payment rather than by a series of payments over a number of years, the fund
that invests in property must be fully aware of the long-term nature of its
commitment.
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(x)loans and mortgages: although pension funds do not formally issue claims
against themselves (the pension contract notwithstanding) they do, on
occasion, lend money by way of loans and mortgages. The main types of risk
that ensue from such activity are those pertaining to marketability and default.
The relative lack of any secondary markets for these assets in the U. K. means
that they are subject to a high degree of marketability risk. Although there is
little that can be done to reduce this, careful consideration of prospective
borrowers can virtually eliminate default risk.
(xi)short-term assets (net): consisting mainly of money (in its broader sense)
and near-monies, as well as various bills (Treasury, commercial, etc.), this
category of assets is demanded for various reasons, such as the regular and
frequent disbursement of benefits to entitled members. Additionally, we have
discussed elsewhere the usefulness of short-term assets in a portfolio when
longer-term assets appear to offer unfavourable opportunities. Thus there is a
degree of income risk attached to the holding of short-term assets by pension
funds. The inclusion of the "net" term indicates that the pension funds have an
occasional penchant for borrowing, predominantly for the short run, when they
do not possess enough liquid assets to pay out current benefits.
(xii)other: this is the ubiquitous "catch all" category used to cover any assets
not included in any of the previously described categories. Indeed, the topical
fine art collections of some pension funds as well as other esoteric investments
find inclusion here. Because of the potential breadth of this category we must
necessarily endow it with a high degree of all types of risk, although some of
these may well be diversified away within the category itself. This category is
best considered as being one of residual demand for assets claiming only a
small fraction of the portfolio on an individual basis, but significant when
aggregated. Anecdotal evidence would seem to suggest that this is not an
unreasonable approach. After all, it was not developments within the art
market that prompted the pension funds to buy objets d'art for their portfolios;
it was the relatively poor performance and prospects offered by the
'traditional' capital markets.
7.5 Trends in Pension Fund Investment
In Chapter Two we discussed in some detail the role of financial
intermediaries in the economy. As we saw, in common with other financial
institutions the pension funds' role is the efficient transfer of funds from savers
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to investors. In spite of this common economic role, we may, however,
distinguish the pension funds from other financial institutions by a balance
sheet comparison. This is because the particular specialism that a financial
intermediary adopts is largely in response to the demands of surplus units for a
haven for their surpluses. It therefore follows that the distinguishing features
of a financial intermediary are manifested through the liabilities they issue
which, in turn, is a major influence on the assets which they hold. In this way,
we can see that a balance sheet comparison provides useful insight into the
operations of financial intermediaries.
On the liabilities side the pension fund's only liability is in the form of a
contract to deliver from some specified date specific amounts of money in a
prescribed manner for which it currently receives income by way of
contributions (see Table 7-1 above). Such contracts are very definitely non-
marketable and, therefore, highly illiquid. However, as these contracts involve
a long term commitment on the part of the pension fund, the investment assets
they purchase have at least to honour this. In other words, the liabilities of a
financial institution should be one of the major determinants of its investment
portfolio distribution. An institution with short-term liabilities would be
expected to invest primarily in short-term assets, and so on. 17 Although the
liabilities of a pension fund are inevitably long term they do also invest in
assets with a wide range of maturities. Why they should choose to invest in
any particular asset (and short-term assets in particular, given the long-term
nature of their liabilities) is the subject of this paper's investigation. However,
no scientific explanations will be put forward at this juncture. What is more
appropriate at this point is a detailed consideration of the portfolio of the
pension funds over recent decades. For convenience we consider the pension
funds as an aggregated group in the first instance and then look at the
individual positions of the private, Local Authority and (other) public sectors
that make up the pension fund industry.
7.5.1 The Pension Funds' Portfolio—An Overview
As we have already seen in earlier chapters, the pension funds control a
large proportion of the personal (or household) sector's savings which they
invest on their behalf in order to provide a guaranteed retirement income (i.e.
pension) in the future. In Table 7-1 we illustrated this link between the pension
funds' sources and uses of funds. In this section we wish to analyse in some
detail the actual balance sheet data for the pension fund industry and its net
acquisitions of assets; this latter item, as we have noted, is made up of both the
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disbursement of new monies and the sale of (some) existing assets. This will
require an examination of the financial markets within which the pension
funds participate in terms of their relative holdings and share of turnover.
Such an examination is crucial because the pension funds operate within a
given financial system and if we are to understand and explain the asset
holdings of the pension funds and their investment policy it is essential that we
know something about the environment within which these decisions are
made. We have already embarked on such a task in our earlier overview
chapters, and the task is completed in detail in Chapter Eight. For the time
being, however, we concentrate on a consideration of the pension funds'
balance sheet and net acquisitions positions over recent years.
7.5.2 The Aggregate Position
In Table A-1 we show the data for annual aggregate pension fund holdings
in (almost) all of the major asset categories described earlier, for the years since
1971. This data has also been calculated as percentages of net total investments
and this appears in Table A-2. In considering these data we also need to bear
in mind that in some cases they are not always directly comparable, because
although almost all figures are being quoted at market value, some others
(albeit only very few, and only in the local authority sector) are quoted at book
value. Because this information pertains to the pension funds as a large single
group the inferences we can make are somewhat limited, as is the case with
any aggregation. However, bearing this in mind the data do exhibit a series of
interesting patterns that offer a revealing glimpse into the investment
behaviour of the U. K. pension funds. Before we do this it is probably worth
considering the relative proportions by which the pension fund industry is
made up of its three component parts: the private sector, public sector, and
local authority funds. This can be easily seen from Figure 7-1. In all years the
private sector funds account for the largest percentage and the local authority
funds the smallest in terms of pension fund holdings. Although not illustrated
here, this is also mirrored in the net acquisitions data. From the figure we can
see that the private sector funds account for at least fifty per cent of all pension
fund holdings, often much more. While the local authority funds account for
the smallest percentage of pension fund holdings, their share since 1972 is at
least a significant eleven per cent, and is even as high as some fifteen per cent
on occasion. The other public sector funds account for anywhere between
twenty per cent and one-third of all pension fund holdings.
Page 271
0 Other Public
II Local Authority
0 Private
I	 I
	 ii
FigUre 7-1: All Pension Funds—Balance Sheet at market
values
200,000
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
£ millions 100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
o
-
-
-
-
_
_
_
_
m i mPrim imrl inm itl iM ill ir-l ill i 1
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
A first look at the two tables immediately reveals two striking features. The
first is that the portfolio is widely diversified, with a spread of assets
unmatched by the other financial institutions with the possible exception of the
life insurance companies. 18
 It is this tremendous diversification that we shall
be trying to account for in later chapters. The second feature is the apparent
stability in the portfolio proportions over the 1970-1985 period, a period of time
during which financial innovation occurred at an ever-increasing rate. Figure
7-2 illustrates this quite clearly. Although there are very definite trends in the
holdings of many assets by the pension funds, perhaps representing changes in
the pension funds' investment policy, these are also remarkably smooth with
the possible exception of the 1973-1975 period which may be considered as
somewhat atypical, a point which we discuss in detail below. (To a lesser
extent the 1981-1982 period may also be regarded in a similar vein). What is
perhaps even more surprising is the relative speed with which the pattern of
holdings settles down to its previous path following this apocalyptic period!
Taking a bird's eye view of the trends in the asset distribution for now we
notice that over the fifteen-year period, 1970-1985, the holdings of virtually
every asset category in absolute terms (ie, in millions of nominal Pounds) has
risen (see Figure 7-3 by way of illustration). This is as one might naturally
expect during a period of time when double-digit inflation was the rule rather
than the exception, and there were an ever-increasing number of contributors.
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Perhaps the most noticeable exceptions are the categories of United Kingdom
Local Authority securities, LAMIT (the Local Authorities Mutual Investment
Trust), and loans and mortgages. Similarly there would appear to have been
only marginal changes in short-term gilts (those with a maturity of less than
five years), as well as in debentures and preference shares. Certainly for the
period for which data for (eg) preference shares alone is available (1970-1975)
there is a noted decline in their holdings, in both nominal and percentage
terms. To a large extent this is likely to be due to the decreasing numbers of
preference shares being issued over that time period, a phenomenon Dodds
(1976) refers to as "Say's Law of financial markets".
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Figure 7-3: Annual Net Investment by All Pension Funds
The picture for holdings of short-term assets (in percentage terms),
however, shows no definite monotonic trend over the data period, but rather
exhibits an almost cyclical pattern that follows the business cycle. This should
not really come as much of a surprise given that the pension funds are more
likely to hold a greater proportion of liquid assets during a period of
uncertainty such as a recession. For example, we notice that in 1974 the
holdings of short-term assets doubles from the previous year which might be
accounted for as follows: Following the (initial) OPEC-induced oil crisis there
was also an almost catastrophic secondary banking crisis 19
 (which followed the
speculative bubble in property with which Slater-Walker is associated). These
two factors in particular brought about an almost unprecedented lack of
confidence in Britain's financial system as indicated by the decline of the
Financial Times industrial ordinary share index from 261.9 in December of 1972
to a low of 68.4 in December of 1974. Unsurprisingly, interest rates also rose by
at least two percentage points over 1974. Consequently with this uncertainty
surrounding the stability of the financial system in the U. K. and the
simultaneous breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime of international
financial arrangements it is no wonder that the pension funds took up with
assets of fairly short-term maturity rather than their more 'traditional' long-
term claims in the 1972-1974 period. It is also comforting to note that as
stability became restored in the ensuing years the funds reverted to their more
usual approach, and as they switched out of short-term assets they replaced
them with claims of a longer maturity. This pattern is revealed once again in
the 1979-1982 period, during which the U. K. economy again moved into
recession.
In looking at the longer-term securities we find that holdings of unit trust
units have exhibited the most growth, being almost one hundred and fifty
times greater in 1985 than in 1974, up from a negligible amount in 1970.
Similarly the pension funds were holding nearly thirty times as many overseas
government securities in 1985 than in 1970, and even this was a doubling of the
1983 figure. The decline in holdings of overseas government securities
between 1971 and 1974 presumably had much to do with the instability
following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of international
monetary arrangements and the associated international problems. Another
significantly large increase—fifty-four times—is exhibited by the pension
funds' holdings of overseas ordinary shares. This general trend of increased
holdings of overseas assets may be regarded as the result of two trends over
the data period: first, there has been an increasing erosion of exchange and
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other controls in both the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Second, the
increasing efficiency of technology in the transmission of information has led to
an ever-increasing internationalisation of the World's capital markets, to the
point that many commentators now regard them as a single World capital
market. The combination of these two factors have surely enabled the pension
funds (as well as other investors) to reduce portfolio risk by the pursuit of a
wider geographical diversification of assets and increase the potential return
from a greater range of markets, such as being able to invest in economies with
(eg) higher growth rates and capital gains than the United Kingdom due to
changes in exchange rates, etc.
Holdings of British government securities have varied but only within a
fairly narrow range. While there has been a relative decline in their holdings of
short-term gilts the pension funds have largely offset this by substantially
increasing their holdings of medium- and long-term gilts over the same 1974-
1985 period by forty and twenty-three times respectively. Notice that each of
these growth rates exceeds the rate of growth of increase in prices, indicating
the pension funds' belief that the yields on these assets would exceed the
inflation rate. In absolute terms all maturities of gilts show little volatility, with
the short-term declining in favour of increasing holdings of longer-term gilts
over the 1974-1982 period and again after 1984. It is worth noting at this point
that from 1981 onwards the percentage of the portfolio allocated to long-term
central government securities has declined, although the amount going to long-
term gilts has declined to a greater extent. This would appear to be partly
because some of these longer-term funds have been shifted to the acquisition of
Index-Linked Treasury Stock, which did not exist prior to 1981. One might
speculate that it would presumably have been the case that these funds would
have been in long-term gilts had the Index-Linked stock not been issued. This
decline in the holdings of gilts would appear to have been counterbalanced by
increasing holdings of overseas ordinary shares, which is in all likelihood a
reflection of the pension funds' perception of the relatively poor growth
prospects of the United Kingdom economy.
Many of these inferences would tend to be substantiated by the information
in Table A-2, and Figure 7-2. We can readily see that short-term gilts, U. K.
Local Authority securities, debentures and preference shares, LAMIT, loans
and mortgages, and short-term assets (net) all declined in terms of their share
of the aggregated pension funds' portfolio. Equally, those assets such as
medium- and long-term gilts, ordinary shares, etc. increased the percentage of
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the portfolio they accounted for over the data period (notwithstanding the
decline in holdings of gilts since 1982). In the previous paragraph we have put
forward some a priori hypotheses to explain some of these trends, but these
need to be tested more rigorously, such as by way of an econometric model, a
procedure that is postponed until later. The decline in holdings of preference
shares, both in absolute terms and in terms of portfolio proportions is readily
attributable to their decline in popularity as a means of raising corporate
finance following the introduction of Corporation Tax in 1965. Under this 'tax
innovation' loan interest payable on debentures was allowed as tax-deductible,
a privilege not extended to interest on preference shares. One further point of
note concerns the fairly stable proportions of the portfolio accounted for by
government securities (gilts) and domestic ordinary shares, about twenty-one
and forty-three per cent respectively. The only major discrepancy occurs
during 1974, an atypical recessionary period, as we have already pointed out.
It is readily apparent that the pension funds' portfolio is dominated by
three major types of asset: ordinary shares, government securities and land,
property and ground rent respectively. What is not so apparent yet a
fascinating feature of the holdings data is that substantial changes in the
holdings of ordinary shares seem to be offset by opposite changes in the
holdings of land, which may also be regarded as an equity asset. This would
tend to be confirmed by examining the trends in Figure 7-2. Although these
offsetting movements are not equal it does indicate that the pension funds
regard these two asset categories as being substitutes to a large degree.
A final comment on the annual holdings data is to note the increasing
proportion of the portfolio accounted for by the residual category ("other
assets"). Were we to disaggregate this sector even further we would notice that
over the data period the various assets that make up this category have
increased in number, a reflection of the ever-present phenomenon of financial
innovation. As any asset and its secondary market becomes more established it
is likely to account for an increasing proportion of the pension funds' portfolio
simply as a result of diversification. Indeed, over the years the pension funds
have increased their holdings of some assets in this residual category to such
an extent that they now warrant inclusion on their own merit. Examples of this
include overseas ordinary shares, unit trust units, overseas loans and
mortgages, etc.
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Although the annual holdings data do indeed give us a good start in
examining the investment behaviour of the pension funds it is really just an
exercise in comparative statics. We can get further information by considering
the dynamics of pension fund investment behaviour. This we do by
considering their net acquisitions data. What these data reveal are the
variations in the allocations of funds to the various asset categories. That is to
say that year by year the pension funds can change the nature of their portfolio
by utilising the net inflow of new monies as well as by the purchase and sale of
securities to arrive at the net acquisition of a particular asset and, in toto, the net
acquisition of all assets. In other words, it is as a result of the flow of net
acquisitions that the stock of annual holdings comes about. The net
acquisitions data presented in Tables A-15 and A-16 give a rather different
picture of the pension funds' portfolio. It is interesting, although perhaps not
surprising, to note that total net acquisitions in nominal terms exhibit a
monotonic upward growth trend on an annual basis, although the quarterly
figures are much more variable.
At first glance, save for the fact that the net acquisitions of longer-term gilts
and ordinary shares are substantially greater than for virtually all other asset
categories—being of the order of thousands of millions of pounds in recent
years—few obvious patterns emerge. Very few of the asset categories appear
to have been "buy only" or "sell only", as indicated by the sign. Perhaps the
only major note of consistency lies in the fact that the asset categories tend to
exhibit either double-digit or single-digit percentages of total net acquisitions.
For example, the three asset groups which dominate the pension funds'
portfolio, land (including property and ground rent), longer-term gilts, and
ordinary shares (both domestic and overseas) unsurprisingly account for
double-digit percentages of total net acquisitions, while all other categories are
of single-digit percentages. Nonetheless, a glance at Figure 7-3 does reveal
certain investment patterns over the 1963-1985 period which tend to
corroborate many of the inferences made from the annual holdings data.
Firstly, we note that, while there is a definite upward trend, the rate of growth
of annual net investment does vary from year to year. In fact, while the period
between 1963 and 1969 shows a fairly constant rate of growth, this is followed
by a somewhat higher growth rate until 1972. The rate of growth seems
highest in the period between 1977 and 1981, after which it tends to slow down
once again. Of course, some of the explanation of the rate of growth lies in the
underlying rate of inflation. We should also note that there are two periods in
which the annual net investment of the pension funds actually declines in
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nominal terms: 1974 and 1982. Once again, these periods are those of the two
major post-War recessions in the British economy, despite which the total net
investment of the pension funds exhibits a remarkably stable upward trend.
The net acquisitions of each of the individual asset categories exhibit rather
less stability, however. Figure 7-3 reveals that the major assets of ordinary
shares, gilts, and land do not show the same monotonic increase as total net
investment. In the periods of the two major recessions the net acquisitions of
these assets is much more volatile, especially in the case of gilts and ordinary
shares. Taking the private sector securities which largely dominate the
portfolio, company securities do not appear to take a set proportion of the flow
of funds. In some years they accounted for around fifty per cent while in other
years the proportion has fallen, with the lowest figures occurring in the
atypical 1973-4 period. It is apparent that the trend is cyclical. As with the
holdings data the trend for ordinary shares is reversed for land, property and
ground rent, so that this latter category also exhibits cyclical properties albeit of
the reverse nature. Figure 7-3 also seems to imply that there is a substitute
relationship between gilts and ordinary shares, as indicated by the increasing
net acquisition of one corresponding to a decreasing net acquisition of the
other. The only time this relationship does seem to breakdown somewhat is
between 1974 and 1975 and also between 1978 and 1979, ie, immediately
following the two oil-price shocks. This substitute relationship would appear
to be further confirmed by the percentage data and also illustrated by Figure 7-
2. In fact, this figure would appear to indicate that, in addition to gilts, land
and debentures and preference shares are also substitutes for ordinary shares.
While the net acquisitions of the major assets of gilts, ordinary shares and
land are more volatile than total net investment, they are relatively stable by
comparison with the net acquisitions of other assets in the pension funds'
portfolio. For example, while the net acquisitions of major assets both increases
and decreases over the 1963-1985 period, there are only two occasions on which
the pension funds actually divest themselves of them; these are the years 1963
and 1970, when we find the pension funds net acquisitions of gilts to be
negative. (This could mean that either the pension funds are actively selling off
some of their holdings of government securities or that the price of government
securities has declined to such an extent that it has offset any increase in the
number of gilts purchased, thereby leading to a decline in the nominal value of
net acquisitions of gilts.) Those assets which comprise smaller percentages of
the pension funds' portfolio do not exhibit this same tendency; while on many
Page 279
occasions they are the subject of acquisition there are also many occasions on
which we find them the subject of divestment. By way of example, consider U.
K. local authority securities. Between 1963 and 1968 the pension funds seem to
be quite happy to continue to acquire these for their portfolios, albeit in
increasingly smaller amounts. However, between 1969 and 1972 there seems to
be a major sell-off of these assets, which is especially marked in 1971 with net
acquisitions of some minus sixty-two millions of pounds worth of local
authority securities. From 1973 on there is no particularly discernible pattern
of net acquisitions, with periods of positive acquisition being followed by
periods of divestment but not in any regular or cyclical manner. Similar
comments would seem to apply equally to the net acquisitions of the other
'minority' assets with the following additional noteworthy points. Net
acquisitions of both forms of unit trust units (ie, authorised and property)
appear to have an upward trend over most of the 1963-1985 period, perhaps
reflecting the growth of smaller pension funds seeking already diversified
investment media. However, property unit trusts decline in popularity in the
very late 1970s, a decline matched soon after by land acquisitions, while unit
trusts maintain a modest growth rate apart from a sudden dramatic burst of
interest in 1982 and 1983. Despite showing a high degree of volatility loans and
mortgages would appear to exhibit a waning popularity over the data period,
with declining but positive net acquisitions until the mid-1970s followed by a
major sell-off for the remainder of that decade and steadily declining net
acquisitions throughout the 1980s. All of these comments would appear to be
borne out by the percentage data.
Throughout the foregoing we should bear in mind that, of course, these are
annual net acquisitions data and therefore likely to indicate only longer term
investment trends. However, the quarterly net acquisitions data (not
reproduced in this Thesis) sheds no further light on the pension funds'
investment behaviour; indeed, as we have previously mentioned, the quarterly
data appears to be even less patterned than that on an annual basis. That the
net acquisitions should appear so inconsistent might seem somewhat
surprising at first glance, especially in view of the consistent nature of the data
on annual holdings. However, further examination reveals two possible
reasons that might explain this discrepancy. Firstly it should be noted that this
data is for all pension funds within the United Kingdom and, while they might
exhibit consistency with their holdings, this may not be the case with their net
acquisitions if one sector of the pension fund industry dominates the overall
picture by virtue of being more active in the capital markets. A second
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hypothesis is that the pension funds, at any point in time, have in mind a
desirable portfolio of assets that they are trying to achieve, and the annual
holdings data is a representation of the actual outcome—that is, a portfolio that
is either a complete or partial attainment of the desired portfolio. The net
acquisitions data, on the other hand, represents their attempts to get to their
desired portfolio in any year/ quarter20
 and is therefore likely to be much less
consistent on two grounds. Firstly, the desired portfolio itself is likely to
change over time as expectations adjust to changing circumstances in the
financial (and other) markets. Secondly, some deviations are likely to occur as
portfolio managers make investments that were not originally planned but are
deemed currently opportune. As we have already alluded, a more consistent
picture might emerge when we disaggregate the pension fund industry into its
three component sectors and then examine that data, which we now do.
7.5.3 The Private Sector Position
In Tables A-3 and A-4 we present the annual holdings of the private sector
pension funds in millions of Pounds and percentages respectively. Because the
private sector funds account for the lion's share of all industry holdings (58 per
cent in 1982, 59 per cent in 1978, 61 per cent in 1975, for example. See Figure 7-
4 and Table 7-2 by way of illustration.) we would expect the pattern that
emerges here to be not so very different from that for the pension fund
industry as a whole. In fact, that turns out to be very much the case. There are
significant increases in all categories except United Kingdom Local Authority
securities, which actually decline substantially, and marginal increases in short-
term gilts and loans and mortgages (which declined for the industry). Once
again, we note the fairly large increase in holdings of overseas assets in the
current decade. Following 1980 we note a significant increase in holdings of
overseas ordinary shares with a similar trend in holdings of government
securities after 1981. The explanation put forward earlier applies equally here.
As with the industry data, we note smaller increases in the holdings of short-
term gilts and also debentures and preference shares. In this latter category we
note that by 1973 holdings of preference shares had dwindled to virtually zero.
Finally, once again, we note an increasing percentage of long-term gilts
holdings being accounted for by Index-Linked Treasury Stock, following their
introduction in 1981.
Perhaps the major inconsistency between the private sector and the
industry data lies in the short-term assets (net) category which showed only a
marginal increase for the industry yet exhibits rather more substantial growth
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for the private sector funds. Because the private funds form such a large
proportion of the pension fund industry such a discrepancy must give some
cause for concern. The simplest a priori explanation lies in the different
investment strategies adopted by funds in different sectors. For example, the
funds in the private sector are often larger and also less conservative typically
in their investment strategies; they are therefore more likely to hold a larger
stock of liquid funds for taking advantage of short-term opportunities that
might arise. The funds in both of the public sectors tend to regard themselves
as more immediately accountable (eg, to the government in the final analysis)
and are therefore more likely to pursue a fairly conservative buy-and-hold
strategy. Nonetheless, as we might have expected, there is a great deal of
similarity between the holdings of the private sector pension funds and those
of all pension funds combined.
As with the industry, the private sector shows most growth in its holdings
of British government securities, especially medium- and long-term gilts, land,
property and ground rent, and, in particular, ordinary shares, both domestic
and overseas. These latter two categories (ie, land and ordinary shares) are
perhaps the most spectacular in terms of their growth, with land holdings
growing some one hundred-fold over the entire data period,and ordinary
shares exhibiting a similar rate of growth over the 1974-1985 period. This
growth in the private sector holdings of ordinary shares has been mirrored (if
not exactly paralleled) by their holdings of both authorised unit trust units and
property unit trust units.
Although these conclusions apply to the figures in millions of pounds they
also seem to be borne out for the most part by the data in percentage terms, as
illustrated in Figure 7-5. Here overseas ordinary shares and medium-term gilts
seem to be the main upward movers, with most other categories remaining
fairly constant, except for the monotonic declines in debentures and preference
shares and United Kingdom local authority securities. Total gilt holdings have
a steady long-term trend around the lower twenty per cent mark apart from a
deviation in the early years of the 'seventies when the figure declined to
around twelve per cent. This seems to be almost wholly offset by changes in
the holdings of ordinary shares, indicating a high degree of substitutability
between these two asset types. Land, property and ground rent is interesting
in that it exhibits a fairly steady monotonic growth in both nominal and
percentage terms until 1981-1982 when the latter drops by some three
percentage points with no apparent offsetting rise in another category. It is
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Figure 7-5: Major Asset Holdings—Private Sector Pension Funds
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Figure 7-6: Selected Annual Net Acquisitions— Private Sector
Pension Funds
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possible that the post-1979 declines in the percentage of both land and gilts
holdings can be accounted for by the increased holdings of ordinary shares.
Perhaps the most fascinating difference between the data for the private
sector pension funds and those for the whole industry is that the former
appears to be largely uninfluenced by the trade cycle. That the investment
pattern of the whole industry should be influenced by the cyclical movements
of the economy while its major component, the private sector funds, remains
unaffected would appear to require an explanation. One possible explanation
would be that while the private sector funds' investment behaviour remains
largely sheltered from cyclical influences, the behaviour of the pension funds in
both public sectors is not so sheltered. This would seem a particularly likely
explanation given the generally more conservative investment approach
adopted by the public sector and local authority funds which we have already
observed. Given their more immediate accountability to various elected
bodies, investment managers in the public sector and local authority funds may
be less likely to respond rapidly to changes in the financial markets or general
economic conditions. Equally, they may also be less willing to follow the lead
of their expectations of changes in the economic situation. While this is a
plausible theory we need to observe if, in fact, the investment behaviour of the
pension funds in the local authority and public sectors does indeed follow a
cyclical pattern, which we now do.
7.5.4 The Local Authority Sector
Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic of the statistics on the Local
Authority sector pension funds' holdings is that there is no published data
prior to 1972. Equally, the data up to 1975 is based on the pension funds'
portfolios at 31st March of each year while for 1975 et seq the data is measured
at 31st December (ie, at end-year) in common with that for the other two
sectors. These two facts are amply illustrated by Figure 7-7. Fortunately, no
such problem arises with the net acquisitions data. However, armed with this
knowledge we can press on and attempt to make some inferences about the
investment behaviour of the Local Authority sector pension funds.
In Tables A-7 and A-8 we present data on the asset-holdings of the Local
Authority sector pension funds in millions of Pounds and percentages
respectively. Although the lack of data limits our inferences, especially around
the early 1970s, certain patterns would still seem to be identifiable. For
example, in both the aggregate and private sector situations we noticed a
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severe dip in the holdings of ordinary shares (in particular) following the 1973
oil shock, although this was to a large degree offset by increased holdings of
land, property and ground rent. This pattern is also exhibited by the Local
Authority pension funds, with a dramatic decline in holdings of ordinary
shares from £888 millions at 31st March 1973 to £596 millions at 31st March
1975. In common with the private sector and the industry, this position was
also quickly reversed with ordinary shareholdings rebounding to some £1,026
millions by the end of 1975. Unlike the private sector and aggregate positions,
this decline was not offset by increased land holdings. Although in 1974 land
holdings did increase, it was only up by £7 millions from the 1973 figure of £17
millions, not really much of an offset to the almost £300 million decline in
ordinary shareholdings! This applies equally to these holdings both in nominal
and percentage of portfolio terms, the latter illustrated in Figure 7-7.
Looking at the holdings picture from 1975 until 1985, we find that the Local
Authority funds increased the market value of their assets some ten times;
from £2,134 millions in 1975 to £20,973 millions in 1985. While this would
appear to be a fairly substantial rate of growth, it is rather less than that
exhibited by the private sector funds. Nonetheless, in common with their
private sector counterparts, the Local Authority funds have increased their
holdings of virtually every asset category over the ten-year period to 1985. The
major exceptions to this growth being declines in holdings of local authority
securities, loans and mortgages, and short-term gilts, and a marginal increase
in holdings of LAMIT (Local Authorities Mutual Investment Trust). It will be
recalled that similar declines were noted for the private sector funds.
From the foregoing we might be tempted to conclude that the investment
behaviour of the Local Authority funds as evidenced by the annual holdings
data bears more than a passing resemblance to that of the private sector funds.
However, when we consider their holdings of short-term assets a rather
different picture emerges. For, whereas the private sector funds' short-term
holdings exhibited a cyclical pattern over the course of the business cycle,
short-term holdings by the Local Authority funds shows an almost
monotonically increasing upward trend. While their short-term holdings do
indeed double between 31st March 1973 and 31st March 1974 (in response to
the oil crisis), from 1975 on they continue upward. In fact, over the data period
there are only two periods when holdings of short-term assets decline. First
during 1975, when current assets decline from holdings of £290 million at 31st
March to £181 million at end-year. And secondly, there is a marginal decline
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between 1979 and 1980. No major increases are noted during recessionary
periods, with the possible exception of substantially increased holdings of
short-term gilts between 1982 and 1983. However, this period actually follows
the recession of the early 1980s, so unless this is a somewhat belated response
to the decline in economic activity it is rather more difficult to posit an
explanation.
In looking at the holdings of longer term securities by the Local Authority
sector pension funds we note that the most growth in the decade up to 1985
was exhibited by the various categories of overseas assets. For example,
overseas ordinary shareholdings grew over seventy-two times while holdings
of overseas government, etc, securities grew a staggering one hundred and
forty-five times. What is equally interesting, although perhaps not surprising,
is that most of this growth occurred after the removal of exchange controls
during the course of 1979 (see Appendix 7-B). It should also be noted that
although the Local Authority pension funds increased the growth rate of their
overseas asset-holdings following 1979, it does not appear to have been a
dramatic once-for-all increase in response to the abolition of exchange controls.
Rather, there is a continued higher growth rate of overseas holdings
throughout the 1980s. Whether this is the result of a responsible investment
strategy or simply due to the increasing valuation of overseas assets in foreign
bull markets can be verified by a consideration of the net acquisitions data,
which we perform shortly.
In the case of British government securities we note an increase over the
data period in absolute holdings of all maturity ranges with the exception of
short-term gilts, as noted above. Again, we note the almost-perfect substitution
of some Index-Linked Treasury Stock for long-term gilts in the portfolio,
following the introduction of Index-Linked Treasury Stock in 1982. The
percentage of portfolio data gives a rather different picture, however. While
the decline in short-term gilts remains even more marked, we see that the Local
Authority pension funds have displayed a declining preference for the
proportion of their portfolio held as long-term gilts. To a large extent this has
been offset by the increasing percentage of the portfolio held as medium-term
gilts. Nonetheless, over the data period 1975-1985, the Local Authority funds
have decreased the percentage of their portfolio held as government securities
from twenty-seven per cent to some seventeen per cent. We note a similar
decline for the private sector funds over the same data period, although they
never held more than almost twenty four per cent of their portfolio as gilts.
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This slight difference could either be due to a scale effect (the private sector
funds have more funds to invest, as we have seen) or to a difference in
investment strategy due to (eg) differing degrees of risk aversion, or to a
combination of these two factors.
7.5.5 The Public Sector Position
In Tables A-11 and A-12 we present the annual holdings of the public sector
pension funds in millions of Pounds and percentages respectively. Once again,
the pattern that emerges is not so very different from that for the pension fund
industry as a whole, and for the reasons already suggested. Again we note
increases in all categories except United Kingdom Local Authority securities
and loans and mortgages, which both decline quite substantially. Like the
private sector, the public sector data for the short-term assets (net) category—
which showed only a marginal increase for the industry—exhibits some 300
per cent growth, although this is not exactly unexpected with net total
investment increasing more than ten times over the 1970-1982 period. Similar
rates of growth are to be observed in most categories, the only notable
exception being debentures and preference shares. As with the overall picture
and that for the private sector pension funds, there is a decline in the holdings
of most overseas assets during the period of the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods regime (1971-1974), but this is more than compensated by the
tremendous increase in the period since 1974. Holdings of overseas
government securities increase from £10 million in 1975 to £157 in 1982, while
holdings of overseas ordinary shares rose from £116 million to £3,760 million
over the same period. Even overseas loans and mortgages show a dramatic
rise from £11 million in 1974 to £139 million in 1982, and this against a
backdrop of a (marginal) downward trend in overall holdings of loans and
mortgages. Like the private sector funds, the public funds have exhibited
dramatic growth in their holdings of government securities, ordinary shares
and land, property and ground rent. However, unlike the private funds they
appear to have most of their growth in holdings of gilts rather than ordinary
shares, an indication of the more conservative investment strategy pursued by
funds in the public sector.
Once again, the data on percentages tends to substantiate the above
conclusions (see Figure 7-9). However, certain peculiarities that require some
explanation are brought to the surface. For example, public sector holdings of
ordinary shares constitute a substantially greater percentage of the portfolio
than that given by the aggregate data during the immediate pre-oil shock
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period, while these same holdings are substantially below that of the aggregate
immediately following the oil-shock, and do not approximate the norm until
1979. We may read several things into this behaviour: firstly, that the public
sector pension funds are rather slower in adjusting their behaviour to changing
market conditions. Secondly, the public sector funds would appear to be more
likely to follow market trends than to set them. (One might stick one's neck out
and suggest that their analysts are "fundamental" rather than "technical"!) All-
in-all, this evidence suggests that the public funds are rather more cautious
than average in their investment policy, although like any investor they can be
caught with their trousers down when the bubble bursts!
7.6 Summary and Conclusions
From the foregoing we have been able to ascertain a great deal about the
investment behaviour of the United Kingdom pension funds. Perhaps the most
interesting fact which came to light is the high degree of similarity of
investment behaviour between the three sectors which make up the pension
funds movement in Britain. Indeed, it would make sense to suggest that on
the basis of the evidence offered we could reasonably model the investment
behaviour of the pension funds using data for the pension funds on aggregate,
rather than having to perform the rather more tedious individual estimation of
the three sectors. Indeed, what we have seen in this chapter would suggest
that such disaggregated estimation would raise the costs of this research
without increasing the insights gained as a result in all likelihood. Indeed, the
only discrepancies that came to light were that the private sector holdings of
short-term assets were less volatile (and therefore less prone to follow the
business cycle), while the Local Authority portfolio exhibited a smaller degree
of substitutability between land and ordinary shares, as well as being less
prone to cyclical volatility.
Let us summarise some of the more salient features of the investment
behaviour of the pension funds, both as individual sectors and in toto, over the
period since the late 1960s. In terms of their annual holdings, we have
observed that there is no discernible pattern as regards short-term assets (net)
with the exception that they account for a much larger percentage of the
portfolio during the major recessions of 1973-1974 and 1979-82. Given that
short-term assets are usually regarded as a residual, this increase during
periods of heightened economic uncertainty can be considered as a predictable
increase in liquidity preference on the part of the pension funds in response to
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a pessimistic investment outlook brought on by the unfavourable economic
climate. The assets whose holdings exhibited the most growth over the data
period were unit trust units and overseas government securities. Although no
'raw' data on issues of these assets is available, based on anecdotal evidence we
can suggest that this is likely due to an increased supply (eg, increased
availability) over the date period.
Looking at the contribution of government-issued securities ("gilts") to the
portfolio, we saw that there was little change overall. Holdings of gilts over the
data period showed modest growth, but there was a change in the maturity
composition, with long- and medium-term gilts becoming increasingly
favoured over short-term gilts over time. As a percentage of the pension funds'
portfolio, we saw a marked decline in the attractiveness of short-term gilts, a
characteristic shared with U. K. local authority securities, Local Authorities
Mutual Investment Trust (LAMIT), loans and mortgages, and short-term assets
(net). The portfolio of the U. K. pension funds was increasingly accounted for
by medium- and long-term gilts and ordinary shares in particular. These
figures were substantiated by those for net acquisitions, where we observed a
tremendous sell-off of U. K. local authority securities between 1969 and 1972, in
particular, the waning popularity of loans and mortgages over the entire data
period culminating in a major sell-off after the mid-1970s, and a high level of
net acquisition of unit trust units that plateaued in the late 1970s.
It was also fascinating to observe the high degree of importance attached to
ordinary shares by the investment managers of the U. K. pension funds. The
data points very heavily to a sequential investment process, with ordinary
shares coming first in the sequence. Indeed, during periods when ordinary
shares seem unfavourable we note that certain substitutes come to light. Of
these, the asset that exhibits the highest degree of substitutability with ordinary
shares is land (ie, land, property and ground rent). This substitutability seems
to be particularly enhanced during the two major recessions of the 1970s. To a
lesser degree we also observed fixed-interest securities (gilts, debentures,
preference shares) as substitutes for ordinary shares. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the only asset category that exhibited any degree of complementarity with
ordinary shares was unit trust units.
Given the likely influence of the long-term nature of the pension funds'
liabilities on their investment portfolio, it is no surprise to find the major asset
categories being the long-term investments of gilts, ordinary shares and land.
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It is also interesting to note that these are the assets whose net acquisitions
seem to be the most stable. Indeed, it is almost as if the actions of government
or short-term changes in the financial markets have virtually no effect upon
investment in these three major categories, their acquisition and holding being
more influenced by the pension funds' long-term view of the economy. Such
findings would be endorsed by the theory of financial intermediation, as seen
in Chapter Two, as well as by the portfolio theory we observed in Chapter Five,
given that these three asset groupings tend to exhibit less risk over time than
the other categories we have encountered.
From what we have seen then, we may conclude that while the pension
funds appear to be active traders in many markets, their overall investment
strategy is typically of the "buy and hold" variety. To what degree this
strategy is a conscious attempt to stay with the market (and hence the
economy) and to what degree it is forced upon them because of their
dominance of the U. K. financial markets we shall determine in the next
chapter.
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Chapter Bevan adnotes
1 This is particularly true of many pension funds in the public sector. See Chapter Two for
full details.
2 It would seem to be reasonable to argue that death is inevitable. This was certainly a view
held by Benjamin Franklin!
3 As we saw in Appendix 6, there are a multitude of methods available for calculating
expected values.
4 is not true, of course, under Culbertson's Hedging Pressure theory, the strict form of the
Preferred Habitat theory of the term structure of interest rates.
5 A full discussion of the relationship between expected and actual rates of interest appears
in Appendix 6.
6 This point is covered in almost every basic text on econometrics, but for a recommended
exposition see (eg) J. Johnston (1972), pages 52-61, or L. Klein (1962), pages 18-19.
7 It should be noted that when dealing with changes in the rate of interest this refers to the
effect of such a change on the purchasing power of the monetary unit (eg, El) plus, perhaps, its
effect upon the capital value of the investment portfolio, and how these affect the demand for
the security.
8 See, however, H. Makower and W. Baumol, "The Analogy Between Producer and
Consumer Equilibrium Analysis", Economica, February 1950.
9 It could be argued that the commercial banks are, perhaps, the only exception on the
grounds of the existence of the bank credit (money supply) multiplier. That is to say, because
their liabilities are often regarded as part of the means of payment (ie, as money), when a bank
extends credit this will usually end up redeposited in the banking system enabling further
loans to be made. Thus, although the amount of loans that can be made by the banks may be
constrained by the level of deposits, the loans made by the banks will also be a major
determinant of the level of deposits. This feature is unique to those financial intermediaries
whose liabilities are regarded as being almost moneylike; traditionally this was solely the
commercial banks but more recently this is true of most depository intermediaries (licensed
deposit-takers in the U. K.).
10 See, in particular, their equation 16 (1967, page 33). In a footnote (page 39) they also
suggest that the quadratic nature of the utility function is not a prerequisite for the results they
obtain.
11 Copies of these questionnaires are reproduced as Appendix 7-A.
12 The most obvious examples are Financial Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics, Business
Monitor MQ5, etc.
13 Further details of these asset categories and their components may be found in Chapter
Four of Professor Revell's excellent The British Financial System (1973).
14 This yield differential may consist of both the difference between the quoted rates of
interest and a possible capital gain/loss due to fluctuations in the exchange rate. Of course,
nowadays a large part of exchange rate uncertainty can be removed by using the forward
exchange markets. A full discussion of these points is offered in virtually all undergraduate
textbooks on international economics.
15 A chronology of the major changes in exchange controls since 1962 is presented in
Appendix 7-B.
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16 In the "Finance" section of the November 4, 1978 edition of The Economist a number of
stories are related revealing the problems caused by investment in the parent company. A
selection of quotes is illustrative:
In 1976 the financial position of J. Lyons, the food-manufacturing, hotels,
property and catering group, was precarious. But not quite as precarious as
it would have been without a timely injection of cash from its pension fund.
This cash injection was one of at least three transactions between J. Lyons
and the trust company that administered its pension funds which give rise
to clear conflicts of interest...	 (page 109)
Few people outside Brooke Bond Liebig know that the big food group's
pension fund has for the past four years been helping prop up a subsidiary
of London and Manchester Assurance ... Welfare Insurance. ... As it
happens, the fund had little choice but to take part since an uncomfortably
high proportion of its own assets consisted of paid-up insurance policies
with Welfare. ...	 (pp.110-111)
Other examples of investment in the parent company revealed by The Economist include
borrowing from the pension fund by British Rail, London Transport and Westminster City
Council; Between 3 and 4 per cent of the ICI pension fund's assets was held as ICI shares; 26
per cent of Lucas Industries' pension fund was in Lucas' own shares, accounting for over 13
per cent of the Lucas equity; Sheffield toolmaker James Neill's pension fund had 16 per cent of
its fund invested in the parent company; Ricardo and Company, Engineers (1927) was 5.6 per
cent owned by its pension fund; and so on! Since 1978 coverage of such cases by The Economist
has dwindled to virtually zero, so it would seem that perhaps investment in parent company's
by pension funds has become rather more prudent.
17 According to Culbertson (1957, pp.498-499)
...Non-speculative behavior ... is probably the predominant type of debt
market behavior ... It involves making choices on some basis that is
independent of any particular expectation ... This can be done in a number
of possible ways. A common one is to select a portfolio maturity structure
suited to the liquidity needs of the investor ... and then hold to this portfolio
structure through whatever short-run shifts may occur in expectations of
interest rates. The behavior of most financial institutions is of this general
character, with investment concentrated in long-term debt except in so far as
liquidity needs require the holding of short-term debt.
18 This point can easily be confirmed by reference to the CSO publication, Business Monitor,
MQ5. We shall be looking in much greater detail at the investment behaviour of many other
financial intermediaries in Chapter Eight.
19 A superb account of the secondary banking crisis and the ensuing "lifeboat" attempt to
prevent the total collapse of the system by the Bank of England is to be found in Margaret
Reid's excellent The Secondary Banking Crisis, 1973-75.
20 This approach was put forward by William L. Silber in Chapter Two of his Portfolio
Behavior of Financial Institutions (see pages 15-17 in particular), and is also used by Dodds
(1979). According to Silber
...empirical studies of behavior in the financial markets have used the stock
adjustment principle as the basic format for the specification of demand
equations for particular financial assets.
Silber uses the following formulation of the stock adjustment process:
dXt = a(Xt* - Xt-1)
where 0 < a < 1, AXt = (X t - Xt_i ) refers to the net acquisition of security X during time period t,
and Xt* represents the desired holdings of security X. Obviously, the desired portfolio consists
of the sum of Xt* for all possible X.
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The Dodds book is reviewed in Chapter Six of this Thesis; see page 6-54 et seq for details of
his use of this approach to modelling the investment behaviour of financial institutions.
20 This slow adjustment to changing circumstances may be considered 'responsible' due to
the large volume of funds that the pension funds have available for portfolio investment. For
example, if a large number of pension funds were to have responded (almost) instantaneously
to the abolition of exchange controls in the United Kingdom by the wholesale shift of their
portfolio from British to foreign securities there is every possibility that this would have
brought about a dramatic decline in the various Financial Times indexes and created bull
markets in several foreign securities markets due to the pension funds' market dominance. In
addition, the interdependence of the world's financial markets means that there would also be
likely exchange rate effects; the declining prices on the London Stock Exchange would bring
about a decline in confidence in the U. K. economy (Economists would refer to this as a
reduced level of expectations) which would reduce demand for Sterling on the international
currency markets, etc.
The issue of market dominance by the pension funds is examined in depth in Chapter
Eight.
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An Inquiry conducted by the Government Statistical Service
IN CONFIDENCE
[ For official use
SUPERANNUATION AND PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS
BALANCE SHEET AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1979
Department of Trade
Economics and Statistics Division 6A
Room 330, Sanctuary Buildings
16 . 20 Great Smith Street,
London SW1 P 3DB
_J
	 Telephone 01-216 5843
Mom correct any errors shown in the name and address
31 March 1980
Dear Sir
This is the form relating to assets and liabilities at 31 December 1979. I should be grateful if you would complete and
return it to the above address not later than 30 June 1980. A franked addressed label is enclosed to cover your reply.
The return should cover assets and liabilities held by funds whose investment policy is managed from within the United
Kingdom including, if possible, funds of subsidiary companies in your group. Should it be more convenient to make a
separate return in respect of funds of subsidiary companies, additional forms will be sent on application.
Your return should relate to your balance sheet at 31 December; if this is not possible, please give figures for the
nearest date and indicate on page 3 what the date is.
Yours faithfully
PG WALKER (MRS)
Statistician
GENERAL NOTES (Please NMI' also to the. detailed not on page 4)
Assets and liabilities should be reported at their market value on the date to which this return relates (normally
31 December). The market value of listed securities should be based on the closing middle market price. Where the 	 .
market price indistinguishably includes interest (as with longer dated British Government securities), such interest should
form part of the valuation. In the case of unlisted securities, the market value as estimated by the fund managers
should be given, however approximate this may be. Where it is impossible to provide a market valuation for some items
the written down book value may be substituted. Similarly investments in land, buildings etc should be shown at
current market values as far as these can be estimated by the fund managers.
The value of foreign currency assets should be converted to sterling at the closing middle market spot rate on the date to
vkich this return relates.
The Republic of Ireland is regarded as an overseas country.
PF 5/79
C3321
IN CONFIDENCE
BALANCE SHEET AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1979
	•
ETS Please refer to the notes and definitions on page 4 CODE	 Balances at market values, E thousand
Current Assets
1.1 Cash and short-term assets (items 1 to 3 on quarterly form) (A)
1.2 Amounts receivable from stockbrokers 	
1.3 Income accrued on investments and rents (E) 	
1.4 Amounts receivable from Inland Revenue 	
1.5 Other debtors, UK and overseas (please specify) 	
13
Public Sector Securities (C)
2.1 British government and government guaranteed securities by
maturity: (D) (E)
2.1.1	 Up to 5 years 	
2.1.2 Over 5 years and up to 15 years 	
2.1.3 Over 15 years and undated 	
22 United Kingdom local authority listed securities and negotiable
bonds (F) 	
23 United Kingdom local authority unlisted securities, loans and
mortgages (F) 	
2.4 Overseas government, provincial and municipal securities (G) 	
Company Securities (C) (H)
31 Debentures (including unsecured loan stocks and Eurodollar bonds):
3.1.1 Companies registered in the United Kingdom:
3.1.1.1 listed 	
3.1.1.2 unlisted 	
3.1.2	 Companies registered overseas (I) 
	
3.1.3 Convertible United Kingdom debentures (J) 
	
3.2 Preference stocks:
3.21 Companies registered in the United Kingdom:
3.2.1.1 listed 
	
3.2.1.2 unlisted 	
3.2.2	 Companies registered overseas (I) 	
13 Ordinary stocks: (K)
3.3.1 Companies registered in the United Kingdom:
3.3.1.1 listed 	
3.3.1.2 unlisted 	
3.3.2	 Companies registered overseas (I) 	
3.4 Authorised unit trust units (L) 	
Loans and Mortgages
4.1 United Kingdom (including sterling assets for back-to-back loans):.
4.1.1	 to parent organisation 	
4.1.2 for house purchase 	
4.1.3	 to financial institutions (M) 
	
4.1.4 to companies other than financial institutions (N) 	
4.1.5	 other (please specify) 	
•
4.2 Overseas 	
•
: 5/79	 2
09
10
11
12
• 14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
.33
34
35
36
ASSETS (continued) Please refer to the notes and definitions on page 4 Balances at market values, thousandCODE
5 Property unit trust units (0)
Fixed Assets
8.1 Land and buildings, property and ground rents (P)
8.2 Other (ie vehicles, office machinery, furniture and fittings,
computer equipment, etc) 	
7 Other investments (0) (please specify)
	
43
TOTAL ASSETS
37
ao
42
LIABILITIES Please refer to the notes and definitions on page 4 Balances at market values, £ thousandCODE
8 Current Liabilities
8.1 United Kingdom bank overdrafts and other short•term UK bank
borrowing (R) 
	
8.2 Loans from parent organisation (S) 
	
8.3 Other short-term borrowing: (S) (please specify)
8.3.1
	 United Kingdom 	
8.3.2	 Overseas 	
8.4 Amounts payable to stockbrokers 
	
8.5 Pensions due but not paid 	
8.8 Other creditors, UK and overseas (please specify).
	
51
9 Long-term debt (induding foreign airrency liabilities on back-to-back, loans):
	
10 Reserves and provisions 	
11 Market value of the pension fund (= net assets of fund) 	
TOTAL LIABILITIES ( = TOTAL ASSETS)
57
59
so
45
46
47
48
49
so
Signature Date
BALANCE SHEET AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1979
Date to which return relates if other than 31.12.79 	
Name 	 	  Telephone number
SPF 5/79
	
3
NOTES AND DEFINITIONS
A Short•term assets are those maturing within one year of their originating date including loans repayable at
lender's option within one year of the date of issue. Include, however, any term deposits at UK banks even If for 12
months or over. Include money at call and short notice and other short-term loans, including longer term mortgages
other than local authority mortgages, which are repayable by invoking a break clause within the first year. The short-
term assets entered under item 1.1 should be of the same type as those entered under items', to 3 on the quarterly
form.
Accrued income from investments will normally be included with the value of those investments. If, however,
such income is accrued separately it should be shown under item 1.3. Income due but not yet received on investments
and rents should be shown under item 1.1 (see note F of quarterly form).
C All investment items should be dealt with by reference to the date of contract rather than the date of payment
or receipt of funds. In cases where payment has not been made or received, a contra item must be entered under
items 1.2 or 8.4, representing balances due from or to stockbrokers. For listed securities, the market value should be
the closing middle market price. For unlisted investments, the fund managers' valuation should be given. However,
if you have acquired securities on which further instalments are payable, (or 'rights" to subscribe to a forthcoming
issue), please enter the total payments made so far (or the cost of the "rights"). Exclude any amounts due in respect
of future instalments, (or of future subscription to the new issue) as these will appear in future returns.
D Excluding Treasury bills which should be entered under item 1.1.
E Securities should be classified according to their residual maturity. Securities with optional redemption dates
should be classified by their final date.
F Exclude local authority bills, which should be included under item 1.1. Shares of water companies should be
included under item 3. Local authorities do not include passenger transport executives, statutory port authorities,
regional water authorities in England and Wales or new town development corporations, investment in which should be
shown under item 7.
G Include those listed in the Stock Exchange Official List (or Yearbook) under Commonwealth Government and
Provincial securities; Commonwealth Corporation Stocks; Foreign stock, bonds etc; Corporation stocks — Foreign;
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
H	 Including securities of investment trusts.
I	 Securities issued by companies registered outside the United Kingdom (including securities of overseas registered
03mpanies which are listed on a United Kingdom Stock Exchange).
J	 Including convertible debentures and loan stocks where rights of conversion into equity are still outstanding.
K Including shareholdings in unit trust management companies.
L A list of authorised unit trusts is enclosed. Shareholdings in unit trust management companies should be shown
under item 3.3. Units of unauthorised unit trusts leg Equity Capital for Industry Ltd) should be included under item 7.
Unit trust units should be valued at the bid price.
M Financial institutions (other than United Kingdom banks and discount houses) are savings banks, finance houses,
insurance companies, building societies, listed investment trusts, authorised unit trusts, superannuation and pension
funds, property unit trusts, the Crown Agents, and certain special finance agencies engaged in medium and long term
financing of industry in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, eg Finance for Industry Ltd, Equity Capital for
Industry Ltd.
N Non-financial companies: UK registered public and private companies (including UK registered subsidiaries of
overseas registered companies) and UK branches of overseas registered companies, but excluding banks, discount
houses and financial institutions (as defined in note M). Include UK co-operative societies.
0 Exclude investments in overseas property unit trusts, which should be included under item 7.
P Exclude investment in property overseas, which should be shown under item 7. The market value of land
should be as valued during the last three years.
Q Include commodities, gold coins, works of art, insurance policies, annuities etc, and units of unauthorised unit
trusts leg Equity Capital for Industry Ltd). Include investments in overseas property unit trusts and in property overseas.
R Overdrafts and borrowing of less than 12 months, from the banks and discount market institutions shown on
the enclosed list.
S Loans with an original maturity of 12 months or more should be included under item 9.
SPF 5/79
4
Telephone: 01 -2155843
di) An Inquiry conducted by the Government Statistical Service
G
, IN CONFIDENCE I
For Oficial use I_	 I	 I	 I
SUPERANNUATION AND PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS
TRANSACTIONS IN ASSETS DURING THE QUARTER
ENDED 30 JUNE 1980
Department of Trade
Economics and Statistics Division 8A
Room 330, Sanctuary Buildings
18 - 20 Great Smith Street
London SW1P 3DB
Pease correct any errors shown In Ins nwre and address
30 June 1980
Dear Sir
I should be grateful if you would complete this voluntary inquiry form for the second quarter of 1980 and return it to the
above address not later than 31 July 1980. Would you please note the inclusion of a new Note Von page 4. A franked
addressed label is enclosed to cover your reply.
Yours faithfully
6)eak.g.,/
P G WALKER (MRS)
Statistician
NOTES AND DEFINITIONS
This return should cover financial assets held by funds whose investment policy is managed from within the United Kingdom
including, if possible, funds of subsidiary companies in your group. Should it be more convenient to make a separate return
in respect of funds of subsidiary companies, additional forms will be sent on application.
A Cash book balances including United Kingdom coin, note issues of the Bank of England and Scottish and Northern
Ireland banks; balances on current and deposit accounts including any term deposit, even if for 12 months or more, held at
the Bank of England or with offices located in the United Kingdom of deposit banks, whether registered in the United Kingdom
or not (including accepting houses and discount houses, but not savings banks, or municipal banks, deposits with which should
be included under item 2.4). All foreign currency balances held in the UK should be included. Bank overdrafts should be
shown under item 5.1.
B Short-term assets are those maturing within one year of their originating date, including loans repayable at lender's option
within one year of the date of issue, and longer term mortgages which are repayable by invoking a break clause within the first
year. Include money at call and short notice except with UK banks, and discount houses (entered under item 1).
The value of foreign currency balances should be converted to sterling at the closing middle market investment currency
rate ruling at the end of each quarter (including 100 per cent of the premium); while for transactions the rate ruling at the time
of the transaction should be used.
D Local authority bills, and unsecured money lent to local authorities, with an original maturity of less than 12 months.
Local authority securities, bonds and mortgages should be entered under items 7.2 and 7.3 even if they mature in 12 months or
less. Local authorities do not include passenger transport executives, statutory port authorities, regional water authorities in
England and Wales or new town development corporations, investment in which should be shown under Item 12.
E Financial institutions (other than United Kingdom banks and discount houses) are savings banks, finance houses, insurance
companies, building sOcieties, listed investment trusts, authorised unit trusts, superannuation and pension hinds, property unit
trusts and certain special finance agencies engaged in medium and long term financing of industry in the United Kingdom and
Commonwealth, eg Finance for Industry Ltd, Equity Capital for Industry Ltd.
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(Continued on page 4)	 C3324
TRANSACTIONS IN ASSETS DURING THE QUARTER ENDED 30 JUNE 1980
Please refer to the notes and definitions on pages 1 and 4 CODE 2 thousand
Balances at end of
previous quarter
Balances at end of
current quarter
Cash inland and balances with United Kingdom banks	 (A)	 	
ihorMerm assets in the United Kingdom (B)
01
•
2,1 Certificates of deposit issued by United Kingdom banks:
2,1.1	 Sterling	 	   02
2.1.2 Other currencies
	 (C) 	   03
2.2 United Kingdom Treasury 13111s
	 	 04
2,3 United Kingdom local authority bills and temporary money
	 (D) 	 05
2,4 Short-term assets with United Kingdom financial institutions other than
banks	 (E)	 	   	 06
2.5 Other short-term assets 	 (F)	 (please specify)	 	
07
Short-tins noels overseas	 (C)	 (G)	 (M)	 (please specify)
	 	
Total of Items 1 to 3
Net balances with stockbrokers
	 (I)	 	
Short-term borrowing
	 (J)
.
5.1 United Kingdom bank overdrafts and other short-term UK bank
borrowing
	 (K)	 	 	 4 	 45 '	
5,2 Other short-term borrowing:
5.2.1 United Kingdom	 (please specify)	 	
5,2.2 Overseas	 (C)	 (H)	 (please specify) 	
Lonp•1erm borrowing Gross borrowing
In current quarter
Repayments in
current quarter
6.1 United Kingdom bank borrowing (including foreign currency through
UK banks) 	
61 Other long-term borrowing (Including foreign currency liabilities on
back-to-back loans):
6,2.1 United Kingdom	 (please specify)	 	
6,2,2 Overseas	 (C)	 (H)	 (please specify)
	  ... 	   	 	
£ thousand
Public Sector investments	 (L)
	 (M) Assets realised Assets acquired
7.1 British Government and Government guaranteed securities by during current during current
maturity: • quarter - proceeds quarter -	 at cost
7.1.1	 Up to 5 years	 	 14
7,1.2 Over 5 years and up to 15 years	 	 15
7,1.3 Over 15 years and undated	 	 16
7.2 United Kingdom local authority listed securities and negotiable bonds (N) 	 17
7,3 United Kingdom local authority unlisted securities, loans and
mortgages MI
	 	
18
7,4 Overseas government, provincial and municipal securities	 (C)	 (H)	 (0) • • 19
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Assets realised	 Assets acquired
during current	 during current
quarter • proceeds	 quarter • at cosi
(continued)	 (continued)
TRANSACTIONS IN ASSETS DURING THE QUARTER ENDED 30 JUNE 1980
Please refer to the notes and definitions on pages 1 and 4COOE	 thousand
I Company kcwitles (L) (P)
8.1 Debentures (including unsecured loan stocks and Eurodollar bonds):
8,1.1 Companies registered In the United Kingdom:
8.1.1,1 listed 	 	 20
8.1.1.2 unlisted 
	 	 21
8.1.2 Companies registered overseas (C) (H) (11) 
	 	
22
8,1.3 Convertible United Kingdom debentures (0) 
	 	
23
8,2 Preference stocks:
8,2,1 Companies registered In the United Kingdom
8.2.1.1 listed 	 	 24
8.2.1.2 unlisted 	 	 25
8,2.2 Companies registered overseas (C) (H) (R) 	 	 26
8,3 Ordinary stocks (SI
8.3.1 Companies registered in the United Kingdom:
8.3,1.1 listed 	 	 27
8.3.1.2 unlisted 	 	 26
8.3.2 Companies registered overseas (C) (H) (n) 
	 d • •	 29
8.4 Authorised unit trust units IT)	 	 	 30
I Loam and mortgages
9,1 United Kingdom (including sterling assets for back-to-back loans):
9.1.1 to parent organisation	 	 	 31
9.1,2 for house purchase 
	 	 32
9.1,3 to financial institutions (E) 	 	 33
9,1,4 to companies other than financial Institutions (U) 	 	 34
9,1.5 other (please specify) 	
35
9,2 Overseas (C) (H) (V) 	 	 36
10 Properly unit trust units (W) 
	 	 37
11 'sediment In fixed assets (X)
11,1 Land, existing buildings, property and ground rents 	 	 38
11,2 New buildings (Y) 
	 	 39
11,3 Other (le vehicles, office machinery, furniture and fittings, computer
equipment, etc) 
	 	
42
12 Other investments (Z) (please speci ly) 	
43
Total of Items 7 to 12	 99
Signature
	
Date 	
Name 	 	 Telephone number 	
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TRANSACTIONS IN ASSETS OF SUPERANNUATION AND PENSION FUNDS
NOTES AND DEFIN ITIONS (continued)
F Include assets held in the form of bank bills and any short-term assets held with the Crown Agents. Include income
due but not yet received on investments, rents and pension contributions. Sums due from Inland Revenue should be
excluded from this return but should be included in the annual return. If income from investments and rents is accrued
separately this should also be excluded from this return but included in the annual return.
G Include certificates of deposit issued by overseas banks.
II The Republic of Ireland is regarded as an overseas country.
I Net balances due from stockbrokers including amounts due on securities sold for future settlement. Net  balances
owed to stockbrokers should be included as a negative item.
J Loans with an original maturity of 12 months or more should be included under item 6. Include loans from parent
company. Sums due to Inland Revenue and pensions due but not paid should be excluded.
K Overdrafts and borrowing of less than 12 months (including any in foreign currency), from banks and discount
market institutions.
L All investment items should be dealt with by reference to the date of contract rather than the date of payment or
receipt of funds. In cases where payment has not been made or received, a contra item must be entered under item 4,
representing balances due to or from stockbrokers. However, if you have acquired securities on which further instalments
are payable, (or "rights" to subscribe to a forthcoming issue), please enter the actual payment made during the quarter (or
the cost of the "rights"). Exclude any amounts due in respect of future instalments (or of future subscription to the new
issue) as these will appear in future returns.
M Securities and bonds should be classified by their expectation of life on the last day of the quarter to which the
return relates. Securities with optional redemption dates should be classified by their final redemption date. Exclude
Treasury bills, which should be entered under item 2.2.
N Exclude local authority bills, which should be included under item 2.3 and shares of water companies which should
be shown under item 8.
0 Include those listed in Stock Exchange Official List (or Yearbook) under Commonwealth Government and Provincial
securities; Commonwealth Corporation Stocks; Foreign stock, bonds etc; Corporation stocks — Foreign; International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
P	 Include securities of investment trusts.
CI Including convertible debentures and loan stocks where rights of conversion into equity are still outstanding.
R Securities issued by companies registered outside the United Kingdom (including securities of overseas registered
companies which are listed on a United Kingdom Stock Exchange).
S	 Include shareholdings in unit trust management companies.
T Shareholdings in unit trust management companies should be shown under item 8. Units of unauthorised unit trusts
leg Equity Capital for Industry Ltd) should be included under item 12.
U Non-financial companies: UK registered public and private companies (including UK registered subsidiaries of over-
seas registered companies) and UK branches of overseas registered companies, but excluding banks, discount houses and
other financial institutions (as defined in note E). Include UK co-operative societies.
V Exclude loans covered by ECGD specific bank guarantees or ECGD buyer credit guarantees, which should be
included under item 12.
W Exclude investments in overseas property unit trusts, which shotild be included under item 12.
X Include any items which appear in your capital account, or.rank as capital items for taxation purposes. Exclude
overseas investments, which should be shown under item 12.
Y Include any buildings purchased or sold before completion, and expenditure on the improvement of old buildings.
Z	 Include commodities, gold coins, works of art, insurance policies, annuities etc, and units of unauthorised unit trusts
leg Equity Capital for Industry Ltd). Include investments in overseas property Wilt trusts and in property overseas.
Include loans covered by ECGD specific bank guarantees or ECGD buyer credit guarantees.
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Appendlg 743: A Chronology of the Major Changes in
achanga Controls Sinca 19E2
The system of exchange controls that existed in post-1945 Britain should be
seen as an element of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates.
Obviously, if a government is able to effect restrictions that prevent the
international flow of funds by the private sector, its own task of maintaining a
given exchange rate by use of official reserves is made easier. Drawing on
Chapter Two, it would seem that exchange controls prevent the efficient flow
of funds from savers to investors on a global basis, and this has been cited as
one reason for (i) the disparate growth of different regions of the planet, and
(ii) the slowdown of real economic growth that occurred worldwide during the
late 1960s and into the early 1970s. There are those who would argue that the
first oil crisis (1973-1974) was simply a reaction that brought these events rather
swiftly and dramatically to a head.
The slow yet (some would argue) inevitable removal of exchange controls
in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) can be viewed as parallel to the slow
yet (some would argue) inevitable breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime
and the adoption of (in theory) a floating exchange rate for the Pound sterling.
There is no doubt that these events run along parallel courses, albeit with a
small time lag.
1962 Merging of the investment currency markets for north American securities
("hard" dollars) with that for securities denominated in currencies of other
countries covered by exchange controls.
May 1962 Companies making direct investments outside the Sterling Area that did
not promise "clear and commensurate benefits" to U. K. export earnings or
the balance of payments within the immediate future (2-3 years) were
allowed to purchase investment currency. This relaxation of controls
provided the first availability of the investment currency market for non-
portfolio investments.
April 1965
	 Introduction of the 25% surrender rule.
May 1966
August 1970
Portfolio investments by British institutions in Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa and the Republic of Ireland became subject to voluntary
restrictions.
Merging of the property market (which had been shrinking in size) with
the investment currency market. Before this the property currency market
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had performed a similar role to that of the investment currency market,
albeit more specialised, being concerned with the trading of eligible real
estate abroad.
June 1972 Securities denominated in the currencies of former overseas Sterling Area
countries subject to exchange control, but not subject to the 25% surrender
rule.
March 1974 25% surrender rule extended to the sale of securities denominated in the
currencies of overseas Sterling Area countries. U. K. direct investment in
both the former overseas Sterling Area countries and the E. E. C. subject to
the same financing requirements as investment in other countries outside
the Schedule Territories (ie, the U. K., the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man,
the Republic of Ireland, and Gibraltar). Permission was required for direct
investment in the former overseas Sterling Area countries and the E. E. C.
if these were financed with borrowed foreign currency or investment
currency. Official exchange no longer available except where the
investment promised exceptionally large and rapid benefits to the U. K.
balance of payments and met the so-called "super-criterion". The sale of
U. K. direct investments in countries outside the Scheduled Territories
which were not members of the overseas Sterling Area countries or the
E. E. C. now had to be conducted through the official foreign exchange
market, being no longer eligible for sale in the investment currency market
with the benefit of the premium. This brought consistency in the treatment
of disinvestment from all countries.
January 1978
	 Abolition of the 25% surrender rule.
June 1979 Abolition of the requirement to use investment currency to purchase
private property abroad.
Allowed interest and other charges on foreign currency borrowings for
portfolio investment abroad to be paid with official exchange. Abolition of
the requirement to hold 115% cover for such borrowings in the form of
foreign currency securities and/or investment currency.
July 1979
	 Exchange controls relaxed to allow:
(i) the repayment with official exchange of foreign currency borrowing for
portfolio investment which, at 19 July 1979, had been outstanding for at
least one year; and
(ii) the purchase, using official exchange, of most quoted foreign currency
securities denominated and payable in the currencies of E. E. C. member
states and of foreign currency securities issued by E. E. C. institutions and
other international groups of which the U. K. is a member.
October 1979 Abolition of all exchange control restrictions from October 24, except those
required for maintaining economic sanctions against Rhodesia, which were
lifted from December 13.
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Chapter EigM: The Position of the Ponsion Funds in the
United Kingdom Capital Markets
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we considered the portfolio position of the pension
funds in the United Kingdom and changes in this since 1963. In Chapter Two
we considered the economic role played in the economy by the financial
institutions as a whole. To a very large degree the role played by an individual
financial intermediary within a given financial market may be seen as being the
same (albeit on a smaller scale)—to channel the funds of surplus units to the
needs of deficit units, ie, the conversion of savings into productive investments.
In Chapter Seven we looked at the portfolio and investment behaviour of the
pension funds in isolation from the perspective of their operating environment.
However, it is entirely possible for the structure and circumstances of this
environment to influence the investment behaviour of its participants to a very
large degree. In this chapter, therefore, we now consider the investment
behaviour of the pension funds within the context of the United Kingdom
financial markets. By looking at the position of the funds in the various capital
markets and comparing and contrasting their behaviour with that of the other
financial institutions we hope to learn something of their motivations and the
restraints (both internal and external) on their investment behaviour which we
can put to use in our modelling procedure in Chapter Nine.
The efficiency of a capital market in channelling savings into productive
investments depends largely upon its structure in terms of competitiveness,
and to a somewhat lesser extent its degree of contestability. 1 As we saw in
earlier chapters, many of the financial markets in the United Kingdom are
dominated by the financial instllutions in the sense that they either hold the
majority of issued securities or they are active traders of the majority of traded
securities in a given market. Even abstracting from the political issues that
such a high degree of market power through concentration throws up, a
number of economic issues need to be addressed. 2 For example,—and most
importantly—most of portfolio investment behaviour theory is predicated
upon the assumption that markets are competitive, as a result of which market
participants are unable to influence price by their individual actions. 3 We refer
to such market participants as price-takers. Now, while this may certainly be
true for the average Briton, it would not seem to be the case for (eg) a Sir James
Goldsmith or the British Rail Pension Fund, whose asset holdings are large
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enough to permit them to purchase the total outstanding equity of several
"blue chip" corporations at a fell swoop. Indeed, it is partly on the basis of
such market power that we often observe a significant rise in the price of the
ordinary shares of a company subject to a takeover bid by such individual
investors. It therefore would seem reasonable to suggest that the degree of
market power possessed by an investor is likely to significantly influence not
only their own investment behaviour but also that of other investors. An
investor who dominates a market must, in their own interests, be careful that
their attempts to purchase given securities do not unduly push up the price
prior to the purchase.
In his 1978 paper, Dodds shows the implications of supply-side constraints
that are imposed upon the investor with a high degree of market power. He
refers to this phenomenon as "Say's Law of Financial Markets". Thus, given
the a priori market dominance that we have seen exhibited by the United
Kingdom pension funds, we would not be remiss in suggesting at the outset of
this chapter that their investment behaviour in many of the United Kingdom's
capital markets is likely to be constrained by such supply-side limitations.
However, if we are to include supply-side constraints in our modelling of their
investment behaviour we need to substantiate the claim of dominance with
empirical evidence.
8.2 The Role of the Pension Funds
As we have indicated ad nauseam, the pension funds are financial
intermediaries, that is to say they are transporters of capital from surplus units
to deficit units. Nonetheless, they are not the only form of financial
intermediary in existence. As we indicated in Chapter Two, while many types
of financial institution carry out the role of intermediary their specialism varies
in terms of the liabilities they issue. As we saw there, the particular form taken
by a financial intermediary is usually determined by the needs of society at that
time. Thus, we saw in Chapter Three that the pension funds grew up in
response to an increased need by society to save for retirement income. From
this, it therefore follows that the major aspect which distinguishes one type of
financial intermediary from another is the kind of liabilities that are issued.
Once again, we have already pointed out that, unlike most other financial
intermediaries, the pension funds do not issue a wide range of liabilities;
rather, they only issue the claim to a future retirement income:- a pension.4
Thus the pension contract promises future delivery of specific amounts of
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money over a period of time in a prescribed manner in return for current
payments (ie, contributions).
We discovered in Chapter Two that the types of liabilities issued by a
financial intermediary will play a significant role in determining the types of
assets they hold in their investment portfolios. The pension contracts issued by
the pension funds are non-marketable in the extreme and are therefore highly
illiquid. Indeed, unlike real assets, the owner of a pension fund contract (ie, the
member of a pension scheme) cannot sell the contract at will. While the
contract can be rescinded by the member this usually involves substantial
costs, including a great deal of bureaucratic wrangling, as well as a likely
foregone investment income on the prindpal. 5 Given these characteristics of
the liabilities issued by pension funds it makes sense that the assets purchased
by the pension funds should at least attempt to honour this commitment.
Given the long term nature of the pension fund's liability we would expect a
substantial proportion of their asset holdings to also be long term. This is
exactly what we discovered in Chapter Seven.
While the pension funds do hold the majority of their assets in long-term
vehicles, we saw in Chapter Seven that they do also hold a small, yet significant
amount of short-term assets. Indeed, during periods of secular economic
uncertainty the proportion of short-term assets held seems to increase
substantially. From this we may deduce that we would expect the pension
funds to be dominant participants in the markets for longer-term financial
assets, such as ordinary shares and long-term gilts, but relatively small players
in markets at the short end of the financial system (except perhaps during those
periods of marked uncertainty, of course). One natural consequence of all this
is that the relative importance of the pension funds in a given financial market
can be summarised in terms of their dominance of that market. Dominance is
usually taken as referring to the phenomenon that the actions of investors
(here, the pension funds) are transmitted to the market in such a way that the
price and yield determined in the market are not independent of the investor's
actions, ceteris paribus. Put more simply, dominance implies that the investor is
no longer a price-taker. Let us proceed to examine the concept of dominance in
some detail.
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8.3 Dominance in the Financial Markets
We have defined dominance above, but not yet given it any meaning that
will be empirically testable. Examples of anecdotal evidence of the concern
occasioned by perception of pension fund dominance in the financial markets
were presented in Chapter One, Section 1.4. The low degree of accountability
enjoyed by the pension funds enhances the public's perception, making the
pension funds appear to dominate all capital markets, almost to the point of
anti-social conspiracy. However, if we are to consider dominance as a measure
of the importance and role of an investor in the financial markets we need a
more scientific and accurate measurement of dominance, which we now
consider.
The activities of an investor in a given financial market can be seen from
any of three vantage points: their holdings, their net acquisitions, or their
trading (ie, their purchases and sales). Dodds (1979) poses the question as to
which of these gives the best measure and answers as follows
Holdings per se are unlikely to give this effect period by period so that it is more
likely to be trading and the overall net acquisitions which can move the market.
Thus one can conceive of a market where one class of investor is dominant in
terms of holdings but another investor, say with only 10 per cent of total holdings,
can, via its trading, be effectively dominant in terms of price and even the terms on
which securities are offered for sale as new issues (with respect to say coupon,
maturity, etc.).
	
(1979, pp. 66-67)
While it is certainly the case that investors are more likely to be able to
influence the price of a financial asset by their trading or net acquisitions
behaviour, it is also observable that larger investors may be able to influence
price simply as a result of their large holdings. While holdings represent the
results of previous actions taken in the various asset markets, and therefore do
not adequately reflect any period-by-period dominance, it would seem to be
the case that it is usually those investors with larger holdings of any particular
financial claim that are the 'market makers'. Thus, for example, if an investor,
despite being relatively inactive in trading in a particular market, held a large
proportion of that market's financial claims, then the investment behaviour of
other participants in that market would be highly influenced by their
expectations about the behaviour of that larger investor. In consequence, it is
entirely possible to conceive of a market where one investor is dominant in
terms of holdings, while another investor with only a small fraction of that
market's total holdings is, as a result of its trading or net acquisitions,
effectively dominant in terms of (spot) price, and perhaps even regarding the
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terms (eg, coupon, maturity, etc) on which (eg) new issues of the security are
offered. Given that an investor's dominance can manifest itself in terms of
either its holdings, its net acquisitions or its turnover, (or any combination of
these) we now proceed to examine the relative holdings, net acquisitions and
turnover of the pension funds in the United Kingdom capital markets to see if
they do exhibit dominance.
8.3.1 The Financial System
(a) Holdings: In his 1982 SUERF pamphlet, David Fanning points out that
the three principal areas of pension funds investment are British government and
government guaranteed securities, predominantly long-dated and undated stocks,
company ordinary shares, and land and property	 (1982, page 3)
This view is entirely consistent with our findings in Chapter Seven. Indeed, we
expressed a similar view there, also noting that the pension funds appeared to
regard ordinary shares and land as good substitute assets within their
portfolio. If the portfolios of the pension funds are dominated by these three
asset categories, then it would not be unreasonable to expect any dominance by
the pension funds to be more likely in the markets for those particular assets.
Thus, as we seek dominance in the financial markets our primary focus will be
on the markets for gilts, ordinary shares, and land.
We commence our analysis of the holdings-dominance exhibited by the
pension funds by looking at their overall position within the domestic capital
markets. In Table 8-1 we present data on the year-end holdings of all assets of
the major non- bank financial intermediaries from 1963 to 1984. This data has
been converted into percentages, which is presented in Table 8-2. The astute
reader will suggest that the percentages ignore the fact that some financial
claims are held by groups other than the non-bank financial intermediaries,
such as the personal sector or indeed the banks. While we would not wish to
suggest that these holdings are irrelevant, a case can be made that they can be
considered unimportant in the light of our analysis. Firstly, the proportion of
financial assets held directly by the personal sector in the United Kingdom is
substantial—individuals accounted for some 25 per cent of share ownership in
1983—the number of investors within this group is very large and highly
diverse, with no real possibilities for effective collusion, so that in terms of
market influence the personal sector can effectively be disregarded. In fact, the
degree of market share accounted for by the personal sector has been
diminishing substantially in the post-War era; individual share ownership was
58 per cent in 1958!6
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Table 8-1: Year-end Holdings of Financial Institutions
market values (£ millions)
Bdicing
Sociftbs
Unit Irtres tnett
Trust	 Trust
ItZURANCEODS.
G at cral Lcng-term
Funis	 Frurls
PENSIONFUNDS
Private	 Lccal	 Pattie
Scdcr Auto*	 Sear ALL
1963 4,359 350 2,817 972 7,425 2,882 727 1,027 4,636
1964 4,888 406 2,887 989 8,143 2,985 791 1,071 4,847
1965 5,577 500 319 1,041 8,826 3,293 .. 1,145 4,438
1966 6,350 553 3,033 1,082 9,514 3,245 838 1,182 5,265
1967 7,523 788 4,013 1,212 10,173 3,879 907 1,434 6,220
1968 8,357 1,349 5,583 1,335 11,830 4,648 1,086 1,746 7,480
1969 9,336 1,334 4,902 1,460 12,741 4,468 1,220 1,699 7,387
1970 10,940 1,316 469 1,671 13,781 4,687 1,246 1,844 7,777
1971 13,067 1,953 5,780 2,089 15,011 6,175 1,316 2,535 10,026
1972 15,386 2,553 7,570 2,528 16,574 7,028 1,845 3,068 11,941
1973 17,709 2,097 5,815 3,186 19,732 7,489 1,934 2,813 12,236
1974 20,094 1,010 3,132 3,639 20,718 6,307 1,372 2,521 10,200
1975 24,204 2,299 5,381 4,548 23,342 9,642 2,134 4,104 15,880
1976 28,202 2,271 5,745 5,463 24,487 11,847 2,652 5,516 20,015
1977 34,288 3,109 6,341 7,375 34,256 16,983 3,849 8,005 28,837
1978 39,538 3,474 6,460 8,458 38,371 20,253 4,304 9,701 34,258
1979 45,789 3,600 6,996 9,585 42,677 23,622 4,942 12,261 40,825
1980 53,793 4,629 8,352 11,516 53,746 31,543 6,891 15,501 53,935
1981 61,815 5,369 8,904 13,132 61,084 36,921 8,167 18,348 63,436
1982 73,032 7,309 10,051 16,293 79,759 48,869 11,365 23,964 84,198
1983 85,869 10,843 13,371 18,782 95,768 63,131 14,274 29,754 107,159
1984 102,689 14,007 15,251 20,019 112,851 77,162 17,649 35,480 130,291
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Financial Statistics, various editions
Given their high degree of visibility as major financial intermediaries it
would seem at first glance that the banks cannot be disposed of quite so
readily. For example, while the asset holdings of the pension funds amounted
to £130,291 millions in 1984, the asset holdings of British retail banks amounted
to £143,504 in the same year. If we were also to include the asset holdings of
overseas banks, consortium banks, the discount market institutions, and the
banking department of the Bank of England, this figure rises to a staggering
£679,092 for 1984 (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1984). However,
while the banks are, in fact, an immensely dominant feature of the British
financial landscape, their influence does not truly extend much beyond the
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money markets. For example, as we saw in Chapter One, 7 bank ownership of
ordinary shares is at best minimal (1.7 per cent in 1969), and has declined to
such an extent that nowadays the banks are typically aggregated together with
investors such as the personal sector and others not included in the category of
non-bank financial intermediaries. Indeed, the evidence presented to the
Wilson Committee (1980, page 498) shows that the only financial markets
where the banks' holdings may be regarded as significant are those for U. K.
local authority securities, where they held an 18 per cent share in 1978, and
British government securities, where they held a 9.1 per cent share in 1978.
Table 8-2: Year-end Holdings of Financial Institutions
(per cent)
Brildng
Soddes
ItsSURANCE COS.
Unit Investnert	 Gartral Lcng-rerm
Trust	 Trust	 Funds	 Furris
PENSONFUNDS
Priate	 Local	 Putlic
Sew AulhoriV	 Seim ALL
1963 21.20 1.70 13.70 4.73 36.11 14.02 3.54 5.00 22.55
1964 22.06 1.83 13.03 4.46 36.75 13.47 3.57 4.83 21.87
1965 26.94 2.42 1.54 5.03 42.63 15.91 0 5.53 21.44
1966 24.62 2.14 11.76 4.19 36.88 12.58 3.25 4.58 20.41
1967 25.14 2.63 13.41 4.05 33.99 12.96 3.03 4.79 20.78
1968 23.26 3.75 15.54 3.72 32.92 12.93 3.02 4.86 20.82
1969 25.12 3.62 13.19 3.93 34.28 12.02 3.28 4.57 19.87
1970 30.43 3.66 1.30 4.65 48.33 13.04 3.47 5.13 21.63
1971 27.27 4.08 12.06 4.36 31.32 12.88 2.75 5.29 20.92
1972 27.21 4.51 13.39 4.47 29.31 12.43 3.26 5.43 21.12
1973 29.14 3.45 9.57 5.24 32.47 12.32 3.18 4.63 20.13
1974 34.18 1.72 5.33 6.19 35.24 10.73 2.33 4.23 17.35
1975 31.99 3.04 7.11 6.01 30.85 12.74 2.82 5.42 20.99
1976 32.72 2.64 6.67 6.34 28.41 13.75 3.08 6.40 23.22
1977 30.02 2.72 5.55 6.46 29.99 14.87 3.37 7.01 25.25
1978 30.28 2.66 4.95 6.48 29.39 15.51 3.30 7.43 26.24
1979 30.63 2.41 4.68 6.41 28.55 15.80 3.31 8.20 27.31
1980 28.93 2.49 4.49 6.19 28.90 16.96 3.71 8.34 29.00
1981 28.92 2.51 4.17 6.14 28.58 17.27 3.82 8.58 29.68
1982 26.98 2.70 3.71 6.02 29.47 18.06 4.20 8.85 31.11
1983 25.88 3.27 4.03 5.66 28.86 19.03 4.30 8.97 32.30
1984 25.99 3.55 3.86 5.07 28.56 19.53 4.47 8.98 32.98
Source: Table 8-1
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Much of what is revealed by Table 8-1 is simply an extension to the entire
non-bank financial sector of what we discovered for the three pension fund
groups in Chapter Seven. To summarise, over the period 1963 to 1984 the asset
holdings of all groups within the non-bank financial sector showed a long-run
upward trend, with occasional short-term reductions. For example, the
pension funds, unit trusts, and investment trusts all experienced reductions in
their asset holdings in 1974, following the OPEC crisis. It is interesting to note
that both categories of insurance companies—general funds and long-term
funds—as well as the building societies were barely affected by the OPEC-
induced recession of the early 1970s. In fact, both insurance companies'
categories do exhibit a noticeable reduction in the rate of growth of their asset
holdings during the 1973-1976 recession. Presumably the long-term and
actuarially certain nature of their liabilities shielded them from any short-term
reduction in the value of their investment portfolios. 8 Even more interesting is
the almost constantly monotonically upward growth exhibited by the holdings
of the building societies, who appear to be totally unaffected by general
economic conditions. It is true that the building societies began to become
more prominent on Britain's High Streets in the early 1970s as they undertook
heavy advertising campaigns and became a seriously threatening competitor to
the U. K.'s traditional depository intermediaries, the commercial or joint-stock
banks. Additionally, as a result of the rampant uncertainty of the stagflation of
the early 1970s, many investors, both individual and institutional, sought those
investment media which were more liquid and more certain; from the
individual's viewpoint, the building societies' liabilities certainly qualified and
in a more attractive fashion than those of the more staid joint-stock banks.
Nonetheless, during the relentless bull markets of the decade of the 1980s the
longer-term intermediaries—the pension funds and long-term insurance
funds—saw dramatic growth in their holdings to the extent that they actually
overtook the building societies.
The percentage data presents a similar picture, albeit in terms of a
representation of market share. The building societies do not seem to exhibit
the smooth path of their absolute holdings. Their market share has oscillated
between 21 and 34 per cent, showing a long-run upward trend until the mid-
1970s and downward since. During the mid-1970s, especially following the
OPEC crisis, the building societies held the largest market share of all non-bank
financial intermediaries. The insurance companies' long-term funds held the
largest market share until being superseded by the building societies in the
mid-1970s. Over the entire data period the insurance companies' long-term
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funds have maintained a dominant market share, but like the building societies
this share has oscillated dramatically. These oscillations have become reduced
substantially since the late 1970s. The most surprising feature of the market
share of the insurance companies' long-term funds is that over the entire data
period it has shown a general downward trend, albeit one which has slowed
during the 1980s. This is almost in direct contrast with the market share of the
insurance companies' general funds. Despite a dip in the late 1960s and
another in 1983, their market share has shown a slow but steady increase over
the entire data period,stabilising at around 5 per cent since the mid-1970s.
Both unit trusts and investment trusts have shown wide swings in their
relatively small market shares, especially prior to 1975. Following 1975 these
shares seem to stabilise with unit trusts showing a slow but steady increase and
investment trusts showing a slightly more rapid decline. During this latter
period the unit trusts average a market share of some 2.5 per cent, while the
figure for the investment trusts is about 4 per cent.
Like the other groups on non-bank financial intermediaries the pension
funds' market share over the entire data period seems to hit a watershed
during the OPEC crisis. Prior to this period the pension funds seemed to be
losing its market share by a small degree, with some oscillation around this
downward trend. However, since those heady days of stagflation their market
share has shown a quite steady and marked upward trend to the point that
they have held the major market share during the 1980s, having overtaken both
the insurance companies" long-term funds and the building societies in 1980.
From the above we may summarise that there are three major groups of
non-bank financial intermediary which possess any significant degree of
dominance over the financial system taken as a whole in terms of their
holdings: the long-term funds of the insurance companies, the building
societies, and the pension funds. Let us see if such a conclusion can be
evidenced by the net acquisitions data as well.
(b) Net Acquisitions: In Table 8-3 we present the data for the annual net
acquisitions of assets by the major non-bank financial intermediaries. Yet
again, both the banks and the personal sector are conspicuous by their absence,
for the reasons we have already cited. Again, the data have been converted
into percentages, which are presented in Table 8-4.
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Table 8-3: Annual Net Acquisitions of Financial Institutions
market values (£ millions)
II tildng
Saids
II% URANCE COS
Unit Investnert	 Geural Lag-term
Trust	 Trust	 Funis	 Funis
PENSDNFUNDS
Prirate	 Lan'	 Put'lc
Sew Anhaity	 Sector
ALL
1963 518 54 69 31 586 214 62 75 428
1964 527 72 96 56 631 239 67 81 452
1965 687 66 19 25 633 274 75 84 489
1966 779 105 69 40 610 292 79 91 531
1967 1,159 80 64 79 682 256 91 99 516
1968 830 234 130 104 791 283 100 116 591
1969 958 173 34 65 751 277 108 124 598
1970 1,600 84 (8) 157 837 349 120 204 734
1971 2,118 81 105 271 971 368 152 204 876
1972 2,309 289 551 372 1,270 409 163 331 966
1973 2,323 196 (35) 341 1,322 557 199 462 1,237
1974 2,580 (21) (202) 436 1,466 737 134 559 1,445
1975 4,075 344 (37) 725 1,784 1,072 355 861 2,203
1976 3,767 47 (8) 928 2,101 1,232 484 1,256 2,974
1977 6,549 144 100 954 2,952 1,454 541 1,208 3,178
1978 4,985 170 (73) 854 4,002 1,687 592 1,455 4,425
1979 6,394 53 (2) 1,352 4,487 2,920 754 1,906 5,583
1980 8,155 87 82 1,020 5,026 3,593 993 1,868 6,872
1981 7,924 429 (33) 1,551 6,047 3,994 1,128 2,317 7,439
1982 11,097 514 208 843 6,285 3,920 1,202 2,251 7,373
1983 12,797 1,114 261 1,228 6,673 4,239 1,230 2,357 7,826
1984 16,283 908 (509) 4,459 1,410 2,176 8,045
1985 17,648 2,346 406 5,320 1,388 2,088 8,808
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Financial Statistics, various editions
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between the annual net acquisitions
and the holdings data (in £ millions) is that, while most of the institutions
exhibit a long run growth in their net acquisitions, there is a lesser degree of
stability exhibited in them by virtually all of the non-bank financial
intermediaries. Of course, this is exactly what we discovered for the pension
funds in Chapter Seven. In fact, it is the net acquisitions of the longer-term
intermediaries, the pension funds and long-term funds of insurance companies,
that exhibit the smoothest pattern of growth. While for virtually the entire data
period the annual net acquisitions of the building societies appear to well
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outstrip those of the other non-bank financial institutions, their pattern of
growth exhibits a very high degree cf oscillation. The building societies'
net acquisitions grow from some £518 millions during 1963 to £17,648 millions
during 1985, with major declines in the level during 1968, 1976, 1978, and 1981,
and a significant plateau during 1973. This contrasts with the net acquisitions
of the long-term funds of the insurance companies, which show no declines.
As with holdings, the net acquisitions of the unit trusts, investment trusts, and
the general funds of the insurance companies show very small growth with
substantial oscillations. Indeed, both the unit trusts and investment trusts
exhibit negative net acquisitions during some years in the data period. Also in
common with the holdings data, the pension funds grow at a faster pace than
their long-term insurance companies cousins in the period after the OPEC crisis
in the early 1970s. This is a reversal of the situation before the crisis.
Table 8-4: Annual Net Acquisitions of Financial Institutions
(per cent)
Bilking
Sccidis
ITSSIRkNCE cos
Unit Investnert	 Gercral Lag-term
Trust	 Trust	 Funis	 Funis
PET•SDNFUNDS
Priate	 Lcral	 Public
Seicr	 Auintity	 Soicr ALL
1963 32.18 3.36 4.28 1.93 36.39 13.32 3.86 4.67 21.86
1964 29.79 4.06 5.46 3.17 35.65 13.52 3.76 4.58 21.87
1965 36.88 3.54 1.04 1.32 34.01 14.70 4.02 4.49 23.21
1966 37.73 5.07 3.32 1.93 29.57 14.14 3.84 4.40 22.38
1967 46.17 3.19 2.55 3.15 27.17 10.21 3.61 3.95 17.77
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
32.09
38.49
47.87
49.60
40.55
43.31
45.35
9.04
6.94
2.53
1.90
5.08
3.65
-0.37
5.02
1.37
-0.25
2.47
9.67
-0.65
-3.55
4.02
2.61
4.69
6.34
6.53
6.35
7.67
30.58
30.17
25.04
22.74
22.30
24.65
25.77
10.93
11.13
10.43
8.62
7.19
10.38
12.96
3.86
4.32
3.59
3.56
2.86
3.70
2.36
3.87
4.47
4.97
6.10
4.78
5.82
8.61
9.82
9.38
19.25
20.42
20.13
16.95
15.86
22.69
25.13
24.92
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
44.40
38.41
47.11
36.46
35.70
39.16
33.93
42.16
42.80
3.74
0.48
1.03
1.24
0.30
0.42
1.84
1.95
3.73
-0.40
-0.08
0.72
-0.53
-0.01
0.39
-0.14
0.79
0.87
7.90
9.46
6.86
6.24
7.57
4.90
6.64
3.20
4.11
19.44
21.42
21.23
29.27
25.12
24.14
25.89
23.88
22.32
11.68
12.56
10.46
12.34
13.35
17.25
17.10
14.89
14.18
4.94
3.89
4.33
4.22
4.77
4.83
4.57
4.11
12.81
8.69
10.64
10.67
8.97
9.92
8.85
7.88
30.31
23.04
27.31
31.24
30.99
31.85
28.01
26.17
1984 65.85 3.67 -2.06 18.03 5.70 8.80 32.54
1985 60.45 8.04 1.39 18.22 4.75 7.15 30.13
Source: Table 8-3
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One of the most interesting features of the net acquisitions data in
percentages is that the various groups of institutions, despite substantial
oscillations in their market share, seem to maintain their relative position over
much of the data period. Thus, for example, while the building societies'
market share varies from less than 30 per cent in 1964 to more than 65 per cent
in 1984, they maintain the highest market share of non-bank financial
institutions' net acquisitions over virtually the entire data period. This stability
of relative position is less the case for the other institutions over the entire data
period, but not over lengthy periods of time. The pension funds are behind the
long-term insurance companies until the period of the 1973 crisis when their
relative positions are reversed. Equally, while the unit trusts, investment trusts
and insurance companies' general funds battle it out for relative positions
during the early part of the data period, they settle down with the insurance
companies ahead of the unit trusts, ahead of the investment trusts following
the 1973 crisis.
The net acquisitions data expressed in percentages also reveals some
interesting relationships between the various non-bank financial intermediaries
that are not readily apparent when the data is expressed in billions of Pounds.
Firstly, and perhaps not entirely surprisingly, we note that over most of the
data period the relative positions of the pension funds and the insurance
companies' long-term funds move in tandem. Thus, when the market share of
the pension funds declines so does that of the insurance companies' long-term
funds. The only exception to this seems to be briefly in the late 1970s. A
similar pattern also seems to be the case for the unit trusts and investment
trusts. The opposite relationship appears to be the case between the building
societies and the pension funds (and hence the long-term insurance companies
as well). Here, when the market share of the building societies rises that of the
pension funds (and the long-term insurance companies) declines. Again, the
only exception here is during the years of the early 1970s. A similarly
competitive relationship would seem to exist between the pension funds and
the investment trusts, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree. This probably tells us
more about the British public's penchant for investment media during different
parts of the business cycle than it does about institutional dominance of
financial markets.
In looking at the percentage data on net acquisitions for the major groups of
British non-bank financial intermediaries the same basic conclusion as deduced
from the monetary data seems to be justified. That is to say, that dominance of
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the financial markets over most of the data period is exhibited by the building
societies, the pension funds and the insurance companies' long-term funds, all
of whom account for more than 20 per cent of the market share of net
acquisitions. Certainly, while the pension funds do hold a dominant market
share, in the period before the OPEC crisis, they are themselves dominated by
both the building societies and the insurance companies' long-term funds. In
the period since 1974, while the pension funds dominate the insurance
companies' long-term funds, they are still well exceeded by the building
societies.
(c) Turnover: Unfortunately there are no data available on the overall
turnover of financial assets of the groups of non-bank financial intermediaries
with which we have been concerned. Thus, our condusions about institutional
dominance of the financial markets in general must be based solely on the
holdings and net acquisitions data that we have already considered.
From the foregoing we can summarise that the pension funds certainly
appear to be a dominant investor in terms of their holdings in the U. K.
financial markets taken as a whole. In fact, for much of the 1980s it would not
be an exaggeration to suggest that they are the major dominant financial
institution. The net acquisitions data also reveals the pension funds to be a
dominant investor, but with a lesser degree of dominance than the building
societies. This is certainly in line with what we might expect on the basis of the
theory of investment by financial intermediaries; that is to say, we would
normally tend to expect financial intermediaries which issue predominantly
short-term liabilities to be more active traders in the financial markets than
their counterparts which issue longer-term liabilities. What is, perhaps, rather
more interesting is that despite having the smaller net acquisitions, the pension
funds overtake the building societies in terms of holdings (both in Pounds and
percentage terms) during the 1980s. This must surely indicate that the pension
funds are earning a much higher return on their investments than the building
societies. Comparison of the predominantly long-term nature of pension fund
investment, especially during the lengthy bull market of the 1980s, with the
building societies' major investment—mortgage loans, during a period of
relatively stable and low inflation—would lend much credence to this view-
point. We can therefore conclude that not only are the pension funds a
dominant investor on the British financial scene but also a rather successful
one.
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Let us now go in further detail into the issue of dominance and consider
individually the various markets that make up the financial system in the
United Kingdom.
8.3.2 British Government Securities
The importance of the market for British government securities for the
smooth operation of both fiscal and monetary policy in the United Kingdom is
both paramount and obvious. The importance of this market within the
financial system of the United Kingdom is not so readily apparent. According
to the Wilson Committee
The gilt-edged market provides the largest proportion of Stock Exchange trading
measured in terms of value (75 per cent in 1978). It predominantly comprises
British government and government guaranteed stocks...
	 (1980, page 494)
Thus, in many respects the market for British government and government
guaranteed stocks may be regarded as the most important market within the
financial system of the United Kingdom.
(a) Holdings: In Table 8-5 we present the data on holdings of British
government securities by the various financial institutions in nominal terms.
The maturity split is for short- dated gilts (ie , with maturities up to five
years) and medium- and long-dated gilts combined. This latter combination is
due to the lack of published data in a more disaggregated form. For
completeness we also include a set of data for all maturities. This latter data is
also presented in percentage form in Table 8-6.
Unlike the overall data presented in the previous section, the picture of
dominance in the gilts market is somewhat blurred. In nominal terms virtually
all of the market participants increase their holdings over the data period, the
only exception being the Discount Market. This holds for gilts of all maturities,
although the Discount Market does seem to be switching out of the longer- and
medium-term into the short-term gilts as the 1980s commence. This, as we also
saw in Chapter Seven, is the reverse of the picture that emerges for the pension
funds; as we enter the 1980s they seem to be moving out of the short and into
the longer gilts.
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Table 8-5: Holdings	 of	 British	 Government	 Securities	 by
Financial Institutions
(£ millions, at end-March)
short dated 1964 1970 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Official Holders 2,864 2,536 4.091 4.033 5.796
Banks 1,045 1.060 1,553 2,053 2,044 2.914 2.388 1,670
Discount Market 442 289 58 65 321 417 668 765
Insurance
Companies 80 96 173 808 1,152 953 1.853 1.918
Pension Funds 40 96 115 386 400 375 383 390
Building
Societies 121 530 805 1,930 1,898 2.632 3,303 3,726
Savings Banks 40 193 173 249 488 1,032 1,703 1,792
Investment &
Unit Trusts .n
- 58 57 90 148 119 72
Other 2.290 2.602 2.818 5.341 6,735 6.647 7,124 8,104
Total 4,018 4,818 5,751 13,753 15,C64 19,209 21,574 4233
long- & medium-
dated 1964 1970 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Official Holders 3,568 3.154 4.525 3.782 4,892
Banks 937 686 461 249 183 195 270 504
n.. 4 8 10 30 7Discount Market - -
Insurance
Companies 1,978 3.088
4,300 6,054 8,046 10,263 13,458 16.391
Pension Funds 1,145 1,258 1,689 2,637 5.000 5.775 8,169 9.751
Building Societies 208 229 461 447 392 528 208 475
Savings Banks 104 343 921 855 997 1,056 1,043 1.327
Investment & Unit
Trusts
_ 114 _ 195 203 217 197 142
Other 5,993 5.605 7.524 7,818 8,856 10,334 10,609 13.263
Total 10,408 11,42s 15,356 21,7 26,839 32,503 37,766 46,752
al natnifes 1964 1970 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Official Holders 6432 5690 8616 7815 8861 105 5 5 10715 11657 12775
Banks 1981 1746 2013 2302 2227 3109 2658 2220 4374 3835 3868 4312
Discount Market 442 289 58 69 329 427 698 779 1309 456 287 551 
Insurance
Companies 2058 3185 4472
6862 9198 11216 1 531 1 17857 21250 23 363 25014 27394
Pension Funds 1185 1355 1804 3023 5400 6150 8552 10886 12966 14653 16014 18702
Building
Societies 329 759 1266 2377 2290 3160 3511 4358 5639 6828 7722 9773
Savings Banks 144 536 1094 1104 1485 2088 2746 3119)
Investment &
Unit Trusts 0 114 58 252 293 365 316 214 3712 4159 4283 4283
Other 8223 8206 10342 13159 15591 16981 17733 19454 21619 23374 23678 23678
Total 14362 16190 21107 35580 42503 52112 59340 68317 81424 87383 92523 101468
Source: Bank of England
David Fanning (1982)
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Table 8-6: Holdings of British Government Securities by
Financial Institutions
(per cent)
all maturities 1964 1970 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Official Holders 18.08 13.39 16.53 13.17 12.97 12.96 12.26 12.60 13.25
Banks 13.80 10.79 9.54 6.47 5.24 5.97 4.48 3.25 5.37 4.39 4.18 4.47
Discount Market 3.08 1.79 .27 .19 .77 .82 1.18 1.14 1.61 .52 .31 .57
Insurance
Companies 14.33 19.67 21.19 19.29 21.64 21.52 25.80 26.14 26.10 26.74 27.04 25.95
Pension Funds 8.25 8.37 8.55 8.50 12.71 11.80 14.41 15.94 15.92 16.77 17.31 16.61
Building Societies 2.29 4.69 6.00 6.68 5.39 6.06 5.92 6.38 6.93 7.81 8.35 10.14
Savings Banks 1.00 3.31 5.18 3.10 3.49 4.01 4.63 4.39 )
Investment &
Unit Trusts 0 .71 .27 .71 .69 .70 .53 5.71 4.56 4.76 4.63 4.44
Other 57.25 50.69 49.00 36.98 36.68 32.59 29.88 28.48 26.55 26.75 25.59 24.56
In terms of nominal values there is no doubt that the largest participant in
the government securities market is the "other holders" category. This
group is defined in the official statistics as being a residual category,
consisting largely of individuals in the personal sector. As we argued before,
despite the largesse of this group's holdings, it is unlikely that this group is
likely to exert any degree of dominance in the gilts market. The next largest
group of participants over the entire data period is the insurance companies. In
his 1979 SUERF pamphlet, Dodds recognises the insurance companies as the
major group of investors in the gilts market in terms of holdings, somewhat
ahead of the pension funds. This dominance, he suggests, is particularly
marked at the long end of the market. Certainly, a glance at a copy of the
government publication Business Monitor MQ5 will reveal that, while both the
insurance companies and pension funds as long-term investors with a
penchant for long-term assets that match their liabilities, the insurance
companies tend to hold a greater percentage of their portfolio as gilts while the
pension funds appear to have a greater preference for equity.
The view of dominance in the market for government securities is probably
best seen from the percentage data. One of the most interesting features that
emerges from this data is the secular decline of the market share accounted for
by "other holders"; from over 57 per cent in 1964 to less than 25 per cent in
1984. This is entirely consistent with the decline in individual investment, and
the secular increase in financial intermediation that we observed in Chapter
One. The declining market share of the Discount Market is also revealed by the
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percentage data, a characteristic that also seems to apply to the banks. In the
period since 1976 three groups appear to have increased their market share
substantially; in ascending order these are the building societies, the pension
funds and the insurance companies. The building societies are up to some 10
per cent in 1984, the pension funds to 17 per cent, and the insurance companies
are leading the pack with 26 per cent. While these are significant shares of the
gilts market, it would seem that dominance via holdings can only be attributed
to the insurance companies and the pension funds. The disaggregated data by
maturity shows this to be much more the case for the long end of the market. It
may indeed be the case that the building societies, while exerting very little
dominance in the gilts market as a whole, are indeed dominant at the short end
of the market. Given that none of these groups seems to be in a truly
monopsonistic position, let us look further afield to see if any institutions are
dominant in the gilts market.
(b) Net Acquisitions: The data on institutional investment in the market for
British government securities is presented in both nominal and percentage
terms in Table 8-7 for the period 1972 - 1985. Given that the holdings data
occur as a result of the net acquisitions data, it is no real surprise to find that
the latter confirm the findings of the former. For example, we noticed a secular
decline in the holdings of gilts by the banks and "other holders"; in terms of
net acquisitions, both of these groups have largely been net sellers over the
data period. The net acquisitions data also reveals the cyclical nature of the
investment behaviour of the various financial intermediaries, something which
is not readily apparent from the holdings data. Other interesting features
exhibited by the net acquisitions data include the virtual disappearance of the
savings banks from the gilts market after 1982, the low percentage of net
acquisitions of government securities accounted for by the unit and investment
trusts combined, the dramatic secular growth of the market share of net
acquisitions of the pension funds, especially during the 1980s, and the marginal
secular decline in the market share of the insurance companies.
Given that the pension funds account for some 30 per cent of all net
acquisitions of government securities during the 1970s, a figure which rises to
over 55 per cent by 1985, it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that they
are a dominant investor in that market. Certainly, the issuers of these securities
would be inclined to take into account the behaviour of such major purchasers
in their pricing and issuing behaviour. 9
 In order to fully establish the
hypothesis of pension fund dominance in this market we must now turn our
attention to other aspects of their trading activity by considering turnover.
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Table 8-7: Institutional	 Investment
Securities
in	 British	 Government
(£ millions)
TOTAL Pension	 Insurance	 Building Savings
Funds	 Companies	 Trusts	 Societies	 Banks Other
1972 228 15	 288 -30	 -38 192 -9
1973 699 190	 318 23	 62 113 -7
1974 290 86	 114 42	 61 -4 -9
1975 3310 930	 1572 79	 641 31 57
1976 3332 1175	 1799 11	 172 270 -95
1977 4710 1116	 2229 130	 680 578 -24
long-term general investment unit
1978 4785 1305	 2426 213	 -30 3 382 517 -31
1979 6660 2294	 2542 393	 73 4 822 532 1
1980 5546 2083	 2176 433	 -47 8 873 80 -52
1981 6302 1873	 2207 703	 -57 103 1251 265 -43
1982 4771 1362	 1841 65	 -7 90 1471 -51
1983 6448 2688	 2092 288	 127 122 1188 -57
1984 5416 2201	 2455 -23	 - 54 797 -68
1985 4860 2708	 1744 149	 67 21 247 -76
(per cent)
Pension
Funds
insurance
Companies Trusts
Building	 Savings	 Other
Societies	 Banks
1972 6.58 126.32 -13.16 -16.67 84.21 -3.95
1973 27.18 45.50 3.29 8.87 16.17 -1.00
1974 29.66 39.31 14.48 21.03 -1.38 -3.10
1975 28.10 47.49 2.39 19.37 0.94 1.72
1976 35.26 54.00 0.33 5.16 8.10 -2.85
1977 23.69 47.32 2.76 14.44 12.27 -0.51
longterm wneral investment unit
1978 27.27 50.70 4.45 -0.63 0.01 7.98 10.80 -0.65
1979 34.44 38.17 5.90 1.10 0.01 12.34 7.99
1980 37.56 39.24 7.81 -0.85 0.14 15.74 1.44 -0.94
1981 29.72 35.02 11.16 -0.90 1.63 19.85 4.21 -0.68
1982 28.55 38.59 1.36 -0.15 1.89 30.83 -1.07
1983 41.69 32.44 4.47 1.97 1.89 18.42 -0.88
1984 40.64 45.33 -0.42 1.00 14.72 -1.26
1985 55.72 35.88 3.07 1.38 0.43 5.08 -1.56
Source: Financial Statistics
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(c) Turnover: Data on the pension funds' turnover activity in the market for
government securities is presented in Table 8-8 in both nominal and percentage
terms. The data reveal that the pension funds' turnover varies from a low of
23.41 per cent in 1978 to a high of 40.66 per cent in 1975. However, in each year
the turnover of the pension funds is exceeded by that of the insurance
companies. Thus, we may conclude that while the pension funds account for a
significant amount of the turnover in this market, the overall dominance is held
by the insurance companies. Given what we have already seen of the relative
importance of government securities in the portfolios of these two groups of
financial intermediaries, this is hardly a surprising find, and is certainly
consistent with the findings of other studies, such as that by Dodds (1978).10
Nonetheless, during this data period the pension funds account for over twenty
per cent of the turnover of government securities, so that while we may
acknowledge the overall dominance of the insurance companies, we may
consider the pension funds as being dominant to a significant but lesser degree.
However, the net acquisitions data examined earlier did reveal that the relative
positions of the insurance companies and pension funds in the market for gilts
switched during the 1980s, so let us consider their turnover data for the 1980s,
which is presented in Table 8-9.
Table 8-8: Pension Funds' Turnover—Government Securities
Market
TOTAL
£ million
Pension	 Insurance
Funds	 Companies
per cent
Pension	 Insurance
Funds	 Companies
1973 8,694 2,297 4,870 26.42 56.02
1974 12,782 3,416 7,901 26.73 61.81
1975 22,242 9,124 10,674 40.66 47.56
1976 28,330 10,583 13,527 37.36 47.75
1977 44,114 14,072 20,865 31.90 47.30
1978 36,642 8,577 21,306 23.41 58.15
1979 45,657 12,745 25,058 27.91 54.88
Source: Financial Statistics
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Table 8-9: Turnover in Government Securities
£ million
short*
PF's InsCos
medium*
PF's InsCos
long*
PF's InsCos
ILTS*
PF's InsCos
ALL
PF's InsCos
1980 1,294 5,630 2,913 7,372 6,451 12,340 0 0 10,658 25,342
1981 745 5,681 3,598 11,595 8,170 15,110 0 0 12,513 32,385
1982 1,392 4,129 6,839 10,641 10,370 13,889 0 5,524 18,600 34,183
1983 2,110 8,889 8,095 16,495 11,417 18,021 852 820 22,474 44,225
1984 2,190 10,261 9,589 27,989 8,486 15,195 2,263 1,976 22,528 55,421
1985 1,115 7,618 13,360 24,724 11,427 19,487 3,867 0 29,769 51,829
1986 1,428 7,468 14,691 27,177 15,137 23,830 3,892 34 35,148 58,514
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
Table 8-9 reveals that much the same pattern of turnover that prevailed in
the market for British government securities in the 1970s, persisted into the
1980s as well. Thus, while the 1980s also saw the pension funds account for a
large percentage of the turnover of government securities, a larger turnover
was exhibited by the insurance companies. This would appear to be true for
virtually all maturity ranges of gilts. Given that "insurance companies"
encompasses both general funds (fire, auto, theft, etc), whose liabilities are
often short-term, as well as long-term funds (such as the life offices), we would
be inclined to expect them to participate more in the market for gilts of shorter
maturity than the pension funds, whose liabilities are entirely long term. The
only category of government security where the pension funds turnover
dominates that of the insurance companies is that of the Index-Linked Treasury
Stock. Indeed, while the insurance companies seemed to have plunged into
investment in ILTS with gay abandon upon their premier issue in 1982, their
position has become somewhat reversed in the years following, years in which
the rate of inflation was declining and becoming much less volatile than the
stagflationary 1970s. However, given the legal requirement that pensionable
benefits be linked to the general price level," we should not be surprised by
the dominance of the pension funds in the ILTS market. Thus, once again, the
turnover data would seem to support the holdings and net acquisitions
evidence of insurance company dominance of the market for government
securities. However, we should still consider this conclusion as open to debate
until we look at a couple of other ways of measuring dominance via trading
activity.
* short = maturity of less than 5 years; medium = 5 to 15 years; long = more than 15 years;
ILTS = Index-Linked Treasury Stock.
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In looking at the turnover data above we are considering the purchases and
sales of government securities as a single sum. In Table 8-10 we show data on
the pension funds' purchases and sales of government securities separately. It
is interesting to note that purchases and sales tend to move together; that i s to
say, in a year when the pension funds are purchasing more gilts they are also
selling more gilts. While some of this strong relationship between purchases
and sales must be due to the impact of inflation on the nominal values of gilts
being traded, the fact that a similar picture emerges from the percentage data
(also in Table 8-10) implies that there are also other factors that might account
for this phenomenon. The major factor that would seem to be relevant
concerns the 'thickness' of the market. 12 Because trading in the market for
government securities is very active and relatively low in transactions costs, we
would readily expect the pension funds (or, indeed, any other investor) to sell
assets when there is an opportunity to purchase the same assets at a lower price
or with improved yield. The significantly high percentage data for the pension
funds suggests that this is the type of investment strategy they do, indeed,
pursue in the gilts market, rather than the more legendary "buy-and-hold"
strategy with which they are typically endowed in undergraduate textbooks.
Table 8-10: Pension	 Funds'	 Transactions	 in	 British
Government Securities	 (£ millions)
Pension Funds
Pirchams	 Saes
All NBFI's
Pachams	 Saes
1973 1,189 999 5,060 4,361
1974 1,751 1,665 6,536 6,246
1975 5,027 4,097 12,876 9,566
1976 5,879 4,704 15,830 12,499
1977 7,594 6,478 24,412 19,703
1978 4,941 3,636 20,711 15,931
1979 7,321 5,424 26,003 19,654
(percent)
Pension Funds Insurance Companies
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
1973 23.50 22.91 63.00 65.81
1974 26.79 26.66 61.43 62.46
1975 39.04 42.83 47.55 47.57
1976 37.14 37.64 48.41 46.92
1977 31.11 32.88 47.30 47.29
1978 23.86 22.82 57.81 58.59
1979 28.15 27.60 53.84 56.26
Source: Financial Statistics
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While the data shows that the pension funds are a significant force in the
market for British government securities, accounting for some twenty to thirty-
five per cent of all sales as well as purchases, they are not the dominant
investor in the market. Once again, the dominant position seems to be
occupied by the insurance companies, which account for between forty-five
and sixty-five per cent of all purchases and sales. This, unsurprisingly,
supports the conclusion we derived from both the turnover and net
acquisitions data; that is to say, that while the pension funds are a significantly
active and dominant trader in the market for government securities, they are
not the dominant trader.
One final means of examining the market activity of participants is to make
use of turnover ratios. Such an approach has been considered by (eg) R. L.
Carter and J. E. V. Johns on (1976) and Dodds (1978, 1979). Following
precedent, we only consider two such ratios, both of which make use of the
data we have already seen. These ratios are used to estimate the extent to
which the pension funds turn over their portfolio of assets. The first ratio,
which I shall refer to as the activity ratio is defined as:
ES 
where Es = total sales over a given period at market prices, and Ep = total
purchases over a given period at market prices. If the activity ratio is above
unity then we would expect net acquisitions over that time period to be
negative, ie, a net selling tendency on the part of the investor. The lower the
value of the activity ratio below unity, the greater the indication that the
investor is pursuing a conservative "buy-and-hold" strategy. I shall refer to the
second ratio as the trading ratio, and it may be defined as:
ys
TH
with Es defined as before, and TH being some measure of the investor's total
holdings. Given that Es is a flow measure while TH is a stock, many analysts
prefer to measure TH by taking the average of end-year holdings. Thus,
instead of TH they use:
TH—  THt + THt_i
2
where THt = total holdings at end of year t, and THt_i = total holdings at end
of year t-1 (le, beginning of year t). With this ratio, a value above unity reveals
the investor's preference to reduce their participation in the market for a
particular asset. If the ratio is close to zero the implication is of an investor
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pursuing a conservative "buy-and-hold" strategy and whose actions in the
market are, therefore, unlikely to influence the asset price significantly.
In Table 8-11(a) we present the annual activity ratios for the pension funds
for the data period 1980-1987. As we have  come to expect, the turnover of
long-term government securities is rather less than that for medium- and short-
term maturities. Also, for the most part, purchases exceed sales, giving activity
ratios less than unity. It is particularly interesting to note the relatively high
values the pension funds' activity ratios exhibit in virtually every year and over
all maturity ranges. This would seem to indicate that the pension funds have a
rapid turnover of their gilts portfolio, rather than the stereotypical "buy-and-
hold" portfolio with which they are usually characterised. To establish
whether this substantial turnover activity gives the pension funds the status of
dominant investor in the market for British government securities we need to
compare the ratios above with those for the major (non-bank) investor, the
insurance companies. Activity ratios for the insurance companies' turnover of
government securities are presented in Table 8-11(b).
Table 8-11:	 Turnover	 in	 British
Activity Ratio
(a) Pension Funds:
Government Securities-
maturity 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
short 1.2861 1.0623 0.7876 0.7030 0.8403 2.3476 1.1935 1.001
medium 0.8045 0.9808 0.9490 0.9311 0.8787 0.9180 1.1434 1.065
long 0.5919 0.6284 0.8303 0.7527 0.8404 0.7575 0.8426 0.876
ILTS 0.9233 0.5982 0.5815 0.6981 0.766
TOTAL 0.71 0.7392 0.8688 0.8142 0.8284 0.8286 0.9514 0.96
(b) Insurance Companies:
maturity 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
short 1.104 0.993 1.007 0.919 0.961 1.151 0.919 1.6173
medium 0.827 0.903 0.913 0.911 0.887 1.033 0.954 1.0459
long 0.704 0.741 0.777 0.844 0.909 0.746 0.922 1.0618
ILTS 0.882 1.092 0.918 0.789 1.1564
TOTAL 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94 1.077
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
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Taking goverrunent securities as a single group, regardless of maturity, we
find that the insurance companies exhibit greater turnover than the pension
funds, when proxied by the activity ratio. There are a couple of years in which
this situation is reversed so that the pension funds' turnover exceeds that of the
insurance companies. In both 1982 and 1986 the pension funds' turnover is
marginally above that of the insurance companies. Indeed, the pension funds
turnover as measured by the activity ratio increases monotonically,
approaching unity throughout the 1980s. This would appear to back up the
findings of both the holdings and net acquisitions data, ie, that the pension
funds have become a more dominant investor in the market for government
securities in recent years.
In looking at those gilts of short maturity, ie, with less than five years to
maturity, no clear pattern of dominance emerges in terms of the activity ratio.
In some years the pension funds exhibit greater turnover, in other years it is the
insurance companies. The period since 1985 shows the pension funds
emerging as the dominant investor with higher activity ratios, although with
values consistently above unity they are showing a net selling tendency. A
very similar picture is shown by the activity ratios for medium term gilts, ie,
those with maturities between five and fifteen years, although it is frequently
the case that when the pension funds dominate the short gilts market, the
insurance companies are dominating the market for medium gilts.
In the market for long-term gilts, ie, those with more than fifteen years to
maturity, the insurance companies are the unequivocal leader. In fact, in only
two years do the pension funds reverse this situation, 1982 and 1985, and then
only by a marginal amount. In fact, even if we were to group the ILTS with the
long-term gilts, the insurance would still emerge as the dominant investor in
the market for all long-term gilts. This is apparent as the insurance companies'
ILTS activity ratios exceed those for the pension funds in virtually all years.
These conclusions are consistent with those found by both Dodds (1979) and
Fanning (1982). While our data period has some overlap with that examined
by Fanning, both authors are dealing with somewhat earlier time periods than
ourselves.
In Table 8-12 we show the calculated trading ratios for both the pension
funds and the insurance companies. 13 With very few exceptions the insurance
companies' ratios are higher than those for the pension funds, indicating yet
again the overall dominance exhibited by the insurance companies in the
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markets for government securities. It is interesting to note that the trading
ratios for both groups of financial intermediaries are generally highest for
short-term gilts, and diminish as the maturity increases. It is only with the
short-term gilts that we find ratios above unity. This is much as we would
expect from institutions that primarily issue long-term liabilities. Once again,
as we discovered with the activity ratios, with the exception of 1980, 1982 and
1986-1987, the insurance companies dominate the market for short- term
gilts, by selling annually a greater proportion of their average holdings than
the pension funds. While the ratios for short-term gilts do not differ
tremendously, there is a much more marked degree of dominance in the
market for both medium- and long-term gilts. In both markets the insurance
companies are consistently exhibiting higher trading ratios than the pension
funds of at least two points. It is only in the market for Index-Linked Treasury
Stock that the picture is less clear, with the pension funds dominated by the
insurance companies in all years except 1985-1986. This is in line with the
findings of the activity ratios.
Table 8-12: Turnover in British Government Securities-
Trading Ratio
(a)Pension Funds:
maturity 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
short 1.915 1.4268 2.0406 1.4197 1.0532 0.9862 1.1116 0.6809
medium 0.4334 0.462 0.5966 0.4764 0.4475 0.5432 0.6164 0.596
long 0.3258 0.4107 0.5701 0.527 0.4229 0.5255 0.7119 0.7348
ILTS 0.1536 0.2478 0.3797 0.3142 0.4462
TOTAL 0.4119 0.4256 0.5411 0.4856 0.4334 0.524 0.607 0.6154
(b) Insurance Companies:
maturity 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
short 1.861 1.667 0.96 1.471 1.456 1.148 0.967 1.06
medium 0.848 1.036 0.608 0.647 0.876 0.733 0.729 0.92
long 0.513 0.6 0.528 0.66 0.64 0.759 0.945 1.062
ILTS 3.487 0.323 0.546 0 0.006 0.82
TOTAL 0.737 0.823 0.695 0.72 0.837 0.738 0.779 0.97
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
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(d) Summary: From the foregoing we may suggest that while the pension
funds hold substantial quantities of British government securities of all
maturities, including the innovative Index-Linked Treasury Stock, and while
their net acquisitions are a very significant proportion of the total issue in any
year, and while they are also much more active traders in the markets for
British government securities than they are stereotypically depicted, they are
exceeded in all of these areas by the activities of the insurance companies.
Nonetheless, while the pension funds do not appear to be the dominant
investor on the basis of the evidence presented above, according to Fanning,
since the mid-1970s
pension funds in the United Kingdom had increased their proportionate
participation in the gilts (and equities) markets to the point where the funds were
large and influential investors and probably price leaders. 	 (1982, page 10)
It, therefore, follows that, while we should not characterise the pension funds
as the dominant investor, they are a highly significant participant in the market
for British government securities. Given the very high degree of their
participation, it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that the actions of the
pension funds may indeed influence the price of British government securities.
Consequently, the demand for gilts by the pension funds is likely to find itself
constrained by the level of gilts currently being issued. Thus, any attempt to
model the investment behaviour of the pension funds needs to take this into
account via the inclusion of a supply-side constraint. This we shall do in the
following chapter.
8.3.3 U.K. Ordinary Shares
Far and away, the best study of the pension funds' activities in the market
for British ordinary shares is Richard Minns' Pension Funds and British
Capitalism (1980). Minns book appears largely stimulated by the view of
legendary management guru Peter Drucker that pension fund holdings of
equity constitute a form of "corporate" or "pension fund socialism" because via
their pension funds the workers own much of the means of production. This is
a view which finds little favour with Minns. He examines the hypothesis of
"pension fund socialism" by means of an in-depth analysis of the role and
position of the British pension funds in the equity markets of the United
Kingdom. By contrast, Drucker's views are based largely on impressions
gained over several decades as a widely-sought consultant to a large number of
wide-ranging enterprises in the United States. 15 The essence of Minns'
argument lies in the distinction between ownership  and control for defining
socialism, a distinction he suggests is lost by analysts such as Drucker.
According to Drucker
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The emergence of the pension fund makes final the divorce of traditional
'ownership' from 'control' which has been a favorite topic of writers in the
industrial and post-industrial economy since Berle and Means's pioneering book,
written forty-five years ago. The pension funds are not 'owners', they are
investors. They do not want control, indeed they are disqualified from exercising
it. The pension funds are 'trustees'.	 (1976, pp.82-83)
This view is opposed by Minns. On the basis of an extensive survey of the
pension funds' activities, including questionnaire surveys of many of the top
policy-makers in the major British financial institutions, he argues that the
pension funds do indeed represent the face of capitalism, not one of socialism.
While many of his conclusions are open to debate on the grounds of (eg) being
based on what many would regard as outdated emotive assumptions, politics
notwithstanding, the study by Minns forms one of the most complete ever
published on the position of the pension funds in the capital markets of the
United Kingdom.
(a) Holdings: As we saw in Chapter Seven, the largest asset category within
the pension funds' portfolio is that of ordinary shares. This is true both in
terms of their holdings and their net acquisitions. Given that the pension funds
are a very significant participant in the gilts market, and that their portfolio
finds gilts dominated by ordinary shares, it would not seem unreasonable to
suggest a priori that the pension funds will be the dominant investor in the
market for domestic ordinary shares.
In Table 8-13 we present the data on holdings of domestic ordinary by the
various financial institutions in nominal terms. In Table 8-14 we present the
same data in percentage form and also include the Briston and Dobbins data
for some of the intermediate years not presented in Table 8-13. In nominal
terms there is no ambiguity about concluding that the pension funds are the
dominant investor, given that their holdings are second only to the extremely
heterogeneous group of "persons, executors and trustees". Once again, as we
saw in Chapter One, the growth of the role of the financial intermediaries in the
U. K. capital markets is immediately apparent. Indeed, this growth,
corresponding to a decline in the relative share held by individuals was one of
the major concerns of the Wilson Committee. One view put forward to the
Committee was that of the Stock Exchange, who argued that
The decline in the activity of the individual shareholder and the emergence of an
identity of view by the institutions has meant that the two-way nature of the
market, and thus its liquidity, has diminished. The loss of liquidity inevitably
leads to greater day-to-day market movements since, in a narrow one-way market,
buyer and seller cannot otherwise be matched.
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Table 8-13:	 Holdings	 of	 Domestic	 Ordinary
Financial Institutions
Shares	 by
(£ millions)
1957 1963 1969 1975 1978 1981 1984
Insurance Companies 1,020.8 2,749.8 4,390.6 7,091.4 12,456.2 18,860.0 44,000.0
Pension Funds 394.4 1,759.9 3,406.5 7,492.8 14,773.7 24,564.0 58,000.0
Investment Trusts 603.2 2,034.9 2,498.1 2,720.6 3,910.7 6,532.0 12,000.0
Unit Trusts 58.0 357.5 1,022.0 1,828.6 2,969.2 3,312.0 8,000.0
Banks 104.4 357.5 643.5 312.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finance, Stock
Exchange and non-
profit sector
510.4 1,677.4 4,012.1 2,988.2 4,779.7 2,024.0 4,000.0
Non-financial
companies
313.2 1,402.4 2,043.9 1,338.0 2,969.2 4,692.0 10,000.0
Public sector 452.4 412.5 984.1 1,605.6 2,896.8 2,760.0 10,000.0
Persons, executors
and trustees
7,632.8 14,848.9 17,940.9 16,725.0 24,043.4 25,944.0 46,000.0
Overseas 510.4 1,924.9 2,498.1 2,497.6 3,621.0 3,312.0 8,000.0
TOTAL 11,600.0 27,525.5 39,439.7 44,600.0 72,420.0 92,000.0 200,000.0
Sources: Table 1-10, The Wilson Committee, The Stock Exchange, Phillips and Drew,
Gabrielli and Fano (editors), The Challenge of Private Pension Funds, (1986).
A further factor in the increasing influence of the institutions is that the
professional investment managers, with a fiduciary responsibility for the savings
of the underlying investor, are less likely to select investments with a high risk
element than people investing their own money. 	 (1980, page 190)
This second concern of the Stock Exchange is really no surprise, as we
explained in the theory of financial intermediation in Chapter Two. Indeed, it
is the view of many financial and monetary economists that this may be
beneficial in the sense that it allows funds to flow to investments with greater
prospective returns at no greater, and possibly less, risk to the individual
investors involved. In fact, this was precisely the view taken by the Wilson
Committee (paragraph 665, pp.191-192). Nonetheless, the possibility of greater
market volatility to this day remains a valid concern. In paragraph 663 the
Wilson Committee expressed the view that
It has not yet been established to our satisfaction that the institutions do cause
greater price volatility, and the argument has not yet been resolved conclusively in
the USA either, despite more research having been carried out there. As the
proportion of shares held by the institutions continues to edge upwards, however,
then increasingly they will find themselves trading with each other. In such
circumstances one-way markets in which institutions sharing similar views are
unable to trade until large price adjustments occur, which has already become a
characteristic of the gilts market at certain times, may b Pcome increasingly
common for equities. This does not necessarily imply that security pricing will
thereby become less efficient in terms of incorporating information. ... But it can
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make continuous dealing difficult. Moreover at times in both the gilt-edged and
the equity markets it does appear to some of us that investment managers are
more concerned with watching each other and seeing which way some of the big
participants are going to jump rather than with longer-term prospects, and this
seems bound to have a destabilising effect on the markets. 	 (1980, page 191)
As well as echoing the sentiments of the late Lord Keynes in likening financial
investment behaviour to the vicarious thrills enjoyed by viewers of beauty
pageants,17 the Wilson Committee views are indeed portentous of the immense
market volatility that has characterised much of the second half of the 1980s,
culminating, of course, in the dramatic decline in stock prices world-wide on
October 19th, 1987. Our interest here, however, does not lie with the
implications of the increasing role of the institutions per se, but rather in
determining the degree to which the pension funds may be the dominant
investor in the domestic equities' market.
Table 8-14:	 Holdings	 of	 Domestic	 Ordinary
Financial Institutions
Shares	 by
(per cent)
1957 1963 1966 1967 1968 199 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1981 1984
InstrareCcmplics	 8.8 10.0 10.0 10.1 11.0 11.6	 12.1	 12.9	 13.9	 14.8	 15.4 15.9 15.9 16.3	 17.2 2(15 22.0
PcnsimFuricls	 3.4 6.4 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.0	 9.7	 10.7	 11.9	 12.9	 14.8 16.8 17.9 19.5 2(14 267 29.0
hvestneitliusts 	 5.2 7.4 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.6	 6.5	 6.7	 6.8	 6.5	 6.6 6.1 6.3 5.9	 5.4 7.1	 6.0
0.5 1.3 L8 2.0 2.4 2.7	 2.7	 3.1	 3.1	 3.4	 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2	 4.1 3.6	 4.0
Balks	 (19 1.3 1.7 0.7
Fitaire,acck
Excluige aid run- 4.4
prit seta
comfarks	 2.7
6.1
5.1 )740 73.0 71.3
10.6
{ 54 )fflf) 66.6 64.3 62A 59.1
6.7
30 } 557
6.6
54.0 t 41
22 20
5.1	 5.0
Publcscetcr	 3.9 1.5 2.6 3.6 4.0 3.0	 5.0
Paws,
eocutas ad tnstes 65.8 54.0 47.4 37.5 33.2 28.2 23.0
Ovelsais	 4.4 7.0 6.6 5.6 5.0 3.6	 4.0
TOT AL	 100 100.1 100 100 100 104.2	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100 100 100 99.9	 100 100	 100
Cairtaisclmarkt Ides
110 27,4A 37,E5D 44,TO 72,z213 92,0100 =TO
Sources: Table 8-12
Briston and Dobbins (1978)
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It is quite apparent from Table 8-13 that there has been tremendous growth
in the U. K. market for ordinary shares over the past thirty years or so. Indeed,
some writers have been moved to talk of "the cult of the equity". 18 Nearly
every category of investor has increased the nominal value of their holdings of
U. K. quoted equities since 1957. The only exception appears to be the banks.
Again, while some of this is due to the continuous inflation that has
characterised the post-War period, other factors must also have been at work.
Among the institutions, in 1957 we find that the insurance companies were the
dominant investor, a position they relinquished to the pension funds during
the 1960s. The data in Table 8-13 shows that since at least 1969 the pension
funds have been the dominant investor in the equities' market, on the
previously stated assumption about the category of "persons, executors and
trustees". In fact, even without that assumption, by 1981 the pension funds'
holdings of ordinary shares was almost equal to those of "persons, executors
and trustees", and exceeded them by 1984. In 1984 the pension funds were the
undisputed dominant investor by virtue of their holdings of ordinary shares.
This conclusion is both confirmed and emphasised by the data on percentages
in Table 8-14. In 1957 pension fund holdings accounted for 3.4 per cent of total
equity ownership; by 1984 this had increased to a staggering 29 per cent. Over
the same period the holdings of non-financial intermediaries fell from 81.2 per
cent to 39 per cent! One feels compelled to point out yet again that the growth
of equity holdings by the pension funds should be seen as part of the secular
growth of financial intermediation in the post-War period. While the other
non-bank financial intermediaries have not exhibited the same degree of
growth as the pension funds in their equity holdings, they have shown the
same upward growth (for the most part) in both nominal and percentage
terms.
(b) Net Acquisitions: We present the nominal data on net acquisitions of
ordinary shares by the financial intermediaries in Table 8-15. In Table 8-16 we
present the same data in percentage form. As with the holdings data in
nominal terms, there is no ambiguity about concluding that the pension funds
are the dominant investor, given that their net acquisitions of domestic
ordinary shares exceed those of all other financial intermediaries as well as the
ubiquitous catch-all category of "other" which includes all other traders of
ordinary shares. This evidence is emphasised beyond any shadow of a doubt
by the data in percentage terms. To highlight this further we illustrate this
percentage data in Figure 8-1.
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Table 8-15: Net Acquisitions of Domestic Ordinary Shares
(£ Minions)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds 354 254 358 696 925 1189 1393 1328 1307 1116 944 972 1140 1482 1650
Insurance Cos. 188 11 -33 87 194 339 466 393 310 227 166 245 340 575 699
Investment Trusts -406 -425 -308 -118 35 181 178 161 117 45 -16 -114 -86 -13 -60
Unit Trusts -9 -40 123 229 270 328 231 113 78 28 49 78 111 137 97
Other 20 -13 -19 -43 -28 2 21 49 31 43 16 -43 -117 -109 -171
TOTAL 147 -213 121 851 1396 2039 2289 2044 1843 1459 1159 1138 1388 2072 2215
Source: Financial Statistics, Business Monitor MQ5
Table 8-16: Net Acquisitions of Domestic Ordinary Shares
(per cent)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds 241 -119 296 82 66 58 61 65 71 76 81 85 82 72 74
Insurance Cos 128 -5 -27 10 14 17 20 19 17 16 14 22 24 28 32
Investment Trusts -276 200 -255 -14 3 9 8 8 6 3 -1 -10 -6 -1 -3
Unit Trusts -6 19 102 27 19 16 10 6 4 2 4 7 8 7 4
Other 14 6-16 -5 -2 0 1 2 2 3 1 -4 -8 -5 -8
Source: Table 8-15
Figure 8-1: Net Acquisitions of Domestic Ordinary Shares
0 Other
E Unit Trusts
Ei Investment Trusts
O Insurance Cos
II Pension Funds
1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Source: Table 8-16
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Yet again, both Tables present a picture of the increasing role of the
financial intermediaries in the U. K. market for ordinary shares that is self-
evident. And, yet again, it is the increasing role of the pension funds and
insurance companies that is starkly revealed. Indeed, for much of the data
period both the investment trusts and "other" are net sellers of ordinary shares.
Examining the nominal data, we see that this is particularly the case in the
years immediately following the recessions of the early 1970s and early 1980s.
While the pension funds' net acquisitions do decline somewhat following the
1980-1982 recession, they recover and continue their upward trend throughout
the remainder of the 1980s. The net acquisitions activities of the insurance
companies lies somewhere between these two scenarios. Like the pension
funds, their net acquisitions shows a steady upward trend over the data period
with a small decline in the early 1980s; like the investment trusts, they become
net sellers following the early 1970s recession. In all years we notice that the
pension funds occupy the position of dominant investor by virtue of having the
largest value of net acquisitions of ordinary shares. This dominance would
seem to be even more marked when consideration is given to the percentage
data.
In percentage terms, the lowest market share of net acquisitions enjoyed by
the pension funds is some 58.31 per cent in 1978. In some of the years of the
early 1970s, the pension funds appear to be buying not only new issues but the
net sales of other groups of investors, as evidenced by net acquisitions above
one hundred per cent. While this is also true to a lesser extent of the insurance
companies, by way of contrast when the insurance companies account for
127.89 per cent of net acquisitions (ie, in 1973), the pension funds account for a
staggering 240.82 per cent! In what might be regarded as more normal times
for the U. K. capital markets (ie, in 1987), when the insurance companies
account for 31.56 per cent, the pension funds' figure is 74.49 per cent. Putting
together these findings with those established from the holdings data, we can
see that while most groups of investors have increased their holdings of
equities since the 1950s, the major purchasers of new issues of ordinary shares
have been the insurance companies and (more particularly) the pension funds.
At this stage, therefore, on the basis of both their holdings and net acquisitions,
we may cautiously declare the pension funds to be the dominant participant in
the market for U. K. ordinary shares.
Once again, these findings are given further credence because of their
consistency with the findings of other studies, particularly those of Fanning
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(1982) and Dodds (1979). While the increasing role of both the insurance
companies and the pension funds does indeed give further fuel to the worries
of the Wilson Committee about price volatility due to market dominance, the
net acquisitions data in and of itself does not offer solid evidence either for or
against that particular view. For such evidence we also need to consider the
trading behaviour of the various participants in the market for ordinary shares,
to which we now turn our attentions.
(c) Turnover: Data on the pension funds' turnover activity in the market for
domestic ordinary shares is presented in Table 8-17 in both nominal and
percentage terms. Once again, it is immediately apparent that the insurance
companies and pension funds are the major participants in the market for U. K.
ordinary shares, accounting for at least fifty per cent of the turnover during
the data period. The pension funds' share of turnover exceeds that of the
insurance companies in all years except 1974, a year in which we have already
established that the insurance companies were heavy net sellers of equities.
This picture is again illustrated by the data for the 1980s, which is presented in
Table 8-18. It seems that the gap between the turnover of the pension funds
and that of the insurance companies has increased quite steadily during the
current decade; pension fund turnover has gone from some twenty-five per
cent above that of the insurance companies in 1980 to being almost double by
1987! Thus, we may conclude that while the insurance companies account for a
significant amount of the turnover in this market, the overall dominance is held
by the pension funds, a dominance that seems to have increased over the post-
War period. Having already seen the relative importance of ordinary shares in
the portfolio of the pension funds, this is hardly a surprising find, although the
degree of dominance is perhaps even more than we might have anticipated.
Table 8-17: Pension Funds' Turnover—Ordinar y Shares
TOTAL
E million
Pension	 Insurance
Funds Companies
per cent
Pension	 Insurance
Funds Companies
1973 8,219 2,215 1,915 26.95% 23.30%
1974 6,419 1,660 1,777 25.86% 27.68%
1975 9,589 2,877 2,269 30.00% 23.66%
1976 10,453 3,946 2,321 37.75% 22.20%
1977 11,330 3,795 2,785 33.50% 24.58%
1978 12,138 3,416 2,930 28.14% 24.14%
1979 14,712 4,354 3,744 29.59% 25.45%
Source: Financial Statistics
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Table 8-18: Pension Funds' Turnover—Ordinary Shares
(£ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds	 4,943
Insurance Companies 3,784
7,422
5,248
10,197
6,593
13,987
9,088
18,733
11,753
27,276
15,336
36,980
22,594
49,659
25,675
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
In Table 8-19 we show the data on purchases and sales of ordinary shares as
separate items, rather than aggregated together as "turnover", in both nominal
and percentage terms. A comparison with Table 8-10 shows that the market for
ordinary shares is somewhat smaller than that for government securities;
consequently, it is not surprising to find that purchases and sales of ordinary
shares are rather less than those cf government securities. Nonetheless,
this disaggregated data does tend to confirm the findings of the turnover data
that the pension funds are the dominant investor in the market for ordinary
shares. In all years their purchases exceed those of the insurance companies,
and it is only in the post-OPEC years of 1974 and 1975 that their sales are
exceeded by those of the insurance companies. As with the gilts market, we
can account for this fairly high level of sales by these supposedly conservative
investors (who are more usually associated with a "buy and hold" strategy) by
acknowledging the low transactions costs and the relative 'thickness' of the
market for ordinary shares.19
Table 8-19: Transactions in Ordinary Shares	 £ million
Pension Funds
Purchases	 Sales
All NBFI's
Purchases Sales
1973 1,319 896 4,378 3,841
1974 957 703 3,103 3,316
1975 1,956 921 5,814 3,775
1976 2,474 1,472 5,910 4,543
1977 2,555 1,240 6,701 4,629
1978 2,290 1,126 7,094 5,044
1979 2,792 1,562 8,543 6,169
er cent
Pension Funds
Purchases	 Sales
Insurance Companies
Purchases
	
Sales
1973 30.13% 23.33% 25.95% 20.28%
1974 30.84% 21.20% 28.81% 26.63%
1975 33.64% 24.40% 0.07% 25.56%
1976 41.86% 32.40% 21.56% 23.05%
1977 38.13% 26.79% 25.07% 23.87%
1978 32.28% 22.32% 25.19% 22.66%
1979 32.68% 25.32% 27.34% 22.82%
Source: Financial Statistics
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Thus far, examination of the holdings, net acquisitions, and turnover data
have led us to the view that the pension funds are the dominant investor in the
U.K. market for ordinary shares. For the sake of completeness, we need also to
consider their trading activities via the two ratios we outlined on pages 8-23 to
8-24—the activity ratio and the trading ratio. In Table 8-20 we present the
annual activity ratios for both the pension funds and the insurance companies
for the data period 1980-1987.
Table 8-20: Turnover in U.K. Ordinar y Shares—Activit y Ratio
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds
Insurance Companies
0.497
0.602
0.637
0.596
0.726
0.669
0.809
0.757
0.746
0.783
0.764
0.720
0.846
0.878
0.743
0.826
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
For the most part there is almost no discernible pattern that emerges from
these ratios, with pension funds having the greater ratio some years but not
others. In all years, however, we do find that purchases exceed sales, giving
activity ratios less than unity. For both the pension funds and the insurance
companies we find activity ratios consistently above 0.5, indicating a fairly
active trading policy being pursued. However, this inconclusiveness is for the
1980s; in Table 8-21 we present findings for some earlier periods for comparison
purposes.
Table 8-21: Turnover in U.K. Ordinar y Shares—Activity Ratio
1964 1970 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979
Pension Funds
Insurance Companies
0.20
0.41
0.45
0.57
0.73
0.99
0.60
0.82
0.49 0.49 0.56
Sources: Business Monitor MQ5, Fanning (1982), Dodds (1978)
Here the picture is a little less blurred, and similar to the view presented by
the holdings and net acquisitions data. What emerges is a picture of the
increasing activity of the pension funds in the market for U. K. ordinary shares
since 1964, a market in which the insurance companies have historically been
more active traders (as measured by the activity ratio), at least prior to the
advent of the 1980s. As with the market for gilts, we find the pension funds
increasing their role to become dominant in the present decade.
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In Table 8-22 we present the trading ratios for both the pension funds and
the insurance companies during the 1980s. 13 What emerges here is a picture of
increasing trading activity by both groups of financial intermediary, with the
insurance companies' ratios being typically somewhat lower than those for the
pension funds, indicating again the dominance exhibited by the pension funds
in the equities market. These ratios are substantially lower than those we
found for the market for British government securities, indicating these two
investment giants have been rather less active in equities than in gilts during
the 1980s. Once again, we need to examine the earlier period to see if a similar
picture emerges. In Table 8-23 we present trading ratios for the non-bank
financial intermediaries for the period since 1963.
Table 8-22: Turnover in Ordinar y Shares-Tradin Ratio
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds
Insurance Companies
0.076
0.097
0.109
0.108
0.130
0.118
0.146
0.138
0.143
0.144
0.168
0.146
0.195
0.192
0.219
0.210
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
Table 8-23: Turnover in Ordinar Shares-Tradin	 Ratio
1963-67 1968-72 1973-77
average average average 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Pension Funds 0.188 0.290 0.456 0.341 0.401 0.666 0.460 0.414 0.315
Insurance
Companies 0.119 0.182 0.288 0.219 0.297 0.366 0.281 0.277 0.234
Investment
Trusts 0.225 0.308 0.408 0.427 0.455 0.476 0.336 0.344 0.429
Unit Trusts 0.368 0.717 0.970 0.795 0.923 1.340 0.887 0.906 0.850
All investing
Institutions 0.183 0.288 0.439 0.355 0.419 0.575 0.451 0.397 0.351
Source: Wilson Committee, (1980) Table 7.1, page 552.
The data for the 1960s and 1970s does little to change the conclusions
arrived at already. What Table 8-22 does reveal is the tendency for there to be
an inverse relationship between a financial intermediary's level of holdings
ordinary shares and their sales activity. This should come as no surprise given
the high level of holdings that these financial intermediaries possess. As we
have already observed, the greater the level of an investor's holdings the more
likely is that investor (and others) to perceive that their actions in the market
will influence price, ie, that they will dominate the market. Thus, we note that
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the investment and unit trusts typically exhibit higher trading ratios than either
the pension funds or insurance companies. Of course, this is exactly what the
theory of financial intermediation would predict. Nonetheless, we do note that
the pension funds consistently have higher trading ratios than the insurance
companies during the 1960s and 1970s. The occasional reversal of this situation
that we observed during the 1980s can be attributed to the increasingly large
holdings of ordinary shares enjoyed by the pension funds throughout that
time.
(d) Summary: From the foregoing it is quite apparent that we may
unequivocally declare the pension funds to be the dominant investor in the
market for U. K. ordinary shares. In terms of all of the measures of dominance
we have employed they have proven themselves to be such. While their
holdings have not always been second-to-none, the other major group has been
the immensely heterogeneous group of "other" investors, who, on aggregate,
are highly likely to influence the price if they acted in concert, an extremely
improbable event. In terms of net acquisitions the pension funds have
consistently been the dominant participant during the 1970s and 1980s in
particular. And their trading activity is typically higher over the entire data
period than the other major participant in the equities' market, the insurance
companies.
8.3.4 Other Company Securities (debentures and preference shares)
While the post-War capital markets have shown a remarkable preference on
the part of industrial and commercial concerns to raise capital primarily
through the issue of ordinary shares, this is not always the case. Indeed, firms
reluctant to relinquish control typically prefer to issue loan stock—or
debentures—and preference shares, which turned out to be fairly popular
during the period from the end of World War II until the introduction of
Corporation Tax in the mid-1960s. From the investor's viewpoint each of these
types of asset has their own particular attributes, as we have seen in Chapter
Seven. Obviously, assets that promise a fixed return, such as debentures,
would tend to be in greater demand during periods of relative uncertainty;
assets whose return moves in line with the general level of well-being of the
economy, such as ordinary shares, would find great favour during extended
periods of economic growth. In the post-War period we have seen a
substantial increase in the issue of ordinary shares, a dramatic decline (almost
to oblivion) in the issue of preference shares, and a relative' decline in the issue
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of debentures. Let us now consider the role of the pension funds in the market
for these other company securities.
(a) Holdings: In Chapter Seven we saw that the position of both debentures
and preference shares in the portfolio of the pension funds had diminished
quite markedly since the early 1960s, to the point where they have been listed
in toto for well over a decade by the Central Statistical Office. The Wilson
Committee revealed that this was not a phenomenon unique to the pension
funds; in their Table 3.68 (1980, page 499) they show how the ownership of
debentures ("loan capital") by all financial institutions diminished from 75 per
cent of total market value in 1957 to 47 per cent in 1978. The corresponding
figures for preference shares are from 36 per cent in 1957 to 76 per cent in 1978,
revealing that despite reducing their holdings the financial institutions still
accounted for an increasing percentage of an ever-decreasing market. This
situation can be seen in a little more detail by reference to Table 8-24.
Table 8-24: Holdings of U.K. Quoted Fixed Interest Securities
er cent
1964
Deben tures
1970	 1974	 1976 1978
Preference Shares
1964	 1970	 1974	 1976	 1978
Pension Funds 24 20 24 30 12 8 6 7 7 3
Insurance Companies 44 35 66 65 29 26 40 61 73 49
Investment Trusts 1 2 3 2 1 6 14 11 9 9
Unit Trusts - 1 1 - - 1 3 6 8 12
All institutions 69 57 94 97 42 41 64 85 97 72
Other 31 43 6 3 58 59 36 15 3 28
Total (£ millions) 1996 4291 4122 4147 5900 1259 649 509 544 700
Total Fixed Interest Securities 1964 1970 1974 1976 1978
Pension Funds 18 18 22 27 11
Insurance Companies 37 35 65 66 31
Investment Trusts 3 3 4 3 2
Unit Trusts 1 2 1 1
All institutions 58 58 93 97 45
Other 42 42 7 3 55
Total (£ millions) 3255 4940 4631 4691 6600
Sources: Wilson Committee (1980), page 498
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin
Financial Statistics
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While we observe an increase in the proportion of the fixed interest market
held by the institutions in the years immediately following the OPEC-induced
recession of the early 1970s, by 1978 there has been a marked decline in that
market share. Perhaps the most noticeable picture that emerges is that, as with
the market for government-issued fixed interest securities, the insurance
companies seem to be the major participant, holding a majority interest in most
years.
In examining the market for debentures, we observe that pension fund
holdings rise from 24 per cent of the market in 1964 to a post-recessionary high
of 30 per cent, before dropping to a low of 12 per cent in the relatively more
economically certain year of 1978. Each of these percentages is well below
those of the insurance companies, indicating that, while the pension funds are a
significant in the market for debentures, they are not the dominant investor.
The position of the pension funds in the market for preference shares is less
ambiguous. Here, the maximum percentage of the market held by the pension
funds is 8 per cent in 1964. This figure has steadily declined to some 3 per cent
in 1978, showing the small and ever-diminishing role played by the pension
funds in the market for preference shares. We may, therefore, categorically
state that, on the basis of their holdings, the pension funds may not be viewed
as the dominant investor in the market for fixed interest securities.
(b) Net Acquisitions: While the holdings data do not reveal any dominance
of the market for fixed interest securities by the pension funds, it may well be
that their net acquisitions do show that their actions influence price. However,
very little attention has been paid to the markets for both debentures and
preference shares in the literature, mostly due to the rather small proportion of
the U. K. capital markets accounted for by them as well as the fact that these
assets typically account for only a small fraction of the portfolios of most
institutional investors. Certainly, dominance of the markets for debentures or
preference shares by the institutions did not appear to be a major concern of
(eg) the Wilson Committee.
The data on institutional investment in the markets for both debentures and
preference shares are presented in Table 8-24. Data for the two assets
combined, which we refer to as "bonds", are also presented in that Table. Two
things are immediately apparent: firstly, there is a great degree of similarity
between this data and that we examined for the gilts market; and secondly,
given that the holdings data to a large degree are the results of the net
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acquisitions data, it is no real surprise to find that the latter tend to confirm the
findings of the former.
Table 8-24:	 Institutional	 Investment
Company Securities
Debentures
in Fixed Interest
(per cent)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Pension Funds 38 150 137 24 137 -836 -556
Insurance Companies 72 -100 -105 96 -71 930 335
Investment Trusts
and Unit Trusts -24 72 35 -10 -3 86 401
Other 14 -22 33 -9 37 -80 -80
Total (£ millions) 87 -18 -9 -40 27 50 53
Preference Shares
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Pension Funds 29 -38 33 19 11 -2 6
Insurance Companies 42 125 42 85 78 77 83
Investment Trusts 17 -38 4 -19 -5 -6
Unit Trusts 13 38 27 21 19 23 20
Other 13 -6 -6 -3 2 -3
Total (£ millions) 24 8 48 48 37 82 35
Debentures and Preference Shares
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Pension Funds 36 300 9 -3 64 -318 -338
Insurance Companies 66 -280 76 33 15 400 238
Investment Trusts -15 160 17 27 14 -65 163
Unit Trusts 3 -30 13 33 -7 112 88
Other 11 -50 -15 10 14 -29 -50
Total (£ millions) 111 -10 39 8 64 132 88
Source: Financial Statistics
In looking at net acquisitions in the debentures market we note that both
the pension funds and the insurance companies are vying for the position of
dominant investor. In particular, the pension funds appear to be the dominant
investor in what might be regarded as the post-recessionary years of 1974-1975
and 1979. In other years the insurance companies dominate with large net
acquisitions, both positive (net buying) and negative (net selling). Indeed, the
position in debentures taken by the insurance companies seems to be very
much cyclically determined. Nonetheless, we would have to conclude that,
while the pension funds play a highly significant rale in the market for
debentures, given the more substantial holdings of the insurance companies
the pension funds are not the dominant investor.
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In the much smaller market for preference shares the condusion is rather
more easily deduced. In each year the percentage of net acquisitions accounted
for by the insurance companies exceeds that of the pension funds. Indeed, in
this market the pension funds' activities are often overshadowed by those of
the investment and unit trusts. Consequently, we may unambiguously state
that in this market the pension funds are definitely not the dominant investor.
Given the much larger size of the debentures market, when we examine the
"market for bonds", the picture is much like that we found for the debentures
market alone. While for the most part dominance is exhibited by the insurance
companies, the pension funds are dominant in a couple of years, especially
towards the end of the 1970s. Nonetheless, given that the pension funds
account for some quite substantial fraction of all net acquisitions of bonds, it
would not seem unreasonable to suggest that they are indeed a dominant
investor in that market. We would certainly expect the issuers of these
securities to take the activities of the pension funds into account in their pricing
and issuing behaviour. However, to properly confirm or deny the hypothesis
of pension fund dominance in this market we must now turn our attention to
other aspects of their trading activity by considering their turnover.
(c) Turnover: Data on the pension funds' turnover activity in the market for
fixed interest company securities ("bonds") is presented in Table 8-25 in both
nominal and percentage terms. As before we show data for the individual
markets for debentures and for preference shares, and also aggregated into a
single market for "bonds". This data shows a consistent picture of the
dominance of both the debentures market and that for preference shares by the
insurance companies. This can be verified by both the data in nominal terms
as well as by the percentage data. In each year the turnover of the pension
funds is exceeded by that of the insurance companies. While the insurance
companies typically account for at least fifty per cent of the turnover in both
markets, the figure for the pension funds averages around thirty per cent for
the debentures market and less than twenty per cent for the market for
preference shares. Thus, we may conclude that while the pension funds
account for a significant amount of the turnover in this market, the overall
dominance is held by the insurance companies. Nonetheless, during this data
period the pension funds do account for over twenty per cent of the turnover of
"bonds", so that while we may acknowledge the overall dominance of the
insurance companies, we may consider the pension funds' as being dominant to
a significant but lesser degree. However, the net acquisitions data examined
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earlier did reveal that the relative positions of the insurance companies and
pension funds in the market for gilts switched during the 1980s, so let us
consider their turnover data for the 1980s, which is presented in Table 8-26.
Table 8-25: Turnover - Company Securities (Fixed Interest)
Market	 £ million 
TOTAL Pension Insurance TOTAL Pension Insurance TOTAL Pension Insurance
Bonds Funds Companies Debentures Funds Companies Pref.Shares Funds Companies
1973	 1,215 406 559 1,043 365 503 172 41 56
1974	 1,008 316 536 876 293 480 132 23 56
1975	 1,341 517 634 1,165 463 572 176 54 62
1976	 1,336 407 738 1,150 380 633 186 27 105
1977	 1,421 414 816 1,248 392 713 173 22 103
1978	 1,329 344 806 1,092 320 663 237 24 143
1979	 1,344 351 781 1,113 333 654 231 18 127
(percent)
Bonds
Peisbn	 Instarce
Furds	 Companies
Debentures:
Persbn	 Instdrce
Furds	 Cbmpmies.
Preference Shares
Pembn
	 Instdrce
Furds	 Cbmidnies
1973 33.42 46.01 35.00 48.23 23.84 32.56
1974 31.35 53.17 33.45 54.79 17.42 42.42
1975 38.55 47.28 39.74 49.10 30.68 35.23
1976 30.46 55.24 33.04 55.04 14.52 56.45
1977 29.13 57.42 31.41 57.13 12.72 59.54
1978 25.88 60.65 29.30 60.71 10.13 60.34
1979 26.12 58.11 29.92 58.76 7.79 54.98
Source: Financial Statistics
Table 8-26: Turnover-Company Securities (Fixed Interest)
Market	 (£ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds
Insurance Companies
425
1,122
557
1,717
984
7,389
1,452
2,904
1,788
3,244
2,142
4,366
2,606
7,711
3,870
8,437
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
Table 8-26 reveals that the pattern of turnover that prevailed in the market
for fixed interest company securities in the 1970s persisted into the 1980s.
While this offers rather conclusive further evidence of the dominance of the
bonds market by the insurance companies, we should still regard this
conclusion as debatable until we have completed our analysis of the other
Page 351
means of measuring dominance via trading activity. For example, in Table 8-27
we show data on the pension funds' purchases and sales of fixed interest
company securities as separate items.
Table 8-27: Pension Funds' Transactions in Company (Fixed
Interest) Securities
<	 (£ million) ---- ------ -----> 1	 <	  (per cent) 	 >
TOTAL
Purchases	 Sales
Pension
Purchases	 Sales
Funds
Purchases Sales
nsurance Companies
Purchases	 Sales
1973 223 183 223 183 33.63 33.15 47.66 44.02
1974 143 173 143 173 28.66 33.99 56.51 49.90
1975 263 254 263 254 36.58 40.84 49.24 45.02
1976 203 204 203 204 29.81 31.15 54.92 55.57
1977 173 241 173 241 26.33 31.54 60.88 54.45
1978 145 199 145 199 21.48 30.43 64.74 56.42
1979 162 189 162 189 23.89 28.38 59.00 57.21
Source: Financial Statistics
This data reveals the same pattern that we have seen already; that is to say,
while the pension funds typically account for substantial proportions of both
purchases and sales of bonds, the largest proportion is accounted for by the
insurance companies. We can see from Table 8-27 that the insurance
companies account for at least fifty per cent of both sales and purchases. It is
an interesting afterthought to recognise that the purchases and sales of the
pension funds tend to move together; that is to say, in a year when the
pension funds are purchasing more bonds they are also typically selling more.
While the data shows that the pension funds are a significant force in the
market for fixed interest company securities, accounting an average of twenty-
five per cent of sales and thirty-three per cent of purchases, they are not the
dominant investor in the market. Once again, that position is occupied by the
insurance companies. This supports the conclusion we derived from both the
turnover and net acquisitions data.
Our final means of examining the market activity of participants has been to
make use of turnover ratios. In Table 8-28 we present the annual activity ratios
for the pension funds and the insurance companies for the data period 1980-
1987. Note that none of the ratios exceed unity, indicating a net buying
tendency on the part of the two groups of investors. For most years the ratios
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exhibited by the insurance companies are above those of the pension funds.
However, in 1983 and 1984 we find the positions reversed. 20 Thus, apart from
these exceptional years, the insurance companies are the more active trader on
the bonds market. This is confirmed by the trading ratios presented in Table 8-
29. While the pension funds do exhibit increasing values in this ratio over time,
for most years the insurance companies have higher trading ratios. The
exceptions are those we have already observed via the activity ratios. These
findings, once again, are consistent with those in Dodds (1979), although
Fanning (1982) does not deem debentures and preference shares of enough
importance in the pension funds' portfolio to be worthy of analysis.
Table 8-28: Turnover in Company (Fixed Interest) Securities-
Activity Ratio
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds 0.82 0.74 0.70 0.85 0.73 0.76 0.72 091
Insurance Companies 0.86 0.81 0.90 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.75 0 72
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
Table 8-29: Turnover in Company (Fixed Interest) Securities-
Trading Ratio
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Pension Funds 0.18 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.41
Insurance Companies 0.20 0.27 1.00 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.43 0.29
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
(d) Summary: From the foregoing we may unambiguously conclude that the
pension funds are a significant investor in the markets for both debentures and
preference shares, revealing a clear preference for the former over the latter.
Despite the large proportion of these markets accounted for by pension fund
activity, they are exceeded in virtually all areas by the activities of the
insurance companies, whom we must conclude to be the dominant investor.
8.3.5 Overseas Assets
In Chapter Seven we saw how overseas assets were becoming an
increasingly important component of the pension funds 'portfolio, especially
since the late 1970s. To a very large degree this increasing importance has not
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been occasioned so much by their increased attractiveness per se as by the
changing nature of the institutional environment of the world financial system.
Firstly, since the early 1950s the countries that make up the planet have
gradually been tearing down the financial and exchange controls that were
established as a result of the enmities of two World Wars and the "beggar-thy-
neighbour" protectionist policies of the period between. This reduction in
regulations has been especially marked since the late 1970s, and has enabled
many investors, particularly the larger financial intermediaries, to seek the best
return on their funds on a global basis, something they had previously been
denied. Secondly, the advent of new technology, particularly the personal
computer revolution, brought changes in the worlds of computing and
telecommunications that made global financial transactions both less costly and
more accessible than ever before. Thus, as a result of these two institutional
changes the world's financial system may truly be regarded as a single system,
if not a completely harmonious one. Given the diverse nature of the Earth's
financial system at this early stage in its development, it is an extremely
daunting prospect to attempt to determine the role of any individual investor
within it at this point in time. Nonetheless, given that the financial system in
the United Kingdom is substantially smaller in volume than its cousins in
Japan and the United States of America, we may conclude quite safely that,
despite the high degree of significance of the pension funds' investment
activities in the financial markets of the United Kingdom, they are not much
more than a drop in the water when viewed from the perspective of the much
larger global financial ocean.21 Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, let
us at least take a cursory glance at the position of the pension funds in the
market for overseas assets.
(a) Holdings: In Table 8-30 we present a simple view of the relative
importance of overseas assets in the portfolios of the major British non-bank
financial intermediaries. Because of the manner of presentation of the data, we
need to remind ourselves that while overseas assets bear more importance in
the portfolios of the unit and investment trusts, the total assets of these
intermediaries is typically much less than that of the insurance companies or
pension funds. We should also bear in mind that this holdings data is for the
period before the removal of exchange controls in the United Kingdom. In
Chapter Seven we saw how the pension funds dramatically increased the share
of their portfolio going to overseas assets in the years following removal of
exchange controls. There we saw how holdings of overseas government
securities increased from £10 million in 1975 to £157 million in 1982, while
Page 354
holdings of overseas ordinary shares rose from £116 million to £3,760 million
over the same period. Even overseas loans and mortgages showed a dramatic
rise from £11 million in 1974 to £139 million in 1982. 22 However, this does not
give us much of an indication of the role played by the British financial
institutions in the world's capital markets; simply an overview of their relative
positions.
Table 8-30: Overseas Assets as a Percentage of Total Assets
1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Pension Funds 1.5 4.5 5.3 4.0 4.9 5.3
Insurance Companies 5.2
General Funds 5.7 8.9 7.8 8.9 9.5
Long-term Funds 3.3 4.8 3.0 4.4 4.2
Unit Trusts 10.3 15.6 20.2 12.3 17.4 19.9
Investment Trusts 33.1 41.7 47.3 30.1 34.3 32.3
TOTAL 8.0 9.7 5.5 7.7 7.3
Source: D. Corner and D. G. Mayes, Modern Portfolio Theory and Financial
Institutions, (1983), page 206
J. R. S. Revell, The British Financial System, (1973)
(b) Net Acquisitions: In Table 8-31 we show some recent figures on the net
acquisitions of overseas assets by the British financial institutions, divided into
the two major groups of assets concerned. It is quite clear that, of the British
institutions, the pension funds are the largest investor in overseas ordinary
shares,while the insurance companies are the largest purchaser of overseas
government securities, at least until 1984. This is consistent with the picture of
investment preferences we have already observed; the insurance companies
seem to prefer fixed interest securities, while the pension funds have a
penchant for equity securities. Were we to combine the two sets of figures in
Table 8-31, we would unambiguously find that the pension funds are the
largest British investor in overseas assets. Nonetheless, without any figures for
(eg) total world net acquisitions it is very difficult to come to any conclusion as
to the degree of dominance (if any) exhibited by these giant British financial
intermediaries.
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Table 8-31: Net Acquisitions of Overseas Assets
	
(£ million)
Ordinary Shares 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Pension Funds 442 1,385 1,516 1,888 1,299 317 2,041
Insurance Companies
General Funds 30 46 53 -39 10 -15
Long-term Funds 113 490 627 947 826 272 1,097
Unit Trusts 23 102 276 217 736 185 999
Investment Trusts 49 361 162 369 210 -317 126
Other -32 -140 -163 -159 -319 -261 -797
TOTAL 625 2,244 2,471 3,223 2,762 181 3,466
Government Securities 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Pension Funds 4 35 42 206 -28 147 253
Insurance Companies
General Funds 41 38 39 161 98 79 -3
Long-term Funds -14 59 92 231 461 248 89
Unit & Investment Trusts -7 14 -3 207 -30 39 -100
Other -1 - 4 -1 -1 -3
TOTAL 23 146 170 809 500 512 236
Source: Financial Statistics
(c) Turnover: In Table 8-32 we present some of the data pertaining to the
turnover of overseas assets by the pension funds and the insurance companies.
In part (a) the figures relate to their turnover in the markets for overseas
ordinary shares, and in part (b) the figures concern turnover in the markets for
all other overseas securities, which are primarily overseas government
securities.
In looking at the market for overseas ordinary shares it is immediately
apparent that the pension funds have a far greater turnover than the insurance
companies as measured by sales plus purchases. This situation is reversed in
the market for other overseas securities. However, these findings are not
exactly mirrored by the two turnover ratios. In both the market for overseas
ordinary shares and that for other overseas securities it is typically the pension
funds that have the lower ratios. This indicates that the insurance companies
are more active traders in the overseas markets than are the pension funds. Of
course, this is not to suggest that the insurance companies are the dominant
investor in the world's capital markets; rather that they turn over this
component of their portfolio more actively than the pension funds. However,
where overseas securities are concerned, given the much larger holdings and
net acquisitions and the much larger turnover (ie, sales plus purchases) of the
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pension funds, the marginally higher ratios exhibited by the insurance
companies may be of little significance.
Table 8-32: Turnover in Overseas Securities
(a) Ordinary Shares 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Turnover (£ millions)
Pension Funds 2,068 3,539 5,085 8,770 12,599 16,954 26,386 30,581
Insurance Companies 1,674 2,296 6,519 5,211 6,859 9,625 13,351 16,716
Activity Ratio (SIP)
Pension Funds 0.31 0.44 0.53 0.74 0.97 0.78 0.86 1.15
Insurance Companies 0.54 0.54 0.79 0.72 0.94 0.80 0.90 1.03
Trading Ratio (S/TH)
Pension Funds 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.47 0.54
Insurance Companies 0.31 0.27 0.65 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.41 0.46
(b) Other Overseas 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Turnover (£ millions)
Pension Funds 72 102 755 860 1,059 1,353 2,618 2,746
Insurance Companies 572 683 1,914 3,116 4,102 4,034 5,968 5,815
Activity Ratio (SIP)
Pension Funds 0.33 0.46 0.58 1.05 0.79 0.67 0.95 0.93
Insurance Companies 0.73 0.70 0.65 0.72 0.85 0.96 1.01 1.00
Trading Ratio (S/TH)
Pension Funds 0.24 0.29 1.00 0.93 0.77 0.63 1.15 1.14
Insurance Companies 0.56 0.51 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.57 0.76 0.64
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
(d) Summary: From the foregoing it is quite clear that while the pension
funds are very active traders in various overseas markets, especially those
involving ordinary shares, their primary concern seems to be with acquiring a
portfolio of quality assets that will provide excellent returns over the longer
run. Their lower ratios show less of a concern with short- and medium-run
trends than that exhibited by the insurance companies. However, while the
pension funds may be considered a giant among their domestic counterparts,
given the immense scale of the world's capital markets as compared to the size
of the pension funds' activities, it would be ludicrous to suggest that they are a
significant or influential investor, let alone one which is dominant.
8.3.6 Loans and Mortgages
Even the most casual observer of the British financial scene is fully aware of
the lack of a well-established secondary market for loans and mortgages. In
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consequence, it would seem to be of little point to examine the role of the
pension funds in this lacuna in the financial system! Additionally, it is usually
regarded as common knowledge that the main issuer of mortgage loans in the
United Kingdom is the building societies. This point has been made by (eg) the
Wilson Committee and also Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford (1975), who
show how in 1974 the building societies supplied 71.5 per cent of all loans for
house purchase in the United Kingdom (page 5). We offer the following
(selective) evidence of the dominance of the 'market' for loans and mortgages
by the building societies, thereby establishing the relative insignificance of the
pension funds in that 'market'.
In Table 8-33 we show the complete dominance of the loans and mortgage
'market' by the building societies. The rather tiny fraction of the market
accounted for by the pension funds would seem, in and of itself, to put to rest
any notions of the ability of the pension funds to influence price by their own
activities.
Table 8-33: Institutional Investment—Loans and Mortgages
(£ millions)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Pension Funds -31 11 36 3 8 11 -21
Insurance Companies
General Funds 16 41 29 50 85 45 -7
Long-term Funds 291 278 217 14 288 338 297
Unit & Investment -
Trusts
Building Societies 5,271 5,722 6,331 8,147 10,928 14,572 14,321
TOTAL 5,547 6,052 6,613 8,214 11,309 14,966 14,590
Source: Financial Statistics
Given the dominance of the building societies in this 'market', it can come as
no surprise to learn that the price of mortgages is largely determined by a cartel
of those building societies, the Building Societies Association (BSA). Known as
the "recommended rate system", this price-setting mechanism is well described
by the Wilson Committee:
The Council of the Building Societies Association (BSA) has been making
recommendations to its members about the interest rates they should charge on
mortgages, and pay for on shares and deposits, since 1939. BSA members, who
account for 99 per cent of all building society assets, are not compelled to accept
these recommendations, but most of the larger ones do. 	 (1980, page 107)
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That the Wilson Committee regarded this price-fixing behaviour as (unac-
ceptable) dominance of the market for loans and mortgages can be easily seen:
The only sure way of providing a competitive spur to building societies is in our
view to end the recommended rate system, that is to allow societies to set their
own rates according to their own circumstances.. . 	 (1980, page 113)
It is with complete confidence, therefore, that we are able to declare that the
pension funds in no way whatsoever exhibit dominance of the 'market' for
loans and mortgages.
8.3.7 Land, Property and Ground Rent
As with loans and mortgages, there is also not a very well-established
secondary market for land, property and ground rent. While markets for both
land and property certainly exist, there is nothing which could even be
considered as close to the efficiency of the markets for most financial assets.
Equally, the diversity of assets within each category make analysis very
difficult. Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter Seven, land, property and ground
rent makes up a significant proportion of the pension funds' portfolio, and we
need to make use of whatever data is available to see if they do exert any
dominating influence in this market.
In Table 8-34 we show institutional investment in land, property and
ground rent for the period since 1979, and in Table 8-35 we present various
measures of turnover in that market by both the pension funds and the
insurance companies. The net acquisitions data in Table 8-34 quite clearly
reveals the significance of the pension funds in this market. In most years the
pension funds account for at least one-third of the institutional investment in
land, property and ground rent. However, once again we find the insurance
companies accounting for an even larger share; here averaging over fifty per
cent! Given the substantial share of the pension funds we need to also take into
account turnover to conclusively establish or refute any hypothesis of
dominance.
In looking at the various measures of turnover presented in Table 8-35 we
clearly see a substantiation of the evidence afforded by the net acquisitions
data. In every year the turnover of the insurance companies as measured by
sales plus purchases exceeds that of the pension funds. In every year with the
exception of 1983 the insurance companies have a higher activity ratio
(sales/purchases) than the pension funds. And in every year with the
exception of 1986 the insurance companies have a higher trading ratio
(sales/average total holdings) than the pension funds. We may therefore
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conclude that, once again, the pension funds are a dominant investor in the
market for land, property and ground rent, but they are not the dominant
investor. That position is held by the insurance companies.
Table 8-34:	 Institutional
Ground Rent
Investment-Land,	 Property	 and
(£ millions)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Pension Funds 536 908 774 797 567 674 486
Insurance Companies
General Funds 57 66 99 127 103 104 83
Long-term Funds 576 789 975 1,003 843 769 913
Unit Trusts 90 77 108 57 -10 47 -4
Investment Trusts 12 12 4 -3 2 1
Building Societies 100 144 196 144 127 131 87
Other 2 9 8 4 -9 -1 16
TOTAL 1,365 2,013 2,189 2,136 1,618 1,726 1,582
Source: Financial Statistics
Table 8-35: Turnover in Land, Property and Ground Rent
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Turnover (£ millions)
Pension Funds 971 1,164 968 1,163 1,231 1,554 1,857 2,297
Insurance Companies 1,276 1,860 1,986 2,062 2,362 2,765 3,443 4,458
Activity Ratio (SIP)
Pension Funds 0.10 0.33 0.20 0.41 0.27 0.49 0.75 0.81
Insurance Companies 0.16 0.38 0.26 0.39 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.72
Trading Ratio (SiTH)
Pension Funds 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07
Insurance Companies 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
As a footnote it is interesting to note the very low values of the trading
ratios for both the pension funds and insurance companies, indicating the very
low liquidity of the asset being traded. This is largely due to transactions costs,
and can be seen as attributable to the information pertaining to any given piece
of land or property. For example, while the nature and characteristics of a
given stock or bond is readily discernible at low cost from (eg) a reputable
newspaper and a consequent decision to buy or sell swiftly made, this is not
the case with a plot of land or piece of property. While the financial pages of
newspapers do carry details of land or property that is for trading, this
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information is not necessarily reliable or accurate. For, unlike financial assets,
land and property cannot be put into standardised packages. The buyer of
land or property requires surveys and appraisals by experts, as well as legal
counsel to aid with the vast quantities of regulation and red tape that seems to
be a universal constant, a costly and time consuming process that becomes
more worthwhile as economies of scale are realised. It therefore makes sense
that traders in this market, as well as being fewer in number, are also likely to
be much less active traders than in the markets for financial assets.
8.3.8 U.K. Local Authority Securities
The final market to which we shall turn our attentions is that for securities
issued by the local authorities of the British Isles. Like British government
securities, these are regarded as being of little or no risk and offer some tax
relief in many cases. However, the market for local authority securities is quite
small, and this may account for the marginal r6le they play in the pension
funds' portfolio. In Table 8-36 we present the data on institutional investment
in this market, and in Table 8-37 we present the various measures of turnover.
Table 8-36 Institutional Investment—Local Authority Securities
(£ millions)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Pension Funds 4 -13 -4 17 5 -6 3
Insurance Companies
General Funds 10 -35 -53 -6 -22 -12 -16
Long-term Funds 93 158 78 10 -19 -7 -13
Unit & Investment - -2 -1 -1 - -1
Trusts
Building Societies -171 -126 -211 338 -98 -106 -80
TOTAL -64 -18 -191 359 -135 -131 -107
Source: Financial Statistics
In looking at the institutional investment data it is immediately apparent
that the market for United Kingdom local authority securities has been
shrinking over the last decade. This is most likely the result of central
government pressures on the local authorities to reduce their spending.
However, it is also quite clear that the pension funds have been only a small
participant in this particular market. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the building
societies that appear as the dominant investor in this market, with the
insurance companies in second place.
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Table 8-37: Turnover in Local Authority Securities
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Turnover (£ millions)
Pension Funds 223 306 112 210 126 66 51 125
Insurance Companies 502 470 707 682 501 348 385 126
Activity Ratio (SIP)
Pension Funds 1.23 1.02 0.76 0.72 0.97 1.00 1.32 1.16
Insurance Companies 0.83 1.18 0.99 1.03 0.97 1.19 0.90 0.91
Trading Ratio (S/TH)
Pension Funds 0.41 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.53 0.61 0.62
Insurance Companies 0.73 0.82 0.70 0.72 0.84 0.74 0.77 0.97
Source: Business Monitor MQ5
Yet again, the turnover data seems to confirm the previous findings.
Measuring turnover as sales plus purchases shows the insurance companies to
be a more active trader than the pension funds. This is also unambiguously
confirmed by the trading ratio, where each year the insurance companies sell a
greater proportion of their holdings than the pension funds, thereby indicating
a more active trading policy on the part of the insurance companies. The
activity ratio, however, sends mixed signals. While the ratios for the insurance
companies are above those for the pension funds in most years, there are
several exceptions: 1980, and 1986-1987. There are no clear reasons as to why
these reversals should have occurred in those particular years, and so, given
the weight of the other measures we have examined, we must conclude that the
pension funds are not the dominant investor in the market for United Kingdom
local authority securities. Indeed, they can not be truly regarded as a
significant investor in that market.
8.4 Conclusion
From the foregoing series of analyses we have seen the important role
played by the pension funds in many of the United Kingdom's financial
markets. We have seen, both in this chapter as well as in Chapters One and
Seven, that the pension funds have shown dramatic growth over the post-War
period, a growth that seems to have even accelerated during the second half of
the 1980s. However, given that the value of both the pension funds' income
sources-contributions and investment income-are tied almost directly to the
well-being of the economy in general, it is no real surprise that they have
exhibited this growth over the long run. The close connection between the
well-being of the pension funds and that of the economy can be seen by
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looking at newspaper stories during the good times and the bad times. When
the economy is in a slump, such as during the early years of the 1980s it is often
the case that employers are complaining of the need to 'top up' their pension
funds to make up for apparent actuarial deficits in their funding. When the
economy is doing well, the cry is usually one of outrage concerning the huge
actuarial surpluses that the pension funds are enjoying. Human nature being
what it is, and especially the short-term outlook favoured by many managers
on the British corporate scene, this is likely to be a series of scenarios we are
likely to see for many, many years to come.
We have discovered that the trend over the past twenty-five years has been
one of increasing participation by the pension funds in the financial markets.
There is really only one market in which we may conclude that the pension
funds are dominant, that for ordinary shares. In the markets for fixed interest
securities—government issued, debentures, preference shares—while the
pension funds were a highly significant investor, with their actions possibly
having some influence on price, they were not the dominant investor. That
epithet was placed on the shoulders of the insurance companies. In the market
for land, property and ground rent the same result obtained; the pension funds
were significant, but the insurance companies dominated. In the markets for
both local authority securities and loans and mortgages we found the pension
funds to be a diminutive participant, with honours for dominance going to the
building societies. Finally, while we were not able to establish dominance, we
did discover that, of the British financial institutions, the pension funds were
the most significant investor in overseas assets, particularly ordinary shares.
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Chaptar Mghtt Encinottes
"A perfectly contestable market is defined as one in which entry and exit are
easy and costless, which may or may not be characterized by economies of
scale or scope, but which has no entry barriers, ... Potential entrants are
assumed to face the same set of productive techniques and market demands
as those available to incumbent firms." 	 (Baumol, Panzar and Willig,
Contestable Markets and The Theory of Industry Structure, 1982, page xx).
The main tenet of the contestable markets literature is that where there is the possibility of
costlessly reversible entry into an industry or market there may be an efficient outcome even if
there are not the large numbers of actively producing firms required by traditional (perfect
competition) market theory. Most of the contestable markets literature has concerned itself
with the implications of contestability for industrial organisation and market structure, and
hence policy prescription. To the best of my knowledge the theory of contestable markets has
not yet been used to examine the workings of the financial markets.
2 Although not dealt with explicitly here, there are also the problems of "insider trading"
allegations that market dominance can occasion.
3 J. R. Hicks (1967) page 103.
4 This also includes payment to widows, payment upon death, etc. See Chapters Three and
Four for full details.
5 See Chapter Four on the portability of pensions.
6 For some interesting views (based on a non-technical analysis) on the changing nature of
the U. K. capital markets see the survey on "The City of London" in The Economist, 14 July,
1984.
7 See Table 1-10.
8 The insurance companies and the pension funds, while often subject to similar experiences,
do appear to be affected differently during the 1973-76 recession. During this time many
pension fund members took "early retirement", thereby increasing the outflow of funds from
the pension funds beyond actuarial predictions. Of more importance was the reduction in
contributions to the funds due to declining National Income and increasing unemployment, as
well as the fact that real rates of return were often negative during this period of British
economic history.
9 Empirical evidence for this viewpoint was presented in Chapter One when we considered
the views of Hamish McRae and Frances Cairncross (1985), and The Economist articles
(especially 28 October, 1978, page 118) on the alleged boycott of the government securities
market by the financial intermediaries in the Autumn of 1976 and the Spring of 1978.
10 Unsurprising because turnover is the sum of purchases and sales, and net acquisitions is
the difference between purchases and sales.
11 See Chapter Four for details.
12 A 'thin' market is one in which there is very little trading activity, perhaps because there
are very few participants, or because the market is relatively new. As the number of
participants, and hence the level of activity of a market, increases we may say that the market
becomes 'thicker'. So, for example, we may regard the Londoq. Stock Exchange as a
particularly 'thick' secondary market, while the secondary market for mortgages in the United
Kingdom would still appear to be very 'thin'. As evidenced in Chapter Two, the 'thicker' a
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market is, the more marketable (and, therefore, the less risky) will be the assets traded there,
ceteris paribus.
13 The reader is asked to note that the 1987 ratios are provisional estimates., based on the 1987
holdings data only. This is because at the time of writing holdings data for 1988 is not yet
available!
14 While the pension funds both hold and acquire a significant quantity of overseas ordinary
shares, it would seem extremely unlikely that they will be the dominant investor in them,
especially when one considers the capitalisation values of all non-domestic markets in ordinary
shares. In this section, therefore, we concentrate wholly on the domestic ordinary shares'
market.
15 See Peter F. Drucker's The Unseen Revolution; How Pension Funds Socialism Came to America,
(1976).
16 Minns, for example, states that "The financial sector does not produce anything", (1980,
page 147). This is a view that is similar to that held by the Physiocrats in the sixteenth century
about the industrial sector. The Physiocrats held the belief that industry was largely parasitic,
living off the surplus created by the only truly productive sector, agriculture. Minns view is
based on the Mandan view of the financial system, which holds that it is essentially a parasite
living off the surplus produced by the industrial and agricultural sector.
Minns also plays with semantics to argue his case, by trying to draw a distinction between
legal ownership and economic ownership. He suggests that Drucker is concerned with the
former, while the important concept is the latter, which he defines as involving "the ability to
put the means of production to work." (1980, page 147). Thus, for Minns, true ownership
necessitates control!
17 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Money and Interest.
18 See, for example, A. J. Frost and I. J. S. Henderson's "Implications of Modern Portfolio
Theory for Life Assurance Companies" in Modern Portfolio Theory and Financial Institutions,
Corner and Mayes (editors), (1983, page 165).
19 The following Table, showing the implied average period of holding ordinary shares, is
reproduced from the Wilson Committee, and reveals that while the pension funds had reduced
their average period for holding ordinary shares since the 1950s, they still tended to hold them
longer than other non-bank financial intermediaries with the exception being, perhaps
surprisingly, the insurance companies.
Number of years; reciprocal of sales rate
x 100
1963-67
average
1968-72
average
1973-77
average
1978
Insurance Companies 23.8 14.9 7.9 11.4
Pension Funds 23.3 9.8 6.1 9.7
Investment Trust Companies 9.6 6.9 4.6 4.5
Unit Trusts 9.8 3.3 2.2 2.5
All investing institutions 15.4 8.5 5.2 6.9
Insurance Companies:
long-term 25.6 16.1 9 14.1
general 15.6 9.3 4.8 4.9
Pension Funds:
private sector 20.4 8.1 4.9 8.3
local authority .. 9.3 8.1 11.6
other public sector .. .. .. 11.6
Source: Wilson Committee,(1980) Table 7.3, page 554.
Page 365
Major stock market capitalisations
	 International banking by centre
end 1983, total: $3.1 trillion
NASDAQ (US)
New York
Stock
Exchange
51%
Britain 7%
Japan 17%
Other
Europe 9%
Other 9%
1983, total: $2.5 trillion
United States
15%
Japan
Other
22%
Britain
27%
20 The data for 1987 is provisional, so we refrain from commenting.
21 According to the "Survey on the City of London" in the 14th July, 1984 edition of The
Economist, at the end of 1983 the British stock market accounted for seven per cent of the
world's $3.1 trillion major stock market capitalisations (see diagram below).
22 This is discussed in full on page 7-39, and a full chronology of exchange controls in the
United Kingdom is presented in Appendix 7-B.
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Chapter Nine: Modelling Pension Fund Investment
Behaviour
9.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we have considered the portfolio position of
the pension funds, their role in the financial markets of the United Kingdom,
and how this has changed over the twenty-year period, 1963-1983. In an earlier
chapter we both summarised and critiqued various attempts to model the
investment behaviour of other British financial intermediaries. In this chapter
we commence on the estimation of our own model by drawing together these
two areas to take into account those points we have previously stressed as
being of importance in modelling financial intermediary investment behaviour.
Our aim is to develop a framework which brings together the role of the
pension funds as financial intermediaries within the environmental and
institutional factors which govern their behaviour.
If we are to attempt to model the pension funds' investment behaviour
we must make a simple choice among two alternative methods regarding their
coverage. Firstly, an "industry" level approach may be chosen whereby
aggregate time-series data is used; or, alternatively, a "micro" approach may
be adopted, which considers the investment behaviour of the individual fund.1
By nature these two approaches are complementary and, in a more perfect
world, both would be chosen since they are not mutually exclusive
possibilities. The world, however, is far from perfect and we are therefore
required to choose between them with regard to the trade-offs involved. Both
approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. Micro-oriented studies,
for example, permit a greater degree of analysis of an intermediary's
investment intentions, particularly (eg) how a pension fund tries to achieve its
objectives against the background of the various constraints it faces. On the
negative side, micro studies do not lend themselves very well to aggregation,
an approach important because one may then arrive at general conclusions for
the industry or, indeed, any wider implications for the economy.
Unsurprisingly the reverse of this situation is true for the macro approach.
In consequence, and in full awareness of its limitations, the approach we
choose is predominantly of a macroeconomic nature. This is a 'choice' that has
been largely imposed on us by the limitations of the data, especially its
availability (or lack thereof!). Consequently our study cannot hope to reveal all
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of the intricacies of the investment process, a constraint that inevitably limits
the quality of our results. Nonetheless, we hope that the results obtained will
shed some light on the key elements involved in the pension funds' investment
choice process. In Section 9.2 we commence the process of modelling the
investment behaviour of the U. K. pension funds by considering their
investment objectives as well as the constraints faced by them, and how these
might usefully be modelled. We also consider the hierarchy of decision-
making that seems to prevail in many large firms, including financial
intermediaries, and examine whether it is also the case for the pension funds.
In Section 9.3 we present individual demand specifications for the major asset
categories adopted. While there are many who might regard this as a
piecemeal approach that leaves itself open to the criticism that it might neglect
the overall portfolio position, it does provide a more-than-useful first step in
the modelling process. Furthermore it is our belief that the advantages of this
approach outweigh the disadvantages for several reasons. For example, under
this approach the individual demand equations are not constrained by the
statistical constraints that an aggregate (or simultaneous equations) system
would typically impose, and therefore we can explore more fully the possible
effects on the demand for each individual asset. In particular, the reader will
notice that we shall be considering the hypothesis that the pension funds adopt
a sequential investment allocation procedure, rather than the simultaneous
allocation which is more usually the norm in models of financial intermediary
behaviour. If found to be correct, the implication would be that a model
composed of individual, separately-derived demand equations is required.
9.2 Objectives and Constraints
While we have already examined the economic role of the pension funds
and considered their behaviour within the context of the British financial
system we now need to put these into more specific terms that lend themselves
to the modelling process. In this section, therefore, we shall be attempting to
ascertain the goals and objectives pursued by the pension funds, as well as
trying to pinpoint the constraints within which they are forced to operate.
9.2.1 Strategy and Tactics
Most models of investment behaviour typically posit a single-period
decision-making problem in which the economic agent simultaneously
allocates funds across a (broad) range of financial assets. In Chapter Five, for
example, we saw how multi-period decision-making could be reduced to a
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series of single-period decisions, even under conditions of uncertainty. In
Chapter Six we saw the application of such modelling procedures to the
investment behaviour of various kinds of British financial intermediaries. We
also observed there that such an approach led to problems because of the
necessity of having to impose statistical limitations on the model that were not
based on empirical observation or the theory of the intermediary's behaviour.2
On the basis of the problems we observed in such models we shall be looking
at individual demand specifications of the U. K. pension funds for two major
reasons. Firstly, such individual equations do not require the statistical
constraints that aggregate or simultaneous equations systems impose,
seemingly almost as a matter of course. Secondly, it is both possible and
permissible for the overall portfolio position to be taken into account by
positing a sequential investment allocation process. Such an approach has
been suggested as meaningful and appropriate by a number of authors. For
example, in his classic The British Financial System Professor Revell argues that,
while theory suggests that contemporaneous decisions as to the assets in a
portfolio are appropriate,
[I]n practice, however, there are some constraints, and the actual investment
procedure of life funds and pension funds has something of a sequential nature.
In logical order the events are: (1) the honouring of lending commitments and
payments for assets undertaken some time before, (2) the inspection of investment
opportunities brought specially to the notice of the life fund managers, and finally
(3) a search for outlets for remaining funds.
	
(1973, pages 441-442)
In a similar vein, H. I. Ansoff (1965) argues that the investment decision is
really a hierarchy of decisions. Firstly there is a set of strategic decisions,
whereby the overall balance of the portfolio between the different classes of
security is determined. Secondly, there is a set of operational or tactical
decisions, which determine the allocation of funds within a particular class of
assets. This is also the view adopted by J. P. Holbrook, F.I.A. Writing from a
position of wide-ranging experience in advising pension funds, in his
"Investment Performance of Pension Funds" he paints a lucid picture of the
investment decision hierarchy:
[T]he practical management of a pension fund investment portfolio involves
decisions at three levels.
(i) Policy, i.e. the proportions of the assets which, as a long-term aim, the trustees
wish to hold in the different investment markets. The fundamental element of
policy is the split between equity-type and fixed-interest investments. Definition
of policy may extend to a split of equity-type investments between U.K. equities,
overseas equities and properties, specific proportions being set for each. If the
trustees are not experts in long-term investment they will tend to formulate policy
in discussion with specialist advisers; it is gratifying to record that actuaries who
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advise on the financing of pension schemes are increasingly becoming involved in
such discussions.
(ii) Strategy, i.e. decisions to depart from policy proportions in the light of current
market conditions, including decisions to hold part of the fund on short-term
deposit. The trustees will usually seek advice from experts in the various markets
regarding the short-term outlook, up to the time of the next investment meeting
and over the next year or so. Except where trustees delegate strategic decisions to
managers and advisers, investment meetings are usually held at short regular
intervals, and arrangements are made for special meetings whenever it is thought
that there has been a material change in market prospects. Often trustees
authorize the managers concerned to determine the timing of purchases; thus a
manager is able to retain part of the assets entrusted to him in the form of short-
term deposits.
OM Selection, i.e. the choice of the particular investments to hold, buy or sell
within the various markets. Again, practice varies; many trustees give their
managers carte blanche in this area—some keep close control over day-to-day
transactions.
It therefore follows that if our attempt to model the investment behaviour
of the pension funds is to be a valid description of pension fund behaviour it
should at least follow the practice of the funds in adopting a sequential
allocation procedure. It is important to note that while mean-variance analysis
(and its derivatives) may be used effectively to model tactical decisions, its
usefulness for modelling the strategic decision is limited. Indeed, as we saw in
Chapter Five, it would require us to make very restrictive assumptions about
the proportions of each and every security within all of the relevant individual
asset classes. That is to say, we would require the portfolio to satisfy the
assumptions necessary for a separation theorem. Because we have chosen to
model the pension funds' investment behaviour as we observe it, we are
therefore restricted to modelling the strategic decision and will not be able to
make use of such analytical methods as put forward by (eg) Markowitz.
In such a manner we strive for our model to be a little closer to being
based on reality. Thus, given that we have chosen to focus on the strategic
decision and thereby neglect the tactical, it is apparent that in trying to piece
the individual demand equations together for an overall view of the pension
funds' activities, a certain amount of compromise will be necessary. Thus, the
incorporation of these specifications into a neat, comprehensive model may
necessitate some sacrifices.
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9.2.2 Constraints on Investment Behaviour
Elsewhere in this paper we have looked into the objectives of and
constraints upon the pension funds' investment behaviour, albeit from an
institutional point of view. Now we need to bring these factors into a focus
that can be used in the modelling process. We have seen that the pension
funds provide a guaranteed retirement income—pensionable benefits—to their
members and, in some cases, their immediate dependents. Consequently, it
would seem appropriate to suggest that the pension funds act as investment
managers via the provision of the pension income, a task which requires them
also to guarantee the capital security and long-term yield of the fund. This
function leads to the posing, and answering, of the following two questions:
1. What are the factors underlying and constraining the pension funds'
investment behaviour?
2. What goals and objectives can be ascribed to their behaviour?
We shall be dealing with the first question here and with the second in Section
9.2.3. We have already observed in Chapters Seven and Eight that, while the
pension funds (in each of the three sectors) have quite considerable freedom in
their investment decisions, their actions, nonetheless, remain somewhat
constrained by a number of factors. In Chapter Eight, for example, we stressed
the problem of market dominance, while in other chapters we have discussed
such areas as political and social constraints. Thus, although the pension funds
can and do influence the environment within which they operate they are
unable to control or determine it to any significant degree. Consequently, we
can divide those factors recognised as affecting the pension funds' investment
decisions into two major groups, viz, external and internal influences. These
can be subdivided as follows:
External:
Internal:
(i) government regulation;
(ii) taxation;
(iii) exchange rate risks and regulations;
(iv) market constraints, especially those on the
supply side;
(v) inflation.
(i) the nature of the liabilities issued;
(ii) capital risk;
(iii) income risk;
(iv) liquidity considerations;
(v) administrative/organisational constraints.
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External:
(I) It has long been common practice for governments to regulate the
markets and institutions within the financial sector of a modern "post-
industrial" economy, especially within the banking sector because of their role
in providing a "means of payment" and their ability to create 'money'. In
Chapter Four we reviewed the regulations under which the British pension
funds operate, and saw that they are largely unregulated in terms of their
investment behaviour. Perhaps the only way in which legislation affects
pension fund investment is via the various Trustees acts; with pension funds
usually being established as a Trust fund their investment behaviour must lie
within whatever constraints (if any) are set out in the Trust agreement.
Contemporary practice is such that the only constraint they face is the so-called
"prudent man" rule, so that the pension funds find their investment behaviour
virtually unregulated. However, regulation does deter-mine the nature of the
benefits that the pension funds are required to provide, thereby determining
their liability structure and, in turn, naturally affecting their investment
decisions. Equally, the government, at both national and local levels, has
shown itself to be adept at influencing their behaviour by various forms of
persuasion. One example of this was the tacit agreement in 1979 between the
pension funds and the government that the former would move slowly into
various overseas securities upon the removal of exchange restrictions.
(ii) Taxation would seem to be an obvious factor in determining investment
policy. A rational investor will be interested in the post-tax yield on their
investments. The income that the pension funds receive by way of
contributions are generally uninfluenced by taxation because at present there is
little incentive via the tax system for an individual to put funds into a pension
scheme (largely because of the way the current legislation sets up pensions).
Howevei, the rather substantial income that a pension fund receives on its
investments is free from taxation while the funds an individual receives as a
pension are subject to income tax. A pension fund is therefore unlikely to
invest in any asset where the yield is paid on a post-tax basis. Certain local
authority securities as well as liquid assets such as Building Society accounts
("shares") are not within the pension fund's feasible set as a result.
MO As we have seen in the previous two chapters the pension funds invest a
considerable proportion of their portfolio in overseas assets, more so than most
British financial intermediaries. Although this has been on an increasing trend
for most of the data period, overseas assets have always accounted for a
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significant fraction of both holdings and net acquisitions by the pension funds.
The theory of international finance tells us that overseas investment will be
affected by two major factors: yield differentials between the two countries,
and the expected exchange rate between the two countries' currencies. 3 In
addition there is also the problem of international risk; some countries are
regarded as being more politically stable than others and therefore less risky
economically. For example, a British pension fund is more likely to have a
substantial quantity of its overseas assets in the securities of the United States
than those of (eg) Nicaragua or Libya. A final point is that although the
pension funds may desire to hold a given quantity of overseas assets it may be
unable to do so due to exchange controls imposed either domestically or by
foreign governments.
(iv) While it may be the case that a pension fund wishes to pursue a particular
type of investment policy, such as buy ordinary shares or sell parts of the
existing portfolio, its ability to do so may be affected by the particular market
in which it is operating. For example, there may be a supply constraint which
limits the availability of a particularly desirable (in terms of its coupon,
maturity, etc.) asset in the quantities required. Additionally, pension funds
may be prevented from selling assets because of a lack of suitable secondary
markets or by other market imperfections which limits their ability to sell.
That the pension funds hold such substantial holdings of many assets acts as a
market constraint on their activities. For example, as we have previously
noted, under portfolio theory it is usually assumed that the investor is a price-
taker, whose market actions will not affect the price; this is certainly not true of
the pension funds because of their substantial role in many of the financial
markets in the United Kingdom.4
(v) Throughout much of the data period of this study the phenomenon of
inflation has been regarded as a considerable problem. Unlike many of the
liabilities issued by other financial institutions, the amount of the pensionable
benefit is usually linked (in some way or another) to the rate of inflation.5
However, with the exception of the recently introduced Index-Linked Treasury
Stock, the returns on pension fund investments (at least, those of a fixed
return!) tend to be denominated in nominal terms.6
 It is sometimes argued
that in an inflationary environment variable return securities offer a better
prospect than those of fixed return. Such a view is said to be responsible for
the "reverse yield gap" that came into existence after f960. 7 However, the
experience of falling stock market values during 1973-1974 and the imposition
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of dividend controls during much of the 1970s served to re-emphasise the
volatility of variable return instruments such as ordinary shares and stress the
need for caution in the evaluation of long-term prospects. During the lengthy
world-wide economic expansion of the 1980s the picture for equities has
brightened considerably more, as evidenced by the five year bull markets up to
the various stock market meltdowns of October 19th, 1987. Even since then
markets have tended to continue upwards, albeit at a slower pace. Equally, the
situation for bonds has benefited from the more stable and lower rates of
inflation that have prevailed during the current decade.
Internal:
(i) As we have already seen in earlier chapters, the investment of monies by
the pension funds requires that they take account of the liabilities which they
issue and the obligations that places upon them in terms of income, capital,
and so on. If the liability structure does not change greatly then it would be
seem to be the case that it has little influence over changes in the investment
policy of the pension funds. It is largely because the pension funds' liability
structure is fairly monolithic and unchanging over time that the pension funds
differ greatly from virtually all other financial institutions. Thus, the financial
structure of a pension fund must not be seen as simply a diversified portfolio
of assets designed to meet its contractual liabilities, but as a wholly intertwined
relationship between the cash flow of its assets and its liabilities.
(ii)and (iii) In fulfilling its obligations the pension fund faces two particular
risks—capital risk and income risk—each of which we have dealt with earlier
in this paper.
(iv) Any financial intermediary will be subject to a liquidity requirement, the
degree of which depends primarily on the nature of their business. Depository
intermediaries in the United Kingdom, such as the joint-stock banks and
building societies, are subject to statutory liquidity requirements, usually
referred to as reserve requirements. The assets eligible to enter the category of
reserves is highly specific in terms of statutory requirements, but it is often the
case that intermediaries hold a greater amount of reserves (ie, "excess
reserves") than that specified by law. In the case of the pension funds there is
no externally imposed liquidity requirement so that their holdings of liquid
assets may be regarded as a choice variable. In addition, as we saw in Table 7-
1, the pension funds generate a substantial net inflow of runds either through
contributions or income generated by previous investments and this may
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provide a cushion against any unforeseen sudden cash drain or if the fund
were suddenly subjected to a catastrophic decline in the value of its portfolio
holdings. If the pension fund does hold excess short-term assets (that is, over
and above those required for normal transactions such as the payment of
pensionable benefits, administrative costs, etc) then this will be because they
are regarded as a choice asset, a temporary abode of investment funds until
more attractive longer-term investments can be made. The holding of short-
term, liquid assets gives the pension funds a degree of manceuvrability
otherwise unobtainable in their investment process.
(v) Unless a pension fund has a highly specific predetermined investment
policy, then its managers require a constant flow of information on assets with
respect to their capital and income attributes if they are to perform their task
properly. For funds pursuing a "buy-and-hold" strategy only an initial
evaluation is necessary, unless portfolio performance measurement is
evaluated nonetheless. If, on the other hand, the fund wishes to actively trade
in one or other of the financial markets then more information is required,
particularly that which will aid forecasts, the appraisal of the existing portfolio,
and the disbursal of both new monies and funds available due to the sale of
existing assets. As pointed out by P. 0. Dietz (1972), such information goes
well beyond performance measurement, requiring also the analysis of portfolio
performance, the estimation of future cash flows and degrees of risk. Any
successful investment policy requires a control framework that can provide
feedback for the planning process. The amount of information required by a
fund will depend upon two factors: the degree of action its investment policy
calls for, and the size of the fund. As we have seen, in many cases the second
factor plays a large role in determining the first, although overall search costs
tend to be higher (as are the potential rewards) the more active and diversified
is the fund's investment policy.
9.2.3 Pension Fund Objectives
Elsewhere in this paper we have looked into the investment behaviour of
the British pension funds as it manifests itself in terms of their holdings and net
acquisitions, and both above as well as in Chapter Four we have considered the
institutional framework within which they operate and the constraints that
framework imposes upon their investment behaviour. Given that the pension
funds regularly invest such large amounts we must recognise that there is an
enormous pressure on the investment managers to seek new outlets and fully
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utilise the existing markets. It is therefore entirely appropriate to enquire why
they adopt a particular investment pattern.
Economic theory traditionally emphasises that the behaviour of its
component parts is rational. The neoclassical theory of the firm posits this
assumption as firms being profit-maximisers. However, this single objective of
the firm has come in for much criticism in the post-1945 era for many reasons.
For example, in the presence of uncertainty the maximisation of profit becomes
an almost meaningless phrase. Equally, in the modern firm there is very often
a separation of ownership and control and, while shareholders may look for
maximum profits, managerial interests, which may take a different view, are
likely to dominate. At this point we need to recognise that pension funds are
somewhat different from firms in (say) manufacturing, but also that the
similarities likely outweigh the differences. For example, we may list the
following similarities:
1. They are both organisational entities.
2. There is a separation of management and ownership. Although a
pension fund has no shareholders its contributors may be considered as its
owners. This is especially true of the "members"—those who expect to receive
a pension in the future—as they have most to lose. Although all contributors
are represented on the Board of Trustees (as we saw in Chapter Four) they are
generally regarded as having much less input into the policy-making of the
pension fund than the shareholders of a corporate entity. One reason for this is
that, unlike most firms, especially the corporations, the pension funds are not
obligated to publish fully detailed accounts on which their members might act.
Also, unlike stockholders, pension fund contributors are not in a position to
"vote with their Pounds" by selling if they disagree with the policies adopted
by their fund. Such "asymmetric information" and other frictions lead both to
a degree of apathy on the part of members and a possible divergence of
interests between the fund's managers and those whose interests they are
supposed to represent.
3. They are perpetual entities. Although the provision of a pension to
a member usually terminates upon death, new members' pension
arrangements are constantly being included, so that the pension funds may be
considered open funds.
What then are the specific objectives of the U. K. pension funds?
Professor Revell suggests that
...pension funds aim to maximise the expected return on their assets, subject to the
need for diversifying the portfolio to reduce risk. 	 (1973, page 439)
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but also recognises the imprecision of the term "maximisation of expected
return". Holbrook goes into rather more detail:
The question of investment objectives for pension funds may be approached by
stating two principles which are believed to command fairly wide support:
(i) The portfolio should be constructed with regard to the nature of the liabilities.
(ii) Subject to (i), the objective should be to maximize the rate of return by
investments which involve an acceptable level of risk. 	 (1976, pages 15-16)
He also offers some alternate approaches, which may be regarded as the dual
of that above:
Pension fund investment should aim to minimize the cost of benefits or, What is
much the same thing, to maximize the future surplus assets which may be used to
improve benefits, by way of post-retirement increases or otherwise.
...it is sometimes argued, the investment objective should be to minimize the
contributions which the actuary will recommend at the next valuation. In the
meantime, it is necessary to secure at least the 'actuary's rate' (i.e. the rate of
investment return assumed in the last valuation);	 (1976, pages 18-19)
It would seem obvious that the main aim of any pension fund should be
the secure provision of pensions to its members, as set out in the Trust
agreement. Because of the long-term nature of this commitment we could
restate the pension fund's dominant objective as being survival, one which is
readily achieved providing the fund can at least remain solvent. To avoid the
disaster of insolvency the pension funds need to earn a target rate of return on
their investments. Although this implies a static view of investment policy it
does provide us with a "safety-first" objective for the pension funds behaviour,
much like "securing at least the actuary's rate". More likely, however, is that
the target rate of return specified will exceed the minimum which must be
earned for solvency, and that this "mark-up" will vary from fund to fund
depending upon such factors as size and the specifics of its liabilities.
In addition to being concerned about survival there is some evidence that
the pension funds are concerned with the growth of their total business (i.e.,
the provision of pensions), although this is rather more difficult to substantiate.
Nonetheless, the literature alludes to this objective for both industrial firms
and financial institutions. 8 There are a number of possible reasons to which we
may ascribe this growth objective. Firstly, there is the simple reason that
growth of the fund reflects well on the fund's managers, and so growth is
likely to be a managerial objective of some priority. It could be argued that, if
this is indeed a managerial objective, it might turn out to be to the detriment of
the members, especially in view of the relative lack of accountability of the
pension fund's investment managers to their members. However, as pointed
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out by R. L. Marris (1967), the growth and "profit" objectives need not
necessarily be in conflict; much of the literature that has revised the theory of
the firm to account for organisational and behavioural factors indicates that the
rate of return is a satisficing target linked to an aspirational level, rather than a
variable which is to be maximised. Indeed, growth could be seen as a proxy
for value maximisation. It should also be recognised that, with the financial
markets performing less well during the 1970s than in the previous two
decades, combined with an ever-increasing number of pensioners, growth of
contributions served as a means by which the funds could continue to service
their outstanding liabilities.
The ability of a pension fund to achieve these objectives will be
constrained by the factors we described earlier. Both the growth and rate of
return objectives require planning of all aspects of pension fund behaviour.
That the pension funds do plan their activities was seen in the earlier chapters
of this paper, and we should take this into account in ascribing objectives to
them; we should naturally preface their objectives with the word "expected".
Although there is almost nothing in the literature on the objectives of pension
funds, we may consider their objectives as being very close to those of (eg)
mutual insurance companies. 9 Among this literature we find J. B. H. Pegler
(1948) arguing that the main principle of investment should be the expected
yield, while a later author, H. G. Clarke (1954), suggests the objective should be
"to maximise the expected yield with the minimum of error, having regard to
the nature and incidence of the liabilities." Further studies of life insurance
companies, such as those by Clayton and Osborn (1965) and G. T. Pepper
(1964), expressed the belief that the expected yield was the fundamental
objective of investment behaviour. However, because the expected yield is.
calculated on the basis of uncertain (some would argue, unknown) knowledge
of the future it remains an uncertain figure itself. Most attempts to calculate
expected values rely on various extrapolations of previous values, such as the
Koyck lag (1954) or that put forward by de Leeuw (1965).
Another way for pension funds to consider the expected rate of return is
by using the concept of a normal rate of return. lo If the current rate is below
the normal rate then it will be expected to rise, and vice-versa. This gives a
linearised demand function of the following form:
NAt = a + b(L - LN)t
where NAt is the net acquisition of a given asset, L represents the actual long
rate of return, and LN represents the calculated normal rate of return.11
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Whichever way we choose to consider the expectations factor there is no
denying its very important role in the pension funds' investment process. The
expected rates of return will yield an optimum portfolio or desired balance
sheet which will usually not be directly observable. Equally there is no
guarantee that the portfolio will be in equilibrium, and so as new funds
become available for investment they are used to close the gaps between actual
and desired or optimal values. At one extreme, the portfolio could be
characterised as an allocation of funds in fixed proportions like a fixed
coefficient input-output model. Some studies of British financial institutions
have adopted such an approach, 12 but the evidence from the previous two
chapters militates against use of this approach for the pension funds. Of
course, in addition to channelling new funds to close gaps, the funds could also
switch assets within the existing portfolio to move towards their desired
position, but this is a more costly approach in general.
As we suggested quite forcibly in the previous section, we can follow H. I.
Ansoff (1965) and posit that the investment decision is split into a hierarchy of
strategic decisions—ie, those between the different categories of asset—and
tactical decisions—choosing the asset mix within a particular asset group.
Such an approach by the pension funds has empirical support especially in the
evidence presented to the Wilson Committee (1980). However, under this
system the Markowitz mean-variance approach to investment decision-making
applies mainly to the tactical decision; it cannot be used for the strategic
decision except under highly restrictive assumptions, such as complete
foreknowledge of the proportions of the different securities within any
category. Should one choose to deny the validity of the Ansoff approach then
the only remaining alternative would be to use a linear programming approach
to analyse pension fund investment behaviour.
Ansoff recognises a third stratum in the decision-making process, that of
the administration in providing information to enable the strategic and tactical
decisions to be made effectively. However, we may safely assume this as being
implicitly within the strategic and tactical elements of the decision-making
process.
As we have already suggested the main objective of measuring portfolio
performance would be to test the effectiveness of previous investment
decisions given the pension fund's stated objectives, with the information
acquired being used to improve future investment performance. Such a
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"planning and control" framework requires continual supervision and the
input and analysis of immense quantities of data. Given the 'two-stage'
investment decision process we have posited here, what would be continually
under review would be the portfolio division between the major categories we
have outlined above; that is to say, it is the strategic decision which would be
subject to performance review. Naturally, within any asset category there will
always be opportunities for "operational switching", that is changing the mix
of securities held within any category. The option of operational switching
would appear to be particularly relevant for the gilt-edged securities category
and even for ordinary shares, where there are often substantial differences in
the rates of return yielded by different securities, as well as substantial
secondary markets to facilitate such switching. One consequence of this is the
need for a performance measurement process that is both dynamic and static in
nature. Empirical evidence, such as that given to the Radcliffe and Wilson
Committees, suggests very strongly that continual performance reviews are
secondary to the investment of future cash inflows for both the pension funds
as well as many other British financial institutions. Naturally, this is somewhat
less true of funds heavily invested in assets where yield data is readily
available at little or no cost.
From the above, then, it follows that although we need to consider both
stock and flow aspects of the pension fund investment decision, primary
emphasis should be placed on flow influences, at the same time recognising
that it is possible for the pension funds' asset holdings to be in disequilibrium.
One popular method of capturing both stock and flow influences is the
standard partial stock adjustment mechanism which, for example, is specified
and utilised by Ryan (1973). This mechanism usually takes the following form:
*	 a264 = 264 1 + a(A t - At4)
where Aat represents the actual demand for asset A at time t, and A* is the
desired or optimum holding of that asset. The value of the adjustment
coefficient, a lies between zero and one. Taking A ta_ 1 to the left-hand side of
the equation enables us to obtain an expression explaining any change in the
holding of asset A between any two consecutive periods, viz:
*	 a264 - 2644 = oc(A t - A t4 )
where 0 < a < 1. This expression explains the net acquisition of asset A as a
partial adjustment from the previous holding level (Ata4 ) towards the desired
holding level (A;) by an amount denoted by a. In using this mechanism in the
modelling process much depends on the actual specification of the ex ante
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.variable At . While several rather different forms are possible, one which has
been employed frequently suggests that a constant proportion of the difference
between the actual and desired holding levels of a particular asset is reduced in
the period immediately following a change in any of the explanatory variables
(eg, such as a change in the term structure of interest rates). This type of
adjustment has the beauty of being able to be simplified to the use of a lagged
dependent variable, making it a useful econometric device. Adjustment
towards the desired portfolio can, of course, be brought about by directing
inflows of new funds into the appropriate areas. The net acquisitions data
would certainly give credence to this approach in that the pension funds can
virtually ignore the market for a given asset in one quarter yet place a
substantial proportion of their new monies there in the next quarter. Such an
approach to investment appears to be increasingly popular with the pension
funds and many other financial intermediaries. In addition, as we have seen,
the pension funds certainly seem more than willing to build up substantial
holdings of short-term assets, particularly in times of relative uncertainty.
Such holdings give the funds room to manoeuvre, and are usually reduced
whenever more profitable longer-term avenues for investment are perceived.
Of course, when the pension funds do decide to 'go short' they assume the risk
that interest rates may move against them, but this may be rationalised as the
funds trading off interest rate security for increased capital security.
We may now formalise these ideas in the following expression for the
pension funds' net acquisitions (NA) of a given asset category (i):
n	 m
NA i = ai0 + E aiiRj+ E bikSk
j=1	 k=1
where Ri is a vector of rates of return on various assets and Sk is a vector of
other explanatory variables including the constraints on pension fund
investment behaviour discussed earlier. The actual elements included within
these vectors will depend upon whether the model is focused on stock or flow
considerations. As previously suggested, a stock adjustment model could
easily be handled by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, while a
'pure' flow model would include an income constraint such as the amount of
net new funds available for investment.
9.3 Towards Individual Demand Specification
In the foregoing discussion we established that we needed to place major
emphasis on the flow aspects of the pension funds' investment decision. The
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implication being that we needed to include income as an argument in our
demand equations. Additionally, the hypothesis of a sequential investment
allocation procedure suggests that total income will not be the appropriate
measure of income for inclusion in all equations. Rather, some measure of
income that recognises that some funds may already have been allocated will
be appropriate. We shall be defining this later as "secondary income". It is
also the case that, if the pension funds do indeed adopt a sequential investment
procedure, demand for those assets which are acquired later in the sequence
may not depend upon their own-yield, but rather upon some measure of a
"yield-gap" relative to that on assets with a prior claim on funds.
Consequently, by adapting the general form of the equation for pension fund
net acquisition of a given asset category (as presented in the previous section, on page
381) we may include these characteristics and arrive at the following model:
NAi = ai + biRi + ciY + diIi	(9-1)
NAk = ak + bk(Rk - Rd+ ci(Y - NA)	 (9-2)
Equation 9-1 posits that the net acquisition of an asset with a prior claim on
funds (NAd depends on its own-yield (Rd, total income (Y), and net issues of
the asset (Id. Equation 9-2 posits that the net acquisition of an asset with a
secondary claim on funds (NAk) depends on a yield-gap between its yield and
that on assets with a prior claim (Rk - Rd, and a measure of residual income (Y
- NAd.
Although the data period of our study is nominally 1963.1 to 1986.1V,
many of the estimations we employ in this Chapter only use data up to an
earlier period, primarily due to data constraints. 13 We begin by delineating
the asset categories we shall be attempting to explain later for net acquisitions;
they are:
1. Government and government guaranteed securities—overall and
split by maturity range to focus on long-term gilts (including Index-
Linked Treasury Stock when appropriate);
2. Ordinary shares (including unit trust units and property unit trust
units)—both aggregated and divided into domestic and overseas;
3. Corporate bonds (consisting of debentures and preference shares);
4. Loans and mortgages—overall only;
5. Land, property and ground rent;
6. Overseas assets.
With these asset groupings in mind we can recall the asset characteristics
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven and distinguish between:
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1) fixed interest securities (gilts and debentures) with variable capital
values;
2) equity assets (ordinary shares and property) with variable returns
and variable capital values;
3) assets fixed in longer nominal money terms (loans and mortgages);
and
4) short-term assets which are fixed in nominal terms but possess little
marketability risk due to their maturity.
As we saw in Section 9.2.2 we may think of the portfolio strategy as being a
decision to allocate funds between these four broad asset groupings, with
operational or tactical decisions being taken within the groupings.
Assuming this to be the case then we need to deduce what factors are likely to
influence strategic decisions. Investment theory suggests that there are four
major factors, which may be listed as:
(i) changes in the liability structure and adjustment to the "desired"
portfolio;
(ii) issues of securities;
(iii) movements in yields, including any pertinent inflation trends;
(iv) the availability of funds—the income or wealth constraint.
We now turn our attention to a review of these factors before we attempt to
include them in the individual demand specifications.
We have already discussed the importance that the liability structure may
have in determining a financial intermediary's investment portfolio strategy.
For example, fixed interest stocks offer income security while equity securities
can provide capital growth, etc. Given the rather homogeneous nature of the
liability issued by the pension funds—the pensionable benefit—it seems logical
to assume that they would be predominantly interested in capital growth with
a keen interest in a stable income over the long term, ie, in equity securities and
low-risk fixed interest assets. This would appear to be borne out by the data
we reviewed in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. If the liability structure had
not changed greatly over the data period then it would be safe to assume that,
while the liability structure is a significant factor in the strategic investment
decision, it has played little part in moulding the changing policy of the
pension funds over our data period. It is in this respect that the pension funds
differ greatly from almost all other financial institutions. Almost every other
intermediary possesses a liability structure that changes over time in response
to the changing demands of savers in the economy and the changing
competition from other financial institutions. This is not the case for pension
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funds in the United Kingdom for two reasons: firstly, the provision of
pensionable benefits has been and remains the sole liability of the pension
fund; and secondly, due to the legal framework within which the pension
funds operate no real competition for pension contributions has manifested
itself. 14 Thus, for the pension funds we may regard the liability structure as
being within the usual ceteris paribus assumption of economic theory, ie, as if
possessing no influence on the investment behaviour of the pension funds.
Also included within the first major factor outlined above is the pension
funds' adjustment to their "desired" portfolio. In theory there are a number of
factors which contribute to the choice of a desired portfolio. If a financial
intermediary practices a policy of matching-immunisation (or strict hedging)
then its liability structure will dominate the choice of both the desired portfolio
and the allocation of new monies. In such a situation the major constraint on
the pension funds' actions will come from the supply side. If a more
speculative investment approach is taken by the pension funds, then other
factors such as yields (in particular) will assume greater importance, even if the
emphasis is on the redirection of new monies to approach the desired portfolio
rather than attempting to change the current portfolio by more active trading.
It is also the case that the availability of stock within a given asset category will
play a primary role in the strategic decision-making process, as we have
suggested earlier. This supply constraint will play a larger r6le for asset
markets in which the pension funds are a dominant force, and also where there
exists a well-established formal primary market, such as is the case in the
United Kingdom for fixed interest securities and equities. Because the supply
constraint is usually regarded as a 'market imperfection' we must, therefore,
recognise the possibility that the portfolio of the pension funds may be
continuously in disequilibrium. 15
 For the most part, time-series data exists on
the volume of issues and we can readily use these to test for their significance
on the pension funds' net acquisitions. This we have done using ordinary least
squares, and the results are set out below in Table 9.1.16
While we have attempted to regress net acquisitions of a given asset
against its own issues figure, because of data restrictions, for British
government securities we have made use cf the overall issues figure,
which includes all maturities. To a very large degree the results obtained by
regressing the net acquisitions of a particular asset against its current net issues
confirm the findings of our investigations into market dominance. 17 That is to
say, we may summarise our regression results as being that issues are of
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Table 9-1: The Impact of Issues on Net Acquisitions (OLSQ)
Dependent NET (self) F-	 data
Variable Constant ISSUES R2 DW statistic	 period
Private Sector:
GILTS 11.0756 0.1103 0.6938 1.6850 199.4090 1963.1-
(0.9167) (14.1212) 1985.11
GS 1.1892 -0.0034 0.0131 1.7331 1.1714	 1963.1-
(0.2472) (-1.00211) 198511
GM -0.5036 0.1156 0.0349 2.3830 3.1867	 1963.1
(-050275) (1.7851) 1985.11
GL 8.2067 0.0876 0.5692 1.9045 116.2740 1963.1-
(0.6531) (10.7830) 1985.11
GLONG 10.3899 0.1022 0.3420 0.8959 18.7134	 1963.1-
(0.7637) (11.6094) 198511
ILTS 147.4080 0.0062 0.0074 1.5013 0.0667	 1982.1V
(2.3411) (-.258301) 1985.11
ORDH 40.7834 0.3935 0.6236 1.3143 149.1340 1963.1-
(3.6085) (12.2120) 1985.IV
COMMON 56.5157 0.5944 0.5342 1.0190 103.2230 1963.1-
(2.8152) (10.1603) 19851V
ORDS 61.7581 0.6008 0.5317 1.0180 102.1080 1963.1-
(3.0283) (10.1000) 1985.IV
DEBS 1.0262 0.0845 0.2698 1.4546 28.8134	 1963.1-
(0.6079) (5.3678) 1982.IV
PREFS -0.1914 0.0848 0.1320 1.9576 11.8645	 1963.1-
(- .885785) (3.4445) 19821V
Public Sector:
GILTS 10.3761 0.0575 0.6032 1.4575 133.7780 19631-
(1.3502) (11.5662) 1985.11
GS 3.1035 -0.0001 0.0000 2.3034 0.0018	 1968.1-
(0.6545) ( - .042403) 198511
GM 1.3198 0.0171 0.1365 1.1704 10.7484	 1968.1-
(0.1446) (3.2785) 1985.11
GL 14.0803 0.0284 0.2093 1.1035 17.9981	 1968.1-
(1.2012) (4.2424) 1985.11
GLONG 7.6324 0.0399 0.4398 1.3720 69.0895	 19631-
(1.0282) (8.3120) 1985.11
1LTS 25.0507 0.0170 0.2825 2.6630 3.5427	 1982.IV
(1.0948) (1.8822) 1985.11
ORDH 38.7666 0.1967 0.5063 1.1391 92.3085	 19631-
(5.5175) (9.6077) 19851V
COMMON 39.3583 0.2979 0.5547 1.0711 112.0930 1963.1-
(4.0761) (10.5874) 1985.TV
ORDS 41.9174 0.2950 0.5422 1.0261 106.5850 1963.1-
(4.2750) (10.3240) 19851V
DEBS 2.4685 0.0218 0.1097 1.3455 9.6078	 1963.1-
(3.2769) (3.0996) 19821V
PREFS 0.0056 0.0198 0.0591 1.9382 4.8986	 19631-
(0.0709) (2.2133) 1982.1V
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Dependent
Variable	 Conslint 
Local Authority Sector;
GILTS	 6.6402
(2.2398)
GS	 -1.6269
(-969232)
GM	 -2.5180
(- .539145)
GL
	
11.4760
(2.2415)
GLONG
	
5.7104
(1.5939)
ILTS
	
10.7217
(0.5924)
ORDH
	
24.2458
(5.5564)
COMMON
	
26.9784
(4.1218)
ORDS
	
29.1564
(4.2586)
DEBS
	
1.1572
(3.0769)
PREFS
	
0.2609
(1.6949)
NET (sdp
IUES
0.0264
(13.7863)
0.0003
(0.2746)
0.0018
(0.3722)
0.0222
(7.2933)
0.0272
(11.7271)
0.0043
(0.6255)
0.1226
(9.6417)
0.1928
(10.1060)
0.1969
(9.8699)
0.0123
(3.5040)
0.0195
(1.1111)
F-	 data
R2	DW	 statkk period
0.6835 1.3248 190.0630 1963.1-
1985.11
0.0010 1.9339 0.0757 1968.1-
19861V
0.0019 1.3852 0.1386 1968.1-
1986IV
0.4182 1.2582 53.1917 19681-
19861V
0.6098 1.3084 137.5240 19631-
1985.11
0.0417 0.9102 0.3912 1982.1V-
1985.11
0.5081 1.0063 92.9630 1963.1-
1985.1V
0.5316 0.8386 102.1320 1963.1-
19851'!
0.5198 0.8207 97.4167 1963.1-
1985.1V
0.1360 1.0287 12.2781 19631-
19821V
0.0156 1.6147 1.2346 1963.1-
19821V
All Pension Funds: 
GILTS	 5.4978
(0.1600)
GS	 30.2669
(1.2060)
GM	 17.9441
(0.3468)
GL	 122.5470
(1.8300)
GLONG	 93.8733
(0.8513)
ILTS	 306.0420
(2.6880)
ORDH	 183.9660
(5.7409)
COMMON	 121.7530
(3.9859)
ORDS	 131.2380
(4.1991)
DEBS	 4.98618
(2.1533)
PREPS
	 0.140874
(0.4669)
0.2475
(11.1401)
-0.0168
(-1.5267)
0.0234
(1.0331)
1.0440
(3.5628)
0.2087
(4.3259)
0.1410
(3.2421)
0.6885
(12.4474)
1.0471
(11.2227)
1.0570
(11.0735)
0.118723
(5.5020)
0.124783
(3.62789)
0.5851 0.8570 124.1020 1963.1-
198511
0.0608 1.4934 2.3310 19761
1985.11
0.0288 2.0525 1.0670 19761
1985.11
0.2607 1.5512 12.8942 19761
1985.11
0.3420 0.8959 18.7134 19761
1985.11
0.5387 1.5755 10.5110 19821V
1985.11
0.6378 1.2723 154.9380 19631-
1985.11
0.5887 0.8129 125.9500 1963.1-
1985.11
0.5822 0.8075 122.6230 1963.1-
1985.11
0.2796 1.3732 30.2727 1963.1-
19821V
0.1444 1.7642 13.1615 1963.1-
1982W
Key: see next page.
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ISgs: GS = short-term government securities
GM = medium-term government securities
GL = long-term government securities
COMMON = domestic and overseas ordinary shares
DEBS = debentures
BONDS = debentures and preference shares
ILTS = Index-Linked Treasury Stock
GLONG = GL + ILTS
GILTS = GS + GM + GL + ILTS
ORDH = domestic ordinary shares
PREFS = preference shares
importance to the pension funds' investment activities only in those markets
in which they are a dominant investor. But this should not come as any
surprise. In all cases it is noticeable that the equations with high values of R2
have as their dependent variable assets which figure prominently in the funds'
portfolio, and in which they may be seen as a dominant investor. Thus,
variations in net acquisitions of British government securities, both of all
maturities, and especially those long-dated, as well as domestic ordinary
shares can be explained to a degree of at least fifty per cent by variations in
their net issues. The equations for net acquisitions of fixed interest company
securities and for short- and medium-dated British government securities
show very poor fit by virtue of very low R2 values. These results also are
confirmed by reference to the t-statistics. 18 Let us examine in detail the results
for each of the three sectors of the pension fund movement as well for the
movement on aggregate.
Starting with the private sector pension funds we notice that the best fit is
obtained in the equations for net acquisitions of British government securities
and for ordinary shares. The British government securities equations perform
well for both all maturities (GILTS) and for long-term securities (GL). When
we include Index-Linked Treasury Stock as a component of long-term
securities (G LONG) the value of R 2 is reduced from 0.5692 to 0.3420. The
equations for net acquisitions of British government securities of short- and
medium-term maturities show very poor fit in terms of R2; in the case of
medium-term gilts the t-statistic (1.7851) indicates significance at the 95%
confidence level, while with short-term gilts the insignificance of issues is
confirmed by the very low t-statistic (-1.002) which is insignificant at the 90%
confidence level (but not at the 80% level). The low fit of these two equations is
confirmed by the F-statistics which, in both cases indicates that we cannot rule
out the insignificance of issues, even at the 95% level. In the case of the
equations for net acquisitions of Index-Linked Treasury Stock (ILTS) we again
find a poor fit indicated by the R2, t- and F-statistics, but given that there are
but eleven quarterly observations this is not entirely surprising. While the
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evidence here does seem to suggest quite strongly that net acquisitions of
Index-Linked Treasury Stock are not influenced by issues, it would be wrong
to make such a firm conclusion on the basis of only a few years' data. Rather,
at this time we should reserve judgment for a future occasion when a longer
time-series is available.
It is particularly interesting to note that the issues variable is negatively
signed in the short-term gilts equation. This would seem to indicate that the
pension funds increase their net acquisitions of short-term gilts when the
government is issuing less securities. This is entirely plausible, given that the
majority of gilts issued are long-term. Furthermore, it is during periods of
economic uncertainty that the government tends to restrain its issuance of
securities; during these same periods, as we have seen, the pension funds tend
to react to the uncertainty by moving their portfolio towards assets of shorter
maturity (ie, greater liquidity).
Turning to the equations for net acquisitions of ordinary shares by the
private sector pension funds we find some rather good fits. The equation for
domestic ordinary shares (ORDH) has extremely good fit indicated by the R 2, t-
and F-statistics. Indeed, the R2
 statistic suggest that some 62% of the variance
of the private sector pension funds' net acquisitions can be explained by
variances in their issues. When the equation was re-estimated including
overseas ordinary shares in the dependent variable (COMMON) we still got a
good fit, but somewhat reduced. This suggests that net acquisitions of
overseas ordinary shares are not influenced by the issue of domestic ordinary
shares. Similarly, we re-estimated the equation using the combined net
acquisitions of domestic ordinary shares, authorised unit trust units and
property unit trust units (ORDS) as the dependent variable. The rationale for
this was that while the larger pension funds tend to purchase shares directly,
many of the smaller funds purchase ordinary shares indirectly through the
acquisition of unit trust and property unit trust units. The result here was once
again an equation of good fit, but less so than for domestic ordinary shares
alone. This would tend to indicate that pension fund acquisitions of unit trust
and property unit trust units are not influenced by issues of ordinary shares.
Indeed, it would seem to be the case that these units may be properly regarded
as a limited substitute for ordinary shares. The same may, of course, also be
said of overseas ordinary shares.
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Turning to the remaining equations, those for fixed-interest company
securities, we find that while the R2 indicates a rather small influence by issues
on the net acquisitions of both debentures and preference shares, this influence
cannot be deemed insignificant due to the t- and F-statistics. In both equations,
the t-statistics on issues are significant at the 99% confidence level, while the F-
statistic confirms that the null hypothesis is not significant at the 99% level.
Moving on to the public sector pension funds we notice that, once again,
the best fit is obtained in the equations for net acquisitions of British
government securities and for ordinary shares. As with the private sector
funds, the British government securities equations perform well for all
maturities (G I LTS) although, unlike the private funds, not quite so well for
long-term securities (GL). Here, when we include Index-Linked Treasury
Stock as a component of long-term securities (G LONG) the value of R 2 is
increased from 0.2093 to 0.4398. The equations for net acquisitions of British
government securities of short- and medium-term maturities show very poor
fit in terms of R2; in the case of medium-term gilts the t-statistic (3.2785) does
indicate significance at the 99% confidence level, while with short-term gilts
the insignificance of issues is confirmed by the very low t-statistic (-.0424)
which is insignificant even at the 70% confidence level (but not at the 60%
level). The low fit of the short-term gilts equation is confirmed by the F-
statistics, but with the medium-term gilts equation we cannot rule out the
significance of issues. In the case of the equation for net acquisitions of Index-
Linked Treasury Stock (ILTS) we again find a poor fit indicated by the R 2, t-
and F-statistics, but as, once again, there are only eleven quarterly observations
this is not entirely surprising. While the evidence here again suggests quite
strongly that net acquisitions of Index-Linked 'Treasury Stock are -not
influenced by issues, it would be wrong to make such a firm condusion on the
basis of a few years data. Again, at this time we should reserve judgment for a
future occasion when a longer time-series is available.
As with the private sector funds, it is again interesting to note that the
issues variable is negatively signed in the short-term gilts equation. As before,
this indicates that the pension funds increase their net acquisitions of short-
term gilts when the government is issuing less securities, for the reasons
previously cited.
Turning to the equations for net acquisitions of ordinary shares by the
public sector pension funds we find some rather good fits yet again. The
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equation for domestic ordinary shares (ORDH) has extremely good fit
indicated by the R2, t- and F-statistics. Indeed, the R2 statistic suggest that
some 50% of the variance of the public sector pension funds' net acquisitions
can be explained by variances in their issues. While this is not quite as good as
the R2 obtained by the private sector funds, it should be remembered that the
public sector funds form a much smaller proportion of the pension fund
industry. Unlike the private sector, when the equation was re-estimated
including overseas ordinary shares in the dependent variable (COMMON) we
got a somewhat improved fit. This implies that net acquisitions of overseas
ordinary shares by the public sector funds are influenced by the issue of
domestic ordinary shares. Similarly, we re-estimated the equation using the
combined net acquisitions of domestic ordinary shares, authorised unit trust
units and property unit trust units (ORDS) as the dependent variable. The
rationale for this was that while the larger pension funds tend to purchase
shares directly, many of the smaller funds purchase ordinary shares indirectly
through the acquisition of unit trust and property unit trust units. The result
here was an equation of better fit, probably due to the much greater number of
smaller pension funds within the public sector. Indeed, the diversity of
pension fund size within this sector may largely account for these results; the
larger public sector funds (often the largest in the country!) tend to be major
purchasers of ordinary shares, often new issues, while the smaller funds tend
to purchase ordinary shares indirectly, via the trusts.
Turning to the remaining equations, those for fixed-interest company
securities, we find that the R2 indicates a terribly small influence on the net
acquisitions of both debentures and preference shares by issues. However, this
influence cannot be deemed entirely insignificant due to the t-statistics. In both
equations, the t-statistics on issues are significant at the 95% confidence level,
but the F-statistics in both cases confirm the significance of the null hypothesis.
The results for net acquisitions by the local authority sector pension funds
are very similar to those of both the other sectors, but closer to those for the
public sector. Once again we find good fits in the overall gilts and ordinary
shares equations. The equations for short- and medium-term gilts tend to be
insignificant, while the equations for long-term gilts show remarkably good fit.
Like the public sector funds, the equation for long-term gilts indusive of Index-
Linked Treasury Stock (GLONG) performs slightly better than that for long-
gilts alone (GL). We get the same kind of poor results for the equation for local
authority funds' net acquisitions of Index-Linked Treasury Stock as we did for
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the other two sectors, and probably for the same reasons. The equations for net
acquisitions of ordinary shares all have R2 values above 0.5 and, in common
with the public sector funds, performance is improved in those equations
which include either the acquisitions of trusts or overseas ordinary shares.
With the two fixed-interest equations we find mostly insignificant results, once
again with the exception of the t-statistic indicating that issues may be
significant in the debentures equation (DEBS). Unlike the public sector funds,
in this case the F-statistic tends to confirm the significance of debentures issues.
Unsurprisingly, the results obtained for all pension funds aggregated
together mirror those for the individual sectors, and in some cases the issues
appear to be a rather more significant factor at this level of aggregation. This is
not entirely surprising, because of the larger proportion of the financial
markets accounted for by the pension funds in toto. Once again, the best fits
occur in the equations for net acquisition of long-gilts, gilts of all maturities,
and ordinary shares. The short- and medium-term gilts equations have very
poor fit, with the negative sign appearing yet again on the issues coefficient in
the short-gilts equation. Inclusion of Index-Linked Treasury Stock improves
the results for the longer-term gilts equation. The major area where we get
totally different results for all pension funds than for any of the individual
sectors is in the equation for net acquisitions of Index-Linked Treasury Stock.
When estimated for each of the sectors individually we got poor results,
implying that issues were not a significant factor in determining the pension
funds' acquisitions of Index-Linked Treasury Stock, yet for all the funds
together we now obtain an R2 of 0.5387, t-statistics which are significant at the
97.5% level (the coefficient on issues is significant at the 99% level), and an F-
statistic which is significant at the 95% level and almost significant at the 99%
level. Thus, while issues did not appear to play a significant role for any of the
sectors individually, on aggregate they do appear to be an important factor in
determining the net acquisitions of Index-Linked Treasury Stock. Similar
results occur in the equations for corporate fixed-interest securities. For the
sectors individually we found issues to be virtually insignificant as a factor
determining their net acquisitions of either debentures or preference shares, yet
for the pension funds in toto we find the results somewhat improved. In the
equations for debentures (DEBS) we find an R2 of 0.2796, while in that for
preference shares (PREFS) the figure is 0.1444. This compares with 0.2698 and
0.1320 respectively for the private sector funds, and R2s below 0.1 for the 'other
two sectors. In both equations we obtain significant t-statistics at the 99% level
for the issues coefficient, and F-statistics which suggest that the null hypothesis
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is not significant at the 99% confidence level. Thus, like Index-Linked Treasury
Stock, the issues of debentures and preference shares are a much greater factor
at the level of the pension funds in toto than at the level of the individual
sectors.
Once again, the equations for net acquisitions of ordinary shares show
remarkably good fit. As with the private sector funds, though not the public or
local authority funds, the inclusion of trusts or overseas ordinary shares lowers
the R2 value somewhat. The importance of issues for the net acquisitions of
ordinary shares is emphasised by the high t- and F-statistic values obtained.
While the results obtained in Table 9-1 are much as we might have
expected given what we observed and deduced in Chapter Eight, there is a
problem and it centres on the Durbin-Watson statistics. In nearly all cases, the
equations estimated revealed evidence of positive autocorrelation of the error
terms with the Durbin-Watson statistic being below the lower limit (d L) at
most significance levels. Because we are dealing with time-series data
expressed in nominal currency units this is not entirely surprising. However,
the existence of autocorrelation does give cause for concern for several reasons.
Firstly, our ordinary least squares (OLSQ) estimators are no longer "best", as
they will no longer have minimum variance; some other estimator will now
have smaller sampling variance, thereby being more efficient. Secondly, given
the evidence for (positive) autocorrelation, ordinary least squares will tend to
give under-estimates of the variances. As a result over-optimistic results for
the significance of the coefficients will be obtained, the F-statistics will be
incorrect, and the R2 will give an overly optimistic view of the success of the
least squares regression. There are several methods for estimating equations in
models in which there is the presence of autocorrelation. We have chosen to
make use of the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure. 19 The results of those
equations re-estimated using this procedure are presented in Table 9-2.
It is interesting to note that for all three sectors and pension funds on
aggregate the various equations for net acquisitions of ordinary shares all
exhibited autocorrelation of the error terms. The same is true for the equations
for net acquisitions of debentures and for some maturities of British
government securities. Across all sectors and on aggregate the equations for
net acquisitions of preference shares consistently showed no evidence of
autocorrelation. The private sector equations typically were less prone to
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Table 9-2: The Impact of Issues on Net Acquisitions (CORC)
Dependent
Variable
	 Constant
NET (self)
ISSUES
F-	 data
R2	 DW	 statistic period
Private Sector:
ORDH
	 78.7483 0.2391 0.6865	 2.2933	 194.902	 1963.1-
(3.5818) (5.8527) 1985.1V
COMMON	 201.567 0.1254 0.7556	 2.1787	 275.173	 19631-
(2.3594) (2.1591) 1985.IV
ORDS	 210.433 0.1218 0.7560	 2.1749	 275.701	 1963.1-
(2.4079) (2.0728) 1985.1V
DEBS	 3.7214 0.0336 0.3473	 2.1248	 40.9728	 1963.1-
(1.3687) (1.8762) 1982.IV
Public Sector:
GILTS	 43.9880 0.0278 0.6602	 2.3835	 168.996	 1963.1-
(2.5626) (4.5925) 1985.11
GM	 8.5157 0.0130 0.2586	 2.0180	 23.3701	 1968.1-
(0.6607) (2.2068) 1985.11
GL	 26.7352 0.0176 0.3786	 2.0725	 40.8713	 1968.1-
(1.5166) (2.4023) 1985.11
GLONG	 19.4443 0.0279 0.5101	 2.0512	 90.5756	 1963.1-
(1.7477) (4.9000) 1985.11
ORDH	 94.9525 0.0286 0.6952	 2.6540	 202.951	 1963.1-
(3.0311) (1.3020) 1985.1
COMMON	 127.381 0.0767 0.7270	 2.4064	 237.015	 1963.1-
(2.3918) (2.5639) 1985.1V
ORDS	 131.912 0.0761 0.7283	 2.3670	 238.615	 1963.1-
(2.3849) (2.5476) 1985.1V
DEBS	 2.8515 0.0169 0.2836	 2.2714	 19.6867	 1963.1-
(2.8204) (2.1665) 1982.W
Local Authority Sector;
GILTS	 8.2324 0.0247 0.7179	 1.8520	 221.440	 1963.1-
(2.0285) (11.0893) 1985.11
GM	 -2.8470 0.0010 0.0888	 1.8954	 7.1147	 1968.1-
(-0.4772) (0.3278) 1986.W
GL	 14.0583 0.0202 0.4961	 1.8587	 71.8707	 1968.1-
(2.8318) (5.9256) 19861V
GLONG	 10.0103 0.0229 0.6620	 1.7841	 170.404	 1963.1-
(1.9204) (8.4403) 1985.11
ILTS	 3.7263 0.0058 0.3372	 1.5943	 4.0706	 19821V-
(0.1177) (1.0564) 1985.11
ORDH
	
38.3751 0.06261 0.6733	 2.8357	 183.450	 1963.1-
(4.0815) (4.3143) 1985.IV
COMMON
	 98.4693 0.0212 0.8660	 2.8284	 575.251	 1963.1-
(2.1633) (1.5621) 1985.IV
ORDS
	 102.541 0.0181 0.8693
	 2.7487	 591.691	 1963.1-
(2.1836) (1.3041) 1985.1V
DEBS
	 1.4568 0.0070 0.3466	 2.0986	 40.8535	 1963.1-
(2.3971) (1.8953) 1982.W
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Dependent
Variable Constant
NET (self)
ISSUES R2 DW
F-	 data
statistic period
All Pension Funds:
GILTS 290.724 0.0894 0.8238 2.3284 406.761 1963.1-
(1.4979) (4.9518) 1985.11
GLONG 93.8733 0.2087 0.3420 0.8959 18.7134 1976.1
(0.8513) (4.3259) 1985.11
ORDH 183.9660 0.6885 0.6378 1.2723 154.9380 1963.1
(5.7409) (12.4474) 1985.11
COMMON 121.7530 1.0471 0.5887 0.8129 125.9500 1963.1-
(3.9859) (11.2227) 1985.11
ORDS 131.2380 1.0570 0.5822 0.8075 122.6230 1963.1-
(4.1991) (11.0735) 1985.11
DEBS 4.98618 0.118723 0.2796 1.3732 30.2727 1963.1-
(2.1533) (5.5020) 1982.IV
-
ILTS = Index-Linked Treasury Stock
GLONG = GL + ILTS
GILTS = GS + GM + GL + ILTS
shares ORDH = domestic ordinary shares
PREFS = preference shares
Ku: GS = short-term government securities
GM = medium-term government securities
GL = long-term government securities
COMMON = domestic and overseas ordinary
DEBS = debentures
BONDS = debentures and preference shares 
autocorrelation, while the local authority equations seemed to exhibit
autocorrelation in almost every case.
In the private sector equations we find improved performance in almost
every aspect: higher R2s, higher F-statistics, and lower t-statistics, as well as
Durbin-Watson statistics that suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
concerning the presence of autocorrelation. Indeed, with the exception of the
debentures equation, the t-statistics imply that all the coefficients are
significant at (at least) the 95% level. In the debentures equation we find that
issues are significant at the 90% level, while the constant is only significant at
the 80% level. A similar picture emerges from the re-estimated public sector
equations. The R2s and F-statistics are typically higher and the t-statistics are
lower. In the various gilts equations the t-statistics suggest that issues are
significant at the 95% confidence level, while the constant is only significant in
the GILTS equation. Perhaps surprisingly, in the equation for net acquisitions
of domestic ordinary shares (OR DH) we find the t-statistic indicating that
issues are not significant. This is not the case when overseas ordinary shares or
the trusts are added to the dependent variable (COMMON and ORDS
respectively). In the debentures equation, while the R 2 and F-statistic imply
that issues are important in determining net acquisitions, the t-statistics only
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indicate the significance of issues at the 90% level; at the 95% level the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
With regards to the re-estimated equations for the local authority pension
funds, while we are consistently finding higher R 2s and F-statistics, and while
the t-statistics are mostly lower, there are some occasions where they are
higher under Cochrane-Orcutt estimation than under ordinary least squares.
Nonetheless, the new results tend to confirm those which we found under
ordinary least squares estimation. For gilts of all maturities and longer-term
gilts, issues appear to be a significant factor according to the t-statistics. For
medium-term gilts and Index-Linked Treasury Stock, the t-statistics still
suggest that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the
Index-Linked Treasury Stock equation confirms this finding. In the equations
for the net acquisitions of ordinary shares, it is only when the dependent
variable is domestic ordinary shares alone that the t-statistic shows issues to be
significant. When overseas ordinary shares or trusts are included the t-statistic
reveals issues to be insignificant. While the debentures equation shows a
much-improved performance in terms of R2 and the F-statistic, the t-statistic
shows issues to be significant only at the 90% confidence level.
Turning to the equations re-estimated for the pension funds on aggregate
we arrive at much the same conclusions. Again there is much-improved
performance in terms of Rs and F-statistics, and generally lower t-statistics.
However, in all cases the t-statistics show issues to be significant at (at least)
the 95% level, thus confirming and strengthening the results of our ordinary
least squares estimations.
In conclusion then, we may make the following inferences. The pension
funds, both in toto and when disaggregated into the three component sectors,
appear to find themselves constrained on the supply side in those markets in
which we found them to be dominant in Chapter Eight. In all cases, we found
the net issues to be a highly significant influence on net acquisitions behaviour
in the markets for British government-issued securities, particularly those of
long-term maturity, and ordinary shares, in all of the three measures used. The
equations for net acquisition of short- and medium-term gilts show net issues
to be a relatively unimportant influence, but given that the issues are
aggregated over all maturities this is not surprising. (It would be interesting to
see how they would perform against net issues data disaggregated by
maturity.) At the level of the pension funds on aggregate we found the net
issues of Index-Linked Treasury Stock to be highly significant, although this
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was not the case for any of the three sectors taken individually. This may be
due in part to the relatively short data-period (necessarily) employed. Given
that the long term nature of the pension fund's liabilities are the most likely
influence on its investment portfolio behaviour (as we have seen), we should
not be surprised that they find their portfolio activities significantly influenced
by the net issues of long-term maturity assets. It is also worth noting that in
terms of the R2 and F-statistics (in particular), the equations for net acquisition
of ordinary shares performed consistently better than those for government-
issued securities. This would seem to support our hypothesis that the pension
funds prioritize their investments, with ordinary shares being considered first.
It would, of course, be interesting to see if such conclusions could also be borne
out by regressing land against its net issues data, but alas such data does not
appear to be readily available. Finally, it should be noted that these regression
equations have given somewhat better performance than in similar studies for
other British financial intermediaries, but in view of the dominance exhibited
by the pension funds in the gilts and ordinary shares markets that is not
entirely surprising.
The next step is to estimate the impact of own-yield on the pension funds'
net acquisition of various assets. To a large degree the own-yield can be seen
as a proxy for the price of a given financial asset, and thus its place as a
parameter in the demand equation is secured. While the own-yield on most
assets is relatively easy to define, there are some assets for which there exists a
multitude of possible proxies, all equally valid a priori. In consequence, for
some assets we have regressed against that multitude of possible proxies; for
example, in the net acquisition of ordinary shares equations we have used the
dividend rate (DIVORD), the earnings rate (ENORD), and the Financial Times
share index (FTINDEX) as proxies for the own-yield. 20 The results of these
estimations using ordinary least squares are presented in Table 9-3.
The results obtained in Table 9-3 bear a certain similarity to those found
in Table 9-1, in that those equations that performed well with net issues as a
regressor also perform well for the own-yield regressor, and vice-versa. Thus,
once again, the equations for net acquisition of short- and medium-term gilts
(GS and GM) and Index-Linked Treasury Stock (ILTS) have no significant
parameters as measured by the t-statistic and the F-statistic, while the equation
for overseas loans and mortgages does have the exchange rate (EXCDOL)
significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level. Nonetheless, given that this
equation has an F-statistic of 3.40046, we cannot rule out.- the impact of the
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exchange rate on net acquisitions of overseas loans and mortgages. However,
each of these equations returns an R2
 of less than 0.1, indicating a rather poor
performance overall. Of these equations, only that for short-term gilts exhibits
autocorrelation as measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW).
Table 9-3: The Impact of Yields on Net Acquisitions (OLSQ)
Dependent
Variable 	 constant	 RGS RGm RGL RGU R2 DW
F.	 data
statistic period
corr.
R2
GILTS	 -46.6254	 -0.71105 -20.8651 2.80351 25.7935 0.1686 2.3149 4.0649 1963.1- 0.1378(-1.6782)	 (-0.0478) (-0.5339) (0.0935) (2.3030) 1985.11
9.87701
	 -1.1791 0.0058 1.6189 0.5098 1963.1- 0.0058(0.5862)	 (-0.7139) 1985.11
GM	 -12.701 3.89916 0.0151 1.867 1.3474 1963.1- 0.0151(-0.3497) (1.1608) 1985.11
-220.76 34.4414 0.2463 0.9127 28.716 19651- Q.2463(-3.1344) (5.3629) 198511
GL2
	
-2.7992 34.7717 0.2228 0.7991 25.229 1963.1- 0.2228
(-2.7395) (5.0228) 1985.11
ILTS	 -239.22	 54.7 260.594 -151.14 -154.42 0.2052 1.7171 0.3873 1982.1V -0.987
(-0.1771) (0.5791) (0.8325) (-0.2991) (-0.3788)
-1985.11
RGL D1VORD ENORD FT1NDEX RDEBS
PREFS	 -3.4798(-1.8625)
0.6992
(1.0691)
0.1934
(0.4083)
-0.1903
(-1.3158)
0.0022	 -0.2159
(0.5166)	 (-0.3608)
0.2055 1.7957 3.827 1963.1-
1982.1V
0.1594
ORDH	 -75.369 -36.358 19.1003 1.2042 0.8053 2.0981 119.96 1963.1- 0.8007(-1.042) (-1.4642) (3.0589) (11.9308) 1985.1V
COMMON	 -359.892 10.5603 13.9755 2.0894 0.8031 0.6934 119.64 1963.!- 0.7985
(-3.1592) (0.3138) (1.6891) (15.8813) 1985.W
ORDS	 -333.667 1.36514 16.8159 2.09083 0.8025 0.6912 119.17 1963.1- 0.7979
(-2.8882) (0.04) (2.0041) (15.6709) 1985.W
DEBS	 39.2761 -2.35362 0.1684 0.9454 15.795 1963.1- 0.1684(5.6029) (-3.9742) 1982.W
BONDS	 36.1177 -2.13788 0.1318 0.8652 13.362 1963.1- 0.1318
(5.2173) (-3.6553) 1985.11
RUKLA HP163 EXCDOL
U1CLA	 -9.81279	 0.86974 0.0549 1.466 4.0083 1965.111 0.0549
(-1.9595)	 (2.002)
- 1983.1
LAND	 -14.9415 0.261864 0.7335 1.577 14-8.62 1967.1- 0.7335
(-1.639) (12.191) 1980.1V
OVERSEAS	 409.144 -145.177 0.3906 0.5628 60.248 1963.1- 0.3906
(10.1422) (-7.7619) 1986.1V
GOVOV	 32.6956 -12.618 0.1843 1.7974 21.232 1963.1- 0.1843
(5.5357) (-4.6078) 1986.1V
ORDOV	 350.592 -85.2507 0.1165 0.7526 5.932 1975.11- 0.1165
(6.1829) (-2.4355) 1986.1V
LMOV	 -0.76057 2.26894 0.0863 2.117 3.4005 1977.1H 0.0863
(-0.3992) (1.844) 1986.1V
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Table 9-4: The Im act of Yields on Net Ac uisitions CORC
Dependent
Variable	 constant	 RGS RGM RGL RGU R2 DW
F-	 data
statistic period
corr.
R2
GILTS	 -51.3755	 -3.02292 -15.1775 -1.88446 27.5661 0.1822 1.9932 4.6779 1963.1- 0.1515
(-2.0895)	 (-0.2239) (-0.4335) (-0.0715) (2.8238) 1985.11
9.06892	 -1.09317 0.042 2.0342 3.8179 1963.1- 0.042
(0.4402)	 (-0.5459) 1985.11
GM -11.1618 3.77114 0.0167 1.9638 1.475 1963.1- 0.0167
(-0.2859) (1.0492) 1985.11
-38.0567 17.6115 0.4735 2.1906 78 254 1963.1- 0.4735
(-0.2889) (1.5018) 1985.11
GL2 79.4728 8.61012 0.5184 2.3487 90.7038 1963.1- 0.5184
(0.5062) (0.62470 1985.11
1LTS 1033.7	 304.702 -314.632 160.162 -253.456 0.6083 2.3281 1.9414 1982.1V -0.5668
(0.968) (2.588) (-0.9935) (0.425) (-0.7769) -1985.11
DIVORD ENORD WINDEX
ORDH -62.2482 -36.3579 19.1803 1.28415 0.8053 2.0981 119.96 1963.1- 0.8007
(-0.7402)	 (-1.4642) (3.0589) (11.9388) 1985.1V
COMMON -174.977	 -42.9973 25.0416 1.95567 0.8886 2.045 231.272 1963.1- 0.8859
(-1.1456)	 (-0.9598) (1.86010 (7.8321) 1985.1V
ORDS -151.946	 -50.7522 27.3537 1.96496 0.8884 2.0432 230.759 1963.1- 0.8857
(-0.9018) (-1.1181) (2.0054) (7.7675) 1985.1V
RDEBS RUKLA HPI63 EXCDOL
DEBS 44.0891 -2.77727 0.3988 2.2695 51.0852 1963.1- 0 3988
(3.6517)	 (-2.7731) 1982.1V
BONDS 39.6549	 -2.4531 0.4098 2.3386 60.4044 1963.1- 0.4098
(3.2195)	 (-2.4015) 1985.11
UICLA -12.1396 1.06338 0.1278 2.1735 9.9667 1965.111 0 1278
(-1.8488) (1.0828)
-1983.1
LAND -14.9833 0.262613 0.7483 2.0545 151.09 1967.1- 0.7483
(-1.2958) (9.8152) 1980.1V
OVERSEAS 382.829 -87.4469 0.7093 2.1345 226.941 1963.1- 0 7093
(3.2906) (-2.0732) 1986.1V
GOVOV 32.8633 -12.6991 0.1838 1.8359 20.9467 1963.1- 0 1838
(5.3869) (-4.4728) 1986.1V
ORDOV 299.167 -37.5577 0.4573 2.1465 37.0711 1975.11 - 0.4573
(2.79760 (-0.57) 1986.1V
LMOV -0.744635 2.32321 0.0929 2.0119 3.5861 19771E1 0.0929
(-0.40940 (1.971) 1986.1V
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While the performance of the other equations is rather better, many of
them exhibit autocorrelation and have therefore been re-estimated by the
Cochrane-Orcutt method. Results of this re-estimation are presented in Table
9-4. While we find an improved F-statistic for the short-term gilts equation,
both coefficients remain insignificant and the R2 remains at a terribly low 0.042.
As already suggested, the equation for medium-term gilts shows abysmal
results. However, the equation for long-term gilts (GL) is a different story.
When estimated by ordinary least squares this equation gave us two significant
coefficients as measured by the t-statistic, but exhibited autocorrelation.. Re-
estimation gave a much-improved R2 (from 0.2463 to 0.4735), but coefficients
that were no longer significant, even at the 5% level. Yet an F-statistic of 78.254
suggests that we cannot rule out the impact of these coefficients on the net
acquisition of long-term gilts by the pension funds. Exactly the same
commentary can be applied to the equations for net acquisitions of all long-
term gilts (ie, including Index-Linked Treasury Stock). This is not entirely
surprising in view of the very poor performance of the Index-Linked Treasury
Stock equation itself.
Turning to company securities we find much better results in the
equations for ordinary shares. While the coefficients on the constant and
dividend rate (DIVORD) are insignificant, the equation for net acquisition of
domestic ordinary shares (ORDH) performs rather well, with an R 2 of .8053 (K2
of .8007), an F-statistic of 119.96, and no sign of autocorrelation. Both the
earnings rate (ENORD) and the FTINDEX are significant, even at the 1% level,
according to their t-statistics. When overseas ordinary shares are included in
the dependent variable (COMMON) ordinary least squares estimation throws
up auto-correlation. Cochrane-Orcutt re-estimation gives similar results to
those for domestic ordinary shares, with a high R 2 (0.8886; K2 of .8859),
significant F-statistic, and the coefficients on earnings and FTINDEX significant
at the 5% level. However, at the 1% level only FTINDEX is significant. When
unit trust and property unit trusts are included in the dependent variable
CORDS) we again find autocorrelation under ordinary least squares estimation,
and high R2 and fe, significant F-statistic, and the coefficients on both earnings
and FTINDEX significant even at the 1% level. Thus, it would seem reasonable
to suggest that the own-yield on ordinary shares is a significant influence upon
the pension funds' net acquisitions of ordinary shares, particularly when the
own-yield is proxied by the Financial Times index, and to a lesser extent by the
earnings rate. Perhaps the only anomalous finding from the various ordinary
shares equations is the negative sign on the constant term, which occurs
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consistently. The only plausible explanation for this must lie with the pension
funds' attitudes towards risk. Given that the return on ordinary shares is likely
to reflect the condition of the macroeconomy, particularly over the longer term,
then the negative constant indicates that during severe recessions, when the
return on ordinary shares in general is likely to be low, if not negative, the
pension funds would prefer to reduce their risks by placing their funds in safer
investment media such as those promising a fixed rate of interest.21
The equations modelling net acquisitions of other company securities
typically perform rather less well than those for ordinary shares. Thus, for
example, while the coefficients on the two parameters are found to be
significant, the ordinary least squares estimation of net acquisition of
debentures (DEBS) exhibits first-order autocorrela don, as indicated by the
Durbin-Watson statistic (DW). Perhaps surprisingly, re-estimation using the
Cochrane-Orcutt method still returns these coefficients as significant, even at
the 1% level. An F-statistic of 51.0852 and an R2
 of 0.3988 give us an equation
of rather good fit. However, this equation does have some rather strange
results, particularly the negative sign on the own-yield factor (RDEBS). The
only possible explanation for a negatively-signed own-yield must deal with the
term structure of interest rates and, to a lesser extent, the sequential allocation
procedure of the pension funds. Thus, we may suggest that while we would
normally expect an increase in the return on debentures to bring about
increased net acquisitions of debentures, such an expectation rests on the
assumption of ceteris paribus. It may be asserted that the negatively-signed
own-yield on debentures reflects the violation of this assumption. Typically,
interest rates tend to move together. Consequently, when the return on
debentures is high we would also expect a high return on other financial assets.
Given the relatively small size of the debentures market, and the additional
risk that corporate securities are seen as incurring vis-d-vis British government-
issued securities, it is likely that any increase in overall interest rates will make
debentures less, rather than more attractive. That the pension funds regard
them as inherently less attractive can be seen by the relatively small and
declining proportion of the pension funds' portfolio for which they account.
Of course, to prove this point would require re-estimation of the equation
using some measure of the yield on debentures relative to other assets, such as
a 'yield gap', which we postpone until later in the chapter. Turning to the
ordinary least squares estimation of the preference shares equation we find no
evidence of autocorrelation, an R 2 of 0.2055, and a low but significant F-statistic
of 3.827. However, as measured by the t-statistic, the only coefficient that is
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significantly different from zero at the 5% level is that on the constant. Given
the rather residual nature with which we have observed the pension funds
regarding these assets, this is not altogether surprising. When we combine
debentures and preference shares into BONDS, we obtain results not unlike
that for the debentures equation. Again, ordinary least squares estimation
exhibits serial correlation of the error term, and Cochrane-Orcutt re-estimation
gives us a significant equation (F-statistic of 60.4044), with rather good fit (R 2 of
0.4098), and significant coefficients on the two parameters, with the return on
debentures (RDEBS) negatively signed once again.
Ordinary least squares estimation of the equation for net acquisition of
United Kingdom local authority securities (UKLA) yields serial correlation
problems. Re-estimation using the Cochrane-Orcutt method is significant (F-
statistic of 9.9667), but with a rather poor fit (R 2
 of 0.1278). The own-yield
coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level, while that on the constant becomes
insignificant at the 1% level, as measured by the t-statistic. This rather poor
performance could once again be taken as an indication of the residual role
played by United Kingdom local authority securities in the pension funds'
portfolio. At the other end of the pension funds' investment priority is net
acquisitions of land. By way of proxy for the own-yield on land we have made
use of the official House Price Index, with 1963 as its base year (HPI63).21A
Estimated by ordinary least squares we find that the Durbin-Watson statistic
gives us inconclusive results as to the existence of serial correlatioa of the etIot
term.22
 Nonetheless, re-estimation by the Cochrane-Orcutt method does little
to change the overall good results obtained. The F-statistic (151.09) shows the
equation to be significant, with rather good fit exhibited by an R 2 of 0.7483.
The t-statistics reveal the constant to be insignificant, but the coefficient on the
own-yield proxy is significantly different from zero, even at the 1% level.
Looking at the first of the equations estimating net acquisitions of
overseas assets (OVERSEAS) by the pension funds we again find evidence of
autocorrelation in the ordinary least squares estimation. Re-estimation by the
Cochrane-Orcutt method gives us a rather high R 2 (0.7093), and an F-statistic of
226.941. Using the dollar exchange rate (EXCDOL) by way of proxy for the
own-yield on overseas assets,22Awe find its coefficient to be significant at the 5%
but not at the 1 00 level, and correctly (ie, negatively) signed. The constant term
is also significant, even at the 1 00 level but, in view of the steady level of net
acquisitions of overseas assets we saw in Chapter Seven, unsurprising. When
we disaggregate the overseas assets the results remain similar, albeit with
Page 401
lower R2s. In the overseas government-issued securities (GOVOV) equation
we find that ordinary least squares estimation gives us no evidence of
autocorrelation, a significant F-statistic, but a rather poor R2 of 0.1843.
However, both the constant term and the correctly signed own-yield proxy
(EXCDOL) have coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
The overseas ordinary shares (OR DOV) equation exhibits autocorrelation
under ordinary least squares estimation. Cochrane-Orcutt re-estimation gives
a significant F-statistic (37.0711) and a surprisingly high R2 of 0.4573 in view of
the insignificant coefficient on the correctly signed own-yield proxy. Finally,
the overseas loans and mortgages (LMOV) equation, estimated by ordinary
least squares, exhibits no evidence of autocorrelation, has a low but significant
F-statistic of 3.4005 and an extremely low R2 of 0.0863. The own-yield
coefficient is significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level, while that on
the constant is not significantly different from zero. This is the only equation
for net acquisition of overseas assets in which the own-yield proxy (EXCDOL)
is positively signed. One suspects that this may largely be due to the use of the
exchange rate as a proxy for the own-yield.
To summarise the results for regression of net acquisition against own-
yields, we typically got rather good results from those assets which account for
substantial proportions of the pension funds' portfolio. The best results were
for the various net acquisitions of ordinary shares equations, with those for
land and (all) overseas assets also showing strong fit. While the gilts equation
did not perform particularly well, when disaggregated we got fairly good
results for gilts of long-term maturity and, somewhat surprisingly, for Index-
Linked Treasury Stock. All of the other assets equations performed rather
poorly, giving further credence to their status as residual assets and the
hierarchical investment decision-making process of the United Kingdom
pension funds.
Given that we are positing that a sequential investment procedure is
adopted by the United Kingdom pension funds, it is important in the
construction of our model to test for such a sequence. Let us call that asset
group which has first call on the pension funds' investment funds the "primary
asset", and those that have next priority "secondary assets"; it therefore
follows that the demand for secondary assets would likely depend less on their
own-yield than on a yield-gap between their own-yield and that on the
primary asset. Similarly, any income or wealth constraint upon demand for
secondary assets would have to use a residual measure of income that excludes
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those funds that have previously been allocated to investment in the primary
asset. We might refer to such a measure as "secondary income". The next step,
then, is to estimate the impact of the relevant yield-gap on the pension funds'
net acquisition of various assets, followed by estimation of the the impact of
"secondary income".
Elsewhere (Cohen, 1981) we have attempted to model a sequential invest-
ment procedure where, following the Dodds' model for U.K. life insurance
companies, British-government securities were the primary asset. 23 While the
results obtained there were quite good, there is no doubt that the evidence of
earlier chapters of this Thesis suggests quite strongly that it is ordinary shares
that form the pension funds' primary asset and not British-government
securities. Thus, in Table 9-5 we present results for net acquisitions of various
assets against their relevant yield-gap (own-yield minus ordinary shares yield).
Because our previous estimations have indicated the Financial Times share
index (FTINDEX) to be the best proxy for the own-yield on ordinary shares it is
employed in the estimations recorded below. For obvious reasons, there is no
equation estimated for net acquisitions of ordinary shares.
Looking first at the equations for net acquisitions of government
securities, we find that in regressing net acquisitions of all gilts against the
various possible yield-gaps we get an improved performance over the own-
yield equation. The correlation coefficients show improvement, the F-statistic
reveals that the null hypothesis can be safely rejected, and the Durbin-Watson
statistic suggests that there is no serial correlation in the error terms. However,
the t-statistics show that only the coefficients on the constant, the long yield-
gap ("Iongap") and the undated yield-gap ("undgap") are significantly
different from zero at the five per cent level. This is not really surprising given
the results of the own-yield equations. What is surprising, however, is the
negative sign on the undated yield-gap coefficient; a priori we would expect
this to be positively signed (like that on long-term gilts), showing a relative
increase in the yield on undated securities leading to increased net acquisition
of gilts ceteris paribus. One plausible explanation is that undated gilts tend to
account for a very small percentage of total gilt acquisitions, so that the
negative sign may be the reflection of a statistical anomaly due to a violation of
the ceteris paribus assumption. The net acquisitions of short-term gilts and
medium-term gilts equations likewise both show some improvement over their
own-yield counterparts. The equation for net acquisition of medium-term gilts
has t-statistics showing the coefficients to be significantly different from zero at
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the five per cent level, a significant F-statistic, no evidence of serial correlation,
and a low but not insignificant R2. The sign on the yield-gap (medgap) is
negative, however, in contradiction of our a priori expectations. In the short-
term gilts equation the Durbin-Watson statistic shows that there is positive
serial correlation and so this equation was re-estimated using the Cochrane-
Orcutt (CORC) procedure (see Table 9-6). While re-estimation does remove the
problem of serial correlation, the t-statistics still reveal that the coefficients are
not significantly different from zero, a point enhanced by the rather low F-
statistic (2.783) and extremely low R2.
Table 9-5: The Impact of Yield-Gaps on Net Acquisitions
OLSQ
Dependent
Variable	 constant shortgap medgap	 longap	 undgap R2 DW
F-	 data
statistic period
corr.
R2
GILTS -220.319 23.3893 -231.956 371.016	 -163.925 0.5378 2.1914 24.721 1963.1- 0.5207
(-2.9803) (0.3922) (-1.0908) (2.2131)	 (-4.7404) 19852
-24.4642 -0.429906 0.0134 1.547 0.5721 1963.1- 0.0134
(-1.16370 (-0.75630 1985.11
GM -105.863 -0.464982 0.2131 2.1169 11.376 1963.1- 0.2131
(-2.0777) (-3.3728) 1985.11
431.599 0.1632 0.0065 2.0747 0.2734 1963.1- 0.0065
(3.7391) (0.5227) 1985.11
GL2 -75.5217 -1.23492 0.271 1.6642 32.854 1963.1- 0.271
(-1.3584) (-5.7318) 1985.11
ILTS 105.428 188.419 -188.592 0	 0 0.1507 1.3691 0.2218 1982.W -1.1232
(0.2932) (0.7564) (-0.7578) (0) (0)
-1985.11
debgap
DEBS 14.197 0.0096 0.0015 0.8232 0.1181 1963.1 -	 0.0015
(2.652) (0.3439) 1982.W
PREFS 0.13958 -0.686119 1.01799 0	 -0.3338 0.0424 1.6184 0.9417 1963.1- -0.0131
(0.1827) (-1.6255) (1.1062) (0)	 (-0.5752) 1982.1V
BONDS 13.5639 12.3332 -5.02145 -21.7658	 14.4679 0.3331 1.5103 9.3663 1963.1- 0.3331
(1.7635) (2.779) (-0.3254) (-1.8569)	 (3 .09 8 8) 1985.11
Iuklagap	 HPgap excgap
UICLA 0.42054 0.002775 0.0005 1.4231 0.0323 1965.111 0.0005
(0.1319) (0.1792) 1983.1
LAND 55.0052 0.2261096 0.2913 0.4947 28.363 1967.1- 0.2913
(5.753) (5.3255) 1980.W
OVERSEAS 91.3478 -0.230484 0.0153 0.3206 1.4598 1963.1- 0.0153
(2.5926) (-1.2081) 1986.W
ORDOV 302.121 0.127532 0.0071 0.8046 0.2701 1975.11- 0.0071
(5.2337) (0.5194) 1986.W
LMOV -0.318384 -0.012584 0.0646 2.0956 2.4879 1977.111 0.0646
(-0.1685) (-1.5773) 1986.11I
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Table 9-6: The Impact of Yield-Gaps on Net Acquisitions
CORC
Dependent
Variable	 constant shortgap medgap	 longap	 undgap R2 DW
F-	 data	 corr.
statistic period	 R2
GILTS -225.707	 18.2461 -225.117 373.71	 -168.392 0.5407 1.9959 24.7206 1963.1-	 0.5235
(-3.2564)
	 (0.3227) (-1.11040 (2.3475)	 (-5.2861) 1985.11
-22.604	 -0.0378 0.0636 2.05 2.783 1963.1-	 0.0636
(-0.8786)	 (-0.5581) 1985.11
GM -122.027 -0498 0.2462 2.0462 13.3934 1963.1-	 0.2462
(-2.5727) (-3.9838) 1985.11
OL 460.26 0.224 0.021 1.96 0.8776 1963.1-
	 0.021(4.3022) (0.778) 1985.11
GL2 -72.1008 -1.221 0.2898 2.0285 35.4976 1963.1-
	 0.2898(-1.08520 (-4.8023) 1985.11
ILTS -819.249	 128.696 142.427 -103.997	 -168.436 0.5128 2.5173 1.0525 1982.1V	 -0.9488(-1.3459)	 (0.5456) (0.18190 (-0.1182) -0.3955)
-1985.11
debgap
DEBS 11.9169 -0.0005 0.3451 2.4201 40.5832 1963.1-	 0.3451(1.2482) (-0.0109) 1982.TV
PREFS -0.0272	 -0.3772 0.1368 0.4581	 -0.2203 0.0808 2.0765 1.8453 1963.1-
	 0.0275(-0.0286)
	 (-0.6066) (0.0635) (0.2724)	 (-0.3353) 1982.IV
BONDS 10.328	 14,159 -22.9883 -0.1432	 8.958 0.3862 2.2203 11.6418 1963.1-
	 0.3862
(1.0472) (2.9134) (-1.3704) (-0.0106)	 (1.6655) 1985.11
ukiagap HPgap excgap
U1CLA -0.0665 0.0006 0.083 2.1937 6.1539 1965.111	 0.083
(-0.0156)	 (0.0274)
- 1983.1
LAND 78.6431 0.1185 0.6963 2.602 155.907 1967.1-	 0.6963
(3.2527) (1.8236) 1980.IV
OVERSEAS 9.2689 0.0868 0.0014 1.4691 0.1275 1963.1-	 0.0014
(2.0643) (0.3569) 1986.1V
ORDOV 280.977 -0.0782 0.3609 2.147 20.8931 1975.11 - 0.3609
(2.9266) (-0.2223) 1986.IV
LMOV 0.3173 -0.013 0.0688 2.0134 2.5857 1977.111	 0.0688
(-0.1732) (1.971) 1986.1V
Out of all the equations estimating net acquisition of government
securities, only that for long-term gilts (GL) gives worse results using yield-
gaps rather than own-yields. Here, while the coefficient on the yield-gap is
correctly signed, there is an R2
 that is close to zero (0.0065), and t- and F-
statistics that suggest that the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. However,
when we incorporate Index-Linked Treasury Stock as an element of long-term
gilts (G L2) the results are markedly improved, both over the previous
incarnation and over the equation using the own-yield. The t-statistic now
indicates that the coefficient on the yield-gap (longap) is significantly different
from zero, the F-statistic suggests that the null hypothesis should be rejected,
and the R2
 is now at 0.271. However, the sign on the yield-gap and the Durbin-
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Watson statistic, which lies in the region of indeterminate results, both give
cause for concern. Re-estimation using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure
eliminates the problems of serial correlation and raises the R 2 value (0.2898),
but leaves an incorrectly-signed yield-gap and an equation that is
outperformed by its own-yield counterpart. The equation for net acquisitions
of Index-Linked Treasury Stock also performs worse than its own-yield
counterpart in terms of all statistical measures.
Of the remaining equations only two perform better using yield-gaps
than own-yields: that for BONDS, ie, debentures and preference shares
together, and that for LAND. However, in the BONDS equation, using
ordinary least squares estimation results in a Durbin-Watson statistic that
reveals positive serial correlation of the error terms. Perhaps surprisingly, re-
estimation by the Cochrane-Orcutt method implies that the own-yield is a
better regressor than the yield-gap postulated here. In the equation for net
acquisition of LAND estimated by ordinary least squares, the Durbin-Watson
statistic reveals there to be positive serial correlation of the error terms. While
re-estimation using Cochrane-Orcutt does not entirely eliminate the problem,
the results obtained do reveal a high R2 statistic (0.6963) and an F-statistic that
suggests that the null hypothesis should be rejected. However, these results
should be viewed with caution. In all other equations the results of the yield-
gap estimation typically under-perform their own-yield counterparts.
In summary then, we may suggest that for the most part the yield-gap
between an assets own-yield and that on ordinary shares is not a relevant
parameter in the demand equation. The only exceptions to this result are the
equations for net acquisition of government securities. The implication of this
finding is quite apparent: that is that government securities are considered by
the pension funds as substitutes for ordinary shares to a high degree, whereas
the other assets are not considered as direct substitutes for ordinary shares. An
additional possibility that comes to mind is that there is more than a two-stage
sequence involved in the pension funds' investment allocation procedure. In
the first stage they decide how much to allocate to ordinary shares, although
this seems to depend partly on the yield on gilts; in the second stage funds are
allocated to fixed-rate instruments, especially gilts; and in the third stage, the
remaining funds are allocated to the remaining asset categories.
As we have already suggested, for a sequential investment procedure as
well as considering the impact of yield-gaps, a measure of "secondary" or
Page 406
"residual income" is also required. Estimation by the ordinary least squares
method of the impact of total income on the pension funds' net acquisition of
ordinary shares and of secondary income on their net acquisitions of various
other assets is presented below in Table 9-7.
Table 9-7: The Impact of Income on Net Acquisitions (OLSQ)
TOTAL-
COMMON
TOTAL-
ORDH
Dependent
Variable 	 constant TOTAL INCOME2 INCO1VIE3
F-	 dataR2	DW	 statistic period
ORDH 25.8873 0.318892 0.8249	 1.7114	 424.092 19631 -
(1.6971) (20.5935) 19851V
COMMON -32.1786 0.536061 0.9191	 1.1134	 1022.66	 1963.1-
(-1.9495) (31.9791) 19851V
ORDS -26.3856 0.543837 0.9227	 1.1834	 1074.91	 1963.1-
(-1.6155) (32.7858) 1985.1V
GILTS -51.1557 0.760138 0.5265	 1.9325	 97.8557	 1963.1-
(-1.3744) (9.8922) 1985.11
GS -44.1616 0.0500365 0.0288	 1.5945	 1.24716 19631 -
(-1.3919) (1.1167) 1985.11
GM -107.848 0.224887 0.0787	 1.7244	 3.58939	 1963.1-
(-1.2831) (1.8945) 1985.11
GL 234.376 0.217375 0.0181 2.0286	 0.77267	 19631 -
(1.3383) (0.8789) 198511
GL2 -33.6063 0.63686 0.4002 2.0548	 58.7248	 1963.1-
(-0.8349) (7.6632) 1985.11
LLTS 258.477 -0.0542429 0.0085	 1.4081	 0.06863	 1982.1V
(1.4101) (-0.2619) -198511
DEBS 15.6077 -0.106602	 0.024	 0.9172	 1.98528	 1963.1-
(5.0627) (-1.4088)
	
1982.1V
PREFS 0.021469 0.0016922	 0.0611	 1.5781	 5.72194	 1963.1-
(0.0627) (2.3919)
	
1982.1V
BONDS 15.4184 -0.0075736	 0.0122 0.9683	 0.96273	 1963.1-
(4.8993) (-0.981)
	
1985.11
UKLA -2.33587 0.0068047	 0.0346	 1.452	 2.47307 196511
(-1.2384) (1.5725)	 -1983.1
LAND 18.1765 0.210831	 0.7103	 1.7486	 169.28	 1967.1-
(2.5561) (13.0076)	 19801V
LM 22.5855 -0.0320294	 0.1331	 1.5752	 10.5975	 19631 -
(5.2322) (-3.2554)	 1985.11
OVERSEAS -21.9326 0.4033297	 0.3966 0.6604	 61.7931	 1963.1-
(-0.871) (7.8608)	 1986.1V
ORDOV -195.28 0.490477	 0.5631	 1.0127	 48.9756	 1975.11 -
(-2.7115) (6.9982)	 1986.1V
LMOV 3.9506 -0.0020135 0.0079	 1.975	 0.28789	 1977.111
(1.0048) (-0.5365)	 19861V
GOVOV -0.513414 0.0177153	 0.1017	 1.776	 10.6454	 1963.1-
(-0.1392) (3.2627)	 1986.1V
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The proxy measure of the pension funds' income chosen was TOTAL,
which measures the total amount spent on investments and on short-term
assets, including cash. It could be argued that the NETTOT variable might be a
better proxy for income as it also includes long-term liabilities, such as
borrowing from both domestic and foreign monetary and financial institutions.
However, the position was taken that the TOTAL variable better represents the
amount of income that the pension funds expect to be able to allocate to the
purchases of investment assets, any shortfall being made up by long-term
borrowing from domestic and foreign monetary and financial institutions.
Indeed, this is borne out by the econometric evidence (not shown here), which
found TOTAL to be a more significant regressor than NETTOT in the equations
for net acquisitions of virtually all asset categories.
Turning to the results in Table 9-7 we note first the very high R 2s in the
equations for the net acquisition of ordinary shares. These are much higher
than in any equation previously estimated. Indeed, such a high degree of
correlation tends to confirm the hypothesis that the pension funds do indeed
operate a sequential investment procedure with ordinary shares as their
"primary asset". Before commenting on the equations estimating the impact of
residual income on net acquisition of "secondary assets", for comparison
purposes we should comment on the results of estimating net acquisition of
"secondary assets" against the pension funds' income (TOTAL). In all cases,
the secondary assets' equations exhibited radically inferior performance to
those of the ordinary shares' equations, and consequently we do not present
those results here.
Of the three equations for net acquisition of ordinary shares, the best
performance is by that for all ordinary shares, both domestic and foreign and
inclusive of unit trust units (OR DS). One inference we might draw from this is
that the same hierarchy of investment sequence—ordinary shares first, etc—is
adopted by all (or, at least, most) pension funds, regardless of size. Despite the
Durbin-Watson statistics' evidence of autocorrelation in the ordinary least
squares estimates of the latter two equations, these same conclusions are
suggested by the revised Cochrane-Orcutt estimates in Table 9-8. However,
because of the relatively small impact of the various unit trust units on the
overall portfolio of the pension funds in toto the measure of residual income
used was that of total income after allocation of funds to domestic and foreign
ordinary shares (INCOME2 = TOTAL - COMMON). The only exceptions to this
are the equations estimating the net acquisition of non-domestic assets; these
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are regressed against income after expenditure on domestic ordinary shares
alone (INCOME3).
Table 9-8: The Impact of  Income on Net  Acquisitions (CORC)
I TOTAL- I TOTAL-
COMMON ORDH
ependent	
anariable	 constt
'
TOTAL INCOME2 INCOME3 R2 DW
F-	 data
statistic period
•RDH 27.6472 0.316874 0.8270 2.0468 425.443 1963.1-
(1.5576) (17.833) 19851V
OMNION -25.0148 0.526264 0.9329 2.0534 1237.13 1963.1 -
( -0.9509) (20.9724) 1985.1V
•RDS -20.4587 0.538304 0.9336 2.0225 1251.89 1963.1 -
( -0.8203) (22.3042) 1985.IV
ILTS -50.6194 0.758647 0.5248 1.9945 96.0831 1963.1 -
(-1.3031) (9.5342) 1985.11
-35.4029 0.037195 0.0694 2.0645 3.05791 1963.1 -
(-1.0141) (0.7738) 1985.11
- 127.324 0.244748 0.1085 1.9692 4.98892 1963.1 -
(- 1 .435) (1.9836) 1985.11
276.495 0.164833 0.0174 1.9626 0.726537 1963.1-
(1.59) (0.6739) 1985.11
L2 -34.4885 0.639351 0.3985 2.0 57.6382 1963.1 -
( -0.8665) (7.8069) 1985.11
II TS 79.5926 0.12366 0.1378 1.8745 1.1185 1982.1V
(0.4259) (0.6287) - 1985.11
INEBS -0.667272 0.0381163 0.3995 2.5071 51.2293 1963.1 -
( -0.0798) (3.357) 19821V
REFS -0.023708 0.00173251 0.1046 2.0834 10.1596 19631 -
( -0.0566) (2.0623) 19821V
i: ONDS 1.08695 0.036155 0.3446 2.5087 40.4887 1963.1 -
(0.1419) (3.0583) 198511
-2.67523 0.00747575 0.1083 2.1912 8.26113 1965.111
(-1.0881) (1.3978) - 19831
AND 23.7225 0.195532 0.7135 2.0181 169.345 1967.1 -
(2.7858) (10.3586) 1980.1V
21.4347 -0.0283407 0.1734 1.9806 14.2649 1963.1-
(3.9973) (-2.4026) 198511
VERSEAS -32.3987 0.340885 0.8325 2.0964 462.173 1963.1-
(-0.984) (9.3304) 1986.1V
•RDOV -114.766 0.420539 0.6599 2.002 71.7832 1975.11-
(-1.3717) (5.7654) 1986.1V
MOV 4.27978 -0.0022661 0.01 1.9961 0.354711 1977.111
(1.8381) (-0.5815) 1986.1V
OVOV -0.518204 0.0177464 0.1087 1.7666 10.4135 1963.1-
(-0.1391) (3.2511) 1986.IV
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In looking at the overall impact of residual income on net acquisitions of
those assets we have hypothesised as being "secondary assets" there are a
number of observations we might make. First, as we have already suggested,
in many cases the use of secondary income typically gives superior
performance to the use of total income as a regressor. In those cases where the
reverse appears to be true, Table 9-7 reveals either an F-statistic that validates
the null hypothesis or a Durbin-Watson statistic that reveals there to be serial
correlation of the error terms. These cases include the equations for short-term
gilts (GS), medium-term gilts (GM), Index-Linked Treasury Stock (ILTS),
debentures (DEBS), United Kingdom local authority securities (UKLA), land,
property and ground rent (LAND), and the various overseas assets. In the cases
where serial correlation occurs, re-estimation using the Cochrane-Orcutt
method does little to change the conclusion that total income works better than
secondary income, as a comparison of Table 9-8 with 9-7 reveals. However, as
the R2
 values are remarkably low (below 0.1) there is little of value that we
might infer from this. The equations for net acquisition of short-term gilts,
long-term gilts, Index-Linked Treasury Stock, and overseas loans and
mortgages all result in F-statistics that confirm the null hypothesis. This
indicates that income, in either of the forms chosen here is not a serious
candidate for inclusion in the regression equation. The implication here is that
these are considered by the pension funds to be a residual part of their
portfolio. Indeed, the evidence of Chapter Eight in terms of the percentage of
the portfolio accounted for by these assets tends to confirm this view. One
possible conclusion we might draw is that the pension funds adopt a more
than two-stage sequence in their investment allocation process, with these
assets being considered almost as an afterthought.
Perhaps the most surprising result obtained above, given the postulated
sequential investment procedure, is the equation for the net acquisition of land,
property and ground rent, which does better with the total income regressor.
At first, one might be tempted to suggest that this implies that land, etc, should
be considered as a "primary asset" alongside ordinary shares. Indeed, as we
noted in Chapters Seven and Eight, both of these asset categories involve
holdings of equity. However, a second possible explanation that also seem
likely in view of the evidence of Chapter Eight is that land, property and
ground rent is considered by the pension funds to be highly complementary to
ordinary shares.
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In summary then, we might offer the following inferences. The evidence
of the regressions estimated above suggest very strongly that the United
Kingdom pension funds do indeed practice a sequential investment procedure.
The extremely superior performance of the various equations for net
acquisition of ordinary shares tends to confirm their status as the "primary
asset" of the pension funds. The slightly reduced performance of the equation
for net acquisition of land, property and ground rent, in combination with the
superior impact of total income suggests that land is either a close "secondary
asset" or a highly complementary asset to ordinary shares. The performance of
the equation for net acquisition of gilts also suggests that it is considered a
"secondary asset" of quality. However, disaggregation suggests that it is the
longer-term gilts that are the real "secondary asset", with short-term gilts in
particular being almost residual. Similarly for the equation for net acquisition
of overseas assets, although this result is coloured to a degree by inclusion of
overseas ordinary shares!
We have now completed an examination of the individual impact of net
issues, yield, yield-gaps, income and residual income on net acquisition of the
various asset categories which form the portfolio of the United Kingdom
pension funds. Thus, we are now in a position to bring together the individual
elements we have just examined and begin specification of the individual
demand equations for the major asset classes we are considering.
9.4 Individual Demand Specification
In the previous section we have attempted to isolate some of the variables
that play a significant role in the determination of the net acquisitions of
various assets by the United Kingdom pension funds. Bearing in mind the
usual caveats concerning the limitations of econometric evidence and those
necessarily imposed due to data inadequacy we bring together the variables
we have considered in the previous section to consider their joint impact on the
pension funds' net acquisitions. We commence by examining demand for the
pension funds' "primary asset", ordinary shares.
9.4.1 Pension Fund Demand: Ordinary Shares
What then are the parameters that influence the demand for ordinary
shares by the United Kingdom pension funds? Based on the evidence of
Chapters Seven and Eight we have postulated that ordinary shares constitutes
the "primary asset" of the portfolio held by the pension funds. In Chapter
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Seven we suggested that this might be the case as a result of 'maturity
matching' or 'hedging' on the part of the pension funds. That is to say, that
with their liabilities increasing in line with the general level of economic
activity, it makes sense to purchase assets whose values are also likely to
increase in tandem with the general level of economic activity. It is quite
apparent that equity assets typically exhibit these characteristics. The superior
appeal of ordinary shares over other equity assets (eg, land, property and
ground rent) lies particularly in their greater marketability, and hence lower
risk. It therefore follows that the acquisition of ordinary shares by the pension
funds will reflect their future liabilities, and this in turn is reflected by
incoming monies to the pension funds. These incoming funds will also act as
an income constraint on the pension funds' investment behaviour, as we have
already discussed. Given that the objective of the pension funds is to
"...maximise the expected return on their assets, subject to the need for
diversifying the portfolio to reduce risk",24 the degree to which the portfolio is
added to by the net acquisition of ordinary shares should be influenced by the
return on ordinary shares. As suggested earlier, this corresponds to the impact
of own-price on quantity demanded in a traditional demand equation. Finally,
as we saw in Chapter Eight, the pension funds exhibit dominance to a high
degree in the United Kingdom ordinary shares market, and thus we must
include a supply-side constraint in our demand equation.
In summary, then, the parameters that are posited as influencing the
demand for ordinary shares by the United Kingdom pension funds are the
pension funds' income (TOTAL), the yield on ordinary shares (FTINDEX), and
net issues of ordinary shares (ORDISS). We have already examined the
influence each of these exerts individually on the pension funds' demand for
ordinary shares; now we examine the extent of their combined influence. In
Table 9-9 we present the results of ordinary least squares estimation of such
demand equations.
Table 9-9: The Demand for Ordinary Shares (OLSQ)
Dependent
Variable	 constant
NET
ISSUES
OWN-
YIELD INCOME R2 DW-	 .
F-	 data
statistic period
corr.
R2
ORDH	 14.0416 0.26338 0.14035 0.20838 0.8639 2.0133 181.99 1963.1- 0.8606
(0.7682) (5.1953) (1.0744) (7.4445) 1985.11
ORDS	 -17.1747 0.23831 -0.046 0.47013 0.9339 1.1856 405.01 1963.1- 0.9323
(-0.839) (4.1974) (-0.3144) (14.9965) 1985.11
COMMON -24.7841 0.24748 -0.02449 0.45468 0.9324 1.1235 .395.23 1963.1- 0.9308
(-1.2152) (4.3748) (-0.168) (14.5568) ,1985.11
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Table 9-10: The Demand for Ordinary Shares (CORC)
Dependent
Variable	 constant
NET
ISSUES
OWN-
YIELD INCOME R2 DW-
F-
statistic
data
period
corr.
R2
ORDH 14.5628 0.26275 0.13808 0.20871 0.863 1.9528 178.47 1963.1- 0.8597
(0.8084) (5.184) (1.0767) (7.5799) 1985.11
ORDS -24.4095 0.24044 0.07655 0.44012 0.9447 1.9794 483.76 1963.1- 0.9434
( -0.78) (4.5089) (0.3808) (10.7372) 1985.11
COMMON -32.416 0.24793 0.09813 0.42588 0.9451 2.0012 487.71 1963.1- 0.9438
(-1.0089) (4.7496) (0.4825) (10.3305) 1985.11
Based on the Durbin-Watson statistics in Table 9-9, the only equation not
exhibiting autocorrelation is that for net acquisitions of domestic ordinary
shares alone (0 RDH). Re-estimation by the Cochrane-Orcutt method seems to
eliminate this problem, as evidenced by the data in Table 9-10. In all three
cases we find similar results, with extremely high measures of "goodness of
fit", with corrected R2s in the high 0.9s for the two 'inclusive' equations and in
the high 0.8s in the domestic shares equation. The significance of each of these
equations is strongly implied by the three-figure F-statistics. However, a
consideration of the t-statistics reveals a slightly different picture. In each of
the three equations the coefficients on the net issues and income variables
prove to be significantly different from zero, while that on the own-yield does
not. This latter finding does pose something of a quandary in view of the high
R2s obtained when we regressed net acquisitions against yield earlier (Tables 9-
3 and 9-4). A number of possible interpretations may be gleaned from these
results. Firstly, it is pleasing to record that, with the exception of the
negatively signed constants in the more inclusive equations (ORDS and
COMMON as earlier), all coefficients are positively signed as one would expect
a priori. It would also seem to be the case that the primary influences on the net
acquisition of ordinary shares are the total income of the pension funds and the
net issues of ordinary shares, with the own-yield playing a much smaller
(apparently statistically insignificant) role. What is perhaps surprising is that
this applies to each of our categories of net acquisition of ordinary shares:
domestically, overseas, and including those acquired via unit trust units.
While one can readily see how the pension funds' net acquisitions of overseas
ordinary shares and unit trust units are (positively) influenced by the pension
funds' income, it is less easy to explain the manner in which they are
influenced by net issues of domestic ordinary shares. Presumably it is the much
larger proportion of domestic ordinary shares in both ORDS and COMMON
that brings about these results.
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9.4.2 Pension Fund Demand: Land, Property and Ground Rent
Land, property and ground rent shares similar characteristics with the
"primary asset" of the pension funds' portfolio, ordinary shares. In particular,
because they are both equity assets their values are likely to increase in tandem
with the general level of economic activity. We have also seen in Chapters
Seven and Eight that land, property and ground rent constitutes a significant
proportion of the pension funds' portfolio, averaging around ten per cent of
both total holdings and net acquisitions. However, as pointed out in Chapter
Seven (page 7-22), the need for specialised knowledge, the low marketability,
and the high costs of land and property, both initially and in terms of
commitment to a series of future payments, make it an attractive investment
only for the much larger pension funds. An additional investment incentive is
the relatively scarce supply of land and property in the United Kingdom,
making it a virtual certainty that prices will increase so long as their is no major
decline in the population.
As with ordinary shares, the pension funds' ability to acquire land and
property will be largely influenced by the amount of monies flowing into the
funds. This was confirmed by our earlier econometric tests (using TOTAL
rather than NETTOT, as was the significant influence of the "own yield" on
land and property as proxied by a house price index. The scarce supply of
land and property does indicate that "issues" should be considered as a
parameter of the demand equation, however, the paucity of data forces this to
be an untestable proposition, as we discussed earlier. Thus, taking the pension
funds' net acquisitions of land, property and ground rent and regressing
against income and yield we obtain the results shown in Table 9-11.
Table 9-11: The Demand for Land, Property and Ground Rent
ESTIMATION
METHOD
constant	 °WN" INCOME
YIELD
R2 DW F-statistic
data
period
corr.
R2
OLSQ
CORC
-8.60015
(-1.1837)
-8.78975
(-1.-273)
0.155392
(3.0624)
0.160131
(2.8663)
0.058231
(2.32040
0.055557
(2.0482)
0.8027
0.8059
1.6751
2.0395
140.326
141.155
19631-
1980.IV
1963.1 -
1980.IV
0.7998
0.803
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While ordinary least squares (OLSQ) estimation reveals autocorrelation,
re-estimation by the Cochrane-Orcutt method (CORC) eliminates it, as
evidenced by the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW). Even with our inability to
include "issues" as an independent variable, we find that the equation
performs remarkably well. A corrected R 2 of 0.803 suggests that over eighty
per cent of the variation in net acquisitions of land, property and ground rent
by the pension funds can be explained by variations in the yield on land and
the pension funds' total income. Both the F-statistic and the t-statistics on both
variables imply the significance of these parameters. Furthermore, the
coefficients on yield and income are both correctly (ie, positively) signed as
theory suggests. However, while the t-statistic suggests it is not significantly
different from zero, once again we are posed with a quandary by a negatively-
signed coefficient on the constant term.
9.4.3 Pension Fund Demand: British Government Securities
The evidence of Chapters Seven and Eight revealed the high degree of
importance of British government securities, or gilts, in the portfolio of the
United Kingdom pension funds. The combination of issuer and extreme ease
of marketability make these a virtually risk-free asset for their holder. Some
eighteen per cent of pension fund holdings were accounted for by gilts on
average, although the percentage of net acquisitions was somewhat higher but
vastly more variable. Thus, we would anticipate that the pension funds'
income would play a significant role in influencing their net acquisitions of
British government securities. The evidence of Chapters Seven and Eight
together with the econometric evidence earlier in this chapter suggested that
gilts were a "secondary asset" to the pension funds. Thus, the appropriate
measure of income which would influence net acquisitions would be residual
income. In the case of British government securities we established that
INCOME2 (= TOTAL - COMMON)—ie income after net acquisition of all
categories of ordinary shares—was the appropriate measure of residual
income. The inclusion of British government securities as a "secondary asset"
also implied that the yield-gap 25 would be an appropriate parameter, a finding
which was somewhat substantiated by the econometric evidence when
incorporating Index-Linked Treasury Stock as a component of gilts (G L2), but
not otherwise. We also saw that the gilts component of the pension funds'
portfolio was composed to a very large degree of long-term gilts. Chapter
Eight showed that the pension funds were a dominant force in the gilt-edged
markets, but not to as great an extent as the insurance companies. Thus, we
would expect new issues of gilts to have some bearing on the pension funds
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net acquisitions of gilts. Putting all of this together we estimate the pension
funds' demand for British government securities, and present the results in
Table 9-12.
Table 9-12: T he Demand for British Government Securities
Dependent	 NET	 OWN- YIELD-	 RESDUAL
constant
 
ISSUES YIELD	 GAP	 INCOME INCOME R2 DW
F-	 data
statistic period
corr.
R2
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES:
GILTS	 -81.4102 0.093674 -0.44493 0.317068 0.564 2.1158 37.0782 1963.1- 0.5535
(-1.7754) (2.3454) (-1.5337) (1.76) 1985.11
GM -33.4491 -0.01982 0.051567 0.1883 2.1454 10.0889 1963.1- 0.1788
(-1.8972) (-1.7759) (1.0895) 1985.11
GL -72.4814 6.0883 0.409978 0.3031 1.9185 18.9214 1963.1- 0.2949
(-0.6995) (0.555) (4.7694) 1985.11
GL2 -45.0541 -0.11824 0.596902 0.4012 2.0474 29.1398 1963.1- 0.3942
(-0.8801) (-0.3649) (4.3342) 1985.IV
ELTS -1562.48 0.032694 161.07 -0.013675 0.1958 1.3858 0.56826 1963.1- -0.206:
(-0.6732) (0.8689) (0.8097) (-0.0419) 1985W
COCHRANE-ORCUTT:
GILTS -81.4035 0.102222 -0.44185 0.294073 0.564 1.9907 36.6445 1963.1- 0.5534
(-1.8689) (2.5551) (-1.593) (1.6585) 1985.11
GM -33.719 -0.21328 0.042605 0.1928 2.0197 10.2727 1963.1- 0.1832
(-2.0439) (-2.0251) (0.9484) 1985.11
GL -73.0321 6.22959 0.487025 0.3021 2.0001 18.6176 1963.1- 0.2938
(-0.665) (0.542) (4.5811) 1985.11
GL2 -44.8236 -0.10836 0.602267 0.3993 2.0086 28.5816 1963.1- 0.3921
(-0.8842) (-0.3386) (4.418) 1985.IV
ILTS -1614.82 0.029519 148.624 0.190902 0.3524 1.6692 1.0882 1963.1- -0.079:
(-0.9428) (0.9616) (1.0106) (0.7266) 1985.1V
Perhaps the most striking feature of these equations is how much poorer
the results are than those we obtained for the demand for ordinary shares and
for land, property and ground rent. It is quite apparent that of the various
demand functions for British government securities, the best performance is
that of the demand for gilts in toto (G I LTS). For example, this is the only
equation that results with a corrected R 2 above 0.5. Nonetheless, the t-statistics
suggest that the only variable which is significant at all confidence levels is net
issues. When estimated by ordinary least squares, the coefficient on residual
income is significant at the 90% level, although not at any higher level.
However, there is some consolation in finding the coefficients correctly signed.
Finally, it should be noted that there are really nowhere near enough
observations to warrant comment on the equation for net acquisitions of
Index-Linked Treasury Stock (ILTS); these results have been included mostly
by way of record.
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Dependent	 OWN- YIELD-
Variable constant YIELD GAP
RESIDUAL
INCOME INCOME DW statistic period	 R2R2
F- data	 corr.
DEBS	 12.7244	 0.0760285
	
0.0415998
(0.989)
	 (1.1766)	 (3.3431)
9.4.4 Pension Fund Demand: Corporate Bonds
The nature of the pension funds' demand for corporate bonds-
debentures and preference shares-has proved rather elusive so far. The
evidence of Chapters Seven and Eight revealed that both debentures and
preference shares had declined dramatically as an investment instrument of
choice for the pension funds, accounting for less than five per cent of holdings
and net acquisitions in the 1980s; down from around twenty per cent in the
early 1960s. Some of this decline was due to the supply side of the market for
corporate bonds. This was confirmed by both F- and t-statistics suggesting that
the null hypothesis was not valid using issues as an argument in the demand
function, but only at the 90% level of confidence. When we considered the
impact of own-yield on net acquisition we were surprised to find the
coefficient negatively signed, but significant even at the 1% level. We
suggested earlier that this phenomenon might be as a result of the term
structure of interest rates (page 9-39), and this was borne out to some degree by
the regression of net acquisitions of bonds against the yield-gap.26 Residual
income did show some promise as a variable influencing the pension funds'
demand for corporate bonds. Regressing this demand against these combined
parameters gives us the results shown in Table 9-13.
Table 9-13: The Demand for Corporate Bonds (Debentures and
Preference Shares )
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES:
BONDS	 16.5679	 0.0064423
(4.51)	 (0.2759)
-0.009707
(-0.9784)
0.0438 0.9725 1.99189 1963.1- 0.0326
19851V
DEBS	 9.66851	 -0.052816
(1.6574)	 (-1.1979)
43.4054 -3.0325
(5.7336)	 (-3.9586)
-0.021885 0.0427
(-1.8191)
0.01216
(1.3476)
1.0196 1.71567 1963.1- 0.0299
19821V
0.1897 0.8879 9.01453 1963.1- 0.1789
19821V
PREFS	 -0.426125
(-0.6234)
-0.002035
(-0.394)
0.0026541
(1.8827)
0.1381 1.7093 6.17079 1963.1- 0.1266
1982IV
COCHRANE-ORCUTT:
BONDS
	 15.4653
(1.8323)
0.0685933
(1.9093)
0.0305744
(2.7684)
0.3701 2.5291 25.263 1963.1- 0.3626
19851V
46.1675 -3.71655
(3.4889)	 (-3.3121)
PREFS	 -0.521968	 -0.002465
(-0.8842)	 (-0.3386)
0.0285706
(2.7995)
0.0026268
(4.418)
0.4091 2.4844
0.4546 2.2164
0.1612 2.0471
26.3119 1963.1- 0.4011
19821V
31.6756 1963.1- 0.4472
19821V
7.3023 1963.1- 0.1499
1982.IV
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Once again we find all equations estimated by ordinary least squares to
be suffering, either from serial correlation of the error terms as indicated by the
Durbin-Watson statistic (DW), or from F-statistics which indicate that the null
hypothesis cannot be ruled out. However, re-estimation by the Cochrane-
Orcutt method gives us much improved results, with the exception of the
equation for net acquisition of preference shares (P RE FS). It is interesting to
note that in all of the equations for net acquisition of corporate bonds the
residual income variable is significant (as measured by the t-statistic) at the
99% level (at the 95% level for PREFS), giving credence to our hypothesis of a
sequential investment allocation procedure. Against this, however, the yield-
gap, while correctly signed, appears to be insignificant in both the debentures
(DEBS) and preference shares (P REFS) equations, yet is significant at the 95%
level in the aggregate corporate bonds (BONDS) equation. It is particularly
intriguing that the own-yield variable, while incorrectly signed, gives us
slightly better overall results, with higher R2s, F- and t-statistics. Of course,
this is not entirely surprising, as it tends to confirm our earlier findings. In
summary then, it would appear that residual income plays an important role in
determining the pension funds' demand for non-equity corporate securities
with all other variables still open to question. While the yield on debentures
plays a significant role in influencing the demand for debentures, the
relationship does appear to be paradoxical, the only possible explanation being
that we proffered earlier pertaining to the term structure of interest rates. It is
also intriguing to find the yield-gap as a significant parameter in the aggregate
(BONDS) equation, as it does not appear a significant influence on the demand
for either component. At this juncture the only explanation that comes to mind
is that the pension funds do not really consider debentures and preference
shares as separate portfolio categories. While this conveniently allows the
econometric results above to fit in with our hypothesis of a sequential
investment procedure, it does seem to be the case given the rather small (and
declining) role played by these assets in the portfolio of the United Kingdom
pension funds.
9.4.5 Pension Fund Demand: Overseas Assets
Elsewhere in this Thesis we have discussed the increasing importance of
the global financial community to the British economy and, in particular, the
pension funds. Indeed, as we saw, the pension funds have been among the
first and foremost British financial intermediaries to take advantage of the
increasing globalization of the world's capital markets. Nonetheless, while
there may be distinct advantages of higher return accruing to those who invest
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overseas, there is typically also extra risk to be incurred, both economic and
political. We have previously suggested that demand for overseas assets will
be determined by their relative risk-adjusted return vis-d-vis domestic assets
and, given that a large percentage of the pension funds overseas assets have
traditionally been dollar-denominated, we use the dollar exchange rate as a
proxy for this relative return. We have also established that overseas assets
seem to be considered "secondary assets" by the pension funds, thus a
measure of residual income (I N CO M E3) is utilised. Because our overseas
assets category includes overseas ordinary shares, our residual income
measure is adjusted accordingly. 27 The results of these estimations are
presented in Table 9-14.
Table 9-14: The Demand for Overseas Assets
Dependent
Variable	 constant
EXCHANGE RERDIAL
RATE	 INCOME
..,,
is'2 DW
F-	 data
statistic period
corr. R2
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES:
OVERSEAS	 -187.189	 53.1993
(-4.5735)	 (3.5276)
0.385874
(15.2494)
0.7895 1.0415 163.12 1963.1 -
1985.11
0.787
GOVOV	 6.5336 -3.09859 0.0109284 0.1831 1.4292 9.75228 1963.1 - 0.1735
(0.8604) (-1.1075) (2.3279) 1985.11
ORDOV	 -162.594 -17.1281 0.478318 0.568 1.0209 24.3283 1977.1- 0.5557
(-1.8424) (-0.6509) (6.5477) 19861V
LMOV	 -0.992963 2.20048 0.00016455 0.081 2.0957 1.63015 1977.1 - 0.0547
(-0.2364) (1.7571) (0.0473) 1986.1V
COCHRANE-ORCUTT:
OVERSEAS -120.281 31.1508 0.340869 0.8395 2.1489 224.832 1963.1 - 0.8376
(-2.1391) (1.4318) (10.4974) 1985.11
GOVOV	 13.3849 -5.36124 0.00619226 0.2535 1.8586 14.6053 1963.1 - 0.2446
(1.4143) (-1.5097) (1.0797) 1985.11
ORDOV	 -93.8406 -17.148 0.419081 0.6613 2.0621 35.1513 1977.1- 0.6513
(-0.9315) (-0.4047) (5.6603) 1986.1V
LMOV	 -0.675964 2.21982 -0.0001132 0.0859 2.0156 1.69217 1977.1- 0.059
(-0.1621) (1.8313) (-0.0327) 1986.IV
It is immediately noticeable that, while once again there is evidence of
autocorrelation in the ordinary least squares estimates, the Cochrane-Orcutt
estimates give us rather good results for the aggregate (OVERSEAS) and
overseas ordinary shares (ORDOV) equations. Indeed, the results for the
aggregate equation are particularly good: an F-statistic of 224.832 and
corrected R2 of 0.8376 suggest a high degree of significance and fit. The t-
statistics reveal that the coefficients on all the variables are significantly
different from zero, although the coefficient on the exchange rate is only
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significant up to the 90% level. Equally, the coefficients are all correctly signed
as expected, a priori. The next best equation in terms of overall performance is
that for net acquisition of overseas ordinary shares. As we saw in earlier
chapters, particularly during the 1980s, these have accounted for a steadily
increasing percentage of the pension funds' portfolio, both in holdings and net
acquisition terms. Once again, there is a fairly high degree of "goodness of fit"
as indicated by an R2
 of 0.6613, while the F-statistic (35.1513) suggests that the
null hypothesis should be rejected. However, the t-statistics suggest that only
the coefficient on the residual income variable is significantly different from
zero, and we also note that the coefficient on the exchange rate is signed
differently than we would expect a priori.
The equations estimating net acquisition of overseas government
securities (G OVOV) and overseas loans and mortgages (LMOV) typically
perform less well. In terms of the F-statistic we can reject the null hypothesis
for the former equation, but not for the latter. In fact, the equation for net
acquisitions of overseas loans and mortgages can best be described as
performing abysmally! However, in view of the remarkably small fraction of
the pension funds' portfolio for which it accounts, this cannot be entirely
surprising. Perhaps some more eclectic choices of independent variable are
appropriate. As with the overseas ordinary shares equation, the exchange rate
variable in the overseas government securities equation appears to be
"incorrectly" signed; it is also only significant up to the 90% level.
Nonetheless, in light of the fact that these securities also occupy only a small
fraction of the pension funds' portfolio these results are not too disheartening.
9.4.6 Pension Fund Demand: Loans and Mortgages
Like many of the assets comprising the "overseas assets" category, loans
and mortgages can be considered as a minority investment in the pension
funds' portfolio because of the small percentage for which it accounts. Indeed,
this percentage has been declining over much of the data period. In Chapter
Seven we saw that one of the major reasons for this was because of the high
marketability risk involved due to the lack of a well-established secondary
market. Because the concepts of "new issues" and "own-yield" are somewhat
amorphous to this particular asset category, it is best to concentrate on the
impact of income on the demand for loans and mortgages. (Results of these
estimations have already been presented in Table 9-7 and 9-8.) What we
discovered was an equation with a rather poor fit (R2 = 0.1734), but with an F-
statistic (14.2649) that suggested the null hypothesis be rejected. The t-statistics
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indicated that both the constant and residual income (INCOME2) were
significant arguments in the demand function. However, it should be noted
that the coefficient on residual income was negatively signed, suggesting that
loans and mortgages are an inferior asset in the pension funds' portfolio.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have made a first attempt at constructing an
econometric model of the pension funds' investment behaviour. We have
eschewed the more rigorous approach adopted by the "Essex School" in order
to test the hypothesis that the pension funds adopt a sequential approach to
their allocation of funds to the various categories of investment media. This
was not an easy choice to make in view of the widespread popularity of the
"Essex School" approach, particularly in studies undertaken in the United
States. Nonetheless, while it cannot be denied that this approach is more
rigorous in terms of its theoretical underpinning, it does appear to suffer from
several shortcomings. First and foremost, it needs to be recognised that the
theoretical background of the "Essex School" is essentially neoclassical
microeconomics. Thus, such an approach is implicitly based on the view that
the financial system consists of perfect capital markets, where all participants
are price-takers, and that all investment decisions can be regarded as if they
were made simultaneously. In other words, the "Essex School" approach is
implicitly embedded in the general equilibrium world of Arrow-Debreu-Hahn-
McKenzie. The evidence of Chapters Seven and Eight have shown us that in
many of the United Kingdom's capital markets the pension funds are not price-
takers, and so the "Essex School" approach may not be valid. Furthermore,
while that approach may still be favoured by so-called 'purists' within the
Economics profession, it is also at odds with reality as described by both
financial economists, such as Professor Revell, and practitioners, such as we
saw in the evidence presented to the Wilson Committee and the writings of
actuaries and other pension fund advisers. These people constantly and
consistently offered the opinion that the pension funds adopted a sequential
strategic investment procedure. And that is what we have attempted to model
in this chapter.
Perhaps the most significant factor to come to light during our
estimations was the overall dominance of the various income variables as a
demand parameter. As we suggested earlier in this chapter, it is more common
for some measure of yield to be considered the major influence on demand for
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a financial asset, yet we would argue that in cases where the investor exhibits
dominance in so many financial markets it is apparent that yield must play a
secondary role. Certainly this is what we found in the equations for net
acquisition of those assets we categorised as "primary assets". It was also
pleasing to find that our various measures of residual income typically
performed better than total income in the equations for net acquisition of those
assets we categorised as "secondary assets"; this offered evidence towards the
sequential investment hypothesis. Against this, the evidence from using yield-
gaps rather than own-yields remains somewhat inconclusive. Finally, it was
also pleasing to find new issues to be a significant argument in those equations
for assets in which markets the pension funds had been found to exhibit
dominance in Chapter Eight. This significance, combined with the secondary
nature of yield as a parameter, suggests that the pension funds are aware of the
dominant role they play in the United Kingdom's capital markets, and act
accordingly. As a first step in modelling the investment behaviour of the
United Kingdom pension funds we believe these are significant findings.
Chapter Nine Endnotes
1 We have seen both approaches used to model the investment behaviour of British financial
intermediaries in Chapter Six. The industry-level, or "macro", approach is that adopted by
what we have referred to as the "Sheffield School" models. The "Essex School" models,
however, characteristically begin with the "micro" approach by constructing a model of the
behaviour of the typical individual intermediary (analogous to Marshall's "representative
firm"), which is then aggregated to produce a "macro" model that can be tested using
aggregate data.
2 This was particularly the case with the Essex School models. In Chapter Six we also
reviewed the critique of imposing (eg) cross-equation restrictions by authors such as V. Vance
Roley (1983).
3 While this can be confirmed by a glance at any text on international economics, a
particularly good example is Heller (1974).
4 We considered the issue of market dominance by the pension funds throughout Chapter
Eight.
5 See Chapter Three for an historical perspective, and Chapter Four for a review of the
current position regarding the inflation-proofing of pension benefits.
6 Of course, the periodic returns on ordinary shares—dividends—are uncertain by nature.
However, the overall return on ordinary shares—dividends plus capital gains/losses-
generally mirrors the rate of inflation because the prices of most shares tend to move with the
general price level of the economy. The same is also true of property. Thus, equities offer a
better hedge against inflation than most fixed-interest securities. They, therefore, offer the
pension funds a fine investment vehicle for maintaining their ability to meet liabilities whose
value depends on the general level of prices.
7 See, for example, J. L. Carr's "Yield Difficulties and Inflation, 1960-74", Investment Analyst,
September 1975, pages 30-35. Many analysts have suggested that the existence of a reverse
yield gap indicates that investors believe that they incur less risk (in terms of movements in
profits and stock market values) from holding ordinary shares than by holding fixed-interest
securities.
8 The evidence presented to the Wilson Committee seems to suggest that the pension funds
are interested in growth.
9 We have already discussed extensively the similarities and differences between the
pension funds and insurance companies. The similar nature of their liabilities indicates a high
degree of likelihood that their objectives will also be similar.
10 This approach has been put forward by a number of well-known authors, from Irving
Fisher to J. M. Keynes.
11 A fuller discussion of this approach is to be found in Dodds (1979, pages 93-96).
12 See, for example, Clayton, Dodds, Driscoll and Ford (1973).
13 In some cases the period used for estimation is smaller because of the lack of published
data. In some cases this is due to the publisher, while in others it is because (eg) the asset has
not been in existence for very long. Index-Linked Treasury Stock provides a good example of
the latter case; we cannot estimate the demand for Index-Linked Treasury Stock before it came
into being towards the end of 1982.
14 As we have pointed out before, for most contributors there is little choice in the allocation
of their funds for pensions. Even in the area of discretionary allocation of monies the
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individual has little choice. While recent legislation has made the possibility of non-pension
fund issued individual retirement accounts (similar to the set-up in the United States), this
does not yet appear to have made any significant difference to the British financial scene.
Indeed, it could probably be argued that the majority of the great British public are either
unaware or simply do not care that such possibilities exist, although more recently the
situation has begun to change with greater mass media advertising by the financial
institutions.
15 There are other reasons as well as dominance that can account for portfolios in
disequilibrium. These include all of the various market frictions, such as transactions costs, etc.
Such disequilibrium can be modelled by use of stock adjustment mechanisms, such as that we
have already seen, which has the elegance of being able to to be included by way of a lagged
dependent variable.
16 For the purpose of comparison with the analysis in Chapter Eight we have performed
these estimations for the pension funds both on aggregate and as separate sectors. For the
remainder of this Chapter we shall be estimating for the pension funds in toto based on our
earlier observations.
17 See Chapter Eight.
18 Given that there is only a single independent variable, there is little point in making
reference to the F-statistic as well as the t-statistic. We have chosen to concentrate here on the
latter measure.
19 D. Cochrane and G. H. Orcutt (1949), "Application of Least Squares Regressions to
Relationships Containing Autocorrelated Error Terms", Journal of the American Statistical
Association, volume 44, pages 32-61. We have adopted this particular method due to its ease of
use within the TSP package available at several installations in both the United Kingdom and
the United States.
20 Financial theory would suggest that there is some connection between each of these
variables in addition to their connection to the price of ordinary shares. For example, via the
"dividend growth model" there is a connection between the dividend rate (DIVORD) and the
price of stock; a company's earnings (ENORD) will influence demand for a given stock, and
therefore its price; the Financial Times index reflects the (weighted) average price of stock in the
United Kingdom. While these are all a priori valid proxies for the own-price or yield on
ordinary shares, there is also the possibility of multicollinearity occurring when all three are
used as regressors in the same equation.
21 After all, as we have seen in Chapter Seven in particular, even if the real rate of interest is
negative during periods of economic uncertainty, it will still be a certain return that will allow
investors to minimise their losses, unlike the uncertain return available on (eg) ordinary shares.
21A The House Price Index (HPI63) is used as a proxy for the yield on land, property and
ground rent in the same manner as (eg) the Financial Times Index is used as proxy for the yield
on ordinary shares. Its use is further justified because of relationships between the
components, land, property and ground rent; house prices are determined in part by the price
of land and are, in turn, significant in determining the value of rent. Additionally, possible
capital gains/losses are best proxied in terms of a price variable. Thus, while choice of HPI63
is partly determined by pragmatism (data availability), its choice is also sound on economic
grounds.
22 cIL
 = 1.53 < 1.577 < 1.60 = du.
22A A number of reasons may be cited for use of the dollar exchange rate as a proxy for the
yield on overseas assets. Firstly, despite limited data availability, there is evidence—both
anecdotal and in reports to government committees, Commissions, etc.)—to suggest that the
major pension funds' overseas purchases are in the United States or are dollar-denominated.
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(See also page 419). With similar real yields available on U.S. and U.K. financial assets over
much of the data-period, the attraction of overseas assets can be seen as due to gains resulting
from exchange rate movements (in addition to the advantages of geographical portfolio
diversification). Additionally, the dollar exchange rate tends to strengthen as does the U.S.
economy ceteris paribus,. And, as a strong economy typically reflects a strong performance by
its firms, the exchange rate can be seen as a reasonable proxy for returns available as a result of
the strength of the U.S. economy.
23 In fact, Dodds makes use of several possible yield-gaps in his studies on the investment
behaviour of British life insurance companies. Thus, in his 1979 book, The Investment Behaviour
of British Life Insurance Companies, Dodds considers both long-term gilts and two proxies for
ordinary shares (dividend yield and earnings yield) before settling on long-term gilts as his
primary security.
24 This, according to Professor Revell (1973, page 439), as quoted on page 9-12.
25 It will be recalled that the appropriate yield-gap for both long-term and aggregated gilts
was that between the yield on long-term gilts and the Financial Times Index (RGL - FTINDEX).
For gilts of shorter term to maturity the own-yield was substituted for RGL.
26 The yield gap was that between the yield on debentures and the Financial Times Index
(RDEBS - FTINDEX).
27 In our earlier equations we used INCOME2 as our residual income proxy. This variable
measured the pension funds' incoming funds after investment in both domestic and overseas
ordinary shares. Here we make use of INCOME3= TOTAL - ORDH, which measures incoming
funds after investment in domestic ordinary shares only.
Chaptar Ten: Conclusion and AfterThoughts
10.1 Introduction
Throughout this Thesis we have examined the nature and role of the
pension funds in the United Kingdom, in theory and in practice, from within
and without, and from a contemporary and historical perspective. To a very
large degree each chapter of this work forms a complete study of its own, yet
this group of broad surveys was entirely appropriate for giving us the
necessary insight into the behaviour of the pension funds and their operational
environment that a study of this nature demands. Thus, in our earlier
chapters—particularly Chapters One to Four—we examined the institutional
context of British pension fund behaviour. The middle chapters—Five and
Six—constitute surveys of the literature on investment portfolio theory and
theoretical and empirical studies of British financial intermediation. Finally,
the remaining chapters—Seven through Nine—offer us an empirical view of
the U. K. pension funds' behaviour over the period 1963 - 1985. In particular,
in Chapter Nine we have endeavoured to draw together the salient features
from earlier chapters in order to attempt to model the investment behaviour of
the United Kingdom pension funds. In this final chapter we shall look back at
what we have learned from the research we have undertaken, consider the
implications, and make suggestions for further research in the area.
10.2 Insights
In what might be regarded as the first section of this Thesis—Chapters Two
through Four—we examined the growth and development of pension funds in
the United Kingdom from a number of perspectives. Each of these chapters
were an attempt to gain some insight into the institutional environment within
which the pension funds operate, as well as to examine the nature of the
pension funds as an institution per se. We considered this to be important for a
number of associated reasons. Firstly, it is one area which is usually neglected
in the literature; in most of the studies of British financial intermediaries that
we examined in Chapter Six, little or no account is taken of the background to
their operations. Secondly, and by way of corollary, the pension funds do not
operate in a vacuum; they must act within a set of constraints imposed by the
nature of the markets in which they choose to operate as well as by
(government) regulation. As we have seen, these constraints can vary from
direct government regulation to the self-regulation within a particular market
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to behavioural constraints brought on by political or public opinion
considerations. To consider the operations of the pension funds without first
examining their environment would be analogous to examining the operations
of a firm without regard to its market structure, for example. Thus, in Chapter
Two we concentrated on pension funds as one amongst a group of financial
intermediaries.
By a theoretical exposition of the role played by financial intermediaries we
were able to discern the similarities between the operations of the pension
funds and those of other financial intermediaries. Because we followed a
schematic historical approach we were also able to distinguish how the
differing forms of financial intermediary developed in response to a particular
need of society over a given period of time. By this approach we were able to
examine the differences that exist between the different forms of financial
intermediary, which manifest themselves primarily through an intermediary's
sources and uses of funds. In consequence we were able to consider the
various alternative methods by which a pension fund might be financed, and
evaluate that method which was ultimately adopted by the pension funds in
the United Kingdom. We saw that the British pension funds were investment
funded, unlike their counterparts in continental Europe where, for example, the
West Germans prefer book funding and the French have adopted Pay-As-You-
Go.
In Chapter Three we continued our examination of the nature and role of
the pension fund via a historical view of their growth and development in the
United Kingdom. In particular, we were able to see how this had been spurred
on by two major factors. Firstly, we saw that over the long run of history (at
least since Mediaeval times) there has been an increasing proportion of the
population accounted for by the elderly. This appears to have been at an ever-
increasing rate during the Twentieth Century! Secondly, despite the occasional
'step backward', the march of history has been one of inexorably increasing
levels of economic activity and therefore higher standards of living for society
as a whole. Taken together we can see that there has been both an increasing
demand for economic welfare for the elderly as well as an increasing supply of
wealth with which to supply those needs. Thus we were able to discern the
march towards the universal provision of pensions as one part of the "welfare
state" that have become commonplace in most developed economies in the
second half of the Twentieth Century. It was also apparent that the growth and
development of pension funds in the private sector was largely spurred on by
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earlier developments in the public sector. It is the opinion of this author that
this is one illustration of "market failure" due to high transactions and
information costs (in particular), whereby government provision acts as an
impetus to private sector provision of a particular good, albeit with a lag.1
By examining in Chapter Three some of the more important legislative
actions behind the increasing provision of pensions in Twentieth Century
Britain, we were then in a position to consider the major elements of the current
legal environment within which the pension funds operate. Despite the
passage of more than a decade and a change from a Labour to a Conservative
government that professed itself to be radical and "free-market-oriented", there
has been relatively little change to the provisions of the 1975 Social Security
Pensions Act, more commonly referred to as the "Castle scheme". The major
objective of the Castle scheme was to provide an integrated system within
which the provision of pensions by the private and public sectors would
peacefully coexist and still universally offer a pension to all citizens so that they
might live out their twilight years with some dignity regardless of their
economic or social standing. There can be no doubt that, while the current
system is not perfect, it has largely achieved the goals it set for itself, and is a
definite improvement over earlier regimes in that respect.
Thus, in the first section we were able to ascertain the historical
development and nature of the pension funds in the United Kingdom and the
institutional environment within which they operate. We were thereby able to
deduce the objectives of pension fund behaviour, particularly on the
investment side, as well as the constraints which limit their actions.
In the second section of this Thesis—Chapters Five and Six—we conducted
two surveys of the literature that might have provided us with some insight
into the pension funds' investment behaviour. In Chapter Five we examined
the 'pure' theory of portfolio selection with two thoughts in mind. Firstly, in
the hope that it might shed some light on the motivations underlying the
investment behaviour of the pension funds in the United Kingdom. And
secondly, because an understanding of portfolio theory was considered
necessary as a prerequisite for surveying the literature examining the
investment behaviour of various types of British financial intermediary. In
common with the approach taken in previous chapters, the literature on
portfolio selection was examined chronologically.
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In Chapter Six we examined the literature on the investment behaviour of
British financial intermediaries in light of the knowledge gained from the
previous chapter on portfolio theory. In this chapter, rather than adopt an
historical approach, we reviewed the literature by the type of intermediary
with which any given paper was concerned. Most of the major intermediaries
in the British economy were considered in the anticipation that both differences
from and similarities to the pension funds would lead to some insight into the
kind of model best suited to examining the pension funds' investment
behaviour. It was immediately apparent that in almost all cases considered
little or no use was made of the kind of portfolio theory we examined in
Chapter Five. Indeed, most of the models of financial intermediary behaviour
appeared to be much closer to the more 'traditional' models of orthodox
demand theory.
For the most part we found that works on British financial intermediary
investment behaviour could be divided into two "schools of thought". The
"Essex school", as exemplified by various works from the pen of Michael
Parkin (often co-authored) take the maximisation of an expected utility
function as their theoretically rigorous starting point. From this a set of
reduced form equations for the demand for a given asset category is estimated,
with the relative rates of return on the feasible asset set as the major arguments.
The "Sheffield school" commences from a less theoretically rigorous
foundation, yet one which is much more obviously a reflection of 'real world'
observation, with the intermediary's environment taken into consideration (for
example). Here the maximisation of expected utility or of expected net revenue
is considered to be the intermediary's objective. A set of demand equations
based on these real world observations is estimated. One of the major
differences between the two approaches we found was that "Essex school"
models typically had various cross-equation restrictions imposed to facilitate
the estimation process. Yet it seemed to be the case that these restrictions
detracted from the model's reliability as a reflection of the observed behaviour
of the intermediaries examined. Nonetheless, in the case of both schools of
thought similar reduced from equations were obtained, with marginally better
results on average under the Sheffield approach.
In the third section of the Thesis—Chapters Seven through Nine—we
commenced our empirical appraisal of the behaviour of pension funds in the
United Kingdom between 1963 and 1985. In Chapter Seven we examined the
flow of funds through the pension funds in order to gain some insight into
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their behaviour that might help with the modelling process to be undertaken in
Chapter Nine. The sources of funds were readily pinpointed, coming
predominantly in equal proportion from investment income and employers
contributions (thus enhancing the view that pensions are somehow "deferred
wages"). This (approximate) equivalence of investment income and
contributions income suggests quite strongly that these are indeed mature
funds.2
 The data in Table 7-1 also confirmed the view that the U. K. pension
funds do indeed operate as trust funds, with surpluses of income over
expenditure being invested for the provision of future pensions. The only
exception to this general rule seemed to be during 1982, when employers were
asked for "additional contributions" to top up the funds at a time when they
were considered to be somewhat underfunded, probably due to the prevailing
recession.
We established that the private sector funds are the largest component of
the U. K. pension funds, accounting for at least fifty per cent, whether
measured by total holdings or by net acquisitions of assets. The Local
Authority funds were the smallest component, accounting for not less than ten
per cent of all pension fund holdings or net acquisitions. Other public sector
funds were found to hold between twenty per cent and one-third of all pension
fund holdings. It seemed to be the case that the administrative costs of the
pension funds were minimal, accounting for less than two per cent of income.
However, the funds in the public sector appeared prone to higher
administrative costs than those in the private sector. We also ventured the
opinion that, based on a priori evidence, there were economies of scale in the
administrative costs of the U. K. pension funds.
Following a survey of asset characteristics and relationships we were able to
argue against using the Essex school approach, largely on the grounds that it
meant the imposition of a cross-equation symmetry restriction that seemed at
odds with both theoretical and empirical findings. We then delineated the
asset categories with which we were concerned. While these may well have
been the categories we would have selected ourselves in a situation of complete
freedom of choice, the asset categories were in fact selected because they are
the categories in which pension fund data are published by the government
statistician at the Central Statistical Office.
Consideration of the trends in U. K. pension fund investment revealed a
number of striking features. First, we found a high degree of similarity
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between the investment behaviour of the three pension fund sectors—private,
Local Authority, and other public sector. One possible inference that might be
made is that, unlike administrative costs, the pension funds find few economies
of scale (if any) in their investment activities. Given that even the smallest of
the U. K. pension funds has substantial monies available for investment, this is
hardly surprising. Second, the pension funds increased their holdings of short-
term assets in both absolute and percentage of portfolio terms during periods
of recession, an increase that was more pronounced in the public and Local
Authority funds than those in the private sector. Thirdly, the assets whose
holdings exhibited the most growth were unit trust units and overseas
government securities, possibly due to their increased availability over the data
period.
It was readily apparent that the most popular asset with the pension funds
was ordinary shares, accounting for over fifty per cent of the holdings'
portfolio. The only other assets that occupy a highly significant proportion of
the pension funds' portfolio are British government securities (fifteen to twenty
per cent) and land, property and ground rent (ten per cent). All other assets
account for rather minimal and declining percentages of the pension funds'
portfolio, with rather noticeable declines in loans and mortgages and fixed-
interest corporate securities (debentures and preference shares).
In terms of the pension funds holdings of British government securities we
saw an increasing preference for the long- and medium-term gilts over the
short-term variety. This changing maturity preference was substantiated by
the net acquisitions data. Overall it seemed that British government securities
were (if at all) only poor substitutes for ordinary shares, whereas land,
property and ground rent exhibited a high degree of substitutability with
ordinary shares. The only asset that showed a high degree of complementarity
with ordinary shares were unit trust units. The apparent predilection of the
pension funds for ordinary shares, British government securities and land,
property and ground rent also manifested itself in the immensely stable net
acquisitions of these assets over time. We suggested that this stability reflected
the long-term view adopted by the pension funds in their investment strategy,
largely in response to the long-term nature of their liabilities, but also because
these three asset groups tended to exhibit less risk over time. Finally, the
analysis in Chapter Seven suggested that the U. K. pension funds, while
trading actively in a large number of financial markets, typically are pursuing a
"buy and hold" investment strategy.
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In Chapter Eight we examined the role played by the U. K. pension funds in
the capital markets of the United Kingdom. While traditional portfolio theory
is typically based on the assumption that the investor is a price-taker, the size
of pension fund holdings and net acquisitions suggested that this is not the
case for the pension funds. Thus, we needed to examine the degree of
monopsony exhibited in the markets for various financial assets by the pension
funds, largely to establish if their investment behaviour would be constrained
by "supply-side limitations". Our investigation of possible market dominance
was conducted by looking at holdings, net acquisitions and trading (purchases
and sales). Our investigation led us to some surprising results. For example,
while the pension funds have substantial investments in ordinary shares,
British government securities, and land, property and ground rent, we only
found them to be the dominant investor in the market for ordinary shares. In
the markets for land, property and ground rent and for British government
securities, while the pension funds could be regarded as a highly significant
investor whose actions would likely influence price, they were not the
dominant investor, that accolade belonging to the insurance companies. The
same result was obtained in the markets for corporate fixed-interest securities
(debentures and preference shares). In the markets for both local authority
securities and loans and mortgages we found the pension funds to be a non-
dominant participant, with the building societies being the dominant investor.
Finally, while we were not able to establish dominance as such, we did find the
pension funds to be the most significant British investor in overseas assets,
particularly overseas ordinary shares.
In Chapter Nine we attempted to bring together the salient features of the
information gleaned from the surveys and analyses undertaken in earlier
chapters to commence construction of a model of the investment behaviour of
the U. K. pension funds. Based on the evidence of (especially) Chapters Six and
Eight we chose to adopt an aggregative or "macro" approach, rather than
follow the "Essex School" and build up from a theoretically rigorous but
empirically false set of behavioural equations for the individual pension fund.
One major reason for adopting this approach was due to the empirical
evidence of Chapters Seven and Eight, which implied that there is a sequential
decision-making procedure (the "Essex School" approach quite strongly
suggests that investment decisions are simultaneous). In this we were
following such as H. I. Ansoff (1965) who argued that the investment decision
is split into a hierarchy of strategic decisions—ie, those between the different
categories of asset—and tactical decisions—choosing the asset mix within a
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particular asset group. We found this approach by the pension funds to have
empirical support in the evidence presented to the Wilson Committee (1980).
The notion of a sequential decision-making process is also consistent with the
objective usually ascribed to pension funds, such as by Professor Revell:
...pension funds aim to maximise the expected return on their assets, subject to the
need for diversifying the portfolio to reduce risk.	 (1973, page 439)
The reduction of risk can be seen to occur in two ways: firstly, by allocation of
monies to different categories of financial (and other) assets, such as fixed-
interest, equities, and so on; secondly, by appropriate diversification within a
particular asset category according to the principles first established by Harry
Markowitz. Given that the pension funds must pursue their objective with a
view to matching their liabilities, the risk-reduction element could also
incorporated into the construction of a "target rate of return". Such a view
seemed to underlay the pension funds' apparent strong propensity for
securities that showed long-term capital growth and stable income, such as
ordinary shares.
It was also found to be the case that the availability of stock within a given
asset category played a primary role in the strategic decision-making process,
with the supply constraint playing a larger rOle for asset markets in which the
pension funds are a dominant force, and also where there exists a well-
established formal primary market.
With these thoughts (in particular) in mind, we set out to construct a simple
model of U. K. pension fund investment behaviour. We commenced by
examining the various factors that had emerged in earlier chapters as
significant on the demand for the different asset categories, prior to combining
their influence in a series of demand equations that reflected the sequential
decision-making process. Perhaps the most significant finding to emerge from
our estimations was the overall dominance of the various income variables as a
demand parameter, a dominance that was particularly noticeable in the
equations for net acquisition of "primary assets". This was in contrast to the
usual financial literature, where it is common for yield to be the major
influence on demand. We suggested that in cases where the investor exhibits
dominance in so many financial markets it is apparent that yield is likely to
play a secondary role. We also found that the various measures of residual
income typically performed better than total income in the equations for net
acquisition of "secondary assets", offering evidence in favour of the sequential
investment hypothesis.
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On the negative side, the evidence from using yield-gaps rather than own-
yields was somewhat inconclusive. New issues were found to be a significant
argument in those equations for assets in which markets the pension funds had
been found to exhibit dominance in Chapter Eight. We argued that this
significance, together with the secondary role played by yield indicates that the
pension funds are aware of the dominant role they play in the United
Kingdom's capital markets, and act accordingly.
To summarise, we had hypothesised that the pension funds, being
dominant long-term investors in many of the United Kingdom's capital
markets, would adopt a sequential investment procedure with little concern for
yield as a major influence on their behaviour. The evidence from our simple
model appeared to strongly confirm our hypothesis. As a first step in
modelling the investment behaviour of the United Kingdom pension funds we
believe our findings to be significant.
10.3 AfterTho ugh ts
A study as broad as this has the potential to lead the author down many
different channels if he does not remain alert to the original task in hand. We
set out to examine the economics of the United Kingdom pension funds with a
view ultimately to constructing a model of their investment behaviour. Along
the way a number of questions and issues arose which were simply beyond the
scope of this work to cover, but we believe this work offers a good first step in
the direction of their solution.
The model we have constructed here could be construed as simple, and yet
it seems to offer a reasonable explanation of the behaviour of the pension
funds. Nonetheless, there are a number of areas in which this research might
be taken further. For example, the explicit inclusion of expectations might
serve to strengthen the model, although our preliminary estimates (which do
not appear here3) suggest otherwise. We believe that the appropriate way to
include expectations is not via the yield parameter, but as expected income or
perhaps even as expected net issues of the primary assets. The model would
also benefit if data on issues of various types of financial asset on a global basis
to examine the degree to which the U. K. pension funds 'dominate' the world's
financial markets. In these days of increasing globalization of the international
financial scene this would seem a fruitful exercise.
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The fact that the pension funds were dominant in many financial markets
has both political and economic ramifications that we were unable to
investigate here. The political ramifications, with particular reference to the
control aspects of pension fund investment in ordinary shares, have been
considered by (eg) Peter Drucker (1976) for the United States and Richard
Minns (1980) for the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, given the ever-increasing
relative importance of ordinary shares in the corporate fund-raising arsenal this
is an area that requires further attention of a contemporary nature. On the
economic side, in this study we have concentrated on the influence of yield on
the pension funds' demand, yet given their dominance this influence must also
run in the opposite direction. That is to say, that the actions of the pension
funds (and other dominant investors) will likely influence the price and hence
the yield of various financial assets. There have been several commentators
who have ascribed the bull markets of the 1980s, and the various 'meltdowns'
of October 1987, to the institutional investors, such as the pension funds.
Indeed, the pension funds' influence in the market for government securities
could have a profound effect on the conduct of government policy. Yet there
would appear to have been very few (if any) studies that examine these
implications. Perhaps our simple model could be put to use in a study of the
impact of the pension funds on the financial markets, or even the
macroeconomy.
In Britain there have been times, usually during severe recessions, when
there has been a public outcry because the pension funds appear to have such
huge sums invested overseas. The argument is usually couched that these
funds could (and should) have been employed in the United Kingdom to build
up the capital base, eg, in manufacturing. The counter-argument runs that the
members of the fund are better served if monies flow to where they will receive
the best return. If the monies were invested in the U. K. at a lower return it
might be necessary to raise contributions or lower pension payments, thus
making members worse off, and perhaps reducing national aggregate demand
in the process. Nonetheless, despite the vigour with which the various
debaters pursue their points, very little solid evidence seems to be on offer on
either side. Some quality research here would serve as a sublime substitute for
the rhetoric that has dominated thus far.
Finally, it should be remembered that the pension funds exist to provide
their members with a stable income during their retirement years. One thought
that has come to mind during this study is that the growth of the pension funds
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has coincided with the post-War diminution of the business cycle, and leads
one to ponder if perhaps there is some connection.
Chapter Ten Endnotas
1 The public provision of welfare services such as pensions appears to provide information
to the public that would otherwise be so costly as to virtually be unobtainable. Thus, public
provision of such goods acts over time to lower information costs to a large enough degree that
private provision eventually becomes feasible. One parallel to this lies with the origins of
coinage. Before coinage, specie was used as a medium of exchange, but it possessed high
information costs as it needed to be both weighed and assayed before a trade could occur.
Coinage, including the stamp of the monarch to attest to a metallic disc's quantity and quality,
brought about a major reduction in the information costs, leading to the eventual displacement
of a barter economy by a monetary economy. A similar parallel can be found with the
replacement of commodity money, such as specie, with paper money.
2 In a less mature fund the majority of the income would have to be by way of contributions.
It is only after a fund has been successfully established, with interest and dividend reinvested,
that the investment income will become sizable.
3 We believe that the inclusion of expected yields serves no real purpose for the pension
funds for a couple of related reasons. Firstly, as our estimations revealed, yield is of minor
importance in determining the demand for a particular asset by the pension funds. Secondly,
because the pension funds face liabilities that are particularly long-term in nature, their
investments are also particularly long-term. Were the pension funds to truly consider expected
yields, they would need to estimate the expected yields over this particularly long-term
horizon. Yet as we know, the future is uncertain, and becomes increasingly more uncertain the
farther into the future one looks. Thus, any attempts to calculate expected yields over such a
long horizon would be virtually futile. Keynes' comment on uncertainty (quote d in Chapter
Six) is particularly sagacious here.
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